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Foreign Policy Analysis

A Toolbox

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CHAPTER 8

What Part Does Culture Play in FPA?

A number of analysts saw the emergence of the constructivist movement in the 1990s as the return of the cultural dimension to the study of international relations (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). In reality, FPA has always been interested in culture. Several researchers devoted their entire careers to studying the role of identities, discourses, norms and cultural practices in foreign policy. If being constructivist means being interested in culture, FPA was constructivist before its time (Kubalkova 2001; Houghton 2007).

Nevertheless, the emergence of constructivism provoked a fundamental epistemic debate, which still has repercussions for FPA. FPA's traditional epistemic position is to treat culture as an independent variable that can be linked to foreign policies via causal relationships. It constitutes a positivist approach, used by scholars such as Peter Katzenstein, Jeffery Checkel, Martha Finnemore, Katherine Sikkink and Judith Goldstein. According to these authors, culture facilitates research on the subjective utility of rational actors. It also enables mediation in games where there is a situation of multiple equilibria and helps clarify anomalies that rationalist theories cannot explain.

A growing number of analysts prefer a post-positivist approach. David Campbell, Vendulka Kubálková, Cynthia Weber, Iver Neumann, Jutta Weldes and Roxanne Doty, among others, consider that the goal of FPA research is not to explain foreign policies by identifying their causes, but to gain insight into foreign policies by placing them in the cultural context, which made some policies possible and others inconceivable. They are interested in the "how", not in the "why" of foreign policy.

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Post-positivist analysts generally favor interpretative epistemology according to which empirical data should be interpreted before being transformed into results. The researcher is steeped in a culture and, consequently, is unable to analyze the subject of the study with detachment. All discourses, including scientific discourse, are culturally charged, and therefore reproduce power relations. This reflexivist observation sometimes leads to a critical approach according to which, in Robert Cox's words, "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (1981: 128.).

The debate between positivists and post-positivists is apparent in all contemporary literature on the role of culture in foreign policy. This chapter reflects the debate, without actually presenting the two sides separately. As Peter Katzenstein pointed out, culture is such an omnipresent and all-encompassing reference that the very concept has a limited heuristic value (1996: 2; Duffield 1999). Focusing on some of its specific components is preferable to tackling it as a whole. Thus, this chapter presents the cultural components that are of most interest to foreign policy analysts, including norms, identities, roles, genders, organizational cultures, strategic cultures and discourses.

Norms

Norms can be defined as the expectations shared by a community with regard to the behavior that is judged appropriate for a given identity. They define the limit between conformity and deviance (Krasner 1983; Finnemore 1996; Raymond 1997).

For example, an international norm prohibits the recruitment of child soldiers. Child recruitment in the armed forces is considered to be a socially reprehensible act, irrespective of its legal status. On the other hand, compulsory military service for young adults or the stigma attached to children born of war rape is not condemned with the same vehemence and is not the object of firmly established international social norms (Carpenter 2007).

Two main theoretical debates link norms to foreign policy behavior: the first considers states as the target of norms, and the second presents states as the actors that disseminate norms.

Norm Compliance

Several types of social norms challenge states and orient their foreign policy behavior. First, it is important to distinguish between national norms and international norms. In general, international norms have a universal scope,

although their origin and impetus may be limited to a specific cultural era. This is clearly the case for human rights, which are of Western origin, but have universal goals (Risse et al. 1999b; Thomas 2001). In some cases, international norms apply to a specific group of states, such as the norm that requires developed countries to allocate a share of their income to development aid (Lumsdaire 1993; Barnett and Weiss 2008), the norm that urges metropoles to guarantee their colonies the right to self-determination (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Jackson 1993; Crawford 1993, 2002) or the norm that proscribes nuclear powers from using their nuclear weapons (Gaddis 1987; Paul 2009, 2010; Avey 2015).

National norms that belong to a specific culture can also orient foreign policy behavior. For example, Canada's political culture promotes compromise, respect of diversity and equal opportunities. On a national level, these political values are reflected by diverse social and economic programs. They are also manifest at the international level as shown by Canada's major commitment to multilateralism (Stairs 1982; Keating 2012; Smith and Sjolander 2012).

We can also differentiate between substantive norms and procedural norms. Substantive norms guide state behavior in relation to a given issue. Some are so specific that they generate discrepancies in a country's foreign policy. Thus, on the international stage, several states may be actively involved in the protection of marine mammals that are not on the list of endangered species and yet remain aloof when it comes to protecting endangered plants and microorganisms (Nadelmann 1990; Epstein 2008; Blok 2008). Similarly, in wartime, some political leaders seem to consider that it is morally more acceptable to target a greater number of individuals using so-called conventional weapons than to target fewer individuals with chemical weapons or terrorist tactics (Price 1997; Farrell 2001; Tannenwald 2007; Carpenter 2011).

Other norms are of a procedural nature and cut across several domains of foreign policy. Procedural norms include those that encourage multilateralism (Ruggie 1993; Dimitrov 2005), seeking a consensus (Morin and Gold 2010), transparency (Florini 1996) and the inclusion of actors from civil society (Bäckstrand 2006). They help explain why General George Marshall proposed his eponymous aid plan to the USSR in 1947 and why, more than 50 years later, Colin Powell did his utmost to convince the UN Security Council to authorize military intervention against Iraq. The former no doubt anticipated the Soviet refusal and the latter suspected the French veto, but they both had to abide by international procedural norms.

Norms are expressed as a behavioral prescription or proscription, which means they operate like legal regulations. In addition, national and international laws often reflect social norms. However, a norm is not necessarily formalized, or even explicit, and deviant behavior cannot necessarily be legally sanctioned (Nadelmann 1990; Percy 2007).

There are several reasons why states generally abide by social norms, even when they are not enshrined in a rule of law. From a rationalist point of view, states that are socialized to a norm adopt the behavior that is expected of them, without necessarily believing in the norm's virtue. They comply simply to avoid being ostracized, to prevent reputational costs, to cooperate in a situation of multiple equilibria, to maintain their partners' confidence or reduce the pressure exerted by social movements. Therefore, norms are perceived as contextual facts, which states take into account to anticipate the consequences of their behavior and to identify the option that maximizes their utility.

From a constructivist point of view, states comply with norms because they perceive them as fair, natural or legitimate. They internalize the principles underlying the expected behavior, assimilate them into their identity and comply with them, regardless of external pressure and perceptions. In this constructivist scenario, norms restrict the scope of possibilities prior to the decision-making process and help define what states perceive as their interest (Checkel 2001, 2005).

However, it is important not to overestimate the distinction between rational and constructivist compliance. They are not mutually exclusive on a theoretical level. In fact, compliance, which is initially motivated by self-interest, can gradually lead to genuine internalization. A government that strategically adopts policies to reduce energy consumption in the hope of reducing its dependence on gas and petrol exporting countries may ultimately internalize the environmental discourse and become a flagship in the fight against climate change.

In general, ideas are usually consistent with interests. In social psychology, it is well established that when discrepancy occurs as a result of contradictory behavior and beliefs, individuals generally modify their beliefs to fit their behavior, rather than the other way round (Festinger 1957).

On a methodological level, it may be difficult to establish whether an actor has genuinely internalized a norm or merely complies to protect their reputation. An analysis of practices and discourses can confirm that a norm exists. However, it is more difficult to determine whether a norm has been internalized in a belief system.

One approach is to chart the irregularities in norm compliance. A state may invoke a norm when calling for certain behavior, which evidently serves its own interests. However, if it appears to disregard that norm in other circumstances, the analyst can legitimately call into question norm internalization (Howard 2004).

Nonetheless, this methodological strategy comes up against the problem of idiosyncrasy when it comes to norm interpretation (Checkel 1998). States do not interpret norms in the same way, even when they have universal scope and are formally established. In Western countries, for example, there are major differences between France, Sweden and Japan in terms of how human rights are integrated into their foreign policy (Sikkink 1993; Cardenas 2004; Remacle 2008). These variations do not necessarily reveal their strictly rhetorical approach to human rights. They may simply express the different interpretations, which have all been genuinely internalized.

Some studies attempt to explain these variations in the interpretation of international norms. Among the variables that can explain the different interpretations, one can note: the political regime's institutional structure (Checkel 1999), the dynamism of local social actors (Wilkening 1999), the position of national identity in relation to international society (Gurowitz 1999), the personality and preferences of political leaders (Shannon 2000; Bratberg 2011), the government's organizational culture (Legro 1997), the issue's salience in public debates (Foot and Walter 2013) and its concordance with national norms (Cortell and Davis 1996).

The latter is one of the elements that have attracted the most attention. Emerging international norms are not diffused in a normative vacuum. They have to integrate the ecosystem of existing domestic norms before they can be assimilated by a state. It seems, for instance, that the Brazilian diplomatic culture, which revolves around the idea of an autonomy-oriented and nationalistic foreign policy, has prevented the full internalization of international climate norms (Vieira 2013).

However, international norms are rarely precise, which sometimes make it difficult to interpret their compatibility or incompatibility with domestic norms. This question can only be settled using an interactive discursive process. National and international norms are constantly shifting and interacting with actors' discourses and practices (Farrell 2001; Blok 2008; Stevenson 2011; Zahar 2012). For example, Japanese society's norm of non-violence is continually interacting with the government's policy on multilateral military operations. This interaction transforms both the

Japanese national norm and the government's understanding of the international norm. The interpretation of each norm is transformed as a result (Berger 1998; Katzenstein 2003; Dobson 2003; Catalinac 2007; Miyagi 2009; Singh 2010).

Norm Diffusion

Research on norms in foreign policy comes up against two major obstacles. First, on an empirical level, several researchers focus on norms that have effectively led to a shift in foreign policy. This emphasis may have been necessary in the 1990s to establish norms as a legitimate object of FPA research, but now it would be useful to further our understanding of normative processes, as well as identify and investigate case studies where norms clash with foreign policy behavior.

Second, on a theoretical level, studies on norms are soon trapped in a circular logic if they argue that norms are guided by dominant behavior, which in turn defines the prevailing norms. Of course, positive feedback loops make norms relatively stable and long-lasting. Norms are strengthened constantly: discourses are reproduced to underpin them, practices validate them and institutions are dedicated to them. However, norms are not external to interactions. It is because they are produced and reproduced socially that they can be created, modified or overturned by actors (Sandholtz 2008; Wiener 2009; Panke and Petersohn 2012).

One method for overcoming these two obstacles is to examine how normative entrepreneurs promote new international norms. This approach offers the significant benefit of recognizing that actors have a degree of autonomy and it allows more linear causal demonstrations.

Research on normative entrepreneurs is centered on two main types of actors. Most studies focus on transnational NGO networks. These networks have managed to stimulate international norms on many issues including on the environment, human rights, disarmament and human security (Sikkink 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Klotz 1995; Price 1997, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999b; Thomas 2001).

Other studies also underline the decisive role of intergovernmental organizations in catalyzing and disseminating norms. The EU is unquestionably the most frequently cited example. It promotes emerging norms among its member states and candidates for EU accession, as well as when dealing with third countries (Finnemore 1993; Adler 1998; Schimmelfennig 1998; Manners 2002; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2003; Sjursen 2006; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Telo 2007; Cao 2009; Greenhill 2010; Rumelili 2011).

However, the role of states as normative entrepreneurs is often overlooked. Only a few studies recognize that states can mobilize their foreign policy to promote new international norms, even in the early stages of norm diffusion. In general, most of these studies consider that once norms are well established domestically, foreign policy can contribute to diffuse them internationally. For example, in the 1950s, Sweden was one of the first to encourage other states to share their revenue with developing countries because the norm of economic solidarity was already firmly established in Swedish political culture (Ingebritsen 2006; Bergman 2007). At the same time, the Indian government's active promotion of non-alignment as a norm among developing countries reflected India's norms of non-intervention and non-violence (Acharya 2011).

Over and above this shift from internal to external, a similar shift can be observed between the levels of negotiation. A state that accepts certain norms on a bilateral level is generally more inclined to promote the same norms on a regional or multilateral level. This behavior can partly be explained by material goals, such as the desire to reduce transactional costs, but also by ideational factors. For example, it is not uncommon for states to think twice before adopting certain trade standards in a bilateral free-trade agreement and then to become firm advocates of those standards during multilateral or regional trade negotiations (Mace and Bélanger 2007).

When a normative state entrepreneur has managed to diffuse the norm that it is advocating, its achievement becomes a source of pride and promoting this international norm becomes a distinctive feature of national identity. Swedish development aid and the Indian non-alignment policy have become an integral part of Swedish and Indian national identity. From this point of view, norms do not solely regulate state behavior; they also contribute to their national identity (Katzenstein 1996).

National Identities

National identity is a socially constructed image that a political community uses to portray itself. It is made up of a set of elements, including constitutive norms, comparative categories, collective aspirations and cognitive references (Abdelal et al. 2006).

It is important not to confuse national identity with what some internationalists in the 1950s called "the national character". National identity

is a social construct, which changes over time as it is continually reproduced. The notion of "national character", however, which is now outmoded, refers to a set of unchanging characteristics, which objectively belong to a nation. Hans Morgenthau relied on this form of outdated essentialism. He attributed mechanical rationality and obsessional formalism to the French, suggesting that this could explain the ups and downs of French foreign policy (2005 [1948]: 141). If we follow this logic of cultural determinism, we might expect the United Kingdom's foreign policy to be phlegmatic, Italy's to be flamboyant, and Canada's to be naive. Obviously, these are just cultural stereotypes tinted with anthropomorphism. As such, they can interfere with cognitive processes, skew perceptions and influence how a foreign policy is formulated when decision-makers are prejudiced against foreign nations. However, these stereotypes do not correspond to the true essence of a nation or to how a nation portrays itself.

