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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY WHITE PAPERS – VALUABLE GUIDING DOCUMENTS OR ASTUTE DOMESTIC POLITICS?

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ABSTRACT

The generation of Canadian foreign policy and the conduct of its foreign relations is indeed unique. From its inception as a nation until the Second World War, its foreign policy was either directly controlled by, or in later years, greatly influenced by Britain. As such, the British idea of a foreign policy white paper and the process required to write it, has become an important tool used by Canadian governments to develop and then promulgate their foreign policy plans. From 1968 to 2005, four Canadian governments completed the lengthy process of writing a foreign policy white paper. The only long serving government, since 1968, to forgo the writing of one is the Harper government. This paper, using the history of the Canadian policy making process from 1970's *Foreign Policy for Canadians* to 2003's *International Policy Statement :A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, as its analytical framework, examines whether the current government's lack of a foreign policy white paper has impeded the actual conduct of its day-to-day foreign relations. It will conclude that the impact of the lack of a white paper has been minimal, at most. It will also suggest that the process of composing a foreign policy white paper in Canada is therefore just as much a tool to shape domestic politics as it is a necessary step in the determination of Ottawa's conduct on the world stage.

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INTRODUCTION

“Ask me at the end of the year and when I look back at what Canada has done, I’ll tell you what our foreign policy is”

- Lester Pearson when asked to define Canadian foreign policy¹

Question: What is white and black but seldom red (read)?

Answer: A white paper.

- Anonymous

The exertion of foreign policy has always been a perplexing issue for Canada.

From the time of the nation’s birth in 1867 until the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the British government had official control over Canadian external relations.

Even then as Ottawa came to acquire the necessary legislative and constitutional capacity to conduct its own foreign policy, Canadian governments continued to look to London for leadership in international affairs.

Indeed, it was not until 1943 that the Department of External Affairs, in the form of the Post-Hostilities Planning Committees, was tasked by the Canadian government to assess the post-war international situation and to envision a legitimate role for Canada within it.² As a result, when the Second World War ended in 1945, Canada – a state which then controlled the world’s third largest navy, fourth largest air force and an army of six divisions - had finally begun to fashion and implement an independent foreign

¹Allan Gotlieb, “Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy.” Paper presented at C.D. Howe Institute Benefactor’s Lecture (Toronto, November 03 2004), 31.

²Don Mutton and Don Page, “Planning in the East Block: The Post-Hostilities Problems Committees in Canada 1943-5,” *International Journal*, Vol 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1977): 691,695-699; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40201593>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2011.

policy.³ Even at this juncture, however, rather than seeking to effect change on their own, Canadian governments strove to act primarily as a ‘linchpin’ between the United States (US) and Britain in the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ while also seeking to develop and support international, multilateral enterprises and bilateral arrangements with the US.

In September 1946, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, who had served as his own Secretary of State for External Affairs for twenty years, appointed Louis St. Laurent to this most important position. Just four months later, in January 1947, St. Laurent delivered the Gray Memorial Lecture, “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs,” at the University of Toronto. His address was effectively the 1940’s equivalent of a foreign policy white paper for Canada. In it, he gave voice to the five basic principles that would remain vitally important to Canadian foreign policy, regardless of which political party governed the country, for the next sixty years: the unity of the Canadian nation could not be threatened by foreign policy; political liberty, as expressed by voters within a country and then among countries internationally, had to be nurtured and protected; the rule of law, as developed through an international code of law, had to be supported; human values ought to influence how Canada as nation conducted its foreign policy; and Canada had to express a willingness to accept international responsibilities within a stable global governance system.⁴

Succeeding Canadian governments later used white papers to re-articulate these same principles to the Canadian electorate. Indeed, since 1968, every Canadian federal

³David Pratt, “The Ross Ellis Memorial Lecture: Is There a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, (March 2008), 22.

⁴Louis St. Laurent, “The Foundations of Canadian Foreign Policy in World Affairs,” *Duncan and John Gray Memorial Lecture* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 13 January, 1947), 23-25.

government that has been in power long enough to complete the lengthy foreign policy review process has produced a white paper. That is, until the current government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

For the first time in forty years, in January 2006, a new Canadian government came to power with no plans to conduct a foreign policy review or to produce a foreign policy white paper to guide its day-to-day foreign relations. According to Paul Heinbecker, the former Canadian ambassador to the UN, when it was first elected, the minority government of Conservative Prime Minister Harper received unsolicited, spontaneous advice from ‘old foreign policy hands’ to forgo a foreign policy review; it was felt that such a comprehensive process might appear overly presumptuous for such a small minority government.⁵ The advice was especially poignant given that Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin’s recently defeated minority government had just completed its own review and had issued a white paper less than a year earlier. Writing more personally, Heinbecker adds that the advice to forgo the review was followed not so much for fear of being seen as arrogant, but because the Conservatives could not have produced a meaningful foreign policy review until they thought more carefully about the distinctiveness of their international vision for Canada and how they might implement it.⁶ Regardless of the legitimacy of the Conservatives’ decision, the lack of a foreign policy review has been criticised by analysts as dooming the government to a reactive approach to world affairs that has restricted Canada’s capacity for real leadership. Heinbecker

⁵Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada*, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010), 204-205.

⁶*Ibid.*, 205.

summarizes this sentiment when he states, “the Harper government has done relatively better in responding to events than in leading them.”⁷

This paper will question whether the current government’s lack of a foreign policy white paper has impeded the actual conduct of its day-to-day foreign relations. It will conclude that the impact of the lack of a white paper has been minimal, at most, and – using the history of the Canadian policy making process as its analytical framework – it will suggest that the process of composing a foreign policy white paper in Canada is therefore just as much a tool to shape domestic politics as it is a necessary step in the determination of Ottawa’s conduct on the world stage.

The remainder of this paper will begin by establishing a working definition of foreign policy that differentiates it from foreign relations. It will then outline the meaning, roles and purposes of white papers. There will then follow an examination of the four most recent Canadian foreign policy white papers from Pierre Trudeau’s *Foreign Policy for Canadians* through to Paul Martin’s *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. This review will compare the policies laid out by the white papers to the policies that the governments in fact pursued. From there, this paper will consider the conduct of the Harper government in terms of how it has expressed its foreign policy intentions to Canadians and how these intentions have measured up against the government’s record in foreign relations over the past five years.

⁷*Ibid.*, 205.

CHAPTER ONE - WHAT IS A FOREIGN POLICY WHITE PAPER?

Foreign Policy for Canadians (1970), *Canada's International Relations* (1986), *Canada in the World* (1995) and *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (2003) are the titles of Canada's four most recent foreign policy white papers.⁸ These documents, produced in response to approximately six and a half years of consultations with Canadians, as part of the foreign policy review process, and comprising 475 pages of English text, strive to encapsulate the high minded notions of the various governments that devised them. As such, it would appear that Canadian governments of the recent past have placed some importance on the writing of foreign policy white papers, even if the reasons for their creation are not completely clear. To better understand why recent Canadian governments have put the time and effort into these documents, this paper will consider the meaning and purpose of foreign policy as well as the definition, role, purposes and history of white papers in Canada.

The 1994 report of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy defined foreign policy as, "a continual process of exercising political will, [and] of mobilizing national resources to meet international challenges."⁹ This definition is close to that given by political scientist David Vidal, who describes foreign policy as, "a formulation of desired outcomes which are intended (or expected) to be consequent upon decisions adopted (or made) by those who have authority (or ability)

⁸William Hogg, "Plus ca Change: Continuity, change and culture in foreign policy white papers," *International Journal* Volume LXI, Number 3 (summer 2004): 528.

⁹House of Commons. Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*. No 52, Tuesday, November 15, 1994, 1.

to commit the machinery of the state and a significant fraction of national resources to that end.”¹⁰ Based on these definitions, and for the purposes of this paper, foreign policy will refer to a long-term process used by a state government employing its national resources to implement decisions taken to meet national aims within the international community. Foreign relations, on the other hand refer to the day-to-day actions taken by a state government to meet specific international events or challenges.

In Canada, government articulations of foreign policy have often been preceded by white papers. The House of Commons website defines white papers as “statements of policy [that] often set out proposals for legislative changes which may be debated before a bill is introduced.”¹¹ The Canadian Oxford Dictionary defines them as official reports, “prepared by an appointed committee summarizing the results of an investigation into an issue, policy or proposed legislation and outlining the government’s intention regarding it.”¹² Another source describes them as documents which provide information on what the government is doing or intends to do on a policy matter.¹³ Based on these definitions, it is certainly reasonable to conclude that Canadian white papers are simply government documents produced to declare official intentions before formal legislation is enacted.

White papers therefore seem to serve two purposes: they convey firm governmental policies while simultaneously inviting debate upon them.¹⁴ Some,

¹⁰David Vidal, *The Making of British Foreign Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), 11.

¹¹House of Commons Weekly Information Bulletin No. 9, (22) 27 January, 1979, Appendix; <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/pages/WhitePapersAppendix.aspx>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2011.

¹²*Canadian Oxford Dictionary*, s.v. “white paper.”

¹³Audrey Doerr, “The Role of Coloured Papers,” in *Canadian Public Administration* Vol 25 No. 3 (Fall 1982): 367.

however, like Professor Audrey Doerr argue that their role is in fact threefold: they are informative in that they allow the Government to publicize policies to Parliament and the electorate allowing for its involvement in the policy making process; they provide public access to the political process; and they provide a means for the government to anticipate potential problems with policy before those problems develop.¹⁵ It seems, therefore, that a government may choose to use a white paper to announce official policy or to stimulate a forum for public and parliamentary debate before that policy is determined. Canadian governments have used white papers in both roles since the Second World War.

Canada's version of the white paper is based on British parliamentary traditions. White papers first appeared in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a means of providing supplemental information to Parliament regarding governmental policies. By 1945, however, the white paper had become a formal instrument of information delivery to Parliament regarding matters of policy or of planned policy. In so doing, it had also evolved into a means of testing parliamentary and even public opinion on a proposed policy.¹⁶

The first white paper appeared in Canada in 1939, when one was used by the Department of Finance to present facts and statistics to Parliament regarding the proposed budget. The first time a white paper was used by the federal government to present a

¹⁴John E. Pemberton, "Government Green Papers", *Library World* Vol LXXI, No 830, (August 1969): 49.

