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Foreign Policy Analysis

A Toolbox

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CHAPTER 2

How to Identify and Assess a Foreign Policy?

This chapter focuses on an essential prerequisite for every FPA, namely, identifying a foreign policy so that it can be grasped and explained. This stage is often neglected and constitutes the Achilles' heel of several studies, which are so preoccupied with the decision-making process that they overlook the foreign policy itself. Yet, it is crucial for analysts to carefully define the policy that they aim to explain. To define is to interpret. In other words, by defining, the researcher attributes a meaning that will, in turn, influence the type of explanation sought.

For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, Switzerland refused to allow members of the coalition to fly over its airspace to transport troops and weapons to Kuwait. Some researchers may see this decision as a manifestation of the Swiss doctrine of neutrality. They would then try to explain why this neutrality persists: does Swiss national identity use this historical heritage as a federating principle? Or do the institutional characteristics of the Swiss political system dissuade the Federal Council from reviewing its constitutional obligations? Other researchers, however, might observe that the Swiss government imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, as outlined in the Security Council resolution 661, and, therefore, conclude that the policy of neutrality was being relaxed. Explaining the change rather than the continuity may then encourage them to study the geopolitical upheavals that occurred in the wake of the Cold War or the shifting balance

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of power between members of the Swiss government. This example clearly illustrates that the foreign policy related to the same question during the same period can be interpreted in different ways. From the outset, the interpretation chosen will steer the research in a particular direction.

In order to interpret a foreign policy correctly, researchers must carefully compare it with previous policies, other states' policies or domestic policies. A comparative exercise is essential to provide an overview, even in the framework of a study focusing on a single case. That is why James Rosenau has argued passionately for a resolutely comparative approach to FPA:

> Comprehension of the external activities undertaken by one national system is not sufficient to answer the questions of systemic adaptation and political process that are inherent in foreign policy phenomena. The repeated experiences of two or more systems must be carefully contrasted for an answer to such questions to begin to emerge. Only in this way can the theoretically oriented analyst begins to satisfy his curiosity and the policy-oriented analyst begins to accumulate the reliable knowledge on which sound recommendations and choices are made. Only in this way will it be possible to move beyond historical circumstances and comprehend the continuities of national life in a world of other nations (1968: 329).

For reasons similar to those mentioned by James Rosenau 50 years ago, comparison remains a central component of FPA. Regardless of whether the method is quantitative or qualitative, the enterprise positivist or post-positivist, the comparison between different states, different periods or different fields remains essential when it comes to identifying specific characteristics and generalizations, as well as continuity and change (Kaarbo 2003).

Comparison requires points of reference, which can help to determine what is real and identify variations. Every foreign policy analyst has their own favorite benchmarks. Charles Hermann, for example, uses four: the orientation, the problem, the program and the level of commitment of the foreign policy (1990). Peter Katzenstein, on the other hand, compares policies by contrasting their instruments and goals (1976, 1977).

This chapter focuses on five benchmarks that provide the basis for a comparative approach, including the goals, mobilized resources, instruments, process and outcomes. As this chapter makes clear, identifying benchmarks is not generally difficult; it is access to comparable data for research that poses problems.

The Goals of Foreign Policy

Some analysts of international relations ascribe a general predefined goal to foreign policy. This goal is then considered as timeless, universal and valid for every country under all circumstances. Depending on their theoretical preferences, analysts consider that foreign policy aims at the stability of the international system, the accumulation of wealth, the increase in relative power, the maintenance of leaders in power or the reproduction of national identity. Stephen Krasner, for example, suggests that foreign policy aims to protect national sovereignty and presumes that "all groups in the society would support the preservation of territorial and political integrity" (1978: 329).

The assumption that states pursue a single predefined goal in this way has an undeniable methodological advantage. The researcher is then exempt from explaining the goal and can freely interpret or model behavior. As Hans Morgenthau observed, attributing a goal to foreign policy "imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible" (1948 [2005]: 5).

However, this is an unrealistic methodological fiction. Political leaders pursue different, sometimes contradictory goals. The concept of national interest, more generally, depends on periods of time, countries and individuals. As a result, there is no general theory of FPA that is valid for all issue-areas and in all circumstances.

Several foreign policy analysts refuse to define a foreign policy goal arbitrarily. Instead, they endeavor to chart and compare the specific goals of the actors they are studying. There are two possible methods to achieve this: to consider that the goals announced by the leaders are actually the ones that they pursue or to deduce the goals that are pursued as a function of the leaders' behavior.

The Goals Communicated

In some cases, foreign policy analysts can identify the foreign policy goals in the government's public declarations. Policy statements, official speeches, government reports to parliament and white papers can be used as sources of information (Paquin and Beauregard 2015).

A foreign policy goal stated clearly in a public declaration should indicate four elements: the target, the direction, the expected outcome and a

timescale. For example, a specific foreign policy objective could be to improve (the direction) the conditions of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa (the target) to combat the spread of HIV (the outcome) in the next decade (the timescale) (Snyder et al. 2002 [1962]: 72).

If every state expressed their goals as clearly and precisely as this last example, it would be easy for the analyst to identify variations in any of the elements included in the foreign policy goals. It would be easy to research the dependent variable, and the analyst could, thus, focus on the independent variables. Why do some states, for example, have a more limited timescale than others for controlling the spread of HIV? However, foreign policy goals are rarely stated clearly and explicitly.

Furthermore, when a specific goal is communicated, it is legitimate for the analyst to question whether there is a discrepancy between the stated goal and the goal actually pursued (Onuf 2001). There are at least three reasons for this kind of discrepancy. First, in order to preserve their international reputation and legitimacy, it may be in states' interest to mask their pursuit of relative gains by mentioning the pursuit of absolute gain or, to use Arnold Wolfers' terms, to conceal their possession goals behind milieu goals (1962: 73–77). Trade restrictions that aim to protect a national industry may be applied in the name of environmental protection; a military intervention that seeks to guarantee access to natural resources may be launched in the name of international stability; and inaction in the face of an ally's reprehensible acts may be justified in the name of international law.

Second, it is tempting for political leaders to reduce the scope of a stated foreign policy goal in order to increase the likelihood of success and, thus, boost their status on the national political stage. For example, the Clinton administration claimed that the aim of the 1998 bombings in Iraq was merely to weaken the capacity of Saddam Hussein's regime to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Many observers, however, suspected that the United States' real goals were more ambitious, ranging from the total elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction manufacturing capability to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. As these objectives were harder to achieve, the Clinton administration opted for a communication strategy that guaranteed success in the eyes of the American public (Zelikow 1994; Baldwin 1999; Baum 2004b).

Third, decision-makers tend to evade the question of communication goals rather than acknowledge them openly. Military intervention abroad, for example, can be officially justified by the need to overthrow a hostile government or preempt an imminent attack. However, these instrumental goals can conceal equally important communication goals. Military intervention can also serve to demonstrate strength to third-party states or to fuel patriotism on the national political stage. Nonetheless, openly acknowledging communication goals is counterproductive and can undermine a government's national and international credibility. Paradoxically, declaring communication goals undermines their achievement (Lindsay 1986; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988).

Consequently, discourse analysis does not usually suffice when it comes to identifying the specific goals actually pursued by foreign policy. More generally, all sources that explicitly state the objectives should be treated with caution. Political statements and press releases are often geared to the electorate and are sometimes at odds with the foreign policy they refer to. Decision-makers' autobiographies are mere narratives compiled *a posteriori* in the light of the events resulting from foreign policies. Minutes and recordings of meetings, when available, are partial and incomplete. Even apparent leaks of secret documents should be carefully examined for their authenticity and representativeness.

Doctrine

Another way foreign policy analysts can identify a government's foreign policy objectives is by searching for a doctrine. A doctrine is a set of beliefs, rules and principles guiding foreign policy. It is a self-imposed coherent framework that helps a government carry out its mission and objectives in the world. A doctrine is often but not always summed up in a statement or in an official document to communicate a government's priorities and goals to its domestic audience as well as to foreign actors.

Doctrines are often assimilated to the notion of grand strategy, yet they are not limited to great power politics. Canada, for example, had its "Axworthy doctrine" in the 1990s, named after its Minister of Foreign Affairs, which emphasized the need to protect human security through several initiatives such as the campaign to ban anti-personal landmines (Hampson and Oliver 1998). Finland had its Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine during the Cold War named after two of its presidents. This doctrine was established to preserve Finnish independence and foreign policy neutrality in the context where it evolved next to the Soviet empire.

As doctrines are not always explicitly presented as such, the search for doctrines is like a national sport for some foreign policy experts. For analysts, doctrines usefully provide macro-political frameworks through

which we can understand states' interests and try to predict their behavior. Doctrines also provide a benchmark for assessing the success and failure of a government's foreign policy strategy over time.

Throughout his tenure as the president of the United States, Barack Obama has confused observers on whether or not his administration had a foreign policy doctrine. A quick search online under "Obama doctrine" shows that this issue has been and still is a major source of debate among experts. Some claim that there was no Obama doctrine (Danforth 2016; Hirsh 2011), whereas others argue there was a doctrine, but they could not agree on its components (Goldberg 2016; Drezner 2011). At times, mere declarations acquire the status of doctrines *ex post* and subsequently serve as a guide for action for the bureaucratic apparatus and the successors of those who initially made the declarations.

Doctrines, however, have the tendency to create distortion between the belief system of a government (the macro-political trend) and the actual foreign policy decisions made by that government. By relying too heavily on the rules and principles contained in a doctrine, FPA experts can miss certain explanatory factors that account for a particular outcome because they don't fit the official doctrine. Take, for example, President Trump's 'America First' doctrine as formulated during his inaugural address on January 20, 2017. Emma Ashford from the Cato Institute writes that "while the implications for trade and immigration are relatively clear, his speech brought us little closer to understanding what this will mean for foreign policy" (Ashford 2017). Indeed, if Trump wants to protect American jobs from the forces of globalization and to increase homeland security through restrictive executive orders on immigration, his doctrine does not shed light on the core principles that will guide his actions toward the Middle East or Russia.

Moreover, a doctrine is like a picture taken at a particular moment that shows the interests, beliefs and principles of a government. It often has a hard time to adapt to domestic and international changes. For instance, Canada's late 1990s' Axworthy doctrine on human security failed to explain Canada's foreign policy behavior in the post-9/11 era, which essentially brings back national security issues to the forefront. Hence, doctrines may be more useful to foreign policy historians as they help to identify different eras and trends in the evolution of a state's foreign policy than to political scientists trying to make sense of current issues.

National Interest

Political leaders often hide behind the notion of national interest the moment they are asked to specify their foreign policy goals. This behavior allows them to depoliticize foreign policy and generate some legitimacy. In fact, it is often the political objectives that define the concept of national interest and not the other way around. As Henry Kissinger commented, "When you're asking Americans to die, you have to be able to explain it in terms of the national interest" (quoted in Weldes 1999: 1).

The concept of national interest is omnipresent in leaders' rhetoric around the world and transcends political parties and political regimes. Rwandan President Paul Kagame once declared, "The history and national interest of Rwanda and the Rwandan people dictate our national orientation" (IGIHE 2012). Thousands of kilometers from there, English Prime Minister David Cameron stated, "I believe something very deeply. That Britain's national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it" (BBC News 2013). Clearly, the majority of British citizens who voted for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in June 2016 did not share Prime Minister Cameron's view of the national interest.

The first question we should ask ourselves when reading such statements is what do leaders mean by the "national interest" and what kind of foreign policy objectives are they trying to communicate? Did Kagame and Cameron's definition of the national interest refer to the same irreducible needs? It is not easy to give a clear meaning to such a fussy concept. The national interest is a catch-all concept that is often used without definition and which has no pre-social significance. It is a social construct that evolves with its context (Rosenau 1968, 1980; Frankel 1970; Finnemore 1996; Weldes 1996).

National interest draws from intuitive thinking rather than from sound theoretical justification and explanation (Paquin 2010). Alexander George and Robert Keohane argue that the national interest is "so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematical and controversial" (George and Keohane 1980: 217). The problem with using this concept without defining precisely what one means by it is that it remains vague, underspecified and non-operational. The challenge to foreign policy experts is therefore to "unpack" this fussy concept in order to make it intelligible and meaningful.

David Callahan (1998) offers an interesting framework to understand the different national interests that democratic states pursue. His framework considers the "needs" and the "wants" of governments. The "needs" are connected to the so-called states' vital interests that ensure their protection and survival in the international system such as the protection of their citizens and national territory, access to energy resources, the health of the economy and the security of its allies. As for the "wants", they refer to states' desires that do not have a direct impact on their security, such as the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad as well as conflict and crime prevention.

This typology is interesting but does not inform the researcher on the kinds of interests that are pursued by decision-makers at a particular time and in a particular place. We can all agree that the Rwandan and the British governments have "needs" and "wants", but this is not specific enough to attribute a foreign policy behavior to a particular type of national interest.

This is where FPA theories come into play. Theoretical models are built on assumptions about what constitutes states' interests. These models provide theoretical mechanisms that establish a connection between the national interest (i.e. policy imperatives) and the foreign behavior of a government. FPA models can operationalize the concept of the national interest, without always directly referring to it, and shed lights on the kinds of interests that were at play in a particular decision-making process. Hence, theories can clarify the fussiness of this concept by testing empirically the theoretical assumptions they make about the national interest.

In sum, unlike political leaders who hide behind the fussy concept of the national interest to bolster the legitimacy of their communicated political goals, foreign policy analysts cannot allow themselves to be as intuitive and vague as political leaders when they refer to this concept because it is meaningless when not properly defined and operationalized in research.