Although most contemporary analysts reject this essentialist vision, several debates prevail with regard to how a national identity is formed, its capacity to evolve, the purpose of reproducing it and its relationship to nationalism.

Self and the Other

Most analysts agree with Iver Neumann (1999) that identity is forged by transforming differences into otherness. In other words, the cultural boundary of "self" is defined in relation to how the "other" is represented. The other does not share the characteristics that the "self" attributes to itself. For example, in India under Jawaharlal Nehru, the constitutive otherness of national identity was the British colonial power, whereas for Pakistan under Muhammad Ali Jinnah, it was embodied by Hindu India. These different representations of the "other" help explain why India distanced itself from its former colonial power by playing a key role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, whereas Pakistan used its foreign policy to forge closer links with the West and was unconcerned about losing its identity in the process (Banerjee 1997).

However, constitutive otherness does not necessarily result from a social interaction between the self-defined actor and its counterpart (Hopf 2002; Rumelili 2004). If identity is always relational, then otherness can very well be an imaginary community. The "Anglo-Saxon" world serves as a foil for French identity, although as a strong cultural entity, it no longer shapes American identity (Meunier 2000). Similarly, Israeli identity attributes

anti-Semitism to its neighbors, even those who do not proclaim anti-Semitism (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Stein 2011).

Consequently, even if the image that a community has of itself does not fit the image reflected by the actors that embody otherness, an identity can still be constructed and maintained (Hudson 1999). The United Nations' recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1971 is a striking example of this. To ensure that the event followed in the tradition of China's identity, Beijing has always claimed that the United States felt humiliated after the General Assembly vote. According to the Chinese narrative of the event, the emergence of communist China caused President Nixon to lose face. Yet, the Nixon administration never hid the fact that it wanted to forge closer links with China in order to isolate the USSR. Humiliation was neither felt nor communicated, which did not prevent China from perceiving it or making statements in that sense (Gries 2005).

The otherness that shapes identity can even be represented by an actor that has no genuine personification and zero interaction with the community in the empirical world. Thus, German identity was constructed in response to its own past. Nazi Germany, a warring military power, is the otherness of contemporary Germany, which defines itself as a civil power and as Europe's federating entity (Marcussen et al. 2001; Ashizawa 2008).

However, national identity is not exclusively created by contrasts. Alliances can also contribute to constructing identity. For example, in the nineteenth century, the United States formed a special relationship with its former colonial power, the United Kingdom. The origin of this alliance stems not so much from trade or security rationale, but from a sense of identity or racial logic, where Anglo-Saxon man was a beacon for civilization (Vucetic 2011).

More recently, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States portrayed itself as a fair justice-maker, by forming an alliance with Bosnia's Muslim community. By depicting the Muslim community as a victim and as the last bastion of a multiethnic state, the United States proved to itself that it was at war against all forms of tyranny, even when the oppressor is Christian and the victim is Muslim (Messari 2001).

Similarly, joining an intergovernmental organization is a way of consecrating aspirations of national identity. Since the end of the Cold War, membership of NATO, the EU or the Council of Europe has helped validate the identity of several East European countries (Risse-Kapen 1995), Finland (Arter 1995; Browning 2008), Baltic countries (Berg and Ehin 2009) and Turkey (Rumelili 2011).

Supranational identities are formed gradually, without necessarily replacing national identities. In transatlantic and European cases, these new collective identities have led to the creation of supranational communities. Military conflict within these communities is now as unthinkable as it is within a state (Pouliot 2006). Supranational communities are constructed in contrast to different types of otherness (Bradley 1990; Wendt 1994; Adler and Barnett 1998; Cronin 1999; Mattern 2001).

It is important to recognize that there are multiple overlapping supranational identities. A political community can define itself simultaneously as Arab, clannish, African, agrarian, modern, Mediterranean, Islamic and developing. Samuel Huntington's 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations" was fiercely criticized by political scientists because it conceals the overlap between identities. Huntington only considered a single cultural unit, that of civilization, which he presented as a homogenous block with well-defined fault lines. In reality, identity references do not simply overlap, they may also appear contradictory (Mungiu and Mindruta 2002; Furia and Lucas 2006).

The possibility of combining different supranational identities does not mean that they are quick and easy to construct. Even in Europe, after several decades of European construction, European identity remains fragile, as the Brexit and the rise of Euroscepticism have shown. Yet, it is not for a lack of efforts from the part of political authorities. On several occasions, the European Commission has had to define itself in the face of American otherness because of its environmental and trade policies, particularly on the issues of hormone-treated beef, climate change and genetically modified organisms. Similarly, the European Neighborhood Policy, debates on EU accession and strategic partnership agreements are often used to reinforce European identity in the face of North Africa, Turkey and Russia (Neumann and Welsh 1991; Herrmann et al. 2004; Rumelili 2004, 2011; Jeandesboz 2007; Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008; Rogers 2009; Carta 2012; Morozov and Rumelili 2012).

Therefore, national or supranational identities cannot be declared by simply proclaiming otherness or alliance. If European identity is to mean more than a rallying point for the continent's elite, it must go beyond political statements and be reflected in shared experiences and everyday practices (Wodak et al. 2009). In this context, Christopher Hill states "organizations like Eurovision or UEFA have probably done more to create a sense of shared experience among the peoples of Europe than the rhetoric of a thousand politicians" (2003: 202).

Evolving Identities

Once national identities have been created, they tend to remain stable. They are reproduced daily by political discourses, media culture, education, national holidays, comedies, the development of historic sites and so forth. They are institutionalized and continually reinforced in a dynamic of "path dependency" (Goldstein 1988; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996; Barnett 1999).

Even new identities appear as the inheritors of former identities. This historic foundation is essential if they are to be perceived as legitimate. It facilitates their spread across society and allows them to take hold. New identities have to merge with existing political cultures and institutions. Consequently, they seldom offer more than a reinterpretation of past identities.

American identity was forged with the first puritan colonies. It has evolved by constantly reinterpreting the antagonism between liberty and tyranny, regardless of whether tyranny was incarnated by the Anglican monarchy, European imperialism or communism (Campbell 1992; Peceny 1997). It is not insignificant that in the weeks following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of George W. Bush reinterpreted this duality once again, by presenting terrorists as the enemies of freedom (Ivie and Giner 2007; Sjöstedt 2007; Nabers 2009).

Path dependency explains why identities frequently outlive their original context. German identity, in particular, was remarkably resistant after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Although analysts anticipated a dramatic shift in German foreign policy, it still distinguishes itself with a firm commitment to European integration, an aversion to military offensives and a clear preference for multilateralism. The impact of reunification was tremendous, but not sufficient to destabilize German identity (Berger 1998; Duffield 1999; Banchoff 1999; Rittberger 2001; Harnisch 2001; Marcussen et al. 2001; Weber and Kowert 2007; Malici 2006; Miskimmon 2009).

In some cases, the stability of identity can actually be a handicap and discourses of identity can backfire on their advocates (Schimmelfennig 2001). In 1947, for example, democratic President Truman attempted to persuade Congress, which had a republican majority, to back an American intervention in the Greek Civil War. To achieve this, he rekindled the antagonism between liberty and tyranny, by presenting the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that had to be contained using all possible economic and military means. The Truman doctrine was immediately met with a positive response, which enabled the president to obtain Congress

approval. However, once it took shape and gained recognition, it became a constraint for all Truman's successors. None of them were able to break away from the Truman orthodoxy. Throughout the entire Cold War, American identity was defined as the leader of the free world at war against Soviet imperialism. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, this identity skewed the perception of President Kennedy's advisors. They failed to understand that Castro was only trying to defend himself against a likely attack by the United States. A few years later, this identity led several Americans to take a firm stance against the strategic rapprochement with communist China, which was being orchestrated by Nixon and Kissinger (Weldes 1999; Sjöstedt 2007).

France is also a prisoner of its identity. Since Charles de Gaulle, members of the French political elite have fueled the belief that because of its historical legacy, the "birthplace of human rights" has an almost inalienable right to be seated beside the great powers. The political elite systematically plays down the impact of European integration on the prevailing civilizing and republican dimensions of French identity. Instead, it presents Europe as a springboard that can enhance the French model's prestige and as a bastion against Americanization. Nonetheless, this discourse has lost its power of persuasion, and inconsistencies have gradually appeared. It is getting difficult for the French elite to justify further European integration without upsetting France's traditional identity, which is built on its prominent position in the international community (Cerny 1980; Hoffmann 1991; Gordon 1993; Flynn 1995; Larsen 1997; Risse et al. 1999a, b; Schmidt 2007; Bratberg 2011; Holsti 2011; Krotz and Sperling 2011).

However, national identities are by no means static. Political crises allow new discourses to emerge, as well as new actors and new identities (Marcussen et al. 2001; Mattern 2001; Nabers 2009; Abdelal et al. 2006). Thus, the overthrow of the apartheid regime in 1991 provided the opportunity to rethink South African identity. Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela were actively involved in reconstructing South Africa's identity under the banner "rainbow nation", which promoted diversity and multiculturalism as rallying points. This national reconciliation was reflected in a foreign policy open to all horizons, which involved resuming ties with the West and acting as a mediator in several conflicts (Becker 2010).

Not all crises have such a disruptive impact on identity. The collapse of the USSR provided a major political opportunity, which could have led to a radical shift in Russian identity. However, no credible federating alternative identity emerged in the 1990s. Several points of reference for Russian

identity were ruled out with the end of antagonism with the United States, Ukraine independence, the decline of its great power status and Marxist–Leninist doctrine's loss of credibility. There was no immediate alternative. Since then, Russia has suffered an identity crisis, which apparently it is trying to overcome by deploying a foreign policy that promotes power and independence (Prizel 1998; D'Anieri 2002; Hopf 2002; Larson and Shevcheko 2003; Light 2004; Mankoff 2009; Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist 2009). Moscow's annexation of Crimea, its military operations in Eastern Ukraine and its military involvement in Syria's civil war by supporting Bashar al-Assad are reflections of this revived identity (Zevelev 2016; Tsygankov 2016).

Foreign Policy as Identity Affirmation

From a post-structuralist point of view, foreign policy actually helps define national identity and avoid identity crises. It provides a response to social and state demands for collective identity and helps maintain a degree of social cohesion (Campbell 1992, 1998; Walker 1993; Hansen 2006; Aydin-Düzgit 2013; Hintz 2016).

Post-structuralism goes far beyond Alexander Wendt's constructivism (1999), which claims that identity provides a stable preexisting foundation for building foreign policy. Post-structuralists suggest that identity is not simply a guide of foreign policy, but also its ultimate goal. Foreign policy constantly reproduces national identity so that it remains in place. Without continual replication, national identity would crumble—along with the state on which it was built.

Foreign policy is far more effective at reproducing identity on a continual basis than any other public policy. Post-structuralists argue that foreign policy constructs security threats beyond the state boundaries. Rather than alleviating insecurity, foreign policy constructs it; instead of building bridges, it erects walls. This is the focal point of the most influential post-structuralist critical theories, including the Aberystwyth school's on critical security studies, the Paris school, inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault's research, the Copenhagen school's on securitization, and the Essex school based on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's work (Bradley 1994; Desch 1996; Larsen 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; McSweeney 1999; Weldes et al. 1999; Rasmussen 2001; Zehfuss 2001; Bigo 2006; Balzacq 2011; Weber and Lacy 2011).

For example, after the dissolution of the USSR, Kazakhstan largely built its political identity by rejecting its past along with the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The idea first emerged in civil society and was rapidly endorsed by the state. Kazakhstan's sovereignty involved the construction of a nuclear threat. Its foreign policy constantly reproduces this threat, by promoting a world free of nuclear weapons (Abzhaparova 2011).

The continuous reproduction of identity is necessary because stable national unity is not preexisting to international relations. Nations are "imagined communities", not timeless facts (Anderson 1983). They did not endow themselves with political institutions to guarantee their protection. Instead, states play a key role in nation building by generating a sense of belonging to a community, often through war (Tilly 1985; Ringmar 1996; Fortmann 2009). Therefore, the nation's insecurity provides the basis for state security. Paradoxically, if the state succeeds in cancelling out all threats to its security, it might cease to exist.

Since the Thirty Years' War, states have used military conflict to reproduce national identity and stabilize their hold on power. In recent years, foreign policy has widened its scope of action. Socially constructed frontiers are no longer just geographic: they are also virtual and cultural. In this context, a whole set of actions are used to reproduce national identify, ranging from the expulsion of refugees to subsidies for the cultural industry. They are used, like war, to maintain the frontiers of the political community on which the state is based (Bélanger 1999; Goff 2000).

Post-structuralist theories suggest that the states with the most fragile national identity are the most dynamic when it comes to mobilizing their policies for identity purposes (Posen 1993; van Evera 1994; Lindemann 2011). Several studies on the issue focus on multicultural states. For example, Switzerland seems to maintain cohesion between its cantons by using a distinctive policy of resistance, which is portrayed by its militia army, its policy of neutrality, its restrictive migratory policies and its refusal to join the EU. Canada has succeeded in differentiating itself from the United States and absorbing Quebec nationalism by using its foreign policy to promote multilateralism, universalist principles, peacekeeping and cultural diversity (Chapnick 2000; Thomsen and Hynek 2006; Potter 2008; Gecelovsky 2009).

In FPA, the idea that the state is a fragile construct, which has to be continually reproduced if it is to be maintained, remains marginal. FPA was built on the premise of the state. This assumption has not fundamentally been examined or criticized. When it comes to national identity, post-structuralist and critical theories are challenged by a theory that is more psychological than sociological and more positivist than post-positivist: social identity theory.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory suggests that there is a direct relationship between the strength of identity and aggressive behavior. The theory claims that the need for esteem and appreciation felt by individuals encourages them to have a negative perception of groups that they do not belong to. It also encourages them to blame those groups for their misfortunes and to discriminate against them. Laboratory experiments have shown that this unfavorable bias is generated as soon as groups are created, even if the criterion to distinguish them is as mundane as eye color or the result of a lottery draw (Tajfel and Turner 1986).