¹⁵A. .D. Doerr, "The Role of White Papers," in *The Structures of Policy Making in Canada* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 197-199.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 180.

major policy was in 1945, when it provided both Parliament and the public with information regarding post Second World War employment and income policies.¹⁷

From 1945 through to 1962, Canadian white papers informed Parliament and the public of government policy. In 1963, their roles changed somewhat when the Pearson government used one to present its proposed pension plan. In this case, the white paper was presented to Parliament to generate public discourse and to gauge parliamentary support for a potentially controversial policy that might have required Pearson's minority government to build support amongst opposition members before officially introducing the legislation.¹⁸ Pearson continued to use white papers to gauge and then garner support for his policies throughout the remainder of his time in office.

When Pierre Trudeau came to power in 1968, he aimed to make democracy more participative. His vision entailed citizens sharing in the decision making process of their elected government through greater consultation.¹⁹ The Trudeau government therefore introduced the idea of generating a white paper at an early stage of the legislative process. The idea was not simply to inform Parliament. Nor was it to merely measure public or parliamentary support. Rather, Trudeau aimed to democratize the legislative process by using the white paper as a method of announcing his government's thinking on a given subject so that the ideas could be debated in parliamentary committees and other public fora. Once these debates and consultations were complete and the public had expressed

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 183-184.

¹⁹Jim Coutts, "Trudeau in Power: A View from Inside the Prime Minister's Office," in *Trudeau's Shadow: The Life and Legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, ed. Andrew Cohen J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1998), 145-146.

its ideas, the government could then develop representative legislation, thereby giving real voice to the electorate.²⁰

In 1985, in the very early stages of its foreign policy making process, the newly elected Conservative government of Brian Mulroney issued a green paper on foreign policy as a means of placing its foreign policy notions before Parliament and the nation.²¹ The green paper, meant as a foreign policy proposal to which the government was not yet wedded, had as its intent, in a spirit similar to that of Trudeau, the generation of discussion and the capacity to allow citizens as well as parliamentary committees to generate recommendations. The government soon stood up a special joint parliamentary committee that heard from 568 organizations and businesses as well as 630 individuals before it made its recommendations on what would eventually become the 1985 white paper.²²

In 1993, Jean Chrétien's Liberal government initiated a foreign policy review to operationalize the ideas released in its pre-election *Foreign Policy Handbook* and *Red Book*. It then coupled these ideas with a special joint parliamentary committee tasked to provide recommendations to the government based on significant parliamentary and public consultation.²³ The result of this was 1995's *Canada in the World*.

²⁰Doerr, "The Role of White Papers," 184-187.

²¹Grant Jordan, "Grey Papers", *Political Quarterly* Vol 48, Issue 1, (January-March 1977): 36. Jordan differentiates white papers from green papers by stating that white papers pronounce firm government policy for implementation while green papers announce tentative proposals for discussion.

²²David Malone, "Foreign Policy Reviews Reconsidered," *International Journal* 61 No. 4 (Autumn 2001): 560-561.

²³Gerald J. Schmitz, *Foreign Policy White Papers and the Role of Canada's Parliament: Paradoxical but not Without Potential*, Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario at London, 3 June 2005, 11-12; <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Schmitz.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2011.

The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon caused a substantial reaction in Parliament whereby several parliamentary committees, including the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, sought to understand the rapid evolution of the nature of foreign relations and traditional security paradigms. These committees and their reports, coming as they did between 2001 and 2003, answered some of the questions necessary for a new white paper. The *Dialogue with Canadians* of 2003 was also meant to canvass Canadians on foreign policy by allowing them to sit down at town-hall meetings with the minister, but Paul Martin replaced Jean Chrétien before much of the material from the dialogue could be acted upon. When the Martin Government released its *International Policy Statement* in April 2005, it did so knowing that there had been much less public consultation regarding the document than had become the norm. As a result, the role of the white paper under Martin reverted to conveying planned government policy. The government did suggest that it would consult parliamentarians and Canadians in order to solicit their opinions on future recommendations for the country's policy;²⁴ however, the Liberals were defeated and subsequently replaced by the Harper Conservatives less than a year after the release of the *IPS*. The Harper government then acted quickly to distance itself from the *IPS* as official policy and from white papers on foreign policy more generally.

Based on this short historical examination of Canadian white papers, it is easy to see that they have had different, multi-faceted roles. That being said, with four significant foreign policy white papers over a forty year period, the Canadian foreign policy white paper can generally be summarized as a means used by a government to

²⁴*Ibid.*, 16-24.

place foreign policy proposals before Parliament and the Canadian public in order to measure the reception of the policies by elected officials, special interest groups and private citizens. These papers have also allowed for debate on said policies before they were enacted as legislation.

The next chapter will examine the question of whether Canadian governments have actually been able to implement their ideas as laid out in their white papers along with the actual achievements of those white papers.

CHAPTER TWO - FOREIGN POLICY VERSUS FOREIGN RELATIONS

In an ideal world, the design of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations would form the two sides of a single coin. Foreign policy would be the long-term enlightened agenda of a country's goals, reflecting its needs and its aspirations; the conduct of foreign relations would consist of the short- to mid-term actions and investments necessary for the implementation of that policy. ... In the real world, however, no state, no matter how large or powerful, is able to so function. ... Governments function in the real world, yet endeavour not to lose sight of the ideal.²⁵

Conducting a foreign policy review or developing a white paper is fraught with challenges. As Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau once conceded, governments in Ottawa understand that much of what actually takes place regarding foreign policy is determined by actions of governments and events outside of Canada. It is these, "events" explains another analyst, "that determine the actual conduct of foreign policy more than the preconceived notions of policy makers, much less half-remembered statements in some previous policy document."²⁶ The result is that the relations Canada actually has on the international scene don't always reflect the policies initially laid out in white papers.

This is especially true in today's world, where globally linked nations and people are causing and reacting to incredibly quick world changing events. The twenty-eight days it took to topple long-time Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and the eighteen days it took to topple Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from his seat of power after forty years, along with the other revolutions currently sweeping North Africa and the Middle East make foreign policy white papers and their lengthy periods of

²⁵Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 1968-1984* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 14.

²⁶Schmitz, "Foreign Policy White Papers...", 16.

development seem hopelessly dated. Trudeau's *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, was not released until over two years after he took power. Even the most recent Canadian white paper on foreign policy, Prime Minister Martin's *IPS*, took sixteen months to be released, and that was after borrowing some of the conclusions of the Chrétien government which had initiated its *Dialogue with Canadians* in January 2003.²⁷ Indeed, the concept of a nation-wide consultation process, followed by recommendations from a parliamentary committee, and then an official government white paper, is hardly ideal.

The speed at which world events take place and the effect they can have on countries like Canada, for whom so much is dependent upon the actions and reactions of the major powers, can result in painstakingly developed foreign policy statements becoming obsolete extremely quickly. Nevertheless, foreign policy white papers are not without benefits. The generation of a white paper forces the government into a critical examination of its own policies along with and in comparison to the policies of its predecessors. This exercise alone is a worthwhile endeavour in that it forces a government to scrutinize the coherence of its policies lest it be caught by Parliament and the public without a cohesive strategic agenda resulting in potential political damage.²⁸

While both William Hogg and David Malone are clearly critical of the value of Canadian foreign policy white papers which still largely echo the sixty year old thoughts of Louis St. Laurent, they both see some benefit to the foreign policy review process. In this long drawn out process, they identify the opportunity for people from across the

²⁷John J. Noble, "Do Foreign Policy Reviews Make a Difference?" *Policy Options* (February 2005): 44, <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/feb05/noble.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2011.

²⁸David Malone, "Foreign Policy Reviews Reconsidered," *International Journal* Vol LVI No. 4 (Autumn 2001): 575.

government, elected members and civil servants alike, to work together and learn how other governmental departments function. The acquaintances and learning opportunities that can grow out of these proceedings become particularly meaningful in times of international emergencies that necessitate a whole of government response.²⁹

This chapter will examine Canadian foreign policy as prescribed by the Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien and Martin government foreign policy white papers and compare their stated aims with the foreign relations that these governments conducted.

Pierre Trudeau and *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, 1970

When Pierre Trudeau became prime minister in April 1968, he announced himself as someone who would shake-up Canadian foreign policy. In his view, his recent predecessors and their policies had been stuck in the past and had stopped serving Canada's evolving interests in an ever changing world. Trudeau questioned whether NATO still served a purpose for Canada, and wondered whether an approach to US-Canada relations that emphasized "quiet diplomacy" was still the best way forward.³⁰ During the election campaign of 1968, he introduced his first foreign policy statement, "Canada and the World." This document advocated 'realist' policies which accepted that Canada no longer held the power that it had held in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The change in Canada's relative international position necessitated a

²⁹ William Hogg, "Plus Ça Change...", 523; David Malone, "Foreign Policy...", 578.

³⁰J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 6-12.

re-examination of its place in the so-called North Atlantic Triangle. It was also seen to be in Canada's interest to bring China into the international community, to rethink the relationship between wealthy nations and the Third World, to re-assess its role in multilateral organizations (specifically the UN), to revisit its relationship with francophone nations, and to create an international development agency.³¹

The ideas from "Canada and the World" were echoed in the September 1968 Throne Speech and became the starting point for *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the government-produced white paper of June 1970. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* consisted of a general paper and sector papers on the Pacific, Latin America, Europe, international development and the United Nations.³² It also outlined six foreign policy priorities which were, in order: economic growth; sovereignty and independence; peace and security; social justice; quality of life; and a harmonious natural environment.³³

Within the various sector papers, the Pacific was identified as the region in which Canada could expand its trade relations. As such, negotiations with China were encouraged. The Latin American section spoke of a Canadian 'responsibility' to strengthen ties through bilateral agreements. There was, however, significant discussion regarding the pros and cons of becoming immersed in Latin America by joining the Organization of American States. The decision, once taken, was to draw closer to individual Latin American countries while eschewing actual membership in the

³¹Department of External Affairs, *Canada and the World: A Policy Statement by Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau* No 68/17 (Ottawa: Information Division, 1968), 2-4.