Deducing the Goals Pursued

Several techniques can be used to deduce foreign policy goals from the state's behavior instead of relying on its publicly stated goals. One technique is to analyze the outcomes. If a policy is maintained for a long period and decision-makers have had numerous occasions to assess and modify it, we can deduce that the outcomes correspond to the goals pursued. For example, many studies on public development aid have observed that bilateral aid has little impact on the economic development in

beneficiary countries. Since this practice has been repeated over several decades, it is legitimate to call into question the primary goal, namely, to promote economic development of stated beneficiaries (Easterly 2006; Jensen and Paldam 2006; Rajan and Subramanian 2008).

In fact, several studies have revealed that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between development aid and the concordance of votes within international bodies. In general, the more aid a country receives, the more likely its stance will resemble that of its donors at the UN General Assembly. On the basis of this observation, analysts may be tempted to draw the conclusion that public development aid's primary goal is to increase the donor's political influence (Rai 1980; Lundborg 1998; Wang 1999; Lai and Morey 2006; Dreher et al. 2008).

However, such a conclusion is premature. First, some surprising studies have observed the opposite statistical relationship. These studies claim that aid reduces rather than increases the beneficiary country's cooperation with the donor country (Sullivan et al. 2011). Second, even if the apparent correlation between aid and the concordance of UN votes proved to be causal, the effects do not always correspond to the intentions. The reaction of beneficiary countries could result from processes of socialization that go hand in hand with aid, without necessarily being the primary goal.

Another, more convincing, approach involves deducing the foreign policy goals from the variables that influence it. Take the example of development aid. Several studies have shown that political considerations seem to have more influence than economic requirements when deciding on the choice of beneficiary countries and the amounts allocated. In other words, the countries in most need of humanitarian aid do not necessarily receive the most aid. The geographic location, the threat of a hostile opposition overthrowing the government, the government's ideological alignment, regional influence and a clique of leaders small enough to be corrupted, all have a positive impact on development aid. When a developing country is elected onto the UN Security Council, for example, American aid leaps by 59% on average before returning to a normal level once the country loses its strategic position. This phenomenon is apparently not unique to the United States. Japan, for instance, provides more development assistance to member states of the International Whaling Commission that vote with Tokyo (Strand and Tuman 2012).

Although contested by some (Kevlihan et al. 2014), we could draw from these findings that donor countries are motivated by the pursuit of political gains rather than humanitarian considerations (Maizels and

Nissanke 1984; Trumball and Wall 1994; Poe and Meernik 1995; Meernik et al. 1998; Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Palmer et al. 2002; Lai 2003; Kuziemko and Weker 2006; Roper and Barria 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).

Nonetheless, it is important to remember that identifying one objective does not automatically rule out other possibilities. The same foreign policy can have several simultaneous objectives, for example: possession and milieu goals, instrumental and communication goals, intermediary and end goals, short-term and long-term goals or domestic and external goals. If development aid is actually designed to strengthen political alliances, there is no reason why it cannot also be driven by moral, trade or electoral considerations (Lindsay 1986; Morgan and Palmer 1997; Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 2000).

In fact, combining a long series of goals seems to be the rule rather than the exception in pluralist societies. Foreign policies are often the result of a trade-off between the different actors involved in the domestic decision-making process. The actors are encouraged to find a way to combine their respective goals so that a common policy can be reached. Elected politicians prefer to announce a foreign policy that encompasses a wide range of goals simultaneously. Conversely, they avoid situations in which they are forced to choose between different goals to avoid disappointing some sections of the electorate. The issue of trade sanctions against the People's Republic of China, for example, put several Western leaders in a difficult position by setting the pursuit of trade interests against the defense of human rights (Drury and Li 2006).

Furthermore, there is controversy over the very concept of preset goals, identified prior to the implementation of a foreign policy. In some cases, foreign policy goals actually seem to depend on the instruments previously used. Do investments in weapons serve military purposes or do military objectives justify investments in weapons? Does the political stabilization of the Balkans aim to facilitate the expansion of the European Union or does the expansion aim at political stabilization? It is sometimes hard to differentiate the goals from the mobilization, the instruments and the outcome. For this reason, some analysts choose to ignore foreign policy goals in their comparative exercises, focusing instead on the resources mobilized, which can be quantified and observed.

Mobilized Resources

As Joseph Nye puts it, "Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it" (Nye 1990: 177). Indeed, power is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental concepts of international relations, but also one of the most difficult to define and implement (Guzzini 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Nye 2011; Lieber 2012).

Raymond Aron is one of the few analysts to propose a clear and subtle vision of power. In his view, power is the implementation of any resources in specific circumstances. It is not a question of possessing a resource or controlling a specific structure, but of mobilizing resources, taking a particular structure into account. For example, in a game of poker, power is not the possession of a royal flush or the capacity to grasp the rules of the game, but playing the royal flush at a strategic moment in the game. Resources and context are essential aspects of power, but do not suffice on their own to constitute it (Aron 1962).

From this perspective, power is not simply a determinant of foreign policy or a fact that governments have to contend with. It is an aspect of foreign policy that can be assessed, compared and explained: there are power politics just as there are inward-looking politics.

Resources

Aron's definition of power breaks with the traditional reflex of assessing power exclusively on the basis of potential force—in other words, the available resources. Here, resources are taken to mean the capital that states can mobilize but rarely increase on their own, such as territory, population and raw materials. This indicator of power has the twofold advantage of being relatively stable and quantifiable. It can be measured in square kilometers, thousands of inhabitants or tonnes, respectively. Although state-controlled resources are only an indirect indicator of power, they do significantly facilitate comparisons.

The comparative exercise can, nonetheless, be made more complex by taking into account the whole range of resources relevant to foreign policy. In the 1940s, several analysts were still focusing solely on material or demographic resources. However, since the studies conducted by Morgenthau (1948), most analysts also take into account ideational resources. Prestige and patriotism can be just as significant for foreign

policy as the number of cubic meters of oil, the number of citizens in the diaspora or the area of arable land (Posen 1993; Hall 1997; Nye 2004; Fordham and Asal 2007).

The Pontifical Swiss Guard, for example, is certainly not the most imposing army corps. Nevertheless, the Vatican exerts considerable influence in several regions of the world because of its moral authority. Likewise, some observers wonder whether the European Union's true source of power lies more in its capacity to define what is "ethical" or "moral" on the international stage than in its economic or military resources (Duchêne 1972; Hill 1990; White 1999; Manners 2002; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2003; Diez 2005; Sjursen 2006; Telo 2007).

On the other hand, some actors seem to be truly handicapped by their lack of symbolic capital. During apartheid, South Africa was unable to exert political influence across the African continent despite its considerable economic weight. To a lesser extent, China's interest in Africa's natural resources is limited by the cultural divide that separates these two regions. Despite their colonial past, several European countries have maintained privileged relationships with African societies: migratory flows, NGO network, sharing a common language and religious communities are all assets that indirectly encourage Western investments in Africa (Alden and Hughes 2009).

In addition to considering multiple resources and revealing their social dimension, most analysts now recognize that resources are necessarily specific to a given field. No single resource is relevant to all theaters of action. During the Cold War, some analysts were still striving to develop an index of absolute power that would be valid under any circumstances. However, this idea is illusory. Power is always specific to a particular context (Ferris 1973; Taber 1989).

Geopolitics and strategic studies were the first to highlight this feature of power: the type of resources required for military victory inevitably depends on the battlefield. The borders of Australia, Switzerland and Russia are so different in number, scale and nature that the resources mobilized to defend them must be adapted to their respective context. Several recent studies continue to underline the fundamental role played by geography in the statistical probabilities of conflict and military victory (Bremer 1993; Vasquez 1995; Senese 1996, 2005; Mitchell and Prins 1999; Reiter 1999; Braithwaite 2005).

The specificity of power is equally valid in diplomatic arenas and different political fields. The number of NGOs working in Africa, for example, cannot be used to establish power balances at the World Trade Organization,

any more than the distribution of oil reserves can explain the failure of UN Security Council reforms. Foreign policy always lies within a particular context, which determines the pertinence of the resources that can be mobilized in power politics (Baldwin 1989).

It is true that some resources, particularly financial resources, appear relatively fungible and can easily be transferred from one domain to another (Art 1996). The Eisenhower administration used its pound sterling reserves to its advantage during the 1956 Suez crisis in order to threaten the United Kingdom with a financial crisis if the British army did not withdraw from Egypt. However, transferring resources in this way, between two very distinct domains in cognitive and institutional terms, is exceptional. Resources cannot be aggregated for mobilization indifferently in all areas of foreign policy.

The Power Paradox

Exerting influence does not depend solely on possessing more resources than other countries in a particular domain. Resources must be mobilized effectively in a context of power politics. States do not always succeed in converting their resources into influence. Several foreign policy analysts call this the "power paradox" (Ray and Vural 1986; Maoz 1989; Baldwin 1989).

For example, just after the First World War, the United States already had all the economic resources it needed to impose an international economic order to suit its interests. Despite this opportunity, it withdrew and opted for an isolationist foreign policy. When the stock market crashed in 1929, the US Congress reacted in a defensive and protectionist way, drastically increasing import tariffs instead of trying to maintain a stable and open international regime. It was only when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was in office that the United States converted its formidable economic resources into influence (Kindleberger 1981; Frieden 1988; Zakaria 1998).

In a way, like the United States in the 1920s, contemporary China is also showing restraint. Given its capabilities, Beijing remains relatively discreet in financial and trade negotiations. There is an undeniable gap between China's available resources and the influence it exercises. It is because of examples like this that Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye insist on defining economic *hegemony* in terms of an actor that not only has sufficient resources to maintain an economic order but also the will to mobilize them for that purpose (Keohane and Nye 1977: 44).

Conversely, some actors with relatively few resources manage to assert themselves. In Asia, some small economies exert a significant influence on regional economic integration in the face of major economic powers, such as Japan and the People's Republic of China. In Europe, small states like Denmark or Belgium sometimes succeed in exerting a significant influence on the European Union's policies and function (König and Slapin 2004; Slapin 2006; Nasra 2011; Schneider 2011).

The only countries whose behavior appears, at first glance, to systematically correspond to their resources are those that are sometimes qualified as "middle powers". However, this is just an illusion, or rather a tautology. The notion of middle power actually refers less to the moderate amount of resources that are available to a state than to the type of behavior it exerts in foreign policy. A middle power is one that seeks compromise, encourages multilateralism, calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes and complies with international laws and standards. It is a socially constructed role rather than a resource-dependent status. Hence, countries as different as France and Ireland can sometimes be qualified as "middle powers" (DeWitt 2000; Chapnick 2000; Ungerer 2007; Gecelovsky 2009; Cooper 2011).

Mobilization and Exploitation

If a foreign policy cannot be explained in terms of resource distribution, it is because there are numerous intermediary variables between resources and influence. Natural resources alone cannot increase external trade and the latter cannot impose economic sanctions any more than a large population can enlist in the army and the army decide to engage in international conflicts. It is the stakeholders operating within a specific social and institutional framework that convert resources into capabilities and capabilities into foreign policy instruments.

The capacity and will to exercise power politics vary from one state to another. A growing number of supporters of the realist school of international relations recognize this. While they consider that states, above all, seek to guarantee their security and maximize power, they are now more willing to acknowledge that the domestic dynamics specific to each country shape that country's ambitions (Krasner 1977, 1978; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Lamborn 1991; Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Christensen 1996; Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998; Schweller 2006; Lobell et al. 2009; Cladi and Webber 2011; Fordham 2011; Kirshner 2012; Ripsman et al. 2016).

The differences between states are particularly linked to the relative primacy of mobilization strategies over exploitation strategies. Mobilization can be defined as the transformation of available resources to generate additional capabilities. Exploitation is the transformation of capabilities into instruments of foreign policy. All states pursue mobilization and exploitation strategies simultaneously, but the balance between the two poles varies as a function of the preferences and constraints specific to each state (Mastanduno et al. 1989).

In some cases, mobilization and exploitation strategies can be contradictory. For example, liberalizing an economy through trade agreements can encourage the mobilization of resources, but restrict the capacity to impose trade sanctions. Conversely, increasing taxes to finance a military intervention abroad can reduce, rather than stimulate, economic growth.

The theory of imperial power cycles developed by Paul Kennedy is based precisely on the contradiction between mobilization and exploitation. Several countries that have successfully managed to dominate the international order have concentrated most of their efforts on exploitation strategies. In so doing, they have failed to mobilize new resources and have, paradoxically, undermined their very position, leading to their decline (Kennedy 1987; Snyder 1991).

Another variable that affects the use of resources involves the choices between control, autonomy and legitimacy. Depending on the social structure and the existing political system, leaders may give priority to any one of these three components of power. A policy that promotes one component may discriminate against the other two. For example, invading a neighboring state can increase the resources that the invading state controls, but harm its legitimacy in the eyes of its allies. Complying with the recommendations of intergovernmental organizations can increase legitimacy, but limit political autonomy. Refusing foreign aid can increase political autonomy, but reduce control over resources (Mastanduno et al. 1989; Blanchard and Ripsman 2008).

To sum up, while approaches based on the comparison of potential resources have the significant advantage of being based on observable and generally quantifiable data, they are of limited use when it comes to explaining foreign policy. Foreign policy does not depend on an aggregated portfolio of resources. In other words, power is not just a stock that determines foreign policy; it is the flow that constitutes foreign policy.