Several analysts use social identity theory to explain foreign policy behavior. For example, it can help explain why states that share a supranational identity seem less likely to engage in military combat with each other. A common religion appears to have a very significant pacifying effect, although some statistical evidence remains relatively weak (Henderson 1998; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Kupchan 2010).

Social identity theory can also help explain Western countries' policy of double standards in the face of violations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Western countries generally express a degree of confidence with regard to liberal democracies and minimize the destabilizing impact of their nuclear weapons programs. However, they firmly denounce autocracies' potential nuclear programs, even before their existence is confirmed. In this case, membership of the group of liberal democracies is the discriminating factor (Chafetz 1995).

In addition, social identity theory proposes that negative bias is more pronounced when group identity is strong. This observation seems equally valid at a national level. Indeed, there is a statistically significant relationship between populist nationalism and the severity of military conflict (Cederman et al. 2011). There also appears to be a relationship between the sense of belonging with regard to European identity and opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. Historically, the French elite has been more attached to the European project than the British elite. This made France a fiercer opponent of European expansion than Britain. French citizens felt

more European, they were more likely to perceive Turkey as the other and they were more averse to its integration (Schafer 1999; Curley 2009).

In a notable article, Jonathan Mercer (1995) used social identity theory to contradict Alexander Wendt's hypothesis (1992), according to which "anarchy is what states make of it". In Wendt's view, states construct friendly, hostile or competitive relations, which lead to Kantian, Hobbesian or Lockean anarchy, respectively. According to Mercer, this idea that agents define the structure ignores cognitive constraints. As social identity theory suggests, if most individuals are wary of those who are outside their group, it is not surprising that hostility dominates interstate relations and that Hobbesian anarchy is the rule, rather than the exception. In other words, although Mercer recognizes that agents socially construct the structure, he uses psychosociology to explain the Hobbesian anarchy (see also Mowle 2003).

Mercer's hypothesis does not have unanimous support among advocates of social identity theory. Some scholars point out that mistrust felt toward outsiders is not necessarily reflected by hatred or aggressive behavior (Brewer 2000; Gries 2005). Different opinion polls reveal that patriotic or nationalist feelings are not associated with animosity toward other states, trade protectionism or support for aggressive foreign policies. Some studies even suggest that there is an inverse relationship (Shulman 2000; Gibson 2006; Foster and Keller 2010).

The key to establishing a relationship between the strength of national identity and foreign policy orientation may be to examine intermediary variables and exogenous variables in more detail. For example, according to some studies, threats against an identity do not provoke a response in terms of identity unless they are combined with immediate material threats, such as economic or security threats (Catalinac 2007; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Woodwell 2007; Coş and Bilgin 2010). However, some analysts place these variables in the ideational world, by underlining that only certain discourses or combinations of norms can transform strong national identity into a catalyst for an antagonistic foreign policy (Furtado 1994; Gries 2005; Woodwell 2007).

One thing is certain—identities are variables, which cannot be isolated from their material and ideational environment. For this reason, the concept of "national role" is presented in the next section to facilitate the study of the relationships between national identity and the international environment.

National Roles

A national role can be defined as a set of shared expectations relating to how a state behaves as a function of its position on the international stage. For example, the roles of leader, mediator and protégé have been part of the traditional dramaturgy of international relations for years. These roles prescribe specific behaviors to those who endorse them, and then, their interactions proceed according to fairly predictable scripts. The concept of role makes it possible to establish a bridge between the actor's specificity and the cultural structure in which he evolves (Walker 2011; Brummer and Thies 2015; Benes and Harnisch 2015; Chelotti 2015; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016).

Kal Holsti introduced the concept of role to FPA in the 1970s, by borrowing from psychosociology (Holsti 1970a). Curiously, constructivist theories developed in the 1990s do not acknowledge this conceptual heritage and rarely use it for inspiration. Yet, there is some resemblance between the notion of role and that of identity and norms. Like identity, roles only exist in interaction with a distinct otherness. Like norms, roles prescribe a behavior rather than describe or represent it. Nonetheless, the concept of role is quite distinct from that of identity and norm.

Role Conception

A national role relates to a specific position on the international stage. This position can be geographic, political or social. It can be situated in space (Dodds 1993), on a scale of power (Holsti 1970a, b) or within a group (Harnisch 2011). Each position corresponds to a limited repertoire of roles. For example, during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union had a dominant position in terms of power, which meant that they both played a similar leading character (Wish 1980).

However, the distribution of roles is not determined by objective conditions. The position is a subjective rather than a material fact. For example, France has a military force and a diplomatic service that are disproportionate to its economic weight and security threats. In the eyes of outside observers, there sometimes appears to be a discrepancy between France's presence on the African continent and its resulting strategic and economic benefits. This gap can be explained by subjective conditions. France's military deployment and diplomatic presence reflect the role that France has

shaped for itself and not the role imposed by objective conditions (Gordon 1993; Flynn 1995; Krotz and Sperling 2011; Fordham 2011).

According to Holsti, a national role is primarily conceived on the basis of "[t]he policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems" (1970a, b: 245–246). In this respect, leaders are the main scriptwriters for their state. They define their role on the basis of their own cultural background. This cultural background can be limited to their close-knit guard, although it is usually shared by the country's elite or by the population as a whole (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016).

The endogenous aspect of national role formation may impede communication with different actors who do not always share the same cultural references. Thus, China's role is partly based on a strictly Confucian worldview and on scripts drawn from collective Chinese memory, which only make sense to the Chinese. These cultural roots make Chinese foreign policy difficult for Westerners to grasp. The combination of power and restraint, especially, leaves perplexed observers more familiar with Western powers' interventionism and proselytizing (Shih 1993, 2012; Feng 2007; Deng 2008).

In this context, modifying a national role often stems from an internal change, rather than external pressure. For example, Japan reassessed its role on the international stage between the first Gulf War and the war in Iraq. Unlike most other states, it manifested greater support for the intervention in 2003 than in 1991. This policy change occurred after Japanese decision-makers reviewed Japan's role on the world stage and not because the international context was more favorable to Japanese intervention (Lind 2004; Catalinac 2007).

Roles also depend on how political leaders perceive the international environment. Marijke Breuning (1995) and Philippe Le Prestre (1997) each developed a typology of roles based on this perception of the international system. In Breuning's typology, the roles of "good neighbor" and "activist" can only be taken on by actors who perceive the international system as being more organized than chaotic. In Le Prestre's typology, the roles of "catalyst" and "stabilizer" are only possible if the system is perceived as restrictive rather than lax.

According to role theory, one of the fundamental states' objectives is to impose their self-defined role on the public and other actors. During a theater performance, the different actors interact continually and exchange

cues with the audience, which allows them to adapt their play. These cues operate in the same way as feedback, reinforcing the roles that meet expectations and sanctioning those that deviate from the expected script (Walkers 1979, 1987).

For example, the Soviet Union initially defined its role as liberator and promoter of a new order. However, countries in Eastern Europe regularly reflected an image of imperial Russia, which forced the Soviet Union to redefine itself (Hopf 1998). Similarly, the EU cast itself as a normative power with a duty to adjudicate in the international arena. However, this role is not recognized by emerging countries, which perceive the EU as an accessory that France and Germany can hide behind. This negative feedback forced the EU to reconsider its role (Elgström and Smith 2006; Bengtsson and Elgström 2012; Morozov and Rumelili 2012).

The public can also influence the scripts by expressing preferences and reacting to the actors' performances. The public in the United States is particularly influential when it comes to local conflicts, such as the one in Northern Ireland (Grove and Carter 1999) or South Ossetia (Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist 2009). The United States was not directly involved in these conflicts, but the actors involved were fully aware that they were being watched closely. Even when the public is passive, simply being in the public eye is generally sufficient to guarantee a degree of coherence and continuity when it comes to role conception.

In this strategic, interactional and social logic, an actor wishing to redefine its role sometimes has to modify the whole scenario, including the other actors' roles. One of the strategies to achieve this is to interact with the other actors as if they were already playing their new roles. In this way, Gorbachev attempted to switch the role of the United States from a rival to aid donor, by behaving as if Washington suddenly no longer represented a threat and by unilaterally reducing the Soviet arsenal. Gorbachev's policies ultimately put an end to the Cold War, giving all the actors the chance to redefine their roles (Wendt 1992: 421).

Nonetheless, sudden shifts in scripts are rare. Generally, the feedback and the adjustments that take place lead to a gradual convergence between the role, as conceived by the actor, and expectations that the audience and other actors have with regard to that role. There is a convergence toward a common intersubjective reality (Chafetz et al. 1996; Harnisch 2012). The survey conducted by Valerie Hudson (1999) in Russia, Japan and the United States reveals that the expectations with regard to a particular state's behavior are shared by the nationals of that state, as well as by foreigners.

Roles as Foreign Policy Guides

Some researchers are more interested in the impact of national roles on foreign policy than in how they are conceived. Most studies on the subject confirm that states generally behave in accordance with their role description. For example, Stephen Walker (1979) used Holsti's discourse analysis to illustrate role conception for 71 states. He observed a strong similarity with behaviors encoded in the WEIS database. Naomi Bailin Wish (1980) also observed a similarity between the roles expressed by 29 political leaders from 17 different states and behaviors transcribed in the CREON database. These results support Kal Holsti's conclusion that "the pattern of role conceptions for any state is a fair indicator and possible predictor of diplomatic involvement" (1970a, b: 288).

Occasionally, an actor deviates from the script, but this is usually only temporary. This occurred in Ukraine at the end of the Cold War. After a period of hesitation, Ukraine finally resolved to abandon the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union because it lacked the necessary stature for taking on the role of nuclear power (Chafetz et al. 1996).

However, role theory is neither mechanical nor deterministic. Roles are played in an irregular way. The actor always has some scope to interpret its role (Hollis and Smith 1986). The same role played by two different actors will be interpreted differently. For example, the role of higher-up official is quite different in France and Japan, irrespective of whether it relates to authority, responsibility or empathy. These different approaches are manifest in France and Japan's foreign policy, even when they both assign themselves similar roles (Sampson and Walker 1987). Similarly, the cultural image that the French and Germans have of a leader differs on several counts. This divergence is reflected in their behavior on the European scene (Aggestam 2004). The cultural differences between France and the United States are also manifest in the way they both play messianic roles as liberator and beacon for human rights in developing countries (Holsti 2011).

The question of how states behave when they have assumed contradictory roles is more sensitive. States play several roles on several stages simultaneously. Kal Holsti, who developed a typology with 17 different roles, observes that states take on at least 4.6 roles (1970a, b). The more active a country, the more likely it is to have numerous roles. Yet, some roles may be contradictory. If a state plays these roles on different stages, they can coexist without interfering with one another. However, when events cause different stages to overlap, the state has to find a trade-off between its roles or try to merge them to create a new one.

Saudi Arabia was forced to take a stand when there was a military action against Iraq. Riyad was torn between its roles of US ally, pillar of Arabism and jealous sovereign state (Barnett 1993). In times of economic crises, the United States is split between its hegemonic role, which must guarantee the international system's stability, and that of unipolar power, which can unilaterally adopt protectionist measures (Cronin 2001). Similarly, during the Falklands War, the United Kingdom had to choose between its role as colonial power or guarantor of stability (McCourt 2011). At the end of the Cold War, Germany was plunged into a dilemma between its leading role in greater European integration and that of a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe (Tewes 1998).

Potential conflicts between different roles significantly reduce roles' predictive capacity. In fact, future research on roles in FPA will have to identify conditions that determine why one role takes precedence over another. Clearly, factors such as the historical context of a specific position, other actors' signals and public demands all influence the trade-offs between different roles.

Gender

Gender constitutes both an identity and a social role. For example, a feminine identity can be broken down into different social roles depending on whether the interlocutor is an aggressor, a child, a victim, a lover or a father. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the concept of gender has followed the concepts of identity and role and that it has been transposed from a level of interpersonal relationships to one of interstate relations. Authors who transpose the concept of gender in this way to shed new light on foreign policy are usually qualified as "feminists"—although some of them reject this label.

Women, Femininity and Feminism

Feminist theory in international relations is extremely rich and diverse. It includes liberal, Marxist, psychoanalytical, post-structuralist, environmentalist and post-colonialist branches. Not all feminists focus their research on the notion of gender. However, those who do, systematically underline the distinction between the notions of gender and sex (Shepherd 2010).

While sex determines the categories of "man" and "woman" on the basis of biological characteristics, the notion of gender offsets masculinity

and femininity on the basis of socially constructed intersubjective realities. Sex is innate, whereas gender is presumed to be acquired and cultural. Feminists working on gender, such as Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe and Jean Elshtain, firmly reject the essentialist idea that sex determines social behavior.

Although femininity and masculinity are not determined by nature, women and men do not move between genders with total freedom. On the contrary, in the feminists' view, genders are social categories that are so omnipresent and so deeply rooted that their structural impact is concealed by what appears to be a natural order. Feminine and masculine categories are rarely acknowledged or called into question. In the absence of critical thought on gender in the discursive landscape, the tendency is to reproduce inequalities and maintain the dominant patriarchal structures.

On the other hand, feminists consider that emancipation from dominant structures is possible. Genders do not inevitably represent a social category. Indeed, they vary according to cultures, in both time and space. For example, the 1980s were marked by the triumph of masculinity, as much in popular culture as in foreign policy, before it declined somewhat in the 1990s (Jeffords 1993). The United States tends to value masculinity and favor a masculine identity in foreign policy more than North European countries (Richey 2001).

Several critical feminists defend the social ideal of gender reconciliation. In general, greater gender equality is associated with a foreign policy that strikes a better balance between behaviors that are socially considered masculine, like confrontation and trade, and behaviors attributed to femininity, such as aid and cooperation (Goldstein 2002; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Neocleous 2013).