³²Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué Foreign Policy for Canadians*, No 44 (Ottawa: Information Division, 1970), 1.

³³John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 129.

Organization of American States.³⁴ An increase in Canadian activities with the Pacific and Latin America did not mean a reduction in ties with Europe. Rather, increased ties with both Western and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, would serve Canada well as a counterweight to the dominance of the United States in Canadian foreign relations. In the remaining two sections of the paper, international development and the United Nations, the government pledged to increase official development assistance (ODA) by 16% to 424 million dollars in fiscal year (FY) 1970-71 and expressed the Canadian desire to concentrate its UN efforts into specific fields upon which it could exert some influence.³⁵

Although the United States, and Canada's relationship with it, did not warrant its own sector paper, it was covered significantly in the general paper and was referred to often in the other sector papers. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* discussed the intricacies, advantages and difficulties of Canada's multifaceted relationship with the US. It also acknowledged that this relationship was too complex to be addressed sufficiently in the white paper. As such, a follow-on US specific white paper would be necessary.

The Canada-US relationship took a significant turn for the worse in the summer of 1971 when the Nixon administration levied a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US. Ottawa assumed that its 'special relationship' with Washington would prevent the surcharge from being applied to Canada but, at least initially, it did not. Much negotiation then ensued and by December 1971, the US government relented and exempted Canada from the tax. This trade scare resulted in the Department of External

³⁴Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy for Canadians, Latin America*, 20-24.

³⁵John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy*....., 2-3.

Affairs being tasked to review Canadian options for the future of the country's relationship with the United States. During the autumn of 1971, while negotiations were still ongoing, External Affairs released a paper entitled *Canada-US Relations: Options for the Future*. The paper included three options: maintain existing ties with the US; seek closer ties with the US; or to seek closer ties with other countries in order to reduce Canadian vulnerability to US economic and political hegemony. In the end, the Department recommended and the prime minister agreed to accept the 'Third Option.'³⁶

Trudeau's relationship with the US evolved over his nearly sixteen years as prime minister. The initial pullback of the early years turned warmer under President Ford (1974-1976), who helped gain Canada admission into what is now the G8, and remained so under President Carter (1976-1980) who supported Canadian national unity in the face of Parti-Québécois challenges. The relationship returned to earlier levels of antipathy when President Reagan (1980-1988) came into power. Canadian political initiatives also affected the bilateral relationship. The Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974 and the National Energy Program of 1980 were nationalist policies that angered US businesses.³⁷ That being said, the Trudeau government agreed to cruise missile testing over Canadian territory and actually initiated free trade discussions with the Reagan administration all the while allowing nothing to interfere with the ever expanding flow of trade between the two countries.³⁸

³⁶Mary Halloran, John Hilliker and Greg Donaghy, *The White Paper Impulse: Reviewing Foreign Policy under Trudeau and Clark*, Paper delivered to Canadian Political Science Association (London: University of Western Ontario, 2005), 10-11; <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Halloran.pdf>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2011 .

³⁷Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 63-73.

Internationally, Trudeau sought to increase the number and quality of Canada's diplomatic relationships. Canada recognized China in 1970 and Trudeau travelled there in 1973. His visit to the Soviet Union in May 1971 resulted in a reciprocal trip to Canada by Premier Kosygin that autumn and a bilateral deal with the USSR. He also worked closely with La Francophonie and certain Latin American countries, among others, in helping to establish a total of 65 bilateral trade agreements between 1968 and 1984.³⁹ Finally, he initially pulled back from the all-purpose, Pearsonian 'helpful fixer' role that he had felt was out-dated.

The initial 'realist' activities and ideals that flowed from *Foreign Policy for Canadians* also evolved over time. The Trudeau government began work on another foreign policy white paper known as *Foreign Policy for the 80's*, which would have addressed some of these issues, but did not complete it before the Conservative victory of 1979. Trudeau regained power in 1980 and just over three years later, he embarked on a peace initiative that some critics felt reverted to the Pearsonian type of diplomacy that he had initially spoken out against in *Canada in the World* and *Foreign Policy for Canadians*.

In the end, perhaps the best way to sum up the Trudeau government and its stated foreign policy versus its actual foreign relations comes from Trudeau's thinking as described at the beginning of this chapter: state governments need to consider and understand their long term needs and aspirations, but they must also react to the events

³⁸Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7-8.

³⁹John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy...*, 130-132.

that threaten to overwhelm their own agendas in the present. In short, the foreign policy review and accompanying white paper become more symbolic than policy-relevant: an expression of the government's intent as opposed to what it actually expects to achieve in the always chaotic forum of international politics.

Brian Mulroney and *Canada's International Relations*, 1985

One of the first things we will do is refurbish that excellent relationship of trust that must exist between the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. is our greatest friend, neighbour and ally, period.⁴⁰

-Candidate Brian Mulroney, September 1984

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was elected with the first Conservative majority government in twenty-six years on 17 September 1984. Political pundits of the day assumed that Mulroney would pull back from the international stage upon which his predecessor had been so prominent in the later years. They thought that Mulroney would focus on North America and aim to repair Canada's 'special relationship' with the US. It was also felt, based on campaign statements, that he would support the conservative governments of US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and increase funding for the Canadian Forces.⁴¹

Mulroney travelled to the United States within weeks of being elected to reset the tone of the relationship and demonstrate that Canada was a good neighbour and strong

⁴⁰Unsigned Article, "An Unusual Country: Canada's Brian Mulroney," Time Magazine, 17 September 1984; <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950140-1,00.html#ixzz1EGVasnZx>; Internet; accessed 17 February 2011.

⁴¹David Taras, "Brian Mulroney's Foreign Policy: Something for Everyone." *The Round Table* No 293 (January 1985): 37-41.

ally. His government delivered its first Speech from the Throne in November 1984, and followed it with a green paper in the spring of 1985. *Competitiveness and Security*, proposed six national priorities: national unity; sovereignty and independence; justice and democracy; peace and security; economic prosperity; and integrity of the natural environment.⁴² The list was remarkably similar to those of Trudeau's *Foreign Policy for Canadians* fifteen years earlier. The order was somewhat different, but the only new priority was 'national unity,' which seemed to replace 'quality of life.' 'Justice and democracy' also replaced Trudeau's 'social justice.'⁴³

Once the green paper was released, the special joint parliamentary committee got to work on the process to deliver the white paper. Like the committee tasked with the same mission by Trudeau fifteen years prior, it heard from a large number of organizations, businesses and individual Canadians through many public hearings held across the country. This process allowed Canadians of all political, economic and ethnic backgrounds to participate directly in the generation of the nation's foreign policy.

The special joint parliamentary committee introduced its final report to Parliament in June 1986 with a number of proposed policy directions and 120 specific recommendations. After taking the time to assess the policy proposals and the recommendations, the white paper, "Canada's International Relations," was formally released by the Government in December 1986. The white paper, like the committee's final report, was released as a two part document. The first part highlighted the

⁴²John Kirton, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Mulroney-Campbell Years" (lecture, University of Toronto, Toronto, 2009-10): 3-5; <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/teaching/312/cfp-10-2009.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2011.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 7.

government's foreign policy plans based upon the current international environment as well as the domestic political and fiscal situations. The second part of the document addressed the 120 specific recommendations made by the committee in their final report.

The first part of "Canada's International Relations" differed only slightly from the green paper delivered the year before. It did so by citing three fixed axes of Canadian foreign policy. The first highlighted the reliance of Canada, as a limited military power, on multi-lateral institutions including the UN, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie as a means to influence world events. The second axis stressed Canada's dependence on an open and stable international trade system that ensured access to worldwide markets especially with key bilateral and multilateral partners. The third axis emphasized the management of the vitally important relationship with the US.⁴⁴

Based on these fixed axes, the white paper then outlined the six broad policy areas that would be emphasized in the government's foreign policy plan. These broad policy areas were: safeguarding international peace and security; strengthening international trade and economic policy; working for international development; promoting human rights; seeking to restore Canada-US relations; and implementing a northern foreign policy.⁴⁵

The second part of the white paper was dedicated to the government's mainly positive, but sometimes tempered, responses to the 120 specific recommendations made by the committee. It was organized into ten sections, six of which were the same six

⁴⁴Department of External Affairs, *Canada's International Affairs: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), 1-5.

⁴⁵Department of External Affairs, *Canada's International Affairs...*, 6-8.

broad policy areas utilised in Part I of the document. It also encompassed sections on Canada's capabilities, international influence and foreign policy goals. Finally, it made a case for using constructive internationalism, the broad use and support of international institutions, as a major means of implementing Canadian foreign policy.⁴⁶

"Canada's International Affairs," based on recommendations from the special joint parliamentary committee, resulted in several key initiatives being championed by the Mulroney government. Firstly it resulted in continued verbalization of Canada's opposition to apartheid and the furtherance of its application of economic sanctions against the South African regime. In the realm of defence, it resulted in the government opting out of government-to-government involvement in US-led Strategic Defence Initiative research, but gave rise to the conduct of a long-term study to determine the cost of re-equipping the CF to meet its national and international obligations. This in turn led to the defence white paper *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* in June 1987.⁴⁷

After nearly three years in power, the Mulroney government, was finally able to release comprehensive, linked foreign and defence policies that were products of significant public consultation and governmental contemplation. Paradoxically, however, by taking so long to consult, the government had been forced to conduct foreign and defence relations without a policy for than half of its mandate. Now that it did have a clear plan, it would have to pursue it in the face of unpredictable global events. This would not prove to be easy.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 37-89.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 77, 45-46.

Within two years of producing the plans for its coordinated defence and foreign policies, including pledges to make expensive equipment purchases and to honour Canada's NATO commitments, the government was forced to re-examine its commitments in light of increasing national fiscal challenges. Large annual deficits had added significantly to the national debt and the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives planned cuts government-wide. Planned military equipment purchases were cut back or even cancelled, but the cuts to defence did not stop there.⁴⁸ The budget of April 1989 proposed to reduce the defence budget by 2.7 billion dollars between 1990 and 1994. The resulting moves saw, among other things, the repatriation of approximately 7,900 CF members and their equipment from NATO duty in Europe. None of these cuts were consistent with either the foreign policy or the defence policy white paper and all of them preceded any indication from the Soviet Union that the Cold War was coming to an end.⁴⁹

While the Mulroney government and Prime Minister Mulroney himself are often accused of being too pro-American, the government took several pragmatic decisions which were not pro-US. The first of these was in regards to the American strategic

⁴⁸ Sean M. Maloney, "Defence During the Mulroney Years," in *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney*, ed. Raymond B. Blake (Montreal & Kingston, The McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 146.