Instruments of Foreign Policy

Instruments are often used as references for reporting variations in foreign policy over time, domains or space. To some extent, the emphasis on instruments reflects the actual decision-making process. Decision-makers are often under pressure to react swiftly to international crises. They rarely have the political opportunity to reassess their goals or consider the balance between resource exploitation and mobilization. When leaders are called on to make a decision, they generally have to choose from a list of possible interventions prepared by their administration.

Several analysts and practitioners perceive the options for intervention as a series of instruments similar to those shown in Fig. 2.1. They range from diplomacy to military force or, in the words of Joseph Nye (2004), from soft power to hard power. Between the two extremes, the instruments can be grouped into three categories: socialization, which targets the maintenance or modification of ideas; coercion, which targets the maintenance or modification of interests; and intervention, which targets the maintenance or modification of the domestic political structures of a foreign state. Each of these categories can, in turn, be broken down into sub-categories.

Socialization

The first category of instruments, socialization, can be defined as the transfer of beliefs, values and ideas from one actor to another (Schimmelfennig 2000; Alderson 2001). As Thomas Risse stated "ideas do not float freely" (1994: 185). They are actively promoted by specific actors, at least in the preliminary stages of their dissemination.



Fig. 2.1 Foreign policy instruments

Ideas are spread in different ways. In the framework of a rational communication process, actors can sometimes be so convinced by the validity of another actor's arguments that they modify their own ideas. Nonetheless, most analysts consider that sincere communication, where all participants are open to being persuaded by the best arguments, is extremely rare in international relations (Gehring and Ruffing 2008).

Most actors communicate strategically. Rhetorical action consists of expressing a set of arguments in order to achieve specific goals. An actor who uses rhetoric dramatizes events, establishes new associations between previously disconnected ideas and thinks up evocative expressions or resorts to using metaphors to influence discussions in a specific direction (Kuusisto 1998; Risse 2000; Payne 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001; Müller 2004; Mitzen 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007).

A rhetorical exchange is not the same as a dialogue of the deaf, which inevitably leads to a stalemate. It can lead some actors to modify their behavior. For example, African countries managed to convince members of the World Trade Organization to encourage the export of generic medicines, by strategically making the link between patent laws and the spread of HIV (Morin and Gold 2010). Similarly, United Nations representatives succeeded in convincing the American government to significantly increase its emergency aid to victims of the devastating tsunami in 2004, through their rhetorical action on the subject of greed (Steele 2007).

Rhetorical action is not just used by weak actors. Great powers use it constantly. The discourse surrounding the "war on terror" developed by the administration of George W. Bush in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, illustrates this. Presenting the attacks as an act of war against American freedom and the American way of life, rather than as a criminal act, was a rhetorical strategy. It legitimized recourse to military force overseas, silenced the opposition, authorized emergency measures curtailing freedom and strengthened national unity (Kuusisto 1998; Heng 2002; Jackson 2005).

Some discourses are not expressed in words, but are translated into actions. For instance, prestige can be consciously fueled by military parades, space exploration or Olympic performances. The study of military purchases, for example, indicates that weapons can have functions that are more symbolic than strategic (Eyre and Suchman 1996). Some countries acquire a new fleet of fighter jets or submarines that are not adapted to the threats they face. The impression of power generated by

this type of weapon, however, can have a real impact. A state that resorts to such demonstrations of power may actually hope to disseminate its ideas abroad more easily (Fordham and Asal 2007).

Public diplomacy, which aims to "conquer the hearts and minds" of foreign populations, is another socialization strategy used on a large scale. During the Cold War, it was the primary motivating factor behind American public funding for Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. Even today, several governments invest massively in public diplomacy. The French government uses several instruments to disseminate French opinion overseas, including the Alliance Française, TV5 Monde, France 24, Radio France International and the Eiffel excellence scholarships for students (Goldsmith et al. 2005; Cull 2008; Nye 2008; Snow and Taylor 2009).

The diffusion of democratic practices through socialization has been largely studied over the years. Some argue that authoritarian exposure to democratic standards and practices shapes their attitude and contributes to their democratization (Cederman and Gleditsch 2004; Simmons et al. 2006; Atkinson 2010). However, it appears that not all types of socialization have a real effect on democratic diffusion. Freyburg (2015), for instance, shows that international education programs and foreign democratic media broadcasting in non-democratic countries do not have a significant impact on democratization. Democratic socialization works only when it involves practical experience. "Officials who have participated in the activities of policy reform programs undertaken by established democracies show a higher agreement with democratic administrative governance than their non-participating colleagues" (Freyburg 2015: 69). Hence, interpersonal exchange has more socialization power than indirect types of democratic socialization.

In other cases, states define the goals of their socialization initiatives more clearly. They can, for example, encourage informal and repeated interactions between their own civil servants and those from another country (Schimmelfennig 1998; Checkel 2001, 2003; Pevehouse 2002; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Cao 2009; Greenhill 2010; Morin and Gold 2014). Intergovernmental conferences organized by capital exporting countries could convince developing countries of the potential benefits of agreements on the liberalization of the investment (Morin and Gagné 2007). Similarly, training foreign officers in American military schools could encourage the spread of American standards and values (Atkinson 2010).

Coercion

While the diverse mechanisms of socialization are still relatively unknown, the literature on coercion abounds (Baldwin 1985; Hirschman 1980; Carter 2015; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2016). Coercive measures are designed to influence how a target state behaves by modifying the way its interests are calculated, without directly intervening in foreign territory. The term conceals a vast array of instruments that are derived from different processes and have distinct impacts. These instruments can be organized into at least five axes that overlap to form a multidimensional matrix.

The first axis refers to the "carrot and stick" idiom as it differentiates between the coercive instruments that use positive sanctions (or reward-based strategy) and those that resort to negative sanctions to induce certain behaviors (punishment-based strategy) (Crumm 1995; Newnham 2000). The conditions for the expansion of the European Union are a form of coercion based on a positive sanction (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Likewise, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been able to compel Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania to adopt legislation that reduced their social and ethnic tensions as a condition to their accession to these organizations (Kelley 2004). Despite their conflicting history, Romania and Hungary have maintained peaceful relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to increase their chances of becoming members of NATO and the European Union (Linden 2000, 2002). Conversely, the American trade restrictions imposed on countries that fail to take the necessary action to prevent trafficking of endangered species are an example of a negative sanction (Reeve 2002). There is no consensus in the literature on which type of coercion works best (Crawford 2011; Izumikawa 2013). But carrot and stick are not always separate options in the sense that they often work in tandem. Jakobsen (2012) shows, for instance, that it is the combination of positive and negative coercion, as well as British confidence-building measures, that led Libya to give up its weapon of mass destruction program in 2003.

Another axis that differentiates between coercive instruments contrasts the threat of sanctions with the actual imposition of them (Bapat and Kwon 2015). According to some historians, military mobilization on the eve of the First World War was a demonstration of power designed to intimidate and target one final abdication before the outbreak of hostilities (Tuchman 1962). In contrast, the Swiss government's decisions to freeze

the assets that certain heads of state held in Swiss banks, including Robert Mugabe, Ben Ali and Jean-Claude Duvalier, were issued without prior warning (Dulin and Merckaert 2009).

Coercive instruments can also be distinguished according to their goals. Dissuasion is a form of coercion that aims to maintain the *status quo*, whereas compellence is a form of coercion that aims to change it. Nuclear weapons are generally seen as an instrument of dissuasion—in other words, an implicit threat to any shift in the balance of power (Kahn 1966; Freedman 1989). On the contrary, the American *Super 301* system, named after the section number of the US Trade Act of 1974, which identifies the countries with apparently unfair trade policies, is an example of a compellence because the targeted countries are requested to modify their practices or risk sanctions (Sell 2003).

A fourth dimension differentiates targeted coercive instruments from those with a general scope (Morgan 1977). The former is usually adopted in times of crisis and have a different logic from the latter, which are institutionalized. Thus, the Eisenhower administration's refusal to support the United Kingdom's request for IMF funding, as long as it did not end the Suez Crisis, cannot be explained by the same mechanisms that led Congress to adopt a law stipulating that no country supporting terrorism would benefit from the US support at the IMF (Kirshner 1995).

The last axis contrasts sanctions that specifically target the elite from those that target the entire population. In January 2011, the United States' decision to ban American citizens from establishing business dealings with the Belarusian petroleum company Belneftekhim primarily targeted President Alexander Lukashenko's inner circle. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the European Union, the United States and other nations issued similar bans against Russian companies including Rosneft, a Russian state oil company, in order to hurt Vladimir Putin's regime (Dreyer and Popescu 2014). In 1973, in protest against American military support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, the Arab countries' reduction of oil exports targeted Western public opinion as a whole (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Pape 1997).

Another type of coercive instrument, which is slightly different in nature from the previous developed axes, is coercive diplomacy (Phillips 2012; Christensen 2011, Art and Cronin 2003). This instrument differs from economic sanctions and the conditionality argument because, although its objective is to influence the behavior of another state, its logic rests on the threat to use force or the actual use of limited violence. In a

sense, coercive diplomacy lies at the intersection between traditional coercive measures and full-scale military intervention abroad (Art and Jervis 2005; Levy 2008). As Alexander George explains, in coercive diplomacy, "one gives the opponent an opportunity to stop or back off before employing force against it" (1991: 6). Hence, military intervention is often the result of failed coercive diplomacy. Turkey relied on coercive diplomacy toward Syria and Northern Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s to force them to stop their support to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Ankara's strategy achieved mixed results: Syria decided to comply with Turkey's request since it was not willing to bear the cost of war to preserve its ties with the PKK, while Northern Iraq remained defiant toward Ankara because it shared similar aspirations with the PKK and ultimately suffered Turkey's retaliation (Aras 2011).

Interventions

The third category of instruments covers interventions and can be broken down into a typology that is equally complex. All interventions are incursions in the domestic affairs of a foreign state to bring about internal structural change. However, it is important to distinguish political interventions from military interventions.

A political intervention targets subversion by supporting dissident groups, or stabilization by supporting a weak ruling power. In this way, the United States provides finance, material and training to diverse foreign political powers that are sympathetic to liberal democracy, including the media, political parties and NGOs. Sometimes political interventions are declared overtly, such as in the 1999 Iraq Liberation Act, which detailed the budgets allocated to Iraqi subversion. More often, interventions are clandestine, as in the case of the American support for the Italian Christian Democratic Party immediately after the Second World War (Miller 1983; Collins 2009).

Research has shown that from 1946 to 2000, the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States deployed overt and covert partisan electoral interventions in no fewer than 117 competitive elections abroad (that is one election out of nine) in order to influence the political outcome of these elections (Levin 2016). As Levin explains, "in a world in which military interventions are increasingly costly and democracies are more common, partisan electoral interventions are likely to become an ever more central tool of the great powers' foreign policy" (Levin 2016: 20).

The scope of military interventions should also be broken down. Contrary to common wisdom, most military interventions abroad do not lead to war. Border skirmishes and maneuvers on foreign territory can just be a strategy to test a state's determination to defend a disputed border. Maritime blockades can simply be used to force negotiations by avoiding direct confrontations. Gunboat diplomacy is merely a show of strength designed to intimidate. Some military interventions have specific targets that can be reached in a matter of hours, for example, assassinating a political leader or bombing a chemical factory. Resorting to war is an extreme decision, which remains relatively rare compared to all other foreign policy instruments (Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Russett and Oneal 2001).

Of course, this has not prevented experts from conducting research on military interventions. Some have focus, for instance, on regime change and democratization as factors making military interventions more likely (Meernik 1996; Downes and Monten 2013; Durward and Marsden 2016; Downes and O'Rourke 2016). Others have looked at intervention in ethnic and intrastate conflicts (Regan 2000; Carment et al. 2006; Schultz 2010). But this does not change the fact that political leaders have an aversion to overt war.

By moving away from the pole of soft power toward the pole of hard power, the instruments gradually become more intensive and, consequently, more dangerous. Each step heightens the degree of commitment, making it harder to back off. A government that beats a retreat after taking draconian measures implicitly acknowledges its mistake and leaves itself open to criticism on the national and international stages. President Obama's decision not to enforce his "red line" in Syria in August 2013, that is, to back down from intervening militarily against Bashar al-Assad's regime following its use of chemical weapons, was highly criticized by the foreign policy establishment for seriously damaging the administration's credibility in foreign policy (Chollet 2016).

In this context, instead of backing off when an instrument proves ineffective, leaders may be forced to sink deeper into a difficult situation. Military interventions are often reactions to failed coercive efforts, which can, in turn, be reactions to the failures of socialization. Yet, a headlong rush can lead to decision-makers demise (Staw 1981; Brockner and Rubin 1985; Bowen 1987; Downs and Rocke 1994; Fearon 1994; Billings and Hermann 1998; Taliaferro 2004; Baum 2004a, b, c; Tomz 2007). This is what President Johnson did in Vietnam. Faced with immense difficulties on the ground, the president chose to increase the number of troops even though some of his advisers, including Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, sought to dissuade him. Johnson preferred to stay the course rather than carry the odium of a military defeat (Janis 1982). This led the president to retire from politics by declining to run in the 1968 presidential elections.

Political leaders generally prefer persuasion to intervention. As the American Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed, "it is better, whenever possible, to let the reputation of power rather than the use of power achieve policy goals" (2004: 62). Although the outcome of socialization may be uncertain and massive intervention at the start of a conflict may maximize the chances of success, when a new situation arises, leaders often prefer resorting to socialization, followed by coercion, before considering military intervention.