Nonetheless, several feminists consider that integrating more women in the foreign policy decision-making process is not sufficient to achieve this goal. Men still represent the majority in official decision-making circles, such as military staff, ministerial cabinets or parliamentary bodies. Until recently, women mainly played roles that were influential, but ignored, minimized or ridiculed, like that of ambassador's spouse, minister's secretary, peaceful activist or prostitute for military expatriates (Enloe 1989, 1993; Moon 1997). However, this asymmetric status between roles attributed to men and women is not the cause, but the symptom of the cultural problem that interests feminists.

In fact, presuming that a woman who is foreign minister would naturally favor a less aggressive foreign policy than a man does not undermine the gender structure—it actually reproduces it (Tickner 2002). It conveys the traditional discourse, which associates women with peace and places them politically on an inferior level compared to men.

This discourse does not really correspond to empirical reality either. Opinion polls clearly indicate that women are generally less in favor of military spending (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012) and less favorable to the use of military force than men (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Eichenberg 2016). Nonetheless, several women heads of state, such as Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher and Golda Meir, proved to be just as aggressive as men and played rather masculine roles when conducting their foreign policy (Cohn 1993). Even the mothers, daughters and spouses that remain in the shadow of foreign policy sometimes adopt behavior and discourses that are more aggressive than is generally expected of them (Elshtain 1995; Tessler et al. 1999).

Nation and State in the Feminist Grammar

Feminists claim that the most important prerequisite to emancipation from gender structural constraints is actually recognizing that they exist. To achieve this, gender should be considered like a grammar whose rules split the world of possibilities into dichotomies. A number of opposites can be added to the masculine/feminine pair, such as strong/weak, active/passive, rational/emotional, violence/compassion, objective/subjective, Western/Eastern, war/peace, modernity/tradition, extravert/introvert, internal/external, culture/nature, mature/immature, autonomy/dependence, high politics/low politics, soiled/pure, having/being, cold/hot, civilized/savage, national/international, thoughtful/impulsive, exclusive/inclusive, taking/giving and superior/inferior. Not only is the world described and perceived in terms of these dichotomies, they are all linked through grammatical gender.

Under this lens, foreign policy, especially security policy, appears to be a typically masculine field. It involves cold and rational behavior, as well as a quest for power and independence. In international relations, conflicts are the norm and demonstrations of force are socially expected. In contrast, domestic policies appear to be a feminine prerogative. They require compassion and solidarity, particularly through education, health and social security policies (Grant 1991; Tickner 1992).

Iconography and discourse analysis show that when it comes to social representation, a nation generally assumes feminine characteristics.

Marianne, Athena, Germania, Europa, Italia Turrita, Mother Russia and Britannia are some of the allegorical figures that personify the essence of a nation. They are the guardians of culture, and they guarantee the metaphorical transmission of traditions and collective memory from generation to generation. The "mother country" bequeaths to its children not only a "mother" tongue, but also a collective identity, which calls for "fraternal" behavior between citizens. Despite this apparently edifying representation, feminists clearly point out that the nation is rooted in and confined to a territory. In Western diplomacy's imagination, the nation only relates to other nations via the intermediary of the state's authoritative male figure (Peterson 1995).

According to this feminist approach to social representations, when a nation with feminine traits is threatened by foreign powers, the male state has the duty to protect it. Nothing is more effective in the call to arms than the "rape" of a national territory by foreigners. However, security concerns can equally be used to justify subservience. When a state offers security guarantee in return for absolute subordination, it is behaving exactly like a pimp (Peterson 1992; Pettman 1996; Hooper 2001; Wilcox 2009).

Foreign States and Nations

According to the gender reading of foreign policy, a state's relationship to foreign populations is particularly complex. When at war, a state generally tries to ensure that its strikes are limited to the enemy's male personae. Foreign state apparatus and *a fortiori* the military are the first targets. On the other hand, civilians, whether men or women, are traditionally represented as feminine. They are perceived as weak and passive or unaware of their own interests because they are the victims of their own state's manipulation. Consequently, they should benefit from immunity, unlike military men and women. This distinction between the military and civilians is unwittingly reflected in the discrimination between men and women and is even institutionalized in international law (Kinsella 2005; Carpenter 2006).

Some conflicts are so violent and passionate that civilian immunity is ignored. According to feminists, attacking civilians is tantamount to emasculating the enemy. Systematic rape, as practiced by soldiers during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was not only a reproduction of the subordination of women on an interpersonal level, but also an attempt to feminize the masculine enemy by demonstrating its incapacity to protect its own population. To some extent, the forced feminization of Bosnia Herzegovina seems

to have persisted after the war. Bosnia Herzegovina still appears to be weak and incapable of guaranteeing its own destiny without the protection of a High Representative appointed by the UN (Hansen 2006; Helms 2008).

When acts of violence target civilians, the response of third states may vary as a function of the conflict's nature. During civil conflict, non-intervention is the traditional practice of third parties. International violence calls for coordinated third-party intervention, whereas violence that involves a state against its own population is condemned in the discourses, but often ignored in practice. From the feminists' point of view, the duty to intervene in civil conflicts, like the repression of domestic violence, is a relatively recent idea that remains fragile. Irrespective of the level of analysis, the taboo surrounding private violence persists and public authorities often choose to ignore it (Tickner 1992).

On the other hand, if a conflict has an international dimension, an attack on civilians can help justify military intervention. For example, the Taliban regime's oppression of women helped to justify NATO intervention in Afghanistan. The war on terrorism was gradually amalgamated with the fight for women's dignity, both in political discourse and the media. Images promoted by NATO forces and diffused in the media often contrast armed and bearded Taliban men with Afghan schoolgirls, smiling under the protection of NATO soldiers. According to several feminists, this paternalistic stance helped justify NATO's security policy and enabled the United States to reconstruct its masculinity, which had been shattered by the castrating collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 (Cloud 2004; Stabile and Kumar 2005).

Paradoxically, attempts to value the role of Afghan women only served to reproduce gender patterns. Even development aid policies that target women, such as establishing micro-credit systems, aid for family planning or nutritional education, are based on assistance. They presuppose that Westerners are the sole bearers of expert knowledge and that foreign women are dependent, passive and ignorant. Feminists consider that this form of development aid largely reproduces traditional structures. Rather than encouraging gender equality, it reinforces the gender identity of aid donors (Richey 2001; Brenner 2009; Naylor 2011).

In a controversial book, Cynthia Weber argues that the goal of American foreign policy with regard to Cuba is specifically to strengthen the United States' male identity (1999). Until the 1959 revolution, Cuba had a female identity in American minds. It was a pleasure island, associated with casinos, music, rum, sex and cigars. The United States could

justifiably consider it as a conquest, because Battista's regime was in their grip and benefited from Washington's largesse. Yet, this symbol of exoticism and eroticism was brutally distorted when Fidel Castro came to power with his shaggy beard, military uniform, passionate speeches and Soviet missiles, which were pointing at Washington. The United States' prostitute suddenly disclosed its hyper-masculinity. The mere presence of this transgender island just a few kilometers away from the Florida Peninsula was a threat to America's sexual identity. According to Weber, Castro did no less than castrate the United States' masculinity. Consequently, throughout the Cold War, Washington's reaction was homophobic. It sought to bring Cuba back to its traditional femininity through clandestine operations and embargoes, but it carefully avoided a direct confrontation with this "unidentified sexual object" for fear of being soiled. In Weber's view, this feminist narrative of American foreign policy, which is unusual and surprising, is emancipating because it reveals both the omnipresence and the superficiality of gender relations.

Not everyone shares Weber's opinion. Some analysts criticize the interpretative approach used by Weber and other feminists. Robert Keohane made a serious attempt to integrate feminism in the dominant epistemic school of thought. He pointed out that feminism could help redefine the concept of power, not in terms of relative control over other actors, but as the potential for collective gain and fulfillment (1989). However, several feminists fiercely rejected Keohane's invitation to join the ranks of positivism. Tickner claimed that traditional theorists "simply don't understand" the feminist project (1997) and that they "may not ever understand" (2010). Weber went even further by denouncing Keohane for infantilizing feminists with his paternalistic attitude, sermons and encouragement (1994).

In fact, most feminists consider that the discipline of international relations is profoundly patriarchal (Cohn 1987; Tickner 1988, 1992). It is a "hard" discipline, based on actor's rationality, obsessed by quantitative methods that give the illusion of controlling the world. Realism, in particular, conveys a genuine misogynist vision. It rejects moral arguments by insisting on the distinction between national and international policies. It suggests that the international system is anarchic, focuses on state actors and only acknowledges relative gains. Morgenthau's definition of power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (1948: 13), as well as Waltz's classic book *Man, the State and War* (1959), is particularly revealing with regard to their misogynous bias.

Therefore, relations between feminists and icons of classic international relations theories are extremely antagonistic. Nonetheless, most scholars who are dubious about the empirical proof of some feminist research actually recognize that their questions stimulate fundamental critical reflection on the sociology of international relations (Sorenu 2010).

Organizational and Strategic Cultures

Culture has multiple levels, which overlap. Some of the cultural elements presented in this chapter are shared by an entire political community, or even by an entire civilization. Other elements have a narrower scope limited to one organization.

An organizational culture is an integrated system of social constructs, including causal beliefs, normative principles, rituals and discourses, which are specific to an organization, be it a ministry, an army corps or even an intergovernmental organization. Members of an organization share a specific approach when it comes to interpreting their environment and understanding their role.

Research on organizational culture in FPA has emphasized international security issues, otherwise known as "strategic culture". Strategic culture, however, is not necessarily bounded by the borders of an organizational culture. Another line of research on organizational culture has centered on economic doctrines. In particular, studies have focused on post-war Keynesian theory (Ruggie 1982; Hall 1997), *dependencia* in Latin American countries (Sikkink 1991), neo-liberalism in the 1980s (Rohrlich 1987; Hall 1993; Golob 2003) and regionalism (McNamara 1998; Hay and Rosamond 2002). Here again, it is important to note that not all studies on economic doctrines are centered on organizational cultures. Whether the focus is on security or the economy, research on organizational culture revolves around three main topics: (1) conditions for change, (2) how different organizations interact (3) and the causal relationship between foreign policy behavior and culture.

Stability of Organizational Cultures

Most studies on organizational cultures point out that they are remarkably stable. For example, for over a century, the United States' strategic culture has revolved around the idea that spreading democracy is favorable to international stability and, therefore, to national security. This idea definitely

shifted between President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points and the Bush administration's efforts to establish democracy in Afghanistan, but a certain ideological continuity is undeniable (Anthony 2008).

On the contrary, some ideas, which may seem momentarily omnipresent, never succeed in becoming firmly rooted in organizational culture over time. These ideas may be propounded by a small number of thinkers or result from a specific context, but they evaporate when the conditions leading to their emergence dissipate. This was the case with the concept of "human security", which was central to Canada's foreign policy for a few years. It was relegated to second place with the departure of the influential foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. The idea of "controlled globalization" suffered the same fate in Europe. It was advocated by Pascal Lamy when he was the European Trade Commissioner, but disappeared from the Commission's discourse when he left (Meunier 2007).

Several processes contribute to the stability of organizational cultures. First, at the recruitment stage, organizations attract and select candidates who already appreciate their mission. The army has little vocational appeal for pacifist activists, and ministries of trade rarely recruit Marxist thinkers. Therefore, civil servants working from the same organization rarely reflect the diversity of the population that they come from.

For example, for many years, the Canadian diplomatic service was largely made up of Anglo-Saxon men with urban backgrounds, who had graduated from foreign universities and were economically well off. In comparison, when the Canadian International Development Agency was founded in 1968, it attracted a number of French speakers with a community background, who were critical of American foreign policy. Thus, before even joining a specific ministry, candidates often share a common subculture (Lyon and Brown 1977; Granatstein 1982).

Subsequently, throughout their career, members of an organization are constantly socialized to their organizational culture. The same discourses and practices are continually reproduced. This constant reinforcement, which is characteristic of any organization, is even more flagrant in the diplomatic service and the military corps. Expatriation or life at a military base isolates diplomats and soldiers from the cultural diversity of their country of origin and encourages a feeling of cohesion in the face of the outside world (Neumann 2007; Lequesne and Heilbronn 2012).

Furthermore, some organizations deliberately encourage this tendency for cultural withdrawal. Cohesion is considered necessary for the coherence of overseas representation and for the efficacy of military operations.

Diplomatic services and the armed forces often insist on their members' assimilation and homogenization. Several have their own training services and are reluctant to let civil servants from other ministries join their ranks.

Even organizations that have established policies to promote a degree of ideological diversity struggle to achieve their goals. Multiplying recruitment methods and establishing procedures to allow civil servants to express their dissent usually fall short of breaking the cohesion of an organizational culture (Gurman 2011).

In this context, it is not surprising that members of the same organization hold the same view, adopt the same discourse and use the same routine gestures. Neutrality can be inconceivable in a culture that values alliances; measures of protection against internal threats can be overlooked if the culture focuses on external threats; and the idea of disarmament can be unthinkable in a culture that promotes offensive action.

As a result of this stability, organizational cultures are often out of synch with their environment. There are numerous examples of this. In Europe, just before the outbreak of the First World War, European military forces were so ingrained with a culture lauding offensive action that they failed to realize that new technologies would lead to trench warfare (Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984). In the Soviet Union, organizational culture was so hermetic to change that it went through decades of economic austerity before the advent of Gorbachev when major reforms were made (Blum 1993; Checkel 1993; Mendelson 1993; Stein 1994; Evangelista 1995). In Canada, peacekeeping is so rooted in organizational culture that the Canadian army's engagement in Afghanistan provoked a genuine crisis of legitimacy when the gap between discourses and practice became virtually untenable. In the United States, the interstate paradigm is so entrenched in the intelligence services that neither the end of the Cold War, nor the terrorist attacks on 9/11 were sufficient to lead to a genuine review of security centered on transnational threats (Parker and Stern 2002; Zegart 2007; Sjöstedt 2007).