⁴⁹Tariq Rauf and John Lamb, "Should Canada Bring the Boys Home?" in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Volume 45, No 7 (September 1989): 35-36; http://books.google.ca/books?id=4AUAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA36&lpg=PA36&dq=canadian+troop+withdawal+from+germany&source=bl&ots=qVmj3yy6ZN&sig=hw8z-EVnUomeCO0XfXiRoFw3lvlg&hl=en&ei=G2dcTbfnJcWblgf01OnjCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CDUQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=canadian%20troop%20withdrawal%20from%20germany&f=false; Internet; accessed 16 February 2011; See Maloney, "Defence During the Mulroney Years," 146-147. Although it was clear by April 1989, when the budget was presented, that the Soviet Union was bankrupt and could no longer compete with the West, there had not been any Soviet withdrawal of forces from Warsaw Pact countries, nor had there been a formal declaration that they would. This then made Canada's withdrawal a unilateral one. .

defence initiative. Based upon public opposition, contention within Conservative backbenchers and the recommendations of the special joint parliamentary committee, the government politely declined to participate at the governmental level. It did however, allow Canadian companies to participate in the initiative so as to ensure economic benefits would make their way to Canada⁵⁰

Another key issue on which the government refused to compromise its interests to satisfy American policy goals was Arctic sovereignty, an issue which was specifically mentioned among the 120 recommendations made to the government in the foreign policy white paper. The sailing of the US Coast Guard Ship *Polar Sea* from Thule to Alaska in June of 1985 caused a minor furor in Canada. The result was a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in September 1985 affirming that Canadian sovereignty included the entire Canadian Arctic archipelago and its internal waters. The same statement was then made in the white paper the following year. Along with the statement came a northern foreign policy strategy calling for the affirmation of Canadian sovereignty; the modernizing of northern defences; preparing for commercial usage of the Northwest Passage; and the promotion of cooperation in the polar region.⁵¹

A final issue which had caused friction between the governments of the US and Canada since the early 1980s was acid rain. This particular conflict of interest, first came to light during the Trudeau-Reagan era and had gone unsolved well into the Mulroney era. The problem resulted from the fact that there was little appetite in the US Senate or

⁵⁰Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 14-15.

⁵¹ Department of External Affairs, *Canada's International Affairs ...*, 31.

House of Representatives to amend the Clean Air Act of 1970 sufficiently to cut air pollution to the levels required to reduce acid rain in Canada. The Mulroney government, frustrated with its inability to convince the US government to act, resorted to producing propaganda on the topic and feeding it to US tourists in Canada as a means of pressuring the US government to act. Simultaneously, the Mulroney government worked with the provinces to enact the Canada Acid Rain Control Program in 1985 and signed the Helsinki Protocol on Sulphur Dioxide in order to persuade the Americans that this was the proper thing to do. Finally, in spite of the propaganda and pressure tactics employed by Canada, once the political climate regarding acid rain changed in Washington, Canada and the US were able to sign the Air Quality Agreement in 1991.⁵²

In the final analysis, the Mulroney government used its green paper, the foreign policy white paper and the defence white paper to ‘democratize’ the country’s foreign policy process by bringing it to the electorate perhaps even more so than Trudeau did. Also like Trudeau, the Mulroney government believed in and used multilateral institutions to further its foreign policy. In the end, Mulroney like Trudeau before him, to a certain extent, came to follow a Pearsonian type of foreign policy which strove to balance Canada’s international activism with its key bilateral relationship. By 1993, Mulroney had arguably restored the ‘special relationship’ between Canada and the US despite confrontations over Arctic sovereignty, trade, SDI and acid rain. However despite these exhibitions of independence, Mulroney was seen by many Canadians as

⁵²Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, *Diplomatic Departures...*, 122-123.

being too overtly pro-American and as having a foreign policy that was too closely tied to that of Washington.⁵³

Jean Chrétien and *Canada in the World*, 1995

While all post Second World War prime ministers up to and including Brian Mulroney developed their foreign policy white papers and conducted their day-to-day foreign relations in the context of a bipolar, super power dominated world, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien did not. Under Mulroney, Canada transitioned from a bipolar to a uni-polar world and this had effects on his foreign policy, but only under Chrétien was that transformation complete. After Chrétien was elected in 1993, like his predecessors Trudeau and Mulroney, he tasked a special joint parliamentary committee to conduct a foreign policy review which would lead to a white paper. The resulting report, tabled 15 November 1994, was released to the nation as *Canada in the World* on 7 February 1995.

The first page of the paper addressed whether the government's foreign policy would change in response to the new world order. It maintained that economic power was supplanting physical power in the world and that Canada was uniquely placed by its history and geography to be among the world's economic leaders. The paper then outlined three key objectives: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of Canada's security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture.⁵⁴

⁵³Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the 21st Century*, 2nd ed, (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), 300-301.

The three objectives were mutually supporting and reinforcing, but the first, promotion of prosperity and employment, was clearly *primus inter pares*. The white paper made the protection and enhancement of Canadian's quality of life one of the key goals of foreign policy. To achieve this goal, the government would promote work greater global prosperity within a rules-based international economic system. Specifically, it would work through multi-lateral trading regimes like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as through Canada's partners in Europe, Asia and Latin America in order to expand and diversify the Canadian economy. The "Team Canada" approach, where the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and other key ministers along with interested and important Canadian business executives would travel to a country to extol the virtues of trading with Canada, would be one of the methods used to meet these aims.⁵⁵

The second objective of the white paper, the protection of Canadian security within a stable global framework, was linked to a defence white paper which had been released in November 1994. This objective was important in that it enabled the meeting of the first objective: protecting and enhancing Canadian prosperity. By ensuring Canadian security through North American Air Defence (NORAD) while also working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations, Canada could help build a stable, rules-based international order that would invite more countries

⁵⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995), i-ii.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-23; Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Online Registration for Canada Trade Missions: Executive Summary," http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/atip-aiprp/online-en_ligne.aspx?lang=eng; Internet; accessed 19 April 2011.

to participate actively in international economic activities. Their participation would then support Canadian prosperity.⁵⁶

While the first two objectives, prosperity and security, were equally front and centre in the Trudeau and Mulroney white papers, the third objective – projecting Canadian values and culture - was relatively new. It was felt that if other countries learned to appreciate the importance of respecting the environment, human rights, the rule of law, free markets and democratic governance, they too would adopt the Canadian way. This enlightened global environment would then lead to greater stability and prosperity for all.⁵⁷

Although *Canada in the World* had outlined the government's long-term policies, within a year, Ottawa had a new, activist, foreign minister in Lloyd Axworthy who brought with him a more ambitious policy agenda. Axworthy believed that the end of the cold war had fundamentally changed international politics so that soft power was superseding hard power in importance and public diplomacy was becoming ever more critical. The Axworthy doctrine maintained that non-governmental organizations were in the vanguard of the new diplomacy and that countries like Canada could lead 'coalitions of the willing' focused on the rights of children and human rather than national security.⁵⁸

Between *Canada in the World* and the Axworthy doctrine, Canada's first post-cold war foreign policy certainly differed from that of preceding Canadian governments. The white paper made economic prosperity its first objective supported by security and

⁵⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World*, 24-33.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 34-39.

the global projection of Canadian values, in order to assist in the development of a safe, stable world in which international trade could flourish. The Axworthy doctrine in practice, though, seemed to supplant economic primacy by turning the means, projecting Canadian values, into an end by attempting to lead the way in transforming the chaotic global state of affairs. In so doing, the projection of Canadian values had ceased to be a supporting actor for enhancing prosperity, but had instead become the end-state.⁵⁹ Consequently, efforts to parlay this altruistic foreign policy into foreign relations would not always be successful.

The first difficulty that arose between the high minded aspirations of the policy and reality was the allocation of resources. During the early years of the Chrétien government, the domestic requirement to eliminate recurring annual deficits dominated political decision-making. Foreign relations would have to be done cheaply, and DND, DFAIT and CIDA all saw their budgets shrink between 1994 and 1997. This meant that these organizations had to achieve their current, or even expanded tasks and missions, with less money. The military budget was cut 40% from 1987 levels to 9.5 billion dollars in 1995 even though DND would be called upon to act in eight separate missions by the Chretien government between 1994 and 2003. Things were hardly better in the Department of Foreign Affairs which lost 24% of its budget, or in CIDA where the reduction was closer to 30%.⁶⁰

⁵⁸Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," *International Journal*, vol 53, no. 3 (Summer, 1998): 380; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203320?seq=1>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2011.

⁵⁹Kim Richard Nossal, "The World we Want? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*. (2003): 7; <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20World%20We%20Want.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2010.

Despite the difficulties of conducting foreign relations under significant financial constraints, the Chrétien government did achieve several key foreign policy objectives. The government helped restructure the international financial system by working with others to create the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to introduce the G20 as a meeting place for finance ministers from twenty influential countries. Canada was also able to convince many countries to sign and ratify follow the 1996 Ottawa Accord banning landmines. Finally, the prime minister and his minister of foreign affairs worked hard to ensure the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002.⁶¹

Comparing the Chrétien government's *Canada in the World* to the government's actual conduct of foreign relations reveals that the policy within the white paper was vague, somewhat rhetorical, and at least partially overtaken by the agenda of Minister Axworthy between 1996 and 2000. The projection of Canadian values evolved to become a foreign policy aim just as the government sought to cut costs at home. Consequently, even though *Canada in the World* suggested that Canada was willing to take a leadership role in the soft power dominated, post cold war world, the lack of applied resources meant that much of the noble oratory of the white paper remained just that, oratory.⁶²

⁶⁰ Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies...*, 10-11.

⁶¹John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy...*, 172-173.