Many foreign policy analysts prefer studying military interventions rather than socialization. This preference is not due to a fascination with violence, nor due to the conviction that military conflicts have a greater impact than the exchange of ideas. It is simply a question of methodological constraints. Socialization is particularly difficult to research, whether through interviews or discourse analysis. Military interventions, on the other hand, can be observed directly and their intensity can be assessed quantitatively.

Thus, there are several databases on military interventions that are freely available to researchers. Four of them are frequently used in research on FPA: Militarized Interstate Disputes (www.correlatesofwar.org), International Crisis Behavior (sites.duke.edu/icbdata/), Armed Conflict Dataset (www.prio.no/cscw) and International Military Intervention (www.icpsr.umich.edu).

These databases differ in terms of their coding manual and their spatial and temporal scope. Some researchers define war as a military intervention in foreign territory, while others define it as a conflict that causes the death of at least 1000 combatants; some go back to the Napoleonic Wars, while others limit themselves to the Cold War; some focus on interstate conflicts, while others include civil wars as well. However, there is no equivalent database that focuses exclusively on states' socialization endeavors.

Event-Based Databases

Obviously, socialization, coercion and intervention are not mutually exclusive. Negotiation, for example, is generally based on a combination of socialization and coercion. The European Union has convinced its East European neighbors to abolish the death penalty by resorting to a discourse on human rights and via policies of economic conditionality

(Manners 2002). In some cases, negotiation can even include some form of military intervention (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000). Foreign policy tends to combine different instruments rather than choose between them. When several instruments are used simultaneously, it is not always easy to determine the level of commitment and the degree of cooperation between two protagonists.

Event-based databases are methodological tools capable of integrating different types of foreign policy instruments, which are implemented simultaneously. They aggregate a vast quantity of information and record it on a common numeric scale. In this way, they facilitate comparisons between countries, domains or periods (Rosenau and Ramsey 1975).

Technically, event-based databases are generated from several thousand one-off events reported in the newspapers. Each event is recorded on a scale of cooperation according to a detailed coding manual. Thus, a bilateral meeting between two heads of state can have a value of +1, a joint military intervention +5 and imposing trade sanction −3. Coding can be carried out manually, by a team of researchers, or automatically, using predefined key words (Schrodt 1995).

The best-known event-based databases are the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO), the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), the Penn State Event Data Project (KEDS), the Minorities at Risk (MAR) based at the University of Maryland and the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON). Most of these databases are accessible via the website for the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research (www.icpsr.umich.edu). Databases dedicated to a specific issue are also available, such as the International Water Event Database on water cooperation (www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu).

These event-based databases provide a common numeric base, which is extremely helpful for comparing policies. They can be used, for example, to determine whether small and large powers tend to be aggressive in the same circumstances (East 1973; Clark et al. 2008) or to assess whether the arrival of a new head of state alters the degree of cooperation (Hermann 1980).

Nonetheless, these databases are not a panacea. In the midst of the Cold War, the American government generously financed the development of event-based databases in the hope that they would serve as a barometer for international tension and even as an early warning system for imminent conflict. However, it was too much to expect of this

methodological tool: even with the use of powerful computer systems that make it possible to diversify sources, increase the volume of data and remove the influence of coders, inaccuracies inevitably still occur (Smith 1986; Laurance 1990; Kaarbo 2003). In fact, the data used are biased even before they are filtered through the analytical grid. As raw information is drawn from newspapers, the databases reflect the media interest generated by a bilateral relationship more than the actual cooperation between two states. Furthermore, they ignore non-events, which are as significant in diplomatic language as the events that have actually occurred. For this reason, several analysts pay greater attention to how decisions are made rather than what actions are undertaken.

The Process of Foreign Policy

Analysts interested in the decision-making cycle often assume that a state's domestic context is more important than the external context, when it comes to explaining foreign policy decisions. However, the range of levels of analysis is still broad at the sub-national level. Some analysts focus on the government leader's cognitive mechanisms, while others take into account the structures that allow interaction between the social actors. In order to identify the relevant level of analysis, the analyst can divide the decision-making process into several stages, which range from identifying the problem to assessing the results.

Years ago, public policy experts understood that by segmenting the decision-making process, different levels of analysis could be identified. However, this segmentation must be slightly adapted for the study of foreign policy. In foreign policy, the highest executive authorities are often challenged, the legislative power is generally less directly involved, interest groups are less active and debates are often less transparent than in other public policy areas. This section proposes a segmentation of the decision-making process inspired by different studies of foreign policy. It then considers the theoretical implications and the limits of this kind of segmentation (Zelikow 1994; Hermann 1990; Billings and Hermann 1998; Hermann 2001; Knecht and Weatherford 2006; Ozkececi-Taner 2006).

Segmentation in Six Phases

Figure 2.2 shows a classic segmentation of the decision-making process in six phases (Jones 1984). Obviously, it is a simple diagram, which does not reflect the complexity of the decision-making process. However, its simplicity



Fig. 2.2 The cycle of formulating foreign policies

gives it heuristic value. Each stage corresponds to a level of analysis. By going through all the stages of the cycle, the analysis completes a circuit. The diagram goes from the social to the governmental level, then to the individual level and back to the governmental level, before returning to the social level.

According to this schematic cycle, framing is the first stage in formulating a foreign policy. It is important to keep in mind that most foreign policy problems remain in a state of limbo because they are not framed as problems. Environmental protection, for example, could have challenged foreign ministers as early as the nineteenth century because transnational pollution was already affecting citizens' quality of life. Yet, it was not actually considered as a foreign policy problem until the 1970s (Maoz 1990; Snow and Benford 1998; Mintz and Redd 2003).

For a problem to be framed as a political issue and shift from a world of objectivity to one of intersubjectivity, it must first be shaped by one or more "policy entrepreneurs". The latter make the problem intelligible by giving it a framework—in other words they name, interpret and simplify it. The problem of access to medicines in developing countries can be framed as a social justice, an economic development or a prevention of global epidemics issue. The way a problem is defined will orient the terms of the debate and determine which actors are called on. Consequently, the

actors that set the framework for the debate have a considerable influence, even when they have no direct access to public decision-makers (Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Busby 2007).

The second stage in the cycle is agenda-setting. Political leaders are challenged on a series of questions and cannot reasonably examine each one of them. Here, the capacity of non-state actors to mobilize and convince key people, such as civil servants and political advisors, who control access to the leaders, plays a major role. Convincing them of the importance of an emerging issue is essential if it is to be included on the list of political priorities.

In several cases, an extraordinary event or a crisis is needed to create the political opportunity necessary to enable a new issue to be included on the agenda. The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing gave policy entrepreneurs the chance to force Western leaders to publicly express their views on Tibet's political status and the freedom of the press (Tarrow 1989; Joachim 2003; Carpenter 2007).

The framework and the political opportunity largely determine the political authority called on to examine the different policy options, which is the third stage of the cycle. International negotiations on climate change can be presented as an issue relating to investment, international distributive justice or the protection of territorial integrity, which concerns the ministries of finance, international cooperation or defense, respectively. In all cases, when an administration takes on an issue, discussions become more technical and the positions more moderate. The experts, including civil servants, advisors, and scientists, gradually replace the activists, reporters or lobbyists who initially framed the issue (Morin 2011).

At the fourth stage, decision-makers are called on to give an opinion on a limited number of options. As a result, their decision is broadly structured by the previous stages. The decision-making unit varies considerably in different countries and for different issues. A dictator, a minister, a politburo and a parliament have very different procedures, which invariably affect decisions and how they are communicated. A significant part of FPA research specifically involves determining the decision-making unit and identifying its particular characteristics (Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann et al. 2001a, b; Hermann 2001).

The process of formulating a foreign policy does not stop at the decision-making stage. Public administration is largely responsible for how it is interpreted, implemented and continually adjusted to external circumstances. Yet, at this fifth stage of the cycle, the administration does

not always have the material capacity, the information, the legitimacy or even the will to ensure that the authorities' decision is perfectly translated into concrete results. These constraints are very real in domestic politics and seem to be exacerbated when a policy is implemented beyond state boundaries. Very little FPA research has been conducted on the implementation stage, and our knowledge is still fairly limited.

Policy evaluation is the sixth and last stage. In foreign policy, evaluation is open to interpretation because results are generally diffuse and multicausal. For example, the arms race during the Cold War can be interpreted simultaneously as a factor of stability between the two superpowers or as a factor of instability, generating local conflicts throughout the world. In this context, the same categories of actors, which initially framed the problem, will seize the opportunity to campaign in favor of maintaining, adjusting or entirely reformulating the policy. The problem can then go through the entire cycle again (Morin and Gold 2010; Morin 2011).

A Linear, Cyclical or Chaotic Process

Figure 2.2 presents the decision-making process in a cyclical form because most issues central to foreign policy are never permanently settled. George Shultz, secretary of state under Ronald Reagan, commented that "policy-making does not involve confronting one damn thing after another, as most people imagine. It involves confronting the same damn thing over and over" (cited in Hoagland 1994: C1). The same issues come up periodically, whether it is the Israel–Palestine conflict, the price of raw materials, Africa's development, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the apparent decline of American power, the reform of the UN Security Council, the devaluation of the Chinese yuan or Turkey joining the European Union.

Nonetheless, an issue is modified slightly each time it goes through the cycle. New arguments are put forward, new institutions are created and lessons are drawn. For this reason, it is more appropriate to consider the cycle of formulating policies as an evolving spiral rather than as a closed circle (Billings and Hermann 1998; Dreyer 2010).

Even when the cycle for formulating policies is seen as a spiral, it is still no more than a simplified diagram. In reality, the different stages overlap more than they follow a linear sequence. Examining the options, for example, is often anticipated at the framing stage, and, sometimes, going back to agenda-setting may be planned at the implementation stage.

Some theoretical models are clearly opposed to a sequential vision of the decision-making process. The garbage can theory, notably, rejects the idea that solutions are imagined as a function of the problems. According to this theory, decision-making is the result of the more or less random assembly of diverse elements, which are divided into four different garbage cans. The first can includes the problems seeking solutions. The second contains solutions seeking problems to solve. The third includes political opportunities seeking a decision, and the fourth includes public decision-makers searching for solutions to problems. The flows in and out of these cans are independent of each other. A minister of international trade may take advantage of the upcoming elections to present a law on intellectual property as a solution to the problem of access to medicines in developing countries. There are no links between the four elements, *a priori*. The only common denominator is the random content of the respective cans (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1984; Bendor et al. 2001).

Nonetheless, a schematic diagram in the form of a spiral is helpful for understanding that formulating a foreign policy is not about a single moment and a single actor. If a researcher conducts interviews to find out about the origin of a well-perceived policy, it would not be surprising if all those questioned identified themselves, in good faith, as being the true initiator: non-state actors whispered about it to civil servants, who recommended it to the minister, who defended it at the council of ministers where it was approved by the government leader. Inversely, in the case of a foreign policy judged unfavorably, everyone will blame a third party. In general, it is futile to conduct interviews with the objective of identifying the single author of a foreign policy.

A precise definition of the purpose of the study may be sufficient to direct the researcher toward a specific phase in the public policy cycle. A project that seeks to understand why a state intervened on a particular issue may focus on the first two stages in the cycle. A project that aims to explain why the state chose a specific option over another may limit its research to the next two stages. A third project that calls into question the maintenance of an apparently ineffective policy may only consider the last two stages. The stage chosen will then guide the researcher toward a societal, governmental or individual level of analysis.

The Outcome of Foreign Policy

Studying the outcome of a country's foreign policy raises fundamental practical and theoretical questions. Assessing the relative effectiveness of a series of foreign policy measures can raise questions concerning the conditions that determine their success or failure. Can an apparently faultless decision-making process lead to a flawed policy? Conversely, can a foreign policy that successfully achieves its target emerge from chaos (Herek et al. 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 2002)?

Measuring Effectiveness

Evaluating the impact of a foreign policy presents considerable methodological challenges. The difficulty of identifying the real goals pursued, the multicausality of the outcomes, the tensions between the short and long term and the problem of counter-factuality are just some of the methodological issues raised by foreign policy evaluation (Harvey 2012; Hansel and Oppermann 2016).

Public development aid and public diplomacy, for example, target such diffuse and long-term goals that it is virtually impossible to evaluate the full extent of their impacts (Goldsmith et al. 2005). Policies of dissuasion have the special feature of leaving no trace of their success. The number of surprise attacks and terrorist attacks that have been discouraged, thanks to politics of dissuasion, remains unknown (Lebow and Gross Stein 1989; Fearon 2002). Even when a war leads to unconditional surrender, it does not necessarily mean that the winner has achieved their goals (Mandel 2006). More fundamentally, if foreign policy only has domestic goals, like reproducing collective identity, it would be pointless to look for indicators of its effectiveness beyond state borders (Bickerton 2010).

These methodological constraints no doubt explain why the literature on the outcomes of foreign policy focuses on economic sanctions. Sanctions actually have three undeniable methodological advantages. First, they are used often enough to enable precise statistical analyses. Second, they are generally imposed for specific reasons, which can serve as benchmarks for assessing their outcomes. Lastly, their use is relatively transparent, which means the outside observer can locate them precisely in time and space and quantify their scale in dollars or euros.

The numerous studies on the effectiveness of economic sanctions conclude almost unanimously that sanctions rarely achieve their goals (Peksen and Drury 2010; Pape 1997). This observation was first established by

qualitative studies on specific cases. Multilateral sanctions against the regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, for example, did not lead them to review their racist policies. The Rhodesian government was overthrown in 1979 and apartheid was abolished in South Africa in 1991, but these revolutions are not directly linked to the sanctions imposed several years previously (Doxey 1972; Klotz 1995).