Although organizational cultures might be stable, they are by no means eternal. Several studies focus specifically on understanding the conditions for cultural change. Most scholars agree that organizational cultures evolve gradually through action, combined with long periods of gestation in terms of ideas and one-off events, which destabilize the existing institutions. Traumatic shocks, such as wars or economic crises, provide political opportunities. Thus, ideas that are already circulating on the fringes of an organizational culture can be integrated and lead to adjustments. America's trade culture has developed in this way since the Second World War. It has slowly

integrated protectionist and regionalist ideas as successive economic crises have occurred, but without ever denying its multilateral liberal heritage. The result may look like incoherent bricolage, but it can be explained by deep institutional attachments and a series of ideational adjustments. Despite some upheavals, the United States has been attached to a multilateral economic system that it helped to establish (Goldstein 1988; Ruggie 1993; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Busby and Monten 2008).

In the same vein, the process of forming a common strategic culture in Europe has attracted considerable expert attention. A common strategic culture is considered to be a prerequisite for establishing a strong European security policy. It is widely acknowledged that the policy will take shape gradually over time. However, there is still some debate about the state of progress of the cultural convergence and how much resistance is exerted by national organizations (Cornish and Edwards 2001 and 2005; Meyer 2006; Mérand 2008; Rogers 2009; Biava 2011).

Interactions between Organizational Cultures

Apart from the question of change and continuity, a burgeoning line of research focuses on the question of interaction between different organizational cultures. Indeed, a state is a conglomerate of different organizations, each with its own culture. At the heart of America's bureaucratic apparatus, the CIA's organizational culture is not the same as that of the FBI, even though their missions overlap (Hook 2008).

When important decisions are made, such as whether or not to intervene in an armed conflict, different organizational cultures may clash. Conventional wisdom suggests that the armed forces prefer massive and decisive military intervention, which maximizes the chances of victory, whereas diplomatic services prefer incremental intervention, which can be used in the framework of a negotiation. For example, there is frequent tension between the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former usually advocates a firm attitude, and the latter a more conciliatory approach (Johnston 1995a; Ripley 2002).

However, it would be too much of a caricature to believe that the military always prefers an offensive or aggressive policy. Several historical examples illustrate that the military is sometimes more reluctant to use armed force than civil authorities. This was the case in France during the interwar period and in the United States after the terrorist attacks in 2001 (Kier 1997).

In addition, there may be several subgroups and dissension within the same organization. Despite being in the army, submariners and paratroopers do not always share the same strategic culture and may have different attitudes and preferences. In fact, it is quite common for the different army corps to establish contrasting organizational identities (Legro 1997).

An organization can even be sensitive to several different cultural tendencies. In Canada, the ministry of foreign affairs is simultaneously permeated by pro-European, pro-continental and pro-international movements, which generate a polymorphic organizational culture (Paquin 2009; Paquin and Beauregard 2013). Similarly, in Italy, nationalist, Atlanticist and pro-European tendencies cross continually and have done for the last century (Brighi 2006). Statements made by political leaders may give the impression that leaders are driven by one trend at a time. However, beneath the superficial fluctuations, different ideological tendencies evolve in parallel.

In fact, the cultures of two organizations from two distinct states may have more in common than the culture of two organizations from the same state. An agency that provides aid to developing countries is probably culturally closer to an equivalent agency in a foreign state than to the ministry of international trade from the same country (Zimmerman 1973). It can be striking to observe that professionals working in the same field, but for different governments, use the same vocabulary and share common rituals and practices, while these cultural elements are foreign to their colleagues in other bureaucratic units. Transgovernmental communities are sometimes established (Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004), some of which can be qualified as communities of practices (Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008, 2016).

Nonetheless, these similarities can conceal significant differences. One of the first contributions made by research on strategic culture in FPA revealed cultural differences between equivalent American and Soviet organizations. The American army clung to the doctrine of rational dissuasion and focused on the question of capacities, while the Soviet army developed a preference for preventive attack and operational planning. Even now and for relatively technical matters involving small organizations in constant interaction, strategic culture differs significantly from one country to another (Snyder 1977; Booth 1979; Gray 1981; Krause 1999).

Strategic Culture

The approach was pioneered by Snyder (1977) and Gray (1981) and gained fresh impetus after the Cold War with research by Johnston (1995), Legro (1997) and Kier (1997). The concept of strategic culture adapts to different levels of analysis, and some authors include social dynamics, which are not formally organized.

Strategic culture focuses on the impact of collective ideas shared by governments' elites on foreign and defense issues. It is an "attempt to integrate cultural considerations, cumulative historical memory and their influences in the analysis of states' security policies and international relations" (Al-Rodhan 2015). This concept is essentially an analytical tool that helps to identify a state's patterns of behavior in foreign and security policy.

Gaullism in France and Atlanticism in the United Kingdom can be assimilated to core post–Second World War strategic cultures. For decades, these cultures have impregnated their foreign and defense policies. Gaullism was a cornerstone of France's foreign and security policies during and even after the Cold War. It was the combination of the idea of "grandeur", independence and resistance to US hegemony in Europe and in the world (Kolodziej 1974; Treacher 2011). This strategic culture led President Charles de Gaulle to remove French military forces from NATO's integrated command in 1966 and to ask for NATO forces to leave French territory. As for Atlanticism in the United Kingdom, it was the idea of maintaining close relationship with the United States to guarantee US security presence in Europe against the Soviet Union as well as British influence on the world stage in the post-1945 era (Wallace and Oliver 2005; Paquin and Beauregard 2015). This strategic culture remained influential after the Cold War. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for instance, invested energy and political capital to be as close as possible to the Bush administration in the early 2000s even if he did not always share the same political views (Wallace and Oliver 2005). Moreover, Atlanticism often confounds with the notion of "bridging", which aims at keeping a strong connection between American and European counterparts in order to preserve harmonious transatlantic relations (Andrews 2005; Walt 2005).

Jack Snyder came up with the concept of strategic culture in the 1970s while writing an analysis on the Soviet strategic culture commissioned by the Rand Corporation, an influential think tank in the United States. Snyder explained in his analysis that:

> Soviet decisionmakers (and American decisionmakers, for that matter) do not characteristically approach issues posed by technological change as though they were culture-free systems analysts and game theoreticians. Preexisting strategic notions can strongly influence doctrinal and organizational adaptation to new technologies. (Snyder 1977: 9)

This quote from Snyder's analysis summarizes the main contribution of the strategic culture literature: it offers a relevant criticism of rational choice analysis, which is the core assumption of strategic studies. Proponents of strategic culture argue that states are not ahistorical and rationalist actors trying to maximize their utility based on available information but rather that cultural determinants present in a state will give meaning to objective and materialist variables (Johnston 1995b: 34). As a result, strategic culture suggests that when placed in similar situations, "elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices" (Johnston 1995: 35).

Bloomfield and Nossal (2007) show, for example, that despite being similar countries with respect to colonial past, institutions, language, level of power and military alliances, Canada and Australia did not always make the same strategic calculations in foreign and defense policies. Contrary to Canada, Australia supported US unilateral interventions in places like Vietnam and Iraq. To paraphrase Snyder, this is because Canadian and Australian foreign policy elites are not culture-free agents or computers with legs. They are guided by their respective cumulative memories, political experiences and geographic realities, which all interfere in the rational calculations of their respective foreign policy elites.

Strategic Cultures and Practices

Despite this progress, there is an ongoing conceptual and methodological debate in research on strategic culture, which may seem archaic in the eyes of anthropologists and sociologists. This debate relates to the relationship between strategic culture and foreign policy behavior. It has crystallized around the 20-year-old debate between Colin Gray and Alastair Iain Johnston, which has yet to be resolved.

In Alastair Iain Johnston' view, differentiating between culture and practices is essential. A strategic culture can be translated into an explanatory model to account for states' preferences. To this end, Johnston opts for a limited definition of strategic culture, which only includes symbols. In his words, it is an integrated:

> [s]ystem of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. (Johnston 1995b: 46)

This limited definition enables a closer examination of the relationships of causality with foreign policy behavior. Thus, Johnston identified a correlation between China's realist strategic culture and its increasing tendency to resort to force during territorial disputes (1995a).

This rather positivist view, however, was contested by Colin Gray (1999), who maintains that Johnston made a mistake by separating ideas from behavior for the sake of generating falsifiable theory. By defining strategic culture as an explanatory variable and by inclining toward causality, the concept of strategic culture inevitably leads to circular reasoning. A strategic culture cannot be simultaneously a cause and an effect (i.e. states' behavior produces strategic cultures and strategic cultures explain states' behavior). From this perspective, research on strategic culture can only improve our understanding of the general context of a foreign policy decision, but cannot explain it.

This problem of circularity has pushed some analysts away from studying strategic cultures, while led others to lower their theoretical claims. Gray suggests that a more contextual or interpretative definition of strategic culture is in order. He emphasizes that strategic culture results from a co-constitutional process that runs between political elites and the dominant structure of ideas (Gray 1999). This interpretative vision led Gray to define strategic culture as "socially transmitted ideas, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a necessarily unique historical experience" (Gray 1999: 51–52). What is certain is that strategic culture is a contentious concept, which remains at the center of an epistemological debate between positivists and interpretivists (Haglund 2004). Some entertain the hope to turn this concept into a causal theory, but establishing causal relationships between culture and practices remains risky. Others think that it should simply be understood as a contextual analytical tool. An increasing number of analysts recognize that practices and discourses, far from being contradictory, overlap and interact continually to form a cultural whole (Duffield 1999; Neumann and Heikka 2005; Bloomfield and Nossal 2007).

Discourse

Several studies on culture in foreign policy are based on discourse analysis. Undoubtedly, this is not the only pertinent methodological approach. Other methods, including content analysis, participant observation, opinion polls and laboratory experiments, can also further our understanding of culture in foreign policy (Abdelal et al. 2006; Paquin 2012; Paquin and Beauregard 2015). However, discourse analysis has a central and increasingly important position in FPA. Its popularity is linked to the fact that it is not just a method, but a theoretical rallying point common to several approaches, including constructivism, post-structuralism, discursive institutionalism and neo-Gramscian Marxism.

Discourse as a Field of Interaction

In spite of or because of the growing interest in discourse analysis, there is no consensual definition about what constitutes a discourse. Nevertheless, everyone recognizes that discourses are social practices. They do not refer to objects that exist independently of social relations, but they convey intersubjective interpretations that give meaning to objects.

The meaning of "conventional weapon" and "weapon of mass destruction", for example, is shared by all weapons experts. Yet, there is nothing natural or obvious about them. A car is not considered to be a conventional weapon and an airplane is not considered to be a weapon of mass destruction. Yet, that is not because their material properties prevent them from being defined as such. It is because these meanings are not attributed to them by the social and cultural contexts (Price 1997; Mutimer 2000).

For discourse analysts, the reality beyond the discourse is not relevant for understanding foreign policy. Like missiles or freight cargoes, the material realities of foreign policy can exist independently of discourse and thought. However, without discourse, the world has no meaning and, therefore, cannot be studied by social sciences. It is the discourse that gives meaning to statements.

Therefore, a discourse is a combination of different meanings, some of which may be implicit. For example, President Bush's discourse on the "war on terror" is the result of a unique combination of a specific idea of war and a specific idea of terrorism. The social reproduction of this combination initially constructs the discourse on the war on terror and then stabilizes it (Heng 2002; Jackson 2005; Croft 2006; Dryzek 2006; Nabers 2009; Holland 2012).

Several discourses even generate ambiguity, which means that different interpretations can coexist. They are riddled with empty signifiers, such as "governance", "equity" or "democracy". These signifiers make it possible to link disparate ideas and engage actors that would otherwise be irreconcilable. The discourses in Beijing and Taipei relating to the Chinese nation and the status of Taiwan generate confusion. Consequently, both can affirm their respective identity and avoid a clash. A similar ambiguity characterizes several discourses on the European security policy, which means it is open to different interpretations in Paris, Berlin and London (Zheng 2001; Howorth 2004; Avruch and Wang 2005; Rogers 2009).

Although discourses are ambiguous, they do provide a framework. Their rules determine what can be thought and stated. By giving meaning to an object and putting that meaning in a broader context, a discourse defines the parameters in terms of the possibilities of thought and action in relation to that object. Even democracies that promote the plurality of opinion are constrained, in reality, by their own discourse on ethical pluralism (Gaskarth 2006).

Thus, different discourses on Iraq and North Korea led the Bush administration to adopt different policies with regard to the two countries. In 2003, Iraq and North Korea alike had equally repressive regimes. They both appeared on the list of states that support terrorism, were suspected of developing a nuclear weapons program and refused inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet, the United States only used military force against Iraq. This inconsistent behavior can be explained in part by the fact that since the early 1990s, the White House systematically challenged Iraq with a confrontational discourse, whereas the discourse on North Korea was one of negotiation. After more than a decade of reproducing these discourses, the actions envisaged for one country were inconceivable for the other (Howard 2004).

Furthermore, discourses are productive. They do not simply impede thought and perception; they directly construct reality, by generating subjects, objects and the relations linking the two. For example, the discourse on the right to asylum developed after the Second World War created the contemporary identities of refugees and the regions that welcomed them. Like many discourses, it was institutionalized in diverse forms, including organizations, law and social norms (Phillips and Hardy 1997).

Several studies on FPA examine the performative dimension of discourses using securitization theory, which was developed by the Copenhagen school of thought around researchers like Ole Waever (Buzan et al. 1998).