⁶²Tom Keating, "A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy," in *The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada*, ed. Lois Harder and Steve Patten, 124-141 (Montreal & Kingston: The McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 129-139.

Paul Martin and *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, 2005*

On 12 December 2003, the 'friendly dictatorship' of Jean Chrétien came to an end and Paul Martin was sworn in as prime minister. The new government outlined its blueprint for governance in the Throne Speech of 2 February 2004. Governor General Adrienne Clarkson touched on the importance of Canadian values and how Canadians wanted their government to bring those values to bear while effecting change in international affairs. She also noted that Canadians wanted their government to play an independent role working through multi-lateral institutions to help bring about new rules governing international activities. Canada's international representatives would be backed by a better equipped military and a more sophisticated relationship with the US. In short, she stated that the government intended to return a role of pride and influence to Canada and that the world needed more Canada.⁶³

The *International Policy Statement* that was issued on 19 April 2005 expanded upon what was said in the Throne Speech in 2004. The white paper confirmed that the main objectives of foreign policy remained the same: continued prosperity and security for Canadians. These key Canadian interests were closely tied to a stable world order. That order was reliant on multilateral action and the willingness of state governments to protect their citizens as well as to respect other countries. Accordingly, Chrétien's

⁶³Governor General, *2004 Speech from the Throne* (Ottawa: Information Services Privy Council Office, 2004): 2, 11-12; http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=sft-ddt/2004_1-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 2 February 2011.

objectives of prosperity, security and the projection Canadian values became Martin's prosperity, security and the responsibility to protect.⁶⁴

The white paper also announced the means by which Canada would achieve these objectives. First it discussed Canada's position in North America vis-à-vis economics and security. The government would work with both Mexico and the US through NAFTA, WTO and other economic fora to expand continental trade. It would also increase the size and strength of the CF while simultaneously making efforts to protect Canadians from international pandemics. Canada would make a difference globally by countering terrorism, stabilizing failed and fragile states and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Canada could also promote global prosperity by strengthening its competitiveness, increasing international trade and investment and promoting sustainable development. Finally, the government would act as a good global citizen and advocate internationally that other governments do the same by respecting human rights and other Canadian values and projecting those values via a "3D" (diplomacy, defence and development) strategy to support at risk governments.⁶⁵

The white paper finished by discussing the 'new multilateralism' and the 'new diplomacy'. In these arenas, Canada would continue to work with the UN and NATO to transform both organizations. The government would also push for the G20 to become an L20 comprising the leaders of the developed and developing world. Simultaneously,

⁶⁴Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2005), 4-5.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 6-25.

it would engage and build stronger political ties with these organization's member nations, many of whom were regional leaders.⁶⁶

While the objectives of this white paper differed little from those put forth by the Chrétien government, the resources allocated to Martin's foreign policy goals made the likelihood of success greater. The new prime minister created a new federal department (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada) which wedded several domestic national security agencies together and thereby made them more compatible with the US Department of Homeland Security. The government also reorganized the CF, creating Canada Command, which enabled a closer working relationship between the CF and US Northern Command to support the defence of North America.

Despite these US friendly initiatives, the 'complicated' relationship with the US, as identified in the white paper, had its challenges. Martin seemed to flip from initially being supportive of ballistic missile defence to eventually deciding in February 2005 to announce that support of the program was not in Canada's interests. Then, in late 2005, during the Canadian election campaign, Martin publicly chastised the US government for its refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.⁶⁷

Internationally, Martin had some success with his responsibility to protect initiative. In late 2004, the leaders of La Francophonie agreed that the UN mandate should be expanded to allow for international intervention when states failed to stop internal violence against their citizens. The Canadian government then took its campaign

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 26-29.

⁶⁷Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Pearson Canada, 2011), 169-171.

to the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on the need to reform the UN. The panel also accepted and supported the Canadian responsibility to protect initiative. Finally, on 16 September 2005, as part of the largest ever gathering of world leaders, at a summit on UN reform, an agreement in principle was struck regarding the international responsibility of states to intervene when individual state governments failed in their responsibility to protect their citizens from internal violence.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, in the autumn of 2005, even though the US government identified a genocide taking place in Sudan, the Martin government and others around the world failed to accept the responsibility to protect the citizens of Darfur.⁶⁹

The Martin government certainly initiated an expansive foreign policy. It was also in the enviable financial position to be able to allocate the necessary resources to follow through on its agenda. Consequently, Canadian foreign policy and subsequent event driven foreign relations under Martin regained some of its earlier leadership in certain functional areas.

Under the Martin government, the purpose and process of the development of the foreign policy white paper also changed somewhat in comparison to that of its recent predecessors. The Martin Liberals did not conduct the public hearings that had come to be the norm in the process. As a result, the white paper, bereft of its preceding in-depth foreign policy review with wide-spread public hearings, maintained only half of its now traditional role: a declaration of the government's intent regarding foreign policy. It was no longer a means of gauging public or opposition support.

⁶⁸John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 192-193.

⁶⁹Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy...*, 171.

Thus, other than the Martin example, the most recent Canadian governments under Trudeau, Mulroney and Chrétien sought to use the development of the foreign policy white paper as a means of bringing the democratic process closer to Canadians. They wanted Canadians of all stripes to express their visions of the future of Canadian foreign policy. These ideas would lend an air of national support to the subsequent white papers. The process could also act as a supersized focus group, enabling the political leadership to gauge the popularity of specific policy options. The highly visible input from the national public and the special joint parliamentary committee could also insulate the government, and its paper, from the harshest of criticism of the opposition.

Furthermore, the foreign policy white papers, while being lightning rods for attention regarding a government's foreign policy ideals, were hardly stand-alone documents. Each government also produced Speeches from the Throne as well as Prime Ministerial responses to those speeches which initiated, altered, augmented or ceased previous foreign policy plans. The leadership in Ottawa also released complementary papers like the defence white paper of 1994. Finally, governments reacted to global and domestic events that sometimes required adjustments to the vague foreign policy ideals projected in their white papers. Furthermore, previous Canadian governments chose how or even whether they would apply the necessary resources to the foreign policies in order for them to achieve their aims. In the cases where they did not or could not apply the necessary resources, the white papers could not survive.

The content of the foreign policy white papers remained relatively fixed from 1970 through to 2005 despite the tumultuous national and international events that occurred in that timeframe. All four white papers directly addressed prosperity and

security in one form or another. Each one also touched upon certain values that Canadians held to be important. The most significant difference, the projection of Canadian values from Chrétien's paper, was expanded in Martin's. Initially the projection of these values was seen as a means to maintain prosperity and security by attempting to stabilize the international community, but over time it morphed into an end of its own.

Based on what has been demonstrated to this point, through the examination of the foreign policy white papers of Prime Ministers Trudeau through to Martin, foreign policy white papers are largely a symbolic representation of what a government would like to achieve in an ideal world. Martin came about his white paper differently from the others and was arguably slightly more successful than the others in converting his foreign policy into foreign affairs, but generally, white papers do not assist greatly in the day-to-day conduct of foreign relations. Indeed, the process of composing a foreign policy white paper is generally more a tool used to shape domestic politics than it is to produce a guiding document on foreign policy.

The rest of this paper will consider the conduct of the Harper government in terms of how it has expressed its foreign policy intentions to Canadians. Additionally, it will examine how these intentions have measured up against the government's actual foreign relations over the past five years and whether its lack of a foreign policy white paper has affected Canadian foreign policy.

CHAPTER THREE – DOES A LACK OF A FOREIGN POLICY WHITE PAPER MEAN A LACK OF FOREIGN POLICY?

Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien and Martin, all made attempts to put their own imprint on Canadian foreign policy, but none of them fundamentally changed the basic objectives of promoting and protecting Canada's security, economic interests, and Canadian's core values.⁷⁰

“We don't review foreign policy, we do it.”⁷¹

- David Manning, Foreign Policy Advisor to British
Prime Minister Tony Blair

On 24 January 2006, something relatively rare in Canadian federal politics took place – a minority government was elected. In the 143 years since Confederation, only eleven minority governments have been elected. For these governments, the average governing duration has been a mere seventeen months. Indeed, all eleven minorities together have led the country for just nineteen years. Consequently, on 6 February 2006, when Stephen Harper was sworn in as Canada's twenty-second prime minister, with the smallest minority in Canadian history – just 127 seats, or forty percent of the House of Commons' 308 – there was little reason to believe that his government would be exceptional. Nevertheless, the 39th Parliament proved to be the second longest minority government in Canadian history. In the fall of 2008, Prime Minister Harper's Conservatives were returned to power with an increased minority of 143 seats. The government remained in power until 26 March 2011. The Conservative minority

⁷⁰John J. Noble, “PMO/PCO/DFAIT: Serving the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Agenda,” in *Canada Among Nations 2007*, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, 38-65. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 45.

⁷¹David Malone, *Foreign Policy Reviews...*, 576-577.

government was therefore in power for just over five years, making it the longest serving minority government in Canadian federal political history.⁷²

The Conservatives were first elected not long after the Martin government released the *IPS*. The work-up to this document determined that essentially the priorities outlined in 1995's *Canada in the World* remained current and valid. Moreover, the Conservative party election platform itself espoused the same basic priorities in foreign affairs – defence of Canada; creating jobs through international trade; and advancing Canadian values and interests on the world stage.⁷³

At the time of the Conservative electoral victory in 2006, foreign policy mandarins and academics expected the new government to conduct a foreign policy review and produce a subsequent white paper. However, the government received some advice to forgo this activity and chose to do so. Pundits like Lawrence Martin however suggest that the Conservatives with an inexperienced, “parochial cast of characters ... with a world view based more on ideology than experience”⁷⁴ were only too happy to accept this advice. Academics like Jennifer Welsh and ‘old foreign policy hands’ like Paul Heinbecker have lamented the Conservatives’ decision. To Welsh, “while certain unpredictable events ... demand rapid, flexible response, the federal government can and should identify, analyze, and adjust to broader power shifts, [and] political

⁷²Parliament of Canada, “Duration of Minority Governments: 1867 to Date,” <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/compilations/parliament/DurationMinorityGovernment.aspx>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2011.

⁷³Conservative Party of Canada, “Stand up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006,” 44-46; <http://www.conservative.ca/media/2006113-Platform.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2011.