The American embargo imposed against Cuba is an even more striking failure. After over half a century of sanctions, the Cuban government has not yet paid compensation to the United States for nationalizing American investments during the Cuban revolution. The Castro regime even blamed American sanctions for the failings of its communist economy and used them to generate patriotic reactions and rally support (Kaplowitz 1998).

With the multiplication of economic sanctions since the 1970s, it is now possible to study their effectiveness from a quantitative point of view. One of the first quantitative studies, and one of the most frequently quoted, is that by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Elliott. Their study was first published in 1985. It presents a systematic analysis of over 100 sanctions imposed since 1914 and concludes that their success rate was approximately 35%. Later editions of the study conclude that the success rate, already relatively low, is decreasing markedly (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Elliott and Hufbauer 1999).

Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott's quantitative argument triggered an intense methodological debate. The first wave of criticisms concerns their choice of case studies. According to several analysts, their study is biased in favor of sanctions with the greatest probability of success. For example, it does not take into account cases where sanctions were envisaged by decision-makers before being dismissed because of the risk of failure. This bias induces an overrepresentation of favorable cases and rules out the possibility of establishing probabilities of success for a hypothetical sanction. The second wave of criticism focuses on the control of certain influential variables. Many examples of success could, in reality, be attributed to other variables, like resorting to military force in parallel, rather than to economic coercion. Reviews and reassessments have concluded that only 5% as opposed to 35% of sanctions achieve their goals (Lam 1990; Von Furstenberg 1991; Kirshner 1995; Drury 1998; Nooruddin 2002).

Nonetheless, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott's quantitative approach made it possible to reorient research on the scope of economic sanctions and, more generally, on the effectiveness of foreign policy. It is no longer a question of knowing whether sanctions are effective, but of identifying the factors that influence their effectiveness.

Feedback Effects

Feedback is another way to measure foreign policy effectiveness. It can be defined as a message about an actor's action, which a system sends back to that actor; or a message about the state of a system, which an actor sends back to the system. The emphasis is not placed on a single foreign policy decision, but on constant flows of actions and reactions spread over time. The causes of foreign policy become its effects and vice versa (Snyder et al. 2002 [1962] p.110; Pierson 1993).

For clarification, it is important to differentiate between two types of feedback: negative and positive. In the case of negative feedback, the effects of a foreign policy undermine its very existence. During the war between the USSR and Afghanistan, the United States supported mujahidin resistance by imposing an embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union. Although the Carter administration's initial goal was to limit the capacities of Soviet action, the embargo caused a slump in the price of cereal products, which primarily hit American farmers. As a result of this unexpected feedback, the American administration lifted its ban (Lindsay 1986).

Another example of negative feedback is how a fragile government's foreign enemies react. Some studies show that governments, which are tackling popular discontent or have recently established their power, are statistically at greater risk of being attacked by a foreign power (Prins 2001; Bak and Palmer 2010). Iraq's attempted invasion of Iran in 1980 took advantage of the weakness of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, which had not yet fully established its power after the Islamist revolution. However, foreign attacks generally provoke a rallying effect on the population. The Iraqi attack did not so much undermine as strengthen Khomeini's control on the Iranian people.

Positive feedback helps explain the gradual strengthening of some foreign policies. For example, Franco-German cooperation required strong political impetus in the post-war period. Relationships of trust have gradually been established at all levels of the administration, which consolidates cooperation on a continual basis (Krotz 2010). This positive feedback mechanism is central to the neofunctional theory developed by Ernst Haas (1958) to explain the process of European integration.

The same phenomenon of positive feedback can also fuel relations of mistrust. A conflict between two countries can alter their mutual perception and lead them to interpret all subsequent actions with suspicion. The economic sanctions imposed on South Africa because of apartheid left Pretoria feeling politically isolated. Consequently, it developed a nuclear weapons program, which further justified the maintenance of sanctions. This vicious circle, fueled by positive feedback loops, explains why a rise in military spending in one country generally leads to a similar rise in expenditure in rival countries (Lepgold and McKeown 1995). It also explains why an initial conflict increases the statistical probabilities of subsequent conflicts (Bremer 1993; Hensel 1994, 1999, 2002; Drezner 1999; Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Dreyer 2010).

A research project that aims to assess the relative value of a causal relationship could benefit from taking into account the continuous feedback between an actor and his environment. Ignoring feedback can distort the analysis. If feedback is positive, the direct relationship between cause and effect is likely to be overestimated because of the amplification effect. Inversely, if the feedback is negative, causality can be underestimated because the reaction partly offsets the effect of the action (Rosenau 1980).

Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is one of many theories that uses the concept of feedback to explain foreign policy. Historical institutionalism focuses particularly on the phenomenon of path dependence—in other words on the constraints that past decisions impose on the present. If an actor takes a given path, backtracking or changing course can be difficult, even if he realizes that he has not chosen the best path. This difficulty is heightened over time, as he continues along the path, because the positive feedback loops constantly endorse the initial sub-optimal decision (Fioretos 2011).

A classic example of path dependence is the use of computer keyboards. Both QWERTY and AZERTY keyboards are sub-optimal—in other words the key layout is not ideal for speed typing. On the other hand, the more familiar a user becomes with a given arrangement, the faster they can type and the harder it is for them to change to a different kind of keyboard, even if, objectively speaking, it is optimal.

Similarly, political leaders can unwittingly commit their country to taking a sub-optimal path. This occurs because they take account of the considerations that relate to the specific initial context, without necessarily anticipating the feedback loops and their long-term consequences. These critical moments generally occur in times of crisis and they are crucial for the future. The economic crisis of the 1930s, the two world wars and the

collapse of the Soviet Union all constitute critical moments when foreign policy decisions were made concerning the attitude to adopt in a given domain or toward a particular country. These attitudes persisted for decades (Mabee 2011).

Positive feedback loops that maintain policies in path dependence are particularly evident in the field of economics. In fact, any trade policy that is adopted will benefit some economic actors and penalize others. Yet, the longer a policy is maintained, the stronger the beneficiaries become and the more they pressurize the government to preserve the policy. Thus, in the United States, granting trade preferences to China in the 1980s encouraged the emergence of large American importers of Chinese products and the development of American investments in China. This limited President Clinton's capacity to impose sanctions on China for its human rights violations, despite his commitment to do so. Instead, the trade concessions paved the way for China's admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Goldstein 1988).

Similar feedback loops can also help explain why a military alliance or security tensions continue. From this point of view, the case of Israel is striking. By authorizing the establishment of colonies on Palestinian territory after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government created an interest group that has since campaigned to conserve and expand the colonies. Gradually, the interest group gained considerable political influence within conservative and nationalist parties. In parallel, the United States first demonstrated its unfailing support for Israel during the Cold War. This policy shaped the expectations of the American people and the Israeli government. The slightest variation would be interpreted as an unacceptable historic change, even though the United States has every interest in working more closely with Arab governments (Dannreuther 2011).

Historical institutionalism does not necessarily present a deterministic view of history. Changing trajectory is always possible. It just becomes harder over time. Radical changes generally occur in exceptional circumstances, such as the overthrow of the ruling elite or a military defeat. These occasions of rupture are critical moments for adopting new policies, which, over time, are also likely to become entrenched by positive feedback loops.

Explaining Effectiveness

Asking the question of what determines the effectiveness of a foreign policy raises the issue of the level of analysis. In the case of economic sanctions, most analysts consider that the main explanatory variables, which determine the sanctions' effectiveness, are at the national level and are inherent to the characteristics of the sanctioned state.

One of the main determinants of the success of sanctions is their economic impact on the targeted state, which is calculated as a percentage of its gross domestic product. A policy change is likely if these costs are greater than the interest represented by maintaining the incriminating policies. From this point of view, the most dependent economies are also the most vulnerable to sanctions (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Hufbauer 2007).

Nonetheless, high economic cost is not a sufficient prerequisite to guarantee the success of a sanction. The ruling power's internal structure should also be taken into account. Several statistical analyses have concluded that autocracies and democracies react differently to sanctions. Democracies are more sensitive to sanctions that have a diffuse impact on society as a whole, whereas autocracies manage to resist them more easily. Trade sanctions imposed on Haiti and Iraq in the 1990s, for example, seriously affected civilian populations, but did not seriously affect regimes in power. In reality, they were more controversial in the countries that adopted them than in the target countries. In order to threaten autocracies, sanctions should directly target the resources of the ruling elite (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Brooks 2002; Nooruddin 2002; McGillivray and Stam 2004; Allen 2005; Lai and Morey 2006; Allen 2008; Blanchard and Ripsman 2008; Sechser 2010).

Some analysts consider the national context in the state that instigated the sanction, as well as the national context in the targeted state. Indeed, a sanction that represents a high cost for the state that adopts it may be unsuccessful. This explains why sanctions that target complementary economies are generally less effective than those that target competing economies (Morgan and Schwebach 1995; Zeng 2002). The most striking example is when the American Congress threatened the People's Republic of China in the early 1990s because of its human rights violations. The threats, which were raised periodically, were so counterproductive that an intensification as opposed to a reduction in Chinese repression ensued. China was in a position to behave so defiantly because the primary victims of the potential trade sanctions would have been the American investors based in China and the American importers of Chinese products. In the case of sanctions, these two heavyweights of the American economy would not have hesitated to put pressure on Congress and plead their case. The American and Chinese economies are so closely intertwined that the

threats from Congress were not taken seriously. The Chinese government no doubt concluded that Congress was merely making threats to please a few activist groups and a few unions with no real intention of taking action (Drury and Li 2006).

However, the effectiveness of sanctions is not entirely determined by rational calculations. Games of perception, filtered through cognitive mechanisms, can also help explain the outcomes of economic sanctions. A long-standing relationship of cooperation between the state sanctioned and the sanctioning state makes it possible to establish a relationship of trust and encourages the former to think that the latter will actually lift the sanctions when their demands have been met. Conversely, the memory of past antagonisms can maintain relationships of suspicion and make the sanctioned state fear that a concession will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and lead to the multiplication of new sanctions (Drezner 1999; Drury and Li 2006; Giumelli 2011).

The international context is another pertinent level of analysis for explaining the effectiveness of sanctions. Third countries can actually neutralize the effects of sanctions by suggesting that they become alternative economic partners. Several United States' traditional allies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan, benefit from unilateral American sanctions to develop their own markets. Therefore, the success of sanctions varies as a function of the capacity to guarantee interstate cooperation and prevent the targeted state from turning to new partners (Martin 1992; Early 2011, 2012).

Guaranteeing this type of cooperation with third states can be difficult. Firm and targeted unilateral sanctions can be more effective than vague and porous multilateral sanctions. That is probably one of the reasons why unilateral sanctions are generally more effective than multilateral sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999). On the other hand, taking the unilateral path when a multilateral option is available can be perceived as illegitimate and may generate opposition instead of concessions. According to a study, the perception of illegitimacy associated with unilateralism could reduce the efficacy of sanctions by 34% (Pelc 2010).

From the Puzzle to the Theoretical Explanations

Debates on economic sanctions have focused less on their degree of effectiveness than on identifying the factors that explain their effectiveness. Thus, the problems are no longer purely methodological, but also theoretical.

Of course, identifying a dependent variable always raises methodological problems: the available information is fragmented and does not always allow to draw comparisons. However, an examination of the most relevant explanatory variables also requires delicate theoretical choices: which level of analysis is the most relevant for explaining a given foreign policy? If the answer is all of them, then how can these variables be included in a coherent theoretical explanation?

Theoretical Models

Now that the identification of the dependent variable, that is, the foreign policy itself, is clarified, the remaining of the book focuses on the independent variables, that is, on the theoretical explanations of foreign policy, which are generated from the multiple levels of analysis.

Theories are abstract simplifications of complex empirical realities. It is because they simplify reality that they are useful to researchers. More specifically, a theory is a coherent and logical statement (or speculation) generated by a researcher. This statement is then operationalized using independent variables and tested to an empirical domain in order to validate or refute its explanatory power (Van Evera 1997; King et al. 1994). Theories guide researchers toward the fundamental explanatory factors and allow them to ignore secondary elements that are not essential for understanding or explaining a phenomenon.

If this definition is generally accepted to be the primary function of a theory, analysts disagree, however, on what the fundamental explanatory factors of FPA actually are. The following chapter focuses on the decision-maker and introduces a number of theories explaining foreign policies at the individual level of analysis.

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CHAPTER 3

Do Decision-Makers Matter?

How useful is the individual level of analysis in understanding foreign policy? This is a legitimate question since there is still controversy surrounding the use of this unit of analysis. Until the 1950s, several internationalists focused their analyses on the "great men" of history, such as Peter the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Bolivar, Otto von Bismarck, Winston Churchill or Mao Zedong. These leaders were depicted as exceptional and independent figures. Their political actions were defining history more than they were forged by the historical context. Their strength of character, strategic genius and charisma have even been considered as fundamental attributes, on an equal footing with military capacities and natural resources, which constituted the foundations of power in their respective states (Morgenthau 2005 [1948]).

With the behavioral revolution in the 1960s, internationalists abandoned the study of "great men". Kenneth Waltz was the first to acknowledge that heads of state do sometimes play a defining role, but considered that they are too complex and idiosyncratic for a systematic analysis (1959). The literature in International Relations focused instead on international and domestic factors as the principal constraints shaping leaders' decisions. When British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was asked why he had changed his policies, he famously answered back, "Events, dear boy, events" (cited in Jervis 2013: 154).