According to the Copenhagen school, political leaders actually construct state security or rather its insecurity, through discourse. Securing an object is a speech act. When an official declares "I pronounce you man and wife", they are not simply describing a situation, but transforming it. Similarly, when a decision-maker states that immigration or climate change threatens state security, they help create that very threat.

Securing an object does not exclude it from political debate. Discourses are likely to be modified by actors because they combine different ideas and remain ambiguous. Their interactive dimension can be added to their substantive dimension. Discourses favor some actors, but they are also a space where struggles and conflicts arise. Meanings may be disputed or vindicated. As interactions occur, discursive elements are gradually added, removed or reinterpreted. In this perspective, discourses are not a vague reflection of society, but the actual setting for social interaction (Schmidt 2008, 2010).

Political leaders sometimes modify their own discourses to make certain foreign policies conceivable or acceptable. This was the case when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed. From the American point of view, the agreement evoked the United States' paternalistic discourse with regard to Latin America, as well as the liberal discourse on mutually beneficial trade between equal partners. A third component, focusing on liberalization as a vector of stability and democracy, was required to link the two discourses, which meant that the United States could portray itself as a development provider (Skonieczny 2001).

Thus, existing discourses give meaning to new linkages, which in turn produce new discourses. This explains the fact that discourses are more likely to change than to be replaced and that their origin may go back to totally unrelated contexts. The discourse on the war on terror was derived from the discourse on the "just war", developed as early as the Middle Ages. After being reworded and diffused by the Bush administration, it was modified by other actors who adopted it, including the Serb nationalists who were trying to justify their claims. Consequently, we can trace the origin of the Serb Radical Party's discourse as far back as Pope Urban II, a thousand years earlier, although they no longer have anything in common (Graham et al. 2004; Erjavec and Volcic 2007).

Some discourses actually generate new conflicting discourses. For example, a discourse on international measures for whale conservation led to the development of two opposing discourses. One advocates an international moratorium on whaling and the other advocates coordinated and

sustainable whaling (Epstein 2008). These disruptions and reversals are relatively frequent. Norms, identities and roles are generally consolidated by positive feedback loops, which guarantee their stability. In comparison, discourses are more dynamic and subject to change (Schmidt 2008).

Methods of Discourse Analysis

On a methodological level, discourse analysis in foreign policy can use different types of material. Discourses can take different forms and their tone may range from technical to popular.

Some researchers limit their study to the analysis of speeches given by heads of state. Among these researchers, some focus on spontaneous declarations, such as responses to journalists' questions or the transcripts of parliamentary committee debates. They see this as a way to avoid the influence of speechwriters and get closer to the political leaders' genuine beliefs.

However, some scholars study discourses that have been carefully articulated by communications experts, such as those found in press releases. These are a better reflection of the rhetorical strategies that the leaders wish to communicate to guide public debates. The choice depends on research objectives, but it should be made carefully. Comparative analyses reveal major differences between spontaneous declarations and the speeches that the same political leaders have read from a written text (Guttieri et al. 1995; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Shannon and Keller 2007).

It is also possible to distinguish political discourses designed to communicate from those designed to coordinate. The former is geared to the public, while the latter is destined for other decision-makers. Here again, analysis indicates that the same political leader significantly adjusts his discourse on a given foreign policy issue according to the audience being addressed (Schmidt 2008).

Several speech analysts do not limit themselves to declarations made by political leaders. As discourses are cultural, they are shared by an entire community. This community may be limited to a ministry or a political party, but it can also be extended to a civilization. Some analysts retrace the discourses relating to foreign policy that are conveyed in popular culture by working on novels, comic books or textbooks, for example (Lipschutz 2001; Hopf 2002; Sjöstedt 2007).

Although it is easier to analyze a discourse if it is written down, it is important to recognize that not all discourses are necessarily expressed in words. Arrangements, practices and rituals are non-verbal means of communicating

and conveying meaning. They shed light on how actors understand each other, their environment and their conduct. Military parades, funerals for soldiers killed in action and the staging of photographs of ministers overseas also constitute discourse that is communicated by the state. Foreign policy research has even analyzed the discourses conveyed by caricatures, video games, press photographs and films from Hollywood. Both *Star Trek* and *Harry Potter* were used successfully to shed light on how a society portrays itself, defines insecurity and conceives foreign policy (Campbell 2003; Weldes 2003; Neumann and Nexon 2006; Der Derian 2009).

These different sources are generally analyzed through their intertextuality. This involves comparing different sources in order to determine the relationship between them, be it one of filiation, antagonism, reversal or envelopment. It also involves picking out any traces of other universe of representations. This approach makes it possible to determine the outline of a discourse and track its development.

Several techniques can be used to analyze intertextuality (Milliken 1999; Mattern 2001; Hardy et al. 2004; Hopf 2004; Laffey and Weldes 2004). Most analysts use an interpretative approach. Rather than analyzing sources with a predetermined grid, as is generally the case in content analysis, they prefer exploring texts. Using an inductive approach, their own contextual knowledge guides them as they chart intertextual references and reconstruct the origins of a discourse. This method makes it possible to take into account the fragile and changing linkages between the elements of a discourse. In addition, it helps detect implicit references, as well as the elements that are overlooked.

A growing number of researchers, inspired by linguistic techniques, also use lexicometric analysis. Different software provide statistical tools, which make it possible to describe or compare lengthy texts on the basis of their vocabulary. These tools can be applied in a hypothetical deductive approach, as well as in an inductive approach. In particular, the software can identify the most frequent and the most specific lexical fields in a text. These data can then guide intertextual and contextual research (Nabers 2009).

For example, a comparative analysis of press releases from NGOs and pharmaceutical companies relating to the export of medicines to developing countries revealed that NGOs use a more technical and legal lexicon with a statistical overrepresentation of terms, such as "amendments", "implementation" or "regulation". This preliminary observation subsequently led researchers to examine the origin of the discourse's technical nature and its impact on trade policy (Bubela and Morin 2010; Morin 2010).

Another approach to speech analysis focuses on metaphors. Metaphors are stylistic devices that facilitate the articulation of different ideas. They can evoke several ideas in just a few words. The "arms race" metaphor simultaneously expresses rivalry between states, the potential breach in stability that would occur if a winner were declared and the fact that no turning back is possible. The metaphor of "rogue" states implies that a set of rules is applicable to the entire international community, that these rules are repeatedly violated by a minority of states, which are only motivated by their material interests, and that these states should be sanctioned before they disrupt the established order (Doty 1993; Shimko 1994; Chilton 1996; Kuusisto 1998; Paris 2002; O'Reilly 2007; Kornprobst et al. 2008; Flanik 2011).

The selection of a metaphor is not insignificant. Each metaphor points to specific behavior, albeit implicitly. During the Cold War, it was judged necessary to intervene in Asia because only an outside force could offset "the domino effect" and counterbalance communist pressure. Inversely, in the early 1990s, it was considered unnecessarily dangerous to intervene in the Balkans because, historically, the conflicts in this "powder keg" are determined by intrinsic factors (Kuusisto 1998).

Metaphors structure thought with such force that they can generate realities that their authors simply want to evoke. The term "war on drugs" coined by President Nixon came before, not after, the military interventions that sought to reduce the supply of narcotics from Latin American countries. The Obama administration abandoned the expression in order to mark its determination to deal with the issue through the prism of public health. This illustrates how, like all discourses, metaphors are not merely words that reflect reality; they actually produce reality (Whitford and Yates 2009).

In summary, using discourse analysis to gain insight into foreign policy is not a new approach. It has been used by advocates of the cognitive approach since the 1960s. The real novelty is acknowledging that discourses, and culture overall, construct reality. More than 25 years after the emergence of constructivism in international relations, this concept is still challenging and continues to generate epistemic and methodological controversies.

The next chapter presents the systemic level of analysis and asks whether the structure of the international system helps to explain foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 9

Does the International Structure Explain Foreign Policy?

Kenneth Waltz argues that states' foreign policy decisions "are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them". He claims that, as a result, "[i]t is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states" (Waltz 1979: 65). This statement is in sharp contrast with the assumptions of the microscopic level of analysis, which was the main focus of the previous chapters as well as the cornerstone of FPA as a field of study (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961).

Following Waltz's assertion, theories focusing exclusively on the macroscopic scale of analysis emerged in the 1970s. These theories assign a dominant role to the structure of the international system, which is viewed as an autonomous and regulatory body (Wallerstein 1974, 1979; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981). They maintain that the state is so entrenched in this international structure and in the organizing principles of international relations that the structure constrains and largely determines the state's behavior, just as the market shapes the behavior of investors, producers and consumers.

The emergence of structural theories intensified the agent–structure debate, which has been at the center of social science discussions since their inception (Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992). The debate focuses on the sources of actor behavior. Some argue that the decisions of those who determine foreign policy are conditioned by the structure of the system (such as the distribution of military resources

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and prevailing rules and norms), while others maintain that individuals are able to act and make their own choices autonomously and relatively freely from structure (Dessler 1989).

Even if the primary aim of structural theories is to explain the outcome of states' interactions rather than foreign policy *per se*, the structure of the international system is an important component of foreign policy decision-making: it defines the parameters within which foreign policy options are debated; it shapes states' opportunities and constraints and makes certain policy options appealing and others simply unthinkable.

According to Christopher Hill, the international system has three reinforcing logics: "the logic of economics (including structures of trade, production and investment); the logic of politics (which is the competition over how the world is to be organized and resources are to be allocated); and the logic of knowledge", which refers to the world of ideas (2003: 165). The 1968 Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia was made possible by the bipolar structure of the system, which conferred spheres of influence on the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers. Back then, the three logics of the system defined by Hill were well understood by state actors. This ultimately explains why the United States and its allies did not flinch when Soviet tanks entered Prague (Lundestad 1975; Mearsheimer 2001b). A similar action taken by Moscow today would have a different meaning and trigger a different response as the international system has a different structure.

Since the structure of the international system matters to decision-makers, it must matter equally to foreign policy experts. Excluding it from the equation would deprive researchers of an important tool for understanding foreign policymaking. Yet, for years, foreign policy experts have tended to focus on the domestic structures of societies, as we have seen in the previous chapters, while leaving the study of the international system to international relations theorists (Hudson 1997b).

This chapter has for main objective to bring together the microscopic and the macroscopic levels of analysis by looking at how consideration of international structure can contribute to FPA. It looks at the shift toward structural theory of international relations by introducing some of the dominant macroscopic theories and approaches. The chapter then addresses the limits and criticisms of this level of analysis, and presents theoretical propositions that try to reconcile different interpretations of agent and structure role.

Structural Theories

Until the late 1970s, most theories of international relations viewed the international system as the product of states' behavior, without recognizing the dominant role of this structure as an autonomous and regulatory body (Kaplan 1966). But things changed as new theories that focused exclusively on the macroscopic scale were developed in order to emphasize the basic sources of international dynamics. Some of these theories, such as Kenneth Waltz's neorealism and Immanuel Wallenstein's world-system theory, went as far as assuming that structure determines states' behavior, while others, such as constructivism or international society theory, went only as far as suggesting that structure constrains actors' decisions (Wendt 1987). This evolution in the field of international relations led to a clear division between FPA and structural theories.

Structural Shift in International Relations

Initially developed by Waltz (1959, 1979), neorealism (or structural realism) has long been viewed as the dominant structural paradigm in international relations (Gilpin 1981; Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 2001a, b). This paradigm centers on the material structure of the system, that is, on the distribution of military resources between sovereign states. Neorealists assert that it is the level of a state's material resources, relative to the other states, that fixes its position in the structure as well as its international behavior, regardless of its domestic characteristics. According to Waltz's theory, states are homogeneous units of the system that are functionally equivalent and fully conditioned by the international structure.

This paradigm is built on five main theoretical assumptions, which are closely related to one another and endorsed, to varying degrees, by all its supporters. First, the state is the basic unit of international relations. Second, states systematically try to maximize their own utility in a rational and egoistic manner. Third, the utility of states is defined in terms of survival. Whether states cooperate or wage war, their ultimate interest is to maximize their chances of survival. Fourth, in this quest for survival, states evolve in a self-help environment as they cannot rely on the assistance of a supranational hierarchical authority. Thus, the international system is fundamentally anarchic, even when it appears to be stable and ordered. Fifth, since states can only count on themselves, they are in constant competition for the accumulation of material resources in a zero-sum game: what one wins, the other loses.

Balance of power (or balancing) is the cornerstone theory of the neorealist paradigm. Although there are different variants of balance of power, the basic idea is that the state naturally tends to balance against a rising power, often by joining military alliances, in order to secure itself in an anarchic world (Waltz 1979; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Parent and Rosato 2015; Oskanian 2016).

Bandwagoning, another central theory of neorealism, is the opposite of balancing. It describes the inclination of a weak state to side with a hegemonic or threatening power to maximize its material gains and to ensure its own survival. A weak state bandwagons when it estimates that the costs of opposing or balancing a hegemonic power exceed the anticipated benefits of supporting it (Walt 1988; Schweller 1994, 1996; Mearsheimer 2001a, b; Grigorescu 2008; Ratti 2012).

Neorealists, however, faced a significant challenge in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer 1990). The United States remained as the sole superpower and no state, or group of states, could seriously pretend to militarily counterbalance the American hegemon (Pape 2005; Massie 2014). As Brooks and Wohlforth explain, "counterbalancing is and will long remain prohibitively costly for the other major powers. Because no country comes close to matching the comprehensive nature of U.S. power, an attempt to counterbalance would be far more expensive than a similar effort in any previous international system" (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008: 23; Wohlforth 1999; Layne 2004).

As a result, some neorealists refined the balance of power argument and argued that "soft-balancing" was the natural way for states to behave under unipolarity (Paul 2005; He and Feng 2008; Saltzman 2012). Soft-balancing focuses on non-military strategies that combine diplomatic, economic and institutional means to resist, constrain or, to use Stephen Walt's expression, "tame" US hegemony (Walt 2005; Cantir and Kennedy 2015; Friedman and Long 2015).