⁷⁴ Lawrence Martin, *Harperland: The Politics of Control*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2010), 79.

developments.” Moreover, if one disagrees with the substance of the subsequent strategy, one can “admire the discipline and wisdom involved in identifying challenges and opportunities, assessing strengths and weaknesses and elevating a particular set of objectives for public servants to focus on.”⁷⁵ Along the same lines, Heinbecker has written, quoting Lewis Carroll: “If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there, and Harper’s foreign policy has lacked coherence and strategic direction.”⁷⁶

While the desired end state of Welsh and Heinbecker is clear and readily understandable to this author – a coherent and strategic foreign policy design that leads to priorities and objectives that the government, consisting of both elected members of parliament and appointed civil servants, can follow through the tumultuous events of every day foreign relations – this chapter will argue that such an objective can be achieved without a foreign policy white paper driven by a long drawn out foreign policy review. Strategic design can and does come from prime ministers, senior caucus members and senior party officials who use documents such as campaign platforms, Speeches from the Throne, prime ministerial speeches and other government white papers and documents to promulgate relevant policies.

The first indications of what a Harper government foreign policy might look like could be found in “Stand up for Canada: The Conservative Party Federal Election Platform 2006.” This document specifically addressed the “big three pillars” of Canadian

⁷⁵Jennifer Welsh, “Immature Design,” *The Walrus* (June 2010): 3-4; <http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2010.06-international-affairs-immature-design>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2011.

⁷⁶Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 205.

foreign policy that have been touched upon by all Canadian foreign policy white papers in one form or another since Trudeau: security and defence; trade; and Canadian values. Regarding security, “Stand up for Canada” spoke of securing the country’s borders in order to defend its sovereignty and security through a “Canada First” policy. Once government policy and action had resulted in the establishment of heightened security at home, Canada could then act on the international scene with greater confidence. Its actions would promote and project Canadian values and interests on the world stage. “Stand up For Canada” listed these Canadian values as: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets and free trade and compassion for the less fortunate. Echoing Chrétien’s *Canada in the World*, “Stand up for Canada” proposed that a Conservative government would seek to employ rules-based trading practices to develop bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Japan and India.⁷⁷

Based on what was stipulated in the election platform, one would expect to have seen the same ideas in the new government’s Speech from the Throne. The April 2006 speech largely did echo the foreign policy sentiments covered in the election platform. The governor-general spoke of supporting Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the world by seeking a stronger diplomatic role for Canada as well as a stronger military and better use of aid dollars. This was especially true in Afghanistan where Canadian national interests were at stake. The government, according to the Speech, would also work with friends and allies to build

⁷⁷Conservative Party of Canada, “Stand up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006,” 26, 42-46; <http://www.conservative.ca/media/2006113-Platform.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2011.

stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships, starting with Canada's biggest trading partner and best friend, the United States. The government also planned to invite the province of Quebec to participate alongside the federal delegation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) meetings.⁷⁸

The day after the Speech from the Throne, the prime minister told the House of Commons that Canadians had voted for a new government to turn over a new leaf and that the Conservatives would in fact turn over five new leaves, one of which dealt with foreign policy. The government intended to increase Canadian influence in the world by pursuing a "Canada First" defence strategy. This strategy would repair the damage done to the Canadian Forces by years of budget cuts and preserve the sovereignty of the nation. The government also promised to provide leadership abroad through its promotion of freedom, democracy and shared human values, as Canada had already been doing in Kandahar.⁷⁹

Between the Conservative Party's election platform, the first Speech from the Throne and the prime minister's reply to the Speech, the gist of the new government's foreign policy was clear. Like many of its predecessors, the Harper government, despite its lack of foreign policy experience, had come to office with some set notions about what it wanted to achieve in world affairs. Moreover, these notions were not that different from those of the Martin government which preceded it.

⁷⁸ Governor General, *2006 Speech from the Throne* (Ottawa: Information Services Privy Council Office, 2006): <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Documents/ThroneSpeech/39-1-e.html>; 5-6; Internet; accessed 06 January 2011.

⁷⁹ Prime Minister's Office, *Turning a New Leaf: Prime Minister backs Speech from the Throne*, 5 April 2006, <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1090>; Internet; accessed 1 March 2011.

Harper, following in Martin's footsteps, planned to dedicate even more money to the CF to ensure that it had a more robust capability to serve both domestically, specifically in the defence of Arctic sovereignty, and abroad. The government also planned, just as Martin had, to increase the international development assistance budget so as to move it closer to the OECD average. The Canadian values espoused by Martin too would be held dearly by the Harper government. In fact, the Harper government vowed that it would not bend in its application of those values as the Liberals had in their dealings with recalcitrant states with which Canada sought greater economic ties.⁸⁰

The October 2007 Throne Speech, "Strong Leadership: A Better Canada," set its sights on the long-term by putting forth a more comprehensive vision for Canada in the 21st century. Among the prime minister's five core priorities were three which had foreign policy ramifications: strengthening Canada's sovereignty and place in the world; protecting the environment and the health of Canadians; and steering the economy toward long-term prosperity.⁸¹

In his reply to the throne speech, the prime minister stated that for the federal government, there was nothing more important than ensuring the nation's sovereignty. The greatest challenge to Canadian sovereignty, he declared, was in the Arctic. He then spoke of the importance of providing comprehensive mapping, for the first time, of the Canadian Arctic seabed as well as the government's plan to construct a new high Arctic research station and increase the capability of the Coast Guard to operate in the North.

⁸⁰Conservative Party of Canada, "Stand up for Canada..." 44-47.

⁸¹ Prime Minister's Office, *Prime Minister Stephen Harper addresses the House of Commons in a reply to the Speech from the Throne*, 17 October 2007, 2-3; <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=1863>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2011.

He also detailed the plans for the military to be able to operate in the North as well as other domestic and expeditionary locations.

The prime minister reiterated the importance of Canadian values and how Canada's conduct in world affairs would set an example to other countries. Although these values were not specifically labelled as core pillars, it was clear that Canada was committed to working with like-minded nations to create an atmosphere that promoted the rule of law which in turn would facilitate more robust international trade. Canada could also act as a model for countries looking to move away from controlled economies or despotic rule and towards liberal democracy. Such countries would be welcomed into the community of law abiding nations that supported democratic institutions, free markets and social equality.⁸²

Both the 2007 Speech and the prime minister's response to it mentioned Canada's position regarding the environment and, more specifically the Kyoto Protocol. The prime minister accused the preceding Liberal governments of committing Canada to the protocol while doing nothing about the country's ever increasing emissions. His government, he reported, had a plan to reduce emissions by working with other countries to establish a new protocol which would see Canada reduce its emissions based on 2005 levels by twenty percent by 2020 and sixty to seventy percent by 2050.⁸³

The third pillar – steering the economy to long term prosperity - also received mention in both the Speech and the prime minister's response. In addition to the domestic policies geared towards strengthening the economy, the government sought to

⁸² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 9.

expand trade with Latin American and Caribbean countries. A recently completed agreement with the European Free Trade Association was touted as the first new major trade agreement in more than half a decade. Also apparent was the first indication of the ‘great recession’ coming out of the US sub-prime market that was starting to spread its contagion around the world.⁸⁴

The Harper government, followed these comments with official policy statements, Throne Speeches and Prime Ministerial responses to these Speeches which indicated a consistent vision of foreign policy priorities. The 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* committed the Canadian Forces to six core missions within Canada, North America and internationally. The strategy advocated CF support for the government’s foreign policy objectives through its ability to “deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America and project leadership abroad by making meaningful contributions to operations overseas.”⁸⁵

The *Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy* was released in 2010. This document outlined the four pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy: exercising sovereignty; promoting economic and social development; protecting the environment; and improving and devolving Northern governance.⁸⁶ The paper also provided detail regarding actual actions the government planned to take in order to see that the plans came to fruition.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 8-10.

⁸⁵ National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy 2008* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2008): http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf; Internet; accessed 06 January 2011.

⁸⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2010): 5; http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

In addition to *Canada First* and the *Statement of Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy*, the three latest Speeches from the Throne also continued to add to the continuity of the government's foreign policy. The 2010 Speech from the Throne, *A Stronger Canada. A Stronger Economy. Now and For the Future*, reiterated the importance of the three main pillars of Canadian foreign policy. It recalled the Harper government's consistent support for the re-building of the CF. It spoke of how the Canadian economy had weathered the global economic downturn and would continue to improve through the implementation and ratification of free trade agreements with Peru, the European Free Trade Association, Colombia, Jordan and Panama as well as with planned agreements with the Republic of Korea, India, the EU, the Caribbean Community and other countries within the Americas. The Speech ended by recapping the importance of Canadian values and using those values to anchor the pursuit of the state's foreign policy goals.⁸⁷

Taken as a whole, the 2006 Conservative election platform, the five Speeches from the Throne and other foreign policy-related documents produced by the Harper government since its election in 2006 demonstrate that the current government has developed a coherent, long-standing, long-term foreign policy plan. This plan is quite similar to the traditional Canadian foreign policy 'playbook' that has been in use for most of the past forty years. What the Harper government does not have is a foreign policy white paper tying it all together. This paper will now examine the Harper government's record to determine its success in implementing its foreign policy plan into actual foreign

⁸⁷Governor General, 2010 Speech from the Throne (Ottawa: Information Services Privy Council Office, 2010): 8, 22; http://www.speech.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft-ddt-2010_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 06 January 2011.

relations activities in light of its lack of a single guiding foreign policy document in the form of a white paper.

Within the first one hundred days of assuming power in February 2006 the Harper government had given strong indications of how it intended to turn its foreign policy into action through its foreign relations. Immediately after the election, US Ambassador David Wilkins criticised the new Canadian Arctic policy which required foreign vessels travelling in Canadian waters to seek Canadian government permission. Stephen Harper, before he had even officially taken office, sternly responded; “The Canadian government will defend our sovereignty. It is the Canadian people we get our mandate from, not the ambassador of the United States.”⁸⁸ Replying in the manner he did, the prime minister-elect demonstrated that despite his desire to have a strong relationship with Canada’s southern neighbour and greatest trading partner, he would stand up to the Americans when and as required. Moreover, he was serious about his Arctic foreign policy and his defence of Canadian sovereignty.