According to Waltz and his followers, structural variables make it easier to identify laws that can be applied universally. This theoretical approach

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was actually encouraged throughout the Cold War: the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were analyzed more through the impersonal prism of bipolarity than in terms of the personality of the American and Soviet leaders.

However, many leaders continue to believe that they are the driving force of international relations. Some are under the impression that they are in full control of their foreign policy. The Reagan–Thatcher and Mitterrand—Kohl couples marked the media as much as the individual protagonists themselves. Henry Kissinger recognized this when he became President Nixon's national security advisor: "As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make" (Quoted in Byman and Pollack 2001: 108).

For Robert Jervis, "[t]he question of the extent to which leaders matter in international politics is as familiar as it is impossible to fully answer" (Jervis 2013: 154). According to him, one way to test the impact of "great men" on the course of history would be "to write the history of the Cold War without mentioning the name of either side's leaders and see if a naïve reader could determine when personnel changes occurred" (Jervis 2013: 154).

In recent years, the individual level of analysis has gradually regained its proper place in the analysis of foreign policy (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012; Krebs and Rapport 2012; Jervis 2013; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Foster and Keller 2014; McDermott 2014; Dolan 2016a, b). Many internationalists now recognize that completely ignoring the role of individuals is as reductive as considering foreign policy to be the projection of a single figure (Byman and Pollack 2001; Post et al. 2003). Moreover, research is increasingly focusing on decision-makers, other than heads of state and government leaders. Generals, parliamentarians, commissioners, advisors and ministers are now increasingly subject to analysis (Smith 2003).

Obviously, individuals do not always play a determining role. Their influence varies as a function of specific circumstances (Hermann 1974). At least three main factors can accentuate or diminish their role. The first is their institutional and political capacity to influence foreign policy. The centralization of authority varies significantly from state to state. In some ways, French President Charles de Gaulle had greater flexibility than Chinese President Hu Jintao. Thus, we can assume that de Gaulle had a greater impact on French foreign policy than Hu Jintao had on Chinese foreign policy (Hermann and Hermann 1989; McGillivray and Smith 2004).

The second factor is the individuals' willingness to exert a major influence on foreign policy. They all have their own specific interests, motivations and leadership styles. For example, General Francisco Franco preferred delegating the crucial issues of Spanish foreign policy to his subordinates on condition that they avoid disruptive action. On the contrary, General Murtala Mohammed was very interested in international relations and tried to shift Nigeria's foreign policy (Beasley et al. 2001).

The third factor is the political opportunity available to decision-makers with regard to influencing foreign policy. Heads of state have greater decision-making power in times of crisis, in particular, as their personalities can permeate foreign policy. These uncertain and ambiguous situations give them the chance to directly impact the outcome of a crisis. Terrorist attacks, natural disasters or recessions, for instance, provide decision-makers with the opportunity to exert a greater influence on foreign policy (Holsti 1979; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1982; Stern 2003).

The circumstances that increase the influence of decision-makers are reasonably well known. However, analysts do not always agree on the theoretical and methodological tools that help to explain how decision-makers actually influence foreign policy when they have the capacity, the desire and the opportunity to do so. As this chapter shows, some researchers are focusing on the cognitive and affective characteristics specific to a given individual, while others are trying to identify major trends in the way decision-makers generally perceive and interpret their environment.

Emotions

Political leaders' affective and emotional life are the most personal variables of FPA. Some researchers consider that this aspect is so private that it only has a marginal impact on foreign policy. However, the most recent studies rooted in social psychology and neuroscience suggest the opposite (Mercer 2013). Dolan (2016a) shows that emotions generated by leaders' perceptions have "distinct effects on cognition, perception, and memory" (2016a: 571). Hence, they will either favor or suppress belief change when facing a tough situation during a war. For instance, anxiety makes strategic change very likely, while frustration is likely to produce resistance to change. In other words, emotions would offer a predictable explanation for leaders' decision to stay the course or to alter their strategies in wartime. Elsewhere, Dolan (2016b) demonstrates that leaders' positive emotions do not have the same effects on

their approach to war. An unexpected good news will produce joy and will likely lead the leader to operate change in his or her strategy by making it riskier or less costly, while an expected good news will provide contentment and will surprisingly lead a decision-maker to resist change of strategy or to oppose increase in aims.

Western culture traditionally sets reason against emotions, as if they were two completely independent thought processes. In reality, they are closely interwoven. Several studies in the field of neurology conducted using magnetic resonance imaging confirm that during the decision-making process, the zones of the brain governing the emotions are activated before cognitive reasoning has been consciously formulated. Furthermore, people who have suffered damage to the part of the brain that controls emotions, but whose cognitive capacities remain intact, experience difficulties when making trivial decisions. Therefore, emotions appear to be an essential component of all forms of decision-making.

On the basis of these neurological studies, specialists argue that FPA should integrate emotional dimensions to a greater extent (Crawford 2000; Greenstein 2001; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Stein 2008; Mercer 2010; Sasley 2010, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011).

Yet, including emotions is no easy task for FPA. The main obstacle is methodological. Presidents and prime ministers refuse to be scrutinized with magnetic resonance imaging apparatus, to lie down on a psychoanalyst's couch or answer a questionnaire on their affective life. Although analysts can directly observe some of their actions and speeches, leaders may attempt to hide their emotions (Greenstein 1982).

From Psychobiography to Statistics

The difficulty of measuring the emotional fluctuations of leaders led researchers to adopt a psychobiographic approach. This method involves compiling as comprehensive and detailed a profile as possible of a particular leader's experience, including their childhood. Different sources of information are generally combined, such as interviews with family members, friends and colleagues, as well as the analysis of archival documents, including schoolwork, personal correspondence and private diaries.

Jerrold Post is undoubtedly one of the analysts who has made the greatest contribution to the development of the psychobiography. He graduated as a psychiatrist and worked for 20 years at the CIA's Centre for the Analysis of Personality, where he was responsible for compiling the psychological profile of foreign leaders. When he became a professor, his research established links between major events in leaders' lives, their personality and their behavior in terms of foreign policy. Post studied the personalities of Slobodan Milosevic, Bill Clinton, Fidel Castro, Kim Jong-il and Woodrow Wilson (1983, 1991, 1993, 2004, 2006).

The best-known psychobiography of Woodrow Wilson, however, is not the one by Jerrold Post. Nor is it the one by Sigmund Freud himself (1939), which is often considered to be partial. It is the one co-written by Alexander and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, which became a classic in the field of psychobiography (1964). Woodrow Wilson is depicted as being a man with low self-esteem. His demanding and moralizing father may have instilled fear in him, which could only be mitigated by extraordinary performances. This personality trait may have been the driving force of Wilson's career. He began as a political scientist and went on to become the president of Princeton University. Then, as a politician, he made it to the White House. However, once at the top, his high moral standards paralyzed his political action during the First World War, as he was unable to find an unselfish justification to get the United States involved in that war. As George and George explain, "Wilson was capable of using force and violence as an instrument of foreign policy if he were convinced of the purity of the cause. He could fight an 'unselfish' war" (George and George 1964: 174). Later on, Wilson lacked the necessary self-confidence to accept concessions and negotiate the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles with Congress. It was his own intransigence, nurtured unconsciously to meet his father's expectations, which might explain why the United States remained outside the League of Nations.

Wilson is no exception. As in the case of other leaders, the affective traits that contributed to his political rise also constituted a handicap once he was in power. We can safely state that the great ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein equally led to their own downfall. This pattern is relatively common among leaders who suffer from varying degrees of narcissism and paranoia. In fact, when diagnosing political leaders, some researchers do not hesitate to turn to the famous and controversial *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* published by the American Psychiatric Association (Birt 1993; Glad 2002; Post 2004; Byman and Pollack 2001).

However, compiling the psychobiographies of leaders who do not have a flamboyant personality and do not suffer from an obvious pathology is more difficult. Apart from the problem of data access, data interpretation

is sometimes based on weak presumptions. Some psychobiographies cannot be falsified and some cannot be replicated. Most of them adopt a strictly idiosyncratic approach as they do not provide any basis for comparison and make no attempt to generalize.

Some studies on the influence of affective dimensions go to the other extreme: they ignore the specific characteristics of each decision-maker and limit themselves to the study of objective variables that are directly accessible and easy to compare. For example, they study the impact of the decision-makers' age, their gender or birth order. In the general population, it is a well-established fact that these demographic characteristics are closely correlated with specific affective tendencies due to psychological or physiological factors. Nevertheless, the studies that attempt to identify the same correlations among political leaders generally obtain ambiguous results. The statistical significance of the impact of age, gender or birth order on the affective life of leaders has not yet been proven, and therefore, it is not traceable in their foreign policy (Holsti and Rosenau 1980; Walker and Falkowski 1984; Hudson 1990; McDermott and Cowden 2001; Horowitz et al. 2005).

Middle Way: Affective Dimensions

A more promising middle way consists of focusing the analysis on a specific affective dimension. It does not involve compiling the full psychological profile of an individual, nor is it limited to measuring an indirect indicator. Instead, it involves isolating and operationalizing a single affective dimension so that it can be directly documented. Subsequently, comparisons can be established and the findings can be generalized.

Some studies that promote this middle way focus on the affective attachment that leaders have to their nation (Herrmann 2017). Jacques Hymans (2006) demonstrates that a particular form of nationalism provokes a cocktail of fear and pride that incites leaders to acquire nuclear weapons for their country. He identified this particular form of nationalism among Indian and French decision-makers who initiated a nuclear weapons program, but not among their Australian and Argentinian counterparts who rejected nuclear arms. Brent Sasley (2010) argues that the different forms of nationalism shown by the Israeli prime ministers influenced their position in peace negotiations. While Yitzhak Shamir was particularly attached to Israeli land, Yitzhak Rabin seemed more attached to the Israeli people. This variation could explain their political differences during the Oslo Peace Process.

Another affective dimension that is often studied is the relationship that political leaders have with social norms (Gaskarth 2011). Some individuals feel tied by social norms, regardless of whether they are formal or informal, while others do not feel personally constrained by them. In foreign policy, decision-makers who appear to be less sensitive to social norms are more likely to resort to armed conflict, even if military intervention is unpopular or contrary to international law. Jonathan Keller (2005) drew this conclusion from his comparison between President John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. Stephen Dyson (2006, 2007) reached the same conclusion after comparing British Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and Tony Blair.

A third affective dimension that can be studied in a comparative and qualitative approach is that of leaders' motivation. David Winter, who devoted his career to this question, distinguishes three principal political motivations: the desire to win and stay in power, the desire to realize an ambitious political project and the desire to develop relationships of social affiliation. In a study on African leaders, Winter observes that those driven by a thirst for power resort to armed force more often in their foreign policy and are less inclined to accept new international standards on arms control (Winter 1980, 2007; Winter and Carlson 1988; Winter et al. 1991).

Typologies Combining the Affective Dimensions

Affective dimensions can be combined to form ideal types. For example, James David Barber (1972) developed a typology of the character of American presidents by juxtaposing two affective dimensions: the need to invest in work and the pleasure derived from work. Barber obtained four ideal types, ranging from the presidents who do not become very emotionally involved in their work, but nonetheless derive a certain pleasure from it, such as Ronald Reagan, to those who are totally dedicated, but only derive a feeling of frustration, as in the case of Richard Nixon. Barber considers that active and positive presidents, like Bill Clinton, are generally the best at deploying an effective foreign policy, despite the fact that they may be inclined to dissipate their efforts in several theaters of action at the same time.

The simplicity of Barber's typology contributed to its success. It includes two variables, each one documented in a dichotomous way. On the other hand, it may be difficult to categorize a specific leader owing to

this simplicity. For example, it is hard to determine whether Dwight Eisenhower was genuinely absorbed in his work or whether he derived real satisfaction from it (Greenstein 1982).

Margaret Hermann (1980) developed a more complex typology and a method that facilitates categorization. Her typology combines seven classic personality traits, including cognitive and affective, which have been addressed separately in this chapter: (1) the level of cognitive complexity, (2) thirst for power, (3) mistrust of others, (4) self-confidence, (5) nationalism, (6) sources of motivation and (7) belief in one's capacity to control events.

According to Hermann's method, these personality traits can be documented by a statistical discourse analysis. Each trait is associated with a series of terms whose relative frequency in a corpus of allocution indicates how pronounced that trait is. The results are then compared to the average for political leaders: a standard deviation above or below the average signifies that the trait is, respectively, particularly strong or weak.

The results obtained for the seven personality traits are subsequently combined and associated to one of the numerous personality types generated by Hermann. The so-called aggressive personality, for example, corresponds to a low cognitive complexity, a thirst for power, a deep mistrust of others, pronounced nationalism and a belief in one's capacity to control events. Hermann's research shows that leaders with an aggressive personality are statistically more likely to engage in armed conflicts.

Margaret Hermann's approach has appealed to numerous researchers. As with the psychobiographies, the approach makes it possible to conduct a subtle analysis, reconciling cognition and affection. However, unlike the psychobiographies, Hermann's quantitative method can be used to establish statistical ratios with diverse dependent variables and to make generalizations.

As Hermann's approach has been used to determine the personality of several leaders, there is now a reliable comparative basis. The averages for each of the personality traits are fairly stable. They are calculated from an increasing number of political leaders and, thus, constitute a benchmark. The approach is encouraging a return to case studies, which can be considered in the light of this comparative basis. Although Hermann compiled her typology using variables defined by previous research, her work is now revitalizing studies that focus on the analysis of a single individual in all their complexity (Preston 2001; Crichlow 2005; Dyson 2006, 2009a; Gallagher and Allen 2014).