Aside from neorealism, world-system theory is another example of a macroscopic and deterministic argument that had a major impact in the field of international relations (Wallerstein 1974; Frank and Gills 1993; Hopkins et al. 1996; Komlosy et al. 2016). This neo-Marxist approach emphasizes the world division of labor between capitalist states as the structural foundation of the capitalist world-economy. The anarchic international system depicted by neorealists is replaced here by the global capitalist economy as the main explanation of international interactions.

For Wallerstein (1974), the leading contributor of world-system theory, the world can be understood as a pyramid on top of which lay high-skill capital-intensive production countries. These countries are the core of the system, and the United States is currently at the top of this category. At the bottom of the pyramid is the periphery, where the least developed countries are located. These states are exploited by the core for their labor and raw resources and include today's poorest developing countries. Finally, the semi-periphery is the intermediate category between the top and the bottom where states are either trying to elevate themselves to, or are falling down from, the core of the world-system. Semi-peripheral states are, simultaneously, being exploited by the core and exploiting the periphery. India and China are current examples of states in the semi-periphery. They give an illusion of fluidity and possible catching-up, providing some political stability to the capitalist system.

In this system, states pursue their own political and economic interests and often adopt policies, such as economic protectionism, that go against the logic and interests of the world capitalist system. Only a global hegemonic power can resolve this contradiction between national interests and global capitalist interests. The hegemon can "exert its will on the other states within the system. It uses that power to ensure the free flow of goods and capital and to undermine economic nationalism" (Hurst 2005: 111).

Thus, according to world-system theory, the world capitalist system was made possible by a strong hegemonic state that established the rules of the world capitalist system through military force, technology and ideas. This was a condition for capitalism to emerge in the sixteenth century and spread worldwide as successive great powers, such as Spain, Holland, France, Britain and the United States, managed to extract and transfer surplus resources from the periphery to the center.

The international society theory is a third theoretical approach that takes structure seriously. Hedley Bull (1977), a pioneer of international society theory, shares the neorealist assumption that the international system is anarchic, but his notion of the international society, or his "society of states" approach, leads him to make a different and somewhat less deterministic structural argument. Bull argues that under an international society, states' international behavior is governed by a set of normative institutions, by which he means habits, rules, principles and norms that are commonly accepted and shared by sovereign states in the conduct of their relations. These institutions are made possible when there is "a consensus among states that they share some common

interests and conceive themselves as being related to each other" (Griffiths 1999: 147; see also Bull and Watson 1986).

According to Bull, international law, diplomacy, reciprocal recognition, balance of power and war are key agreed-upon institutions through which the international society of states can maintain the international order needed to pursue and maintain peace and security (Bull 1977; Wight 1991; Little 2000). Hence, the international order is generated by all members of the international society and not, as neorealists maintain, simply by great powers. Without such a consensual understanding among states, however, there is no international society but only an international system defined by power politics and anarchy (Buzan 1993). For instance, although an international system of states emerged in Europe in the fifteenth century, it took centuries before a truly international society emerged in Europe in the late nineteenth century (Gong 1984, Buzan 1993). The international system is therefore a necessary condition for an international society to emerge. Bull's argument suggests that not only do these institutions, taken as a normative framework, constrain states' behavior, but sovereign states often prioritize the well-being of these institutions at the expense of their own interests.

Like for neorealism or world-system theory, international society theory does not attempt to predict specific state behavior (Little 2000). Some have also criticized it for its lack of theoretical clarity (Waever 1992; Buzan 1993; Finnemore 2001). Nevertheless, this theoretical proposition implies that normative structural considerations, much more so than domestic rational calculation, shape states' international behavior.

Like international society theory, constructivists understand the international society as a social construction that gives meaning to states' actions. In the 1990s, constructivists such as Friedrich Kratochwil (1991), Alexander Wendt (1992) and Nicholas Onuf (2012) drew attention on the intersubjective ideational structures that give meaning to international relations. Unlike material structures shaped by the distribution of resources among states, ideational structures are socially constructed, which means that they are not exogenously defined but rather the product of constant interactions between agents. The main distinction between international society theory and constructivism is that international society theory suggests that that norms and principles matter only when an international society of states has developed, while constructivists always see international politics as a social construction.

Constructivists argue that the international structure is made up of norms and rules that define the "reality" of international relations as well as the identity and interests of state actors. As Wendt explains, "It is through reciprocal interaction, in other words, that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests" (1992: 406). Once constituted, the social norms that make up the ideational structures, such as sovereignty or anarchy, become social facts that reinforce certain state behaviors and marginalize others (Wendt 1995, 1996, 1999; Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1998).

Of course, constructivists do not deny the materiality of facts, whether an intergovernmental conference, the dropping of a bomb or the signing of a treaty. However, they consider that it is the social meaning of these facts that matter above all. For instance, are these facts a manifestation of friendly or adversarial relations? As Wendt points out, "A gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy, and enmity is a social, not material, relation" (1996: 50).

Limits and Criticism

During the Cold War, the stability of the international structure made systemic theories quite appealing. Western experts did not know much about what was happening inside the Chinese or the Soviet states and they did not have enough information to explain these great powers' preferences. Structural theories therefore provided a convenient way to explain and predict states' interactions because they conceived of the state as a unitary and rational actor (Hudson 2010). This led Alexander Wendt to criticize neorealism and world-system theory for being inadequate to explain state action because they fail to recognize the co-constitutive nature of agents and structures (Wendt 1987).

By arguing that it is the system as a whole that dictates states' behavior, structural theories fail to explain change in the international system because the only possible source of change is the system itself (Moravcsik 1997; Hurst 2005). Neorealism failed, for instance, to predict the end of the Cold War and the systemic transformations that came with it (Lebow 1994). A few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kenneth Waltz confidently wrote that "[a]lthough [the Cold War] content and virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics and will last as long as that structure endures" (Waltz 1989: 52). This infamous quote is often cited in international relations textbooks as a critique of the systemic determinism of neorealism.

A substantial part of FPA research opposes the primacy of the system's structure to explain foreign policy. The analogy of the state as a billiard ball, originally popularized by Arnold Wolfers (1962), is often used by FPA experts to criticize systemic theories (Fordham and Asal 2007). They argue that states cannot be treated as opaque, monolithic balls that are functionally interchangeable. They reject the idea that states all react in the same way when hit and that only their positions on the board are important in predicting their behavior.

On the contrary, the vast majority of FPA experts recognize that state actors have much more autonomy than what structural theories claim, regardless of the structure in which they operate. They recognize that taking domestic variables into account sometimes makes theoretical explanations more complex, but ignoring them completely in favor of systemic models generates simple and, ultimately, impotent explanations (Ripley 1993; Hagan 2001).

Jordan and Syria are good examples in this regard. Although Syria is more populous than Jordan and more heterogeneous ethnically and religiously, their geographical location and the type of resources they control are relatively similar. Yet, Jordan and Syria have adopted diametrically opposed behaviors, the former allying itself with Western powers and the latter being hostile to them. This difference in behavior can only be explained by examining their respective histories as well as political and social forces (Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006). Hence, while neorealism argues that systemic pressures explain why very different states behave similarly, it cannot explain why states sharing similar material capabilities behave differently. Therefore, snowflakes are a more appropriate analogy for states than billiard balls because while their trajectories are certainly affected by joint forces such as gravity and wind, they vary according to their internal and multidimensional characteristics (Fordham and Asal 2007).

Tensions between supporters of the structural perspective and those who favor state-specific dynamics have crystallized around the issue of the use of armed forces. Some studies indicate that military interventions have a more significant statistical relationship with the variation of the distribution of military resources in the international system than with the evolution of electoral calendars, public opinion and political parties in power (Meernik 1993; Gowa 1998). Other studies, however, conclude that the use of force varies more with internal policy changes than with changes in the international environment (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991).

The most compelling works are undoubtedly those that recognize that the actions of agents and the constraints of international structure are distinct but complementary. Internal and external factors are involved at different stages of the process leading to an armed conflict (Rose 1998; Dyson 2010; von Hlatky 2013). These more nuanced studies, however, attract less attention than those that defend the most entrenched positions (Gaubatz 1999).

Can Structural Theories Inform Foreign Policy?

For years, scientific orthodoxy had advocated a strict distinction between the national and the international levels of analysis. Syncretism was perceived as a breach of the imperatives of theoretical coherence. Throughout his career, Kenneth Waltz argued for a rigid distinction between the study of international politics and the study of foreign policy. He argued that his structural model can explain and predict systemic orientations, or war and peace, but that neorealism cannot and should not attempt to predict anything about foreign policy because his model is at too high a level of generality and abstraction to explain a particular state behavior. Hence, Waltz categorically refused to reconcile neorealism and FPA.

The question, then, is how can we test structural theories if we cannot link them to states' behavior? According to some, the conceptual division between structural theories and theories of foreign policy is harmful to the advancement of knowledge in international relations (Schweller 2003). Randall Schweller argues that structural theories must specify the connection between systemic causes and states' behavior. Otherwise, this division "creates problems with theory testing and evaluation, because our confidence in an explanation rests on its fit with the actual behavior of states under the conditions specified by the theory" (Schweller 2003: 322).

Schweller is not the only one to believe that the structure can and should inform foreign policy. Some argue that structural realism "does not provide a theory of foreign policy," but by stressing the importance of relative power and security, it does have something to say about foreign policy (Telhami 2002: 170).

Even Waltz himself relied on multiple foreign policy examples to defend his neorealist argument in his seminal theory of international politics. Waltz did not hesitate, for instance, to use "his version of neorealist theory to predict German and Japanese foreign policies in the post–Cold War

world (Elman 1996: 10). This is ironic considering Waltz' explicit stance on the agent–structure debate as well as confusing to the reader who is trying to make sense of his structural argument.

Structural Assumptions and State Units

Whether one agrees with the strict distinction between systemic theories and foreign policy theories, those who choose to apply systemic assumptions at the national level must be creative and vigilant. They must specify the connection between structural assumptions and states' motivations and interests, while making sure to maintain logical consistency in the process.

Over the years, several studies have taken up this challenge by drawing foreign policy implications from structural theories (Grieco 1988, 1990; Paquin 2008, 2010). Despite Waltz's attempt to keep his neorealist argument out of the realm of foreign policy, several authors have used neorealism to inform foreign policy, following Colin Elman's statement according to which "neorealist theories are suitable for making statements about individual state's foreign policies" (Elman 1996: 48).

Joseph Nye (2005), for instance, relies on balancing to explain why Syria allied with Iran during the Iran–Iraq war at the start of the 1980s despite its linguistic and ideological connections to Iraq. By allying with Iran, which appeared weaker than Iraq, Syria wanted to prevent Saddam Hussein's regime from becoming a preponderant power in the region (Nye 2005: 64). The theory of bandwagoning was also used to explain specific foreign policy. The decision made by the Czech government in 1938 to peacefully agree to the Munich agreement, which allowed Germany to annex the German-speaking portion of its territory, obeyed that logic (Labs 1992). Opposing or balancing Nazi Germany would have probably precipitated war with Hitler and threatened Czechoslovakia's survival since its geographical proximity made it "a prime and early target for conquest" (Labs 1992: 393).

Robert Pape (2005) uses soft-balancing to explain US allies' foreign policy in the weeks leading up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Allies used political and institutional means to oppose the warmonger administration of George W. Bush. As Pape explains, "France, Sweden, and other European states used institutional rules and procedures in the UN to delay, if not head off completely, U.S. preventive war against Iraq" (Pape 2005: 38–39).

For his part, David Skidmore (2005) explains that American unilateralism under George W. Bush was not simply rooted in the neoconservative

ideas upheld by his administration but must be understood more broadly in terms of the unipolar structure of the international system. Skidmore maintains that unilateralism was not a unique feature of the Bush administration but rather a constant structural dynamic that encompassed every administration since the end of the Cold War when the United States became the sole remaining superpower. He argues that:

> with the removal of the Soviet threat, American presidents have gained greater scope to act independently of international opinion abroad combined with less freedom to resist the influence of parochial, antimultilateralist interest groups at home. This analysis suggests that the structural sources of unilateralism in American foreign policy have deeper roots than the ideological complexion of the Bush administration. (Skidmore 2005: 208)

Similarly, Robert Kagan explains that the difference between Europe and the United States as far as their foreign policy is concerned is not rooted in their different values and national character but rather in their relative material power. He argues that the structural distribution of power explains the changing role and interests of the United States and Europe since the Second World War. Kagan maintains that Europe's current commitment to multilateralism and international law is due to the relative decline of its power and its inability to reach its ends through other means (Kagan 2002). Europe is relatively weak, the argument goes, so it is natural that it has developed an aversion to the use of power. It is also natural that Europe has greater tolerance for threat, such as Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, because it lacks the means to address the problem. In conclusion, the asymmetry in the respective levels of material power of the United States and Europe has led them to perceive the world differently and to adopt different discourses, justifications and strategies.

Others have adapted Hedley Bull's international society argument to foreign policy. Despite its medium-sized material capabilities, India behaved as a great power from 1947 to 1962, notably by fighting US and Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia. This behavior is puzzling because of the lack of correspondence between India's relative power and its geostrategic ambitions. By relying on the international society argument, we can gain a broader understanding of India's preferences (Roy 2011).

As a member of international society, India subscribed to its core institutions and cherished the international order that resulted from them. The international society argument would suggest that, when faced with

the great power rivalry between the United States and China in Asia, India felt insecure and feared that this rivalry could compromise the international order. Nehru's concern for the protection of normative institutions, including the principle of sovereignty, coupled with the state's feeling of insecurity, would therefore account for India's puzzling post-1945 behavior (Roy 2011).