Also helping to set the tone of his government was Harper’s first overseas visit to Canadian troops and President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan 11-13 March 2006. The trip contrasted with the more common practice of former Canadian prime ministers who had gone to Washington to see the US president. Harper’s visit came at a critical time for Canada and NATO: Canada was in the process of increasing its troop strength on the ground in Kandahar Province from 700 to 2,200 and of taking command of NATO forces in Regional Command South. During the visit with Canadian soldiers, the prime minister vocalized his plan to ‘take ownership’ of the Afghan mission and to simultaneously

⁸⁸John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy*..., 197.

demonstrate his intent for Canada to project leadership in international operations: “Your work is about more than just defending Canada’s interest,” he said. “It’s also about demonstrating an international leadership role for our country. Not carping from the sidelines, but taking a stand on the big issues that matter. You can’t lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader.” He went on to acknowledge that things were difficult and would not get easier in the short-term, before concluding: “There are some who may want to cut and run. But cutting and running is not your way. It’s not my way. And it’s not the Canadian way. We don’t make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don’t and we won’t.”⁸⁹

Shortly after the Prime Minister’s return to Canada, the government introduced a motion to extend the mission in Afghanistan for two years until early 2009. After some heated debate, and with the help of some thirty Liberal MPs, the motion was carried by a vote of 149 to 145.⁹⁰ By the spring of 2007, polls suggested that this important mission was losing support amongst Canadians. In August, the prime minister switched ministers of national defence, replacing Gordon O’Connor with the much more dynamic and photogenic Peter Mackay in order to, among other things, help sell the mission. When approval ratings failed to change significantly, throughout the fall of 2007 and when presented with the opportunity to utilize the good name of the former Liberal deputy

⁸⁹ Prime Minister’s Office, *Address by the Prime Minister to Canadian armed Forces in Afghanistan*, 13 March 2006; <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1056>; Internet; accessed 18 March 2011.

⁹⁰ Library of Parliament, “Afghanistan: Chronology of Canadian Parliamentary Events,” <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0724-e.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2011

prime minister, John Manley in a non-partisan approach to solve the dilemma, the prime minister struck the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan.⁹¹

The panel's mission was to advise the government on what approach Canada should take once the 2009 extension expired. It was given, as part of its mandate, four non-exclusive options to examine. They were: to continue to train Afghan army and police beyond February 2009 when Canadian combat troops would re-deploy; to concentrate Canadian efforts on governance and development in Kandahar Province while other NATO forces provided security; to continue with the current program of providing security and conducting governance and development programs in another, quieter province within Afghanistan; and to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan less those required to protect aid workers and diplomats.⁹² In the end, the panel could not recommend any of these options and proposed a comprehensive, new Afghan strategy, "that serves Canadian interests, gives expression to Canadian values and corresponds realistically to Canada's capacity."⁹³

The panel made five recommendations to implement of this new strategy. The first called for Canada to push for the appointment of a high-ranking UN civilian representative of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan in order to better coordinate civilian-military efforts; for NATO to adopt a comprehensive plan to address security

⁹¹John Siebert, "From the Manley report to sustainable peace in Afghanistan: You can't get there from here!" *The Ploughshares Monitor* Vol 29, No 1 (Spring 2008): 2-3; <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monm08b.pdf>; Internet; accessed 06 April 2011.

⁹²*Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley, Chair (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008) 30-31; http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf; Internet; accessed 06 April 2011

⁹³*Ibid.*, 33.

concerns by increasing the number of troops on the ground; for pressure to be exerted on Pakistan to increase its own stability and security; and for the Afghan government to eradicate corruption while providing better service to the Afghan people. The second recommendation urged Canada to extend its combat mission beyond 2009, but to place greater emphasis on training the Afghan army so that it could eventually take over security without NATO assistance. Two caveats to this recommendation stated that NATO needed to provide an additional battle group of approximately 1000 troops before February 2009 and the Canadian government had to provide unmanned aerial vehicles and medium lift helicopter also before February 2009. The third recommendation was to give higher priority for reconstruction and development projects designed to make life better for Kandaharis. The fourth was to develop objective metrics to better determine effectiveness of benchmarks and timelines and then base future commitments on successful completion of these benchmarks and timelines. The final recommendation was for the government to provide better information to the Canadian people regarding the aims and status of the mission.⁹⁴

The prime minister addressed the report and its recommendations on 28 January 2008. He congratulated Manley and the commission for its “balanced, thoughtful and comprehensive report” that provided “insight and analysis beyond partisan politics.”⁹⁵ His government would broadly accept all recommendations put forth by the commission and specifically accept the recommendation to extend the mission if the extra NATO

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 37-38.

⁹⁵Prime Minister’s Office, *Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on an independent panel of eminent Canadians in the examination of Canada’s future role in Afghanistan*, 28 January 2008; <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1975>; 1; Internet; accessed 07 April 2011

battle group could be found and new equipment could be secured. Finally, Harper planned to take the decision to keep Canadian forces in Afghanistan beyond 2009 to Parliament and base any eventual withdrawal on the successful completion of the benchmarks and timelines as laid out by the panel.⁹⁶

Two months later, the government tabled a motion to extend the combat mission until July 2011 with the redeployment to be completed no later than December 2011. This motion passed 197 to 77.⁹⁷ During the election campaign of the fall of 2008, the prime minister then set December 2011 as a hard deadline for mission completion. He did so in spite of the Manley Commission's argument that setting an end date for the mission would be senseless. The Prime Minister's deadline may have been, as was suggested in a *Macleans* article in October 2008, an attempt to attract Quebec voters who would be key to a Conservative majority and who also when polled in July 2008 showed only 31% of those questioned supported the Afghan mission.⁹⁸ Whatever the reason, this decision flew in the face of the prime minister's 'we will not cut and run' statement from 2006.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁹⁷Parliament of Canada, "House of Commons Vote Details, Vote 76, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session" (13 March 2008); <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HouseChamberBusiness/ChamberVoteDetail.aspx?FltrParl=39&FltrSes=2&GroupBy=province&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2&Vote=76>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2011.

⁹⁸CBC News, "36% support keeping troops in Afghanistan through 2011: Poll," <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/07/07/afghanistan-poll.html>; Internet; accessed 06 April 2011. Michael Petrou, "Afghan troop withdrawal a 'surprise'," *Macleans* (October 2008); <http://www2.macleans.ca/2008/10/30/afghan-troop-withdrawal-a-surprise/>; Internet; accessed 06 April 2011. Bob Ewing, "Polls say support for Afghan mission and talks with Taliban dwindling," *Digital Journal*, (July 2008); <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/257123>; Internet; accessed 06 April 2011.

Finally, after considerable speculation, on 11 November 2010 the Prime Minister confirmed that Canada would remain in Afghanistan beyond the 2011 deadline until 2014. It would however do so in a diminished role whereby it would reduce its numbers by about two-thirds to approximately one thousand personnel and would move to Kabul from Kandahar in order to conduct a less dangerous training mission.⁹⁹

At approximately the same time that the prime minister was making his first trip to Afghanistan in early 2006, Hamas emerged victorious in the Palestinian Authority's national election. Prime Minister Chrétien had declared Hamas a terrorist organization in 2002 and nothing that the organization had done since then had shown that it had repudiated any of its radical ideas regarding the destruction of Israel. Upon its election victory, world leaders had asked that it renounce its support of terror and recognize Israel. It refused to comply.¹⁰⁰ It was therefore still regarded as a terrorist organization in the eyes of the Canadian government and many other international organizations.¹⁰¹ As a result, the Harper government, in accordance with its firm belief in and principled application of the rule of law acted swiftly becoming the first country to cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority. In this case, it appears that the other three core Canadian values: freedom, democracy and human rights may have taken a backseat to the rule of law since

⁹⁹Gerald J. Schmitz, "Library of Parliament Seminar, 'Afghanistan: Where do we go From Here?'" Reference and Strategic Analysis Division Parliamentary Information and Research Service (December 2010), 14; <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2010-85-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2011.

¹⁰⁰Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2006) 294.

¹⁰¹"Armed Conflicts Report: Israel-Palestine Summary for 2006," *Ploughshares*; <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRBriefs/ACRBrief-Israel.htm>; Internet; accessed 07 April 2011.

Hamas had been elected in a fair election.¹⁰² Critics argued that the government's actions were designed to court ethnic groups in large Canadian cities where Conservatives lacked support. As journalist Lawrence Martin has noted, although Muslims outnumber Jews two-to-one in Canada, the Jewish community is more "politically impactful."¹⁰³ But the prime minister responded that Canada's foreign policy was based on principles and that dealing with a government formed by a terrorist organization, even if fairly elected, would compromise those principles. Unlike previous Liberal governments, the Conservatives would not compromise on those principles even if such decisions were not always popular.¹⁰⁴

The next major foreign policy issue to arise was the Canada-US softwood lumber dispute which re-emerged following the termination of a previous agreement in March 2001. In 2002, alleging that Canada was subsidising soft-wood exporters, the Americans placed a twenty-seven percent duty on softwood lumber coming from Canada into the US. Both the Chrétien and Martin governments had sought recourse with the World Trade Organization and a NAFTA joint trade panel. Both governments had achieved some successful rulings, but for various reasons were never quite able to solve the complicated, politically thorny problems. Prime Minister Harper wanted to find a quick solution to the problem to show that his government could act quickly.¹⁰⁵ Consequently,

¹⁰²Paul Wells, *Right Side Up...*, 294-295.

¹⁰³Lawrence Martin, *Harperland...*, 81.

¹⁰⁴Anca Gurzu, "Canada's International Year: The year that Wasn't?" *Embassy* (December 2010): 4, 6; <http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/yearreview-12-15-2010>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2011; Lee Berthiaume, "Behind the Harper Government's 'Principled' Israel Policy: Standing for Principles is one thing, but have things gone too far?" *Embassy* (May 2010): 1-3; <http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/israel-05-26-2010>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.

by August 2006 a tentative deal had been struck – one, however, that was not a complete victory for Canada. It would see only four billion dollars of a total of just over five billion dollars of tariffs taken by the Americans returned to Canada. As such, it was opposed by some lumber companies, the Liberal opposition and the NDP. The prime minister and his team, after convincing some of the hesitant lumber exporting companies that no better deal was likely to be coming any time soon, took the deal to parliament and with the assistance of the BQ pushed the deal through.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, the Harper government completed an agreement with the Americans in less than three months where the two previous Liberal governments had been unable to do so over four years.