Cognition

The human mind is limited and cannot analyze all the information that it perceives. As a result, leaders try to integrate all this information into theories or within the mental images of the world they have constructed. Leaders analyze information through their cognitive filters, which make it possible to identify and give meaning to the elements that seem important to them. "Cognition" usually refers to the mental processes that allow individuals to interpret their environment. There is no consensus of opinion, however, with regard to the theoretical model that best reflects cognitive processes.

Cognitive Consistency

Several cognitive scientists believe that the human mind is governed by the need to maintain internal consistency. To avoid a feeling of doubt, which is psychologically uncomfortable, any information that is incompatible with the established belief system is ignored. Inversely, any information that is compatible with this belief system can be integrated easily. Similarly, individuals' aspirations are generally consistent with their expectations and their beliefs match their behavior. When an internal inconsistency is identified, the human mind makes swift adjustments to re-establish an impression of coherence by imagining a detailed explanation or an exception to the preset rules of thought without altering the actual essence of the rules (Festinger 1957; Jervis 1976; Janis and Mann 1976; Kahneman 2011).

According to the theory of cognitive coherence, an individual's belief system is shaped by their earliest experiences. It then expands, though the central core remains relatively stable throughout their life. As Henry Kissinger commented, "The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office" (quoted in Andrianopoulos 1991: 13). The more experience individuals acquire, the stronger their belief system, the more established their insights and the more their reactions will be automatic and intuitive. Thus, the religious beliefs that leaders have grown up with can have a lasting influence on the way they interpret the world and, by extension, on their foreign policy (Hermann 1980).

As a result of this tendency to maintain a coherent belief system, leaders sometimes experience difficulty when it comes to adapting to changing situations. They have difficulty in integrating new information that cannot

be explained by preexisting ideas and mental images. This can lead to a lack of flexibility (cognitive rigidity) and difficulty in reacting promptly to crises. Even when leaders claim to be open to new ideas and are presented with convincing proof that their perception of the world is outmoded, they are not always able to shed their old cognitive reflexes. For example, Ole Hosti observed that the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had such a fixed idea of the Soviet Union that he failed to fully grasp the information contradicting the Soviet Union's alleged hostility to the United States (1962). Similarly, in the 1980s, several leaders denied that the profound changes that shook the USSR would resolutely change international relations. During the 1990s, some leaders were still unable to shake off the prism of the Cold War (Chollet and Goldgeier 2003; Malici and Malici 2005).

Operational Codes

One of the methods most frequently used by foreign policy analysts to grasp the political leaders' belief system involves defining their operational code (Walker 1990; Winter et al. 1991). Alexander George (1969) developed this method after being inspired by Nathan Leites' work on the beliefs of Soviet leaders (1951). The operational code method involves identifying the beliefs specific to each leader in relation to ten fundamental questions. These questions are organized in a hierarchy, ranging from the most fundamental and inflexible to the most marginal and transient. The first five questions are of a philosophical nature and the following five are instrumental:

> (1) What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents? (2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and ideological goals? Can one be optimistic or pessimistic? (3) In what sense and to what extent is the political future predictable? (4) How much control or mastery can one have over historical developments? What is the political leader's (or elite's) role in moving and shaping history? (5) What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development? (6) What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? (7) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? (8) How are the risks of political action best calculated, controlled, and accepted? (9) What is the best timing of action to advance one's interest? (10) What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? (Quoted in George and Bennett 2005: 87–88).

Although the operational code approach was initially developed in the United States to further our understanding of Soviet leaders, researchers were quick to turn the spotlights on Washington. The ten questions that constitute the operational code have actually guided research on several American presidents, secretaries of state and national security advisors, such as Woodrow Wilson (Walker and Schafer 2007), Dean Acheson (McLellan 1971), John Kennedy (Stuart and Starr 1981), Lyndon Johnson (Walker and Schafer 2000), Henry Kissinger (Starr 1984; Walker 1977), Jimmy Carter (Walker et al. 1998), George H. W. Bush (Walker et al. 1999), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Crichlow 2000) and George W. Bush (Renshon 2008). Recent studies have also used the ten questions devised by Alexander George to study leaders in different countries, including German chancellors (Malici 2006) and Russian presidents (Dyson 2001). Overall, the operational code approach made it possible to examine the belief system of over 100 political leaders (Schafer and Walker 2006; Malici and Buckner 2008).

The comparative analysis of the most recent case studies was greatly facilitated by the widespread use of a common encoding technique proposed by Walker et al. (1998). Instead of using a qualitative approach, combining archive research, interviews with key people and content analysis, to find the answers to the ten operational code questions, Walker, Shafer and Young developed a quantitative technique for speech analysis. This technique, called "verbs in context", involves the systematic analysis of verbs in a vast corpus of speeches using specialized software (Schafer and Walker 2006). For example, the proportion of verbs used in the active voice followed by a direct object, which refers to a political opponent, reflects a degree of confidence in the capacity to control events and influence the course of history. This corresponds to question five in the operational code. This common statistical basis provides the framework to compare the belief systems of different political leaders.

The Achilles' heel of cognitive analysis using the operational code is the difficulty of establishing the links between the responses obtained and foreign policy behavior (Karawan 1994). Several studies compile detailed profiles of a specific decision-maker's operational code. Yet, they satisfy themselves with vague allusions to the impact that the operational code may have had on the decision-maker's actions. In other words, research on

the dependent variable rarely attracts as much attention as research on the independent variable. Harvey Starr (1984) even reached the conclusion that he was unable to identify any significant relationships between Henry Kissinger's operational code and the American foreign policies adopted when he was secretary of state.

Heuristic Shortcuts

One method that can be used for a more direct examination of how leaders' cognition influences foreign policy is to study the stereotypes that they hold with regard to foreign countries. Stereotypes, sometimes referred to as "images" in FPA, are heuristic shortcuts that are conveyed culturally or shaped by the initial contact with foreign countries. Once they are deep-rooted, stereotypes tend to persist even against the will of those who wish to be free of them (Holsti 1962).

The stereotypes that are relevant to FPA vary according to a series of perceptions with regard to foreign states, including those concerning their power, their cultural status and their political objectives. For example, the stereotype of the immature state corresponds to the weak culturally inferior state that has friendly goals. It reflexes a paternalistic stereotype and suggests certain types of foreign policy behavior, such as France's behavior toward Africa and the United States' behavior toward the Philippines (Doty 1993; Herrmann et al. 1999; Morgan 2001; Alexander et al. 2005).

An alternative approach to studying political leaders' cognitive processes is the study of the analogies they use in their speeches (Oppermann and Spencer 2013). Analogies are used to interpret the present in the light of lessons learned from past events, regardless of whether they were experienced personally or are part of the collective memory. They are intellectual shortcuts, much like stereotypes: it is easier to recall similar experiences than to consider all the relevant elements and think logically about the present case. By transposing lessons from the past to the present, decision-makers find it easier to define the situation they are facing, anticipate events to come and identify the best course of action (Vertzberger 1986; Neustadt and May 1986; Vertzberger 1990; Shimko 1994; Sylvan et al. 1994; Peterson 1997; Hehir 2006, Dyson and Preston 2006; Layne 2008; Brunk 2008; Flanik 2011).

Prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein sought to understand the situation he was facing by relying on the Gaddafi analogy. Hussein came to believe that the Bush administration might punish his regime as the Reagan administration had punished Colonel Gaddafi's Libyan regime in the 1980s, but that Washington would not militarily intervene to depose him. This analogy increased Hussein's misperception of the Bush administration's real intentions since, as we know, the United States invaded Iraq (Duelfer and Dyson 2011).

One of the most classic studies on the use of analogies in foreign policy was conducted by Yuen Foong Khong (1992). He shows that during the Vietnam War, American decision-makers allowed themselves to be guided by lessons drawn from previous wars. In particular, by drawing from the Munich Crisis, when France and the United Kingdom agreed to negotiate with Hitler, they deduced that it is important to act firmly and swiftly against aggressive enemies. In addition, by drawing from the Korean War, they deduced that massive intervention is an effective way to limit the enemy's ambitions. However, as the example of the Vietnam War illustrates, analogies do not always provide sound advice. By obscuring specific details and strengthening certitudes, analogies often lead to inaccurate interpretations and poorly conceived foreign policy (Dallek 2010). This is why analogies are often referred to as "history's traps".

Cognitive studies that focus on heuristic shortcuts sometimes underestimate the complexity of cognitive processes. Decision-makers could simply mention analogies *ex post* in order to justify their actions and convince the public that their policies are well founded. From this perspective, analogies may tell us more about the decision-makers' rhetorical strategies than about their cognitive processes. Decision-makers may draw analogies from history that correspond to their preferences, rather than identifying their preferences as a function of analogies (Breuning 2003).

This possibility could explain why there is no apparent generational effect in terms of the analogies mentioned by political leaders (Holsti and Rosenau 1980). Although George W. Bush described himself as being a product of the Vietnam generation, it was the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the war against Nazism that were raised after the September 11 attacks. Perhaps the use of vague and distant analogies, which have a considerable impact on public opinion nonetheless, was merely a rhetorical strategy to justify the war against Iraq (Western 2005).

Cognitive Mapping

Some researchers keen to reconstitute the complexity of decision-makers' cognitive processes use cognitive mapping. Robert Axelrod (1973), Michael Shapiro and Matthew Bonham (1973) developed this technique

to create a graphic representation of the structure of decision-makers' causal beliefs. Essentially, it involves the use of speech analysis to identify reference points for thoughts that are linked by positive or negative causal relationships. For example, if a prime minister maintains that signing a free-trade agreement will help reduce poverty, a link can be drawn between the concept of free trade and poverty that is marked with a minus sign. By analyzing an entire corpus of speeches and by identifying multiple causal beliefs, the researcher obtains a cognitive map that can include dozens of concepts that have hundreds of links.

Compiling cognitive maps can target three different goals. Axelrod's primary goal was to use them in a reflexive exercise involving the political leaders themselves in order to help the latter consider their own belief system and identify possible inconsistencies. With the development of information technology in the 1980s, some researchers hoped that cognitive maps would be applied to modelling cognitive processes and predicting the reactions of foreign leaders. Today, cognitive maps are used more often to compare the degree of complexity of different individuals' belief systems. A decision-maker with a high level of cognitive complexity will have a cognitive map comprising more concepts and causal relationships.

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive complexity varies from one political leader to another. In addition to cognitive maps, comparisons can be made on the basis of the statistical analysis of the terms used in speeches. This approach was first developed by Margaret Hermann (1980) and has been used by an increasing number of researchers ever since.

According to Hermann, several terms indicate a high level of complexity, including "sometimes", "probably" and "some". In a speech, they suggest an equivocal and subtle understanding of the world. Terms like "always", "certainly" and "all" indicate a lower degree of complexity and more general, absolute and coarse mental categories. By establishing the ratio of these two groups of key words in a corpus of speeches, a researcher can obtain an assessment of the level of cognitive complexity on a quantitative scale and, thus, compare different individuals.

This method made it possible to establish the fact that leaders with a low level of cognitive complexity, like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, generally see the world dichotomously. They are quick to associate foreign powers to enemies and to evil, and internal powers to friends and to good. This Manichaeism reduces their capacity for empathy, their tolerance to protests, their inclinations to bow to international constraints and their will to negotiate compromises. When faced with a threatening situation, they are quick to resort to armed force, without considering all the other possibilities of intervention.

Conversely, leaders with a higher level of cognitive complexity are generally more comfortable with ambiguous situations, surround themselves with advisors who are not afraid to express their differences, adapt more easily to changing situations, consider a broader repertoire of action, find more suitable analogies for a given situation, show greater respect for international standards, are more willing to negotiate agreements with their adversaries and, lastly, are less likely to resort to military force (Adorno et al. 1950; Hermann 1980, 1983; Glad 1983; Vertzberger 1990; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Preston 1997; Dyson and Preston 2006; Dyson 2009a, b; Foster and Keller 2014). Looking at the diversionary use of force, Foster and Keller (2014) show that a leader's low level of cognitive complexity is likely to rely on military diversion when faced with domestic political problems, while those with more complex cognitive minds will perform a thorough cost–benefit analysis before rejecting the use of force as a diversion tool in favor of a less risky approach.

The weakness of some of these studies is to suggest that cognitive complexity is an invariable fact that remains stable throughout a leader's political career. Yet, several studies analyze the different speeches of a specific leader separately. They indicate that cognitive complexity fluctuates, depending on the context. International crises, in particular, generate a high level of stress, which can reduce the leaders' cognitive complexity. Robert Kennedy describes just that in relation to the stress felt during the Cuban Missile Crisis: "That kind of crisis-induced pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men" (1969: 22).

Several studies actually suggest that intense and prolonged stress momentarily atrophies the complexity of the decision-makers' belief system. In addition, it reduces their tolerance to ambiguity and encourages the use of stereotypes and analogies. All these symptoms can be detected by speech analysis. Consequently, some researchers suggest that fluctuations in the degree of cognitive complexity could be used to detect bluffs during a tense negotiation or even to anticipate the probabilities of an enemy surprise attack (Holsti and George 1975; Suedfeld and Tetlock

1977; Holsti 1979; Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Guttieri et al. 1995; Wallace et al. 1996; Astorino-Courtois 2000; Suedfeld and Leighton 2002; Conway et al. 2003; Mintz 2004; Post 2004).