Foreign policy experts have also built on Wallerstein's world-system theory to provide foreign policy explanations. Harry Truman's policy toward Western Europe following the Second World War is a case in point (McCormick 1995). Back then, the world capitalist system was in crisis because Western European economies were struggling to rebuild. This structural crisis put pressure on the Truman administration to adopt the Marshall Plan to prevent Western Europe from reverting to economic nationalism, and to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The ultimate objective of this economic stimulus package was to guarantee the flow of goods and capital in a world capitalist economy that benefited, above all, the American hegemonic power (McCormick 1995; Hurst 2005).

Constructivism also makes it possible to establish synergies between FPA and the structure of the system. Since ideational structures are socially constructed by agents, constructivists do not see agents as solely dominated by structure, but also as producers of their own structure. Most constructivists argue that agents and structures co-constitute and co-determine each other. The international structure therefore defines the playing field in which foreign policy agents operate, and agents, through their discourses and practices, reproduce and transform the structure (Börzel 2002).

A telling example of the importance of ideational structures for states' foreign policy is the radical transformation of the US Congress and the shift in President Reagan's position on the apartheid regime in South Africa (Klotz 1995) from conciliatory to hostile. This change of policy is both surprising and counterintuitive since the segregationist South African regime was an important US ally against communism and a reliable economic partner of the United States. In the 1980s, an anti-apartheid transnational community strengthened the social norm on racial equality by denouncing the segregationist regime of South Africa. This community associated the pro-apartheid position of the Reagan administration with a racist position, which propelled the issue to a national debate and led congressional Democrats to speak against the apartheid regime. With the help of moderate Republicans, Congress eventually passed tough sanctions against South Africa through the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,

with which the Reagan administration was compelled to comply. Hence, constructivism suggests that only a change in the ideational structure of international relations can help us understand this surprising policy shift.

Constructivists subscribing to the idea of co-constitutionality feel compelled, however, to choose between structure and agent as an analytical entry point, to avoid the circular argument that ideas are both the causes and the consequences of actors' behavior. Facing the chicken or the egg dilemma, most constructivists choose to focus on structures to explain agents rather than the reverse. This structural perspective, however, is often criticized. Valerie Hudson, for instance, reminds us that since only human beings have ideas, agents must precede the constitution of the international structure (Hudson 1997a, b). Of course, we could counterargue that humans would not have political and social ideas without them being socialized in an ideational structure.

Reconciling Agent and Structure

Peter Gourevitch was one of the first theorists to attempt to reconcile the different levels of analysis. As he argued, "[t]he international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them". Consequently, "international relations and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes" (Gourevitch 1978: 911).

Robert Putnam has also contributed to this discussion by making a convincing demonstration of the relevance of integrating levels of analysis in the study of international negotiations through his two-level game theory (Putnam 1988). In his opinion, it is useless to try to find which level best explains international relations, because they all play a role. As Putnam argues, "It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly 'Both, sometimes.' The most interesting questions are 'When?' and 'How?'" (Putnam 1988: 427).

Far from having achieved a consensus, the agent–structure reconciliation has nevertheless gained considerable momentum over the last decades. Not only individual research initiatives have applied structural assumptions to state units, as we have seen in the last section, but new schools of thought and research programs are trying to bridge the gap by explicitly connecting agent and structure in a constructive way. These approaches tend to fall into two categories: those that start from structure and extend

to agents and those that focus on agents and then connect to structure. The remainder of this chapter presents two theoretical flagships that illustrate these categories, namely, neoclassical realism and behavioral international relations (Behavioral IR).

From Structure to Agent

Starting from the perspective of structure, neoclassical realism, which emerged in the 1990s, opens the analysis explicitly to agents and their perceptual biases (Wohlforth 1993; Christensen 1996; Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998; Schweller 2003; Layne 2006; Dueck 2006; Rathbun 2008; Lobell et al. 2009; Dyson 2010; Juneau 2015; Ripsman et al. 2016). This school of thought was developed by scholars who argued that systemic theories of international politics were ill-equipped to explain, for instance, "how superpowers would define their competitive relationship, let alone the nuances and evolution of their respective grand strategies" (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 2).

Without abandoning the neorealist primacy of the international structure, which they define as the primary independent variable, neoclassical realism reaches out to classical realist authors, such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Henry Kissinger, who integrated ideas and domestic political variables into their analyses of the international system. This explains why Gideon Rose coined the term "neoclassical realism" to define this emerging school of thought (Rose 1998).

According to neoclassical realism, the impact of structure must be studied at the national level through a series of intervening variables that "filter" structural constraints through leaders' perceptions, state institutions, societal cohesion, the role of political elites and access to material resources. These intervening variables are very important because they have a direct impact on decision-makers' ability to make decisions. While neorealism claims that states with similar material resources will behave in a similar way, neoclassical realists explain that they may actually take different, or even opposite, routes if they have different state structures and domestic constraints. As Rose points out, "the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level" (Rose 1998: 146).

In the case of US military interventions abroad, neoclassical realist research suggests that the president, whether Truman in Korea, Johnson in Vietnam or Bush in Iraq, has a certain perception of the national interest and of the threats to it. These interests are defined by the position of the United States

in the international structure. But when the president comes to the conclusion that a military intervention is needed to respond to a threat, it is through the constraints of national policies that the presidency defines its strategy and seeks public support. It is through state structures, taken as intervening variables, that the president defines the state's military strategies. These intervening variables are key because they give rise to the policy variations that cannot simply be explained by systemic pressure. As Dueck explains:

> [T]he desire to build domestic support for intervention may, for example, encourage the president to oversimplify circumstances in his public rhetoric. The same desire may also lead him to add or subtract elements of intervention that might have been desirable from a purely international, realist perspective. (Dueck 2009: 148)

In the 1960s, Lyndon Johnson misrepresented the situation of the Vietnam War to the American people so that his Great Society project could have the full attention of legislators and the public. This led Johnson to wage an ineffective war that was partly hidden from the American people, eventually leading to a loss of public confidence in the administration and a decline in support for the war. Johnson's perceptions of domestic constraints had a profound impact on the course of the Vietnam War. This point was emphasized by Zakaria (1998), who maintains that the state's role in filtering or interpreting the constraints of the international system cannot be ignored.

Neoclassical realism is seen by some experts as an *ad hoc* effort to compensate for the failure of neorealism to use structural pressure to explain certain phenomena (Vasquez 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999). For example, neorealism can explain the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War but cannot explain why Washington adopted a strategy that mixed liberal internationalism and containment (Taliaferro et al. 2009). It can explain why great powers seek conquest and expansion but cannot account for why great powers rarely sought regional hegemony and expansion in the early twentieth century (Schweller 2006). Because the structural positioning of great powers cannot account for these puzzles, scholars have generated neoclassical realism.

This shift from neorealism to neoclassical realism came with its share of criticisms. Legro and Moravcsik (1999) argue, for instance, that by relying on domestic variables, neoclassical realism looks a lot like liberalism and undermines the neorealist paradigm. As they argue, proponents of neoclassical realism "seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms

that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent, and less distinctive to realism" (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 6). They maintain that this school of thought is a degenerative effort to save neorealism from theoretical impotence. Rathbun (2008) counterargues that neoclassical realism can be defended as having a "coherent logic that incorporates ideas and domestic politics in the way we would expect structural realism to do so" and that it "explains when states cannot properly adapt to systemic constraints and points out the serious consequences that result" (Rathbun 2008: 296).

Neoclassical realism will probably remain a prime target of theoretical purists who claim that the parsimonious nature of neorealism is sacrificed on the altar of FPA. Nonetheless, it remains a constructive addition to the agent–structure debate.

From Agent to Structure

Starting this time from the perspective of agent, new bridges were built toward structural theories through Behavioral IR (Mintz 2007; Walker et al. 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). This social-psychological approach is neither an alternative to structural theories nor even a unified theory. Behavioral IR emerged in the 2000s and joins together a number of existing theories, some of which have been discussed in detail in previous chapters. They include poliheuristic theory, prospect theory, attribution theory, faulty heuristics and/or groupthink (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Khong 1992; Levy 1997; McDermott 1998; Mintz 2004; Brulé 2005; Yarhi-Milo 2014).

While structural theories assume that agents will rationally adapt their strategies as new structural information is communicated, Behavioral IR argues that agents adapt to new information in ways that systematically deviate from rationality. It connects agents to structure by showing that emotions and psychological factors shape leaders' beliefs about the international system. The unconscious factors that define the psychological "inside system" of the decision-maker are directly connected to "the formation of conscious beliefs about the outside" world (Herrmann 2017: 79). This inside-to-outside process is central to Behavioral IR, allowing it to bridge FPA and international relations (Walker 2011a).

This approach calls into question the basic assumption of rational choice theory according to which actors make rational decisions in order to maximize their expected utility. It argues that human beings are not fully rational and that their decisions are guided by emotions and social

psychology. "Hatred, love, fear, threat, and support all produce not only different choices from opposite emotions, but also variations in the way people arrive at a choice" (Mintz and DeRouen 2010: 100).

Behavioral IR theories all recognize that (1) decision-makers do not always make rational decisions; (2) leaders adopt cognitive shortcuts when making decisions, as they cannot process large amounts of information; and (3) the decision-making process is biased (Mintz 2007).

Behavioral IR is not a new field of study, but its initial development was slowed down by a lack of empirical data (Walker 2011b). Recent progress in laboratory experimental research, however, has brought psychology research back to the forefront of international relations and FPA in what some go so far as to call a behavioral revolution (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017: 2). New behavioral research allows us to better understand the sources of variations in actors' preferences and beliefs. This contribution is important because while rational choice assumes that actors will have the same preferences under the same environment, Behavioral IR shows that decision-makers operating in the same environment can develop different preferences and beliefs. This approach is therefore valuable because it looks for the causes of the "systematic differences in how actors perceive the situations they face, rather than assuming agreement and taking perceptions for granted" (Kertzer 2017: 110).

Some behavioral studies focus on operational code analysis and assume that foreign policy decisions are conditioned by the combination of two political worlds: (1) the external world of events defined by the power and behavior of other states, and (2) leaders' internal world of beliefs, which is defined by their emotions and psychological traits (Malici and Malici 2005; Renshon 2008). By combining these two worlds, operational code analysis connects structure-oriented to agent-based theories (Walker 2011a).

Using this approach, we can provide an explanation as to why the North Korean and the Cuban communist regimes did not adapt to the post-Cold War world system. While structural theories cannot account for the continuity of these regimes after 1991, operational code research suggests that Kim Il Sung and Fidel Castro failed to change their belief systems as the Cold War ended. They were unable to adapt and learn by generating new skills and beliefs based on their interpretation of the end of bipolarity (Malici and Malici 2005). While the external world radically changed, the cognitive and emotional experience of these leaders, that is, their internal world of beliefs, remained constant.

Other behavioral research adopts a different perspective and focuses on the so-called two-level model of cognition (Kahneman 2011). According to this model, decision-makers think both fast and slow. Some decisions result from fast intuitive and impulsive thinking (System 1), while others follow a slower and more rational path (System 2). Research has shown that most of the time decision-makers rely on System 1, which is generated by emotions and psychological factors. This system is the source of human motivations and desires. System 2 is used by decision-makers to make more complex computations, and it is actively solicited when "an event is detected that violates the model of the world that System 1 maintains" (Kahneman 2011: 24). Otherwise, System 2 remains in a low-effort mode. As Kahneman summarizes, "most of what you (your System 2) think and do originates in your System 1, but System 2 takes over when things get difficult, and it normally has the last word" (Kahneman 2011: 25; Haidt 2013; Herrmann 2017). Hence, the decision-maker is like "a rational rider on an emotion-driven elephant" (Haidt 2013). This analogy shows how difficult it is for decision-makers to find the perfect balance between emotion and reason.

Studies from this research perspective have shown that the more people's beliefs are motivated by their national attachments to their country, the more international norms will be inconsistently enforced. During the Iraq War, for instance, Americans who expressed a chauvinistic attachment to the United States tended to underestimate the importance of nationalism as a source of resistance in Iraq and to reject the idea that the United States was an occupying force. Even when controlling for education, knowledge and income, they did not see the US intervention as "violating the norm of self-determination but as nurturing necessary preconditions for independence" (Herrmann 2017: 68). Hence, Americans who were the most emotionally attached to their country tended to buy the Bush administration's justification for the war and to disregard international norms that went against their beliefs and contradicted their emotions. The same study confirmed the existence of the reverse relationship. This leads Herrmann to argue that:

> people can easily believe almost anything that supports their team, and they find ways to disbelieve those things that do not. My theory suggests this may be because they are seeking to avoid painful tradeoffs. They want to act on the inclinations of the emotion and they want to do so while believing they are acting in the morally appropriate fashion. [...], [w]hen reasoning is motivated by strong emotions, beliefs are likely to form in ways that do not follow the logical rules of evidence (Herrmann 2017: 80).

While neoclassical realism is criticized for its lack of theoretical distinctiveness, Behavioral IR is mainly attacked from a methodological standpoint (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). Most behavioral studies rely on laboratory experimental research or surveys using representative samples of people. Few actually deal with foreign policy elite samples when measuring the impact of psychological variables. Moreover, experimental research and surveys cannot replicate the "real life" of decision-makers in their working environment, which is typically characterized by pressure, responsibilities and stress. Some have counterargued, however, that "if a theory is expected to apply to any decision maker, then testing that theory in a convenience sample [...] is appropriate" as long as the research is randomly assigned (Hafner Burton et al. 2017: 22).

These relatively new theoretical approaches are gradually marginalizing the extreme positions that did not allow reconciliation of FPA and structural theories because they espoused different levels of analysis. Most experts, whatever their theoretical inclinations, now recognize that the behavior of actors is not entirely determined by structure and that their choice is not entirely devoid of structural constraints.

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