In the spring of 2006, the Conservatives introduced their first budget. The spending priorities were a strong indicator of whether the Harper government was serious about turning its foreign policy plans into foreign relations actions. Under this budget, planned defence expenditures would rise from \$14.6 billion in 2005-6 to \$16.5 billion in 2007-8. Simultaneously ODA would increase to \$3.8 billion in 2006-7 and to \$4.1 billion in 2007-8. Also in accordance with a campaign promise, by 2008-9 ODA to Africa was to double from actual monies paid, as opposed to Liberal monies promised in 2003-4. This increase was in spite a retreat from Africa to Latin America regarding development priorities.¹⁰⁷

The Harper government also had specific plans for China. The relationship with China was a complex one for the Conservatives. The Liberal governments of both Jean

¹⁰⁵ Lawrence Martin, *Harperland ...*, 49-50.

¹⁰⁶ John Kirton, "The Harper Years...", 16-17. "Africa hears more reasons to do less", *The Harper Index*, <http://www.harperindex.ca/ViewArticle.cfm?Ref=0051>; Internet; accessed 08 April, 2011.

¹⁰⁷ John Kirton, "The Harper Years ...", 9-10.

Chrétien and Paul Martin had openly courted China in an attempt to increase trade between the behemoth Chinese market and Canadian producers. The Liberals politely chastised the Chinese on occasion regarding human rights violations, but did nothing bold enough to jeopardize trade relations. In contrast, the Harper Conservatives initially refused to overlook the human rights abuses of the single-party dictatorship. The prime minister as well as other cabinet members at various times openly criticized the Chinese for their actions. As a result, Sino-Canadian relations went into the deep freeze for more than three years. However, when confronted with the dual facts that the Chinese government would not be swayed by Canada's principled stance and faced with the 'great recession' that was wreaking havoc with western economies but barely denting that of China, Prime Minister Harper seemed to re-assess the principled approach. In 2009 the Ministers of Trade, Transport and Foreign Affairs all visited China followed by the prime minister himself in December 2009. It was during this visit by the prime minister that the two countries agreed to make further use of their existing forty bilateral agreements. The visit also resulted in China granting Canada 'Approved Destination Status' which would increase the ease of travel for Chinese tourists, business people and students wishing to visit Canada.¹⁰⁸ In 2010, Premier Hu Jintao paid a reciprocal visit to Canada just prior to the G20 meeting. These actions signify that relations between the two countries are now improving.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Prime Minister's Office, Canada-China Joint Statement, 3 December 2009, 2-3; <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3005>; Internet; accessed 09 April 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Lawrence Martin, *Harperland...*, 82-83; Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 210-211;

While there was certainly dissent in Ottawa regarding the Harper government's policies towards China and the government ended up looking somewhat amateurish in its policy flip-flop, it would prove to be nothing compared to the difficulties that arose for the government thanks to its stand on the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Under Prime Minister Chrétien, Canada had committed to reducing greenhouse gases six percent, based on 1990 emissions levels, by 2012. This goal would be difficult enough to achieve; however, between 1997 when the protocol was signed, and 2003, Canada's emissions had increased by a further 24% resulting in a required total reduction of 30%.¹¹⁰

Based on the growth of emissions, it was clearly impossible for Canada to achieve these optimistic goals in a mere six years. This was especially true in light of the fact that neither the Chrétien nor Martin governments had done anything of significance to meet said goals. It can, however, be argued that the protocol did allow for countries that were unable to meet their emissions reductions to purchase "emission reduction amount units." Daniel Schwanen, an economist and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation has calculated that in Canada's case, based on estimated prices per metric tonne of emissions overages, the government would initially be required to purchase credits of \$1.6 billion to \$3 billion per year to make up for the overages.¹¹¹ Any Canadian government would experience political difficulty trying to explain to Canadians how they would have to pay for these overages. It thus fell to the Harper government to

¹¹⁰Daniel Schwanen, "Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: When Reality Sets In," in *Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 292-295.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 315.

admit that it could not meet the Kyoto Protocol's targets. The government did state that in accordance with the Conservative election platform of 2006, it would enact a 'Made in Canada' plan to address the issue of reducing greenhouse gases and other pollutants emphasizing new green technology instead of purchasing greenhouse gas credits from countries that had beaten their own reduction goals.

In December 2009, when the Copenhagen Accord on climate change was signed, Canada agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020 while continuing to negotiate under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change for a legally binding post-2012 agreement.¹¹² Despite this agreement and the fact that it is in line with American greenhouse gas emission reductions, Canada was still awarded, for the third year in a row, the 'Colossal Fossil' award at Copenhagen by the Climate Action Network, a global consortium of NGOs working in the environmental field, for its obstruction, delaying tactics and inaction regarding emissions.¹¹³

Based on the examples given in this paper it is now obvious that much like its predecessors, the Harper government does have a documented foreign policy. This enduring policy, expanded from the 2006 Conservative Party election platform through Speeches from the Throne as well as prime ministerial speeches and other formal governmental documents and papers, has continued through the over five years that the government has been in power. It has had some modification over the five years,

¹¹²Government of Canada, "Canada's Action on Climate Change," <http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=72F16A84-1>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

¹¹³National Post, "Canada Branded Colossal Fossil at Climate Talks," <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/copenhagen/story.html?id=2356558>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2011.

specifically with the mission in Afghanistan and relations with China, but has essentially maintained the same core pillars throughout: defence of Canada; increased economic prosperity through foreign trade; and the advancement of Canadian values and interests.

Like its predecessors, this government has had some success converting its foreign policy into foreign relations, but also similar to its predecessors, it has experienced challenges. There is nothing unusual about these results. What is unusual however, is that this government has consciously decided not to conduct a foreign policy review and transform that review into an all-encompassing foreign policy white paper. Instead, one has to comb several documents to piece together the government's foreign policy.

Despite all the rhetoric about the importance of the democratic process via nationwide town hall meetings and joint-parliamentary council sessions that the foreign policy review and subsequent white paper provides, foreign policy reviews only become foreign policy white papers if the serving prime minister, his caucus and senior Cabinet members agree with the proposed policies and recommendations. As Paul Heinbecker stated in *Getting Back in the Game*, "Prime Ministers make foreign policy. To be sure, they do so on the advice of their cabinets, ministers of international portfolios, caucus, senior officials ... barbers, chauffeurs ... and whoever talked to them last, not necessarily in that order,"¹¹⁴ but in Canada it is the prime minister, not a special joint parliamentary committee, who decides what will become foreign policy.

Consequently, the fact that the Harper government did not and has not conducted a foreign policy review nor written a foreign policy white paper has had no serious,

¹¹⁴Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 53.

detrimental effects on its ability to conduct its foreign affairs. The government has expressed its basic foreign policy plans right from the election platform that resulted in its election. It has also continued to express those plans via prime ministerial speeches, Speeches from the Throne and official governmental documents and panels.

Certainly, a foreign policy white paper and its preceding review could have aided the newly elected Conservative members to work with and get to know their public servant compatriots. It could have allowed the Conservatives to initiate the 39th parliament in a much more conciliatory manner than it otherwise did by allowing a joint parliamentary-senatorial committee to work together in examining foreign policy. In the same vein, it might have been helpful in promoting a whole of government or comprehensive approach to foreign policy issues. Importantly, it could also have assuaged some of the fears and assumptions of the electorate in central and eastern Canada, regarding the seemingly deeply conservative Reform Party roots of the prime minister and some of his cabinet members. Finally, it could have appeased the fears of ‘small l liberals’ concerning a hidden Tory agenda when the inevitable white paper would have come out showing very little difference from what had been written in recent white papers. In other words, the development of a foreign policy white paper would have added little as a guiding document, but certainly have made for astute domestic politics for the Harperites.

CONCLUSION

Foreign policy reviews and white papers serve a role for the government, but as has been shown throughout this paper, that role has little to do with providing a guiding document for the government, its ministries, and its departments to follow as it works to transform its foreign policy plans into foreign relations actions. As US Army General and US Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor said of his own government, “It is common practice for officials to define foreign policy goals in the broad generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation and good will – unimpeachable as ideals but of little use in determining the specific objectives we are likely to pursue and the time, place and intensity of our efforts.”¹¹⁵ What this means in the anarchic forum of international politics is that governments, even that of a global super-power, do not have enough control over the events that drive their foreign relations to be able to accurately map out their foreign policy intentions to any detail sufficient for it to be of much real value.

As a consequence of the uncertainty within which governments must attempt to exert their foreign policy plans, the major role of the foreign policy review and white paper becomes one of domestic rather than international politics. In the domestic arena, the foreign policy review is intended to elicit public and parliamentary debate while the white paper itself provides public accessibility to the planned policies before they are acted upon. In contrast to Professor Welsh’s suggestions otherwise, the review and white paper do not necessarily provide any further direction for the people who must act on

¹¹⁵Keith A. Dunn, “The Missing Link in Conflict Termination Thought: Strategy,” in *Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion and War*, ed. Steven J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn (Boulder Colo: Westview Press, 1987), 178.

governmental foreign policy than do speeches and party platforms. In essence, both the review and the white paper itself, as used by recent Canadian governments, can act as an alternate form of polling disguised as a more democratic process used to determine the popularity of a governmental policy before the government becomes wedded to said policy. As such, a foreign policy review and the subsequent white paper does have a role to play for the Canadian government, just not what it would be expected to be.

The aim of this paper has been to examine the current government's lack of a foreign policy white paper and demonstrate that the lack of a foreign policy white paper, which is largely symbolic of what a government would like to achieve in an ideal world, has minimal impact on a government and the actual conduct of its day-to-day foreign relations. Furthermore, the paper has shown that the process of composing a foreign policy white paper is actually more of a tool used to shape domestic politics than it is to produce a valuable document that can be used to guide the government through its actions on the world stage.

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