In addition, the level of cognitive complexity appears to fluctuate as a function of the political leaders' goals. In general, their speeches reveal a simpler belief system when they are striving to gain power than when they are actually in power. They also tend to express more basic causal relationships when they are calling for war and use more subtle language when calling for peace. For example, that is what emerges when Yasser Arafat's speeches at the time of the 1967 Six-Day War are compared with those given during the Oslo process 30 years later; or again the comparison of Richard Nixon's speeches when he was senator during McCarthyism with those given 20 years later at the time of his rapprochement with communist China (Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Maoz and Shayer 1987; Crichlow 1998; DiCicco 2011).

Schema Theory

The evolution in leaders' belief systems is difficult to reconcile with the theory of cognitive coherence. According to the theory's initial wording, the belief system is relatively rigid and stable. Life's diverse experiences enhance it continually, making it increasingly hermetic to information that could be contradictory. The theory of cognitive coherence clearly recognizes that it is possible to make gradual peripheral adjustments to the knowledge system, specifically in order to maintain the system's coherence. However, core changes are rare, and when they do occur they occur brutally, in the wake of a major event. A decision-maker has to be confronted head-on with the inadequacy of his belief system before he possibly agrees to revise it fundamentally. The Soviet attack on Afghanistan may have provoked a brutal shift in Jimmy Carter's belief system, much like the September 11 terrorist attacks for George W. Bush in 2001 (Walker et al. 1998; Renshon 2008).

DiCicco (2011) shows that dramatic events involving NATO in the winter of 1983–1984 transformed President Reagan's mental construct of the Soviet Union. The US intelligence found that Moscow greatly feared that a NATO military exercise (the Able Archer 83) was the first step of a US surprise attack against the USSR. As a result, Soviet leaders were anticipating nuclear war. This led Reagan to "reevaluate his understanding of Soviet perceptions" of the United States' intentions (2011: 253) and to initiate a change in his approach by focusing on an open and peaceful dialogue. This incident was the tipping point that moved Reagan's strategy from confrontation to cooperation.

The more recent schema theory recognizes that there is greater flexibility in the political leaders' cognitive processes. Schemas are constructions of the mind, which aggregate knowledge and beliefs in relation to a specific domain. Contrary to the concentric and hierarchical vision of the belief system proposed by the theory of cognitive coherence, schema theory maintains that beliefs are fragmented and relatively independent of each other. Different beliefs that belong to different domains may appear incoherent to an outside observer, but they are upheld, nonetheless, because they are dissociated cognitively. Therefore, schema theory is more compatible with the idea that cognition adapts continually to environmental changes (Larson 1994; Renshon and Larson 2003; Sohn 2012).

Schema theory maintains that individuals learn continuously from their interactions with the environment (Levy 1994; Reiter 1996). They are not presented as passive filters that absorb or reject certain information depending on their belief system. They are actors who are continually testing hypotheses and adjusting to the feedback they receive from the environment. Soviet leaders, for example, have learned by trial and error from the various policies they deployed in the 1970s and 1980s. According to several Sovietologists, if Mikhail Gorbachev radically changed Soviet foreign policy, it is not so much because of the shift in the international system or his exceptional personality, but because he drew lessons from previous Soviet failures. His predecessors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were faced with the same structural difficulties as Gorbachev, but maintained a confrontational stance toward the United States (Nye 1987; Blum 1993; Checkel 1993; Mendelson 1993; Stein 1994; Evangelista 1995; Wallace et al. 1996; Bennett 1999; Laucella 2004).

Having said that, the cognitive capacities of adaptation vary from one leader to another. Some leaders prove themselves to be relatively inflexible, while others demonstrate a remarkable capacity for learning. For example, for decades, Yitzhak Rabin's operational code was far more stable than that of Shimon Peres, which fluctuated frequently as a function of the context (Crichlow 1998).

Therefore, the theory of cognitive coherence is not necessarily incompatible with schema theory (Larson 1985). The first is more suitable for analyzing dogmatic leaders, who use deductive reasoning based on a

broad general theory. The second is more suitable for pragmatic leaders, who prefer induction using their empirical observations. Paradoxically, dogmatic leaders tend to be more confident in the soundness of their own logic, whereas pragmatic leaders are better at grasping the complexities of their environment and anticipating the evolution in international relations (Hermann et al. 2001a, b; Tetlock 2005).

Perceptions

In the 1960s, Richard Snyder (1961) and the couple Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) were already interested in the importance of perceptions in foreign policy. They clearly pointed out that if analysts want to fully understand foreign policy decisions, they should reconstruct the world as political decision-makers perceive it and not as it actually is or as the analysts imagine it to be (Gold 1978).

There is always a gap between the real world and the perceived world. A human being can only assimilate the environment by omitting certain elements, by simplifying reality, by making assumptions to compensate for unknown data, by relying on personal and historical analogies and by restructuring scattered information to give it meaning (Tetlock and McGuire 1985; Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012). Political leaders react to this biased vision of reality and not to reality itself. If analysts ignore this bias, their analyses are likely to be distorted.

Despite this note of caution from the pioneers of FPA, most foreign policy analysts disregard the perceptions of the actors that they are studying. Reconstructing the decision-makers' perceptions is risky in methodological terms because it is impossible to slip into their minds to see the world through their eyes. A number of analysts prefer using objective rather than subjective indicators. Thus, they accept the fiction, which is methodologically convenient, that decision-makers directly assimilate the real world.

Robert Jervis, in his key book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976), has helped overcome these methodological difficulties. In this book, Jervis suggests that perception bias in foreign policy is not totally idiosyncratic and unpredictable. Some bias recurs in most individuals' mind, which can actually be observed systematically in a laboratory. Jervis' central premise is that political leaders perceive the world with the same bias.

Misperception

Duelfer and Dyson define misperception as "the gap between the world as it actually exists and the world as it exists in the mind of the perceiver" (2011). One of the most common forms of perception bias that has drastic consequences is to overestimate the hostility of one's rivals (Jervis 1976). Actions that are strictly defensive are frequently perceived as being offensive actions. For example, China and Japan have been eyeing each other like China dogs for decades. Although they are economically interdependent, they continue to interpret each other's actions with mistrust (Yahuda 2006; He 2007).

At the same time, individuals tend to underestimate how much others mistrust them. Few individuals define themselves as threatening or aggressive, and it is hard for them to imagine that they can be perceived as such. They mistakenly consider that their intentions are clear and that others can interpret their behavior correctly (Jervis 1976). Nehru seriously underestimated the threat that India represented in the eyes of Mao Zedong's China. Yet, Chinese authorities genuinely feared an attack from India. Therefore, Nehru failed to anticipate that China would carry out a preemptive attack on India (Vertzberger 1984; Garver 2006). More recently, the Bush administration seriously underestimated the mistrust of the Afghan and Iraqi populations. While the United States was expecting to be welcomed as a liberator in Kabul and Baghdad, a substantial part of the Afghan and Iraqi populations came to perceive the American army as a hostile occupying force (Mandel 2009). According to a *Pew Research Center* opinion poll, the majority of the Jordanian population considered, as early as 2004, that the United States' war on terror was motivated by the desire to control oil in the Middle East (71%), to protect Israel (70%) or for world domination (61%). However, in the United States, these explanations were ruled out by the vast majority of the population. They were held by 18%, 11% and 13% of Americans, respectively (with a margin of error of 3.5 and a 95% confidence interval).

The combination of overestimating the hostility of others and underestimating the threat perceived by others can lead to a spiral of misunderstanding and mistrust (Jervis 1976; Larson 1997). A political leader who fears for his state's security can react by increasing its military capacities. Foreign governments will interpret this as a threat, and in turn, they will react by increasing their military capabilities. This is the famous security dilemma in which defensive measures fuel insecurity rather than increase

security. The First World War is the most obvious example. While most protagonists were not seeking territorial gain, they were all under the impression that they had to prepare an offensive operation to preempt an enemy attack. The devastating outcome is well known (Wohlforth 1987; Walt 1996; Williamson 2011).

Several factors generate this mutual distrust. On an organizational level, it can be exacerbated by the ultra-careful attitude of certain advisors or bureaucratic organizations that feel duty-bound to imagine the worst-case scenario and prepare for the consequences. On a more socio-psychological level, individuals from all cultures generally appear to define their enemies as a reflection of themselves—in other words, as a diametrically opposed projection of themselves. According to this theory, if an individual considers himself to be balanced and humble, he will generally judge his enemies to be nervous and arrogant. As individuals generally have a positive self-image, they tend to demonize their rivals. This bias prevents them from empathizing with their rivals and has a negative influence on their perception (Eckhardt and White 1967; White 1968; Garthoff 1978). In sum, misperception reduces the rationality and the objectivity of the decision-making process and thus depletes that process.

Attribution Bias

Mutual distrust can also be fed by a different but equally common perception bias—namely, attributing intrinsic motivations strictly to the unfriendly actions of others. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, several of President Kennedy's advisors immediately interpreted the dispatch of Soviet missiles to Cuba as the demonstration that Moscow had suddenly decided to adopt a hostile and aggressive policy. Kennedy's advisors overlooked the possibility that the Kremlin was merely reacting to American actions, namely, the installation of missiles in Turkey (Jervis 1976; Hermann 1985).

Attribution bias can even lead decision-makers to draw conclusions, which have tremendous consequences, from events that have not even occurred. In Errol Morris' documentary *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara* (2003), the former secretary of defense recounts the incident that led Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution in 1964, which authorized President Johnson to use all necessary conventional military means in Southeast Asia, and to escalate the war in Vietnam. In August 1964, the destroyer USS *Maddox* reported

to the Pentagon that it had been attacked twice in 48 hours in international waters by North Vietnamese boats. President Johnson retaliated by ordering bombing in North Vietnam and by getting Congress to pass the Tonkin resolution. In retrospect, McNamara acknowledged the fact that there was tremendous confusion back then on whether or not the USS *Maddox* had really been attacked. He even confessed that events afterward showed that their judgment was partly wrong as the *Maddox* had not been attacked the second time:

> President Johnson authorized the attack on the assumption that [the second North Vietnamese attack] had occurred. [...] [On the assumption] that it was a conscious decision on the part of the North Vietnamese political and military leaders to escalate the conflict and an indication they would not stop short of winning. We were wrong, but we had it in our minds... in our mindset and it carried such heavy costs. We see incorrectly or we see only half of the story at times" (Morris 2003).

In addition, individuals naturally tend to interpret their enemies' friendly behavior as the outcome of a constraint. Daniel Heradstveit made this observation after interviewing Egyptian, Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian decision-makers (1979). In the Middle East, everyone considers that the others' aggressive behavior is the manifestation of their genuine desire. On the other hand, peaceful behavior is considered to be the result of external pressure. Decision-makers have a positive self-image and are aware of their own strategic actions. Therefore, they generally take the credit for their enemies' acts of goodwill.

On the contrary, when decision-makers adopt aggressive policies, they are quick to justify them as constraints that are beyond their control. They blame public opinion, opposing political parties or pressure from an interest group. However, when they adopt peaceful policies, they gladly point out that the policies reflect their genuine intentions.

In all cases, individuals naturally seek simple causal explanations to justify their own and others' behavior. Chance, coincidences, impulsions, unforeseen consequences and multicausality seem to be as unsatisfactory on an intellectual level for decision-makers as they are for experts who analyze them. The mind is naturally drawn to simple and direct causal mechanisms, which give the comforting illusion that everything can be understood and explained. Conspiracy theories always generate more followers than complex explanations, which are partly based on the vagaries of chance (Jervis 1976).

This attribution bias is connected to the perception bias of the decision-making process. Decision-makers are fully aware of the different opposing factions within their own governmental apparatus. Nonetheless, they generally overestimate the degree of centralization and cohesion in other countries. The controversial speech given by Nicolas Sarkozy in Dakar in 2007 on the "misfortunes of Africa" was interpreted by many African observers as a reflection of the state of mind of the entire French political class. Similarly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strident declarations about the United States and Israel were interpreted in the West as being the opinion of the entire Iranian government (Jervis 1976; Vertzberger 1990; Malici and Buckner 2008).

This overestimation of the cohesion of others is equally valid in terms of international coalitions. During the Cold War, Western countries were fully aware of the tensions within NATO, but overestimated Moscow's control over the members of the Warsaw Pact. In some cases, overestimating an interlocutor's cohesion can lead to the failure of deterrence policies. Political leaders who have access to considerable economic resources are sometimes tempted to offer compensation to foreign governments to ward off an attack. If leaders overestimate the foreign governments' cohesion and their control over different social and political fractions, they run the risk of not offering sufficient compensation to appease the most aggressive groups. From this perspective, overestimating the enemies' centrality diminishes the probability of the success of deterrence strategies and increases the probabilities of conflicts (Sechser 2010).

Probabilities

Although the cohesion of foreign coalitions is generally overestimated, an enemy's military capabilities, in particular, are often underestimated. Wars are frequently the result of overoptimism on both sides. Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, France and the United Kingdom seriously underestimated the resilience of the German economy. On the contrary, the allied countries' capacities were generally overestimated. France and the United Kingdom made exactly the same mistake in the First World War, by seriously overestimating their Russian ally's capacities (Jervis 1976; Wohlforth 1987).

Overestimating the probabilities of success goes far beyond military dimensions. Diplomats often make the same mistake in negotiations. In 2002, behind the scenes at the UN Security Council, American diplomats were still convinced that they could persuade France not to veto the authorization of military intervention in Iraq. The French diplomats, in turn, were still convinced that they could persuade the United States that the threats made against Iraq were sufficient and that it was not necessary to circumvent the UN apparatus (Marfleet and Miller 2005).

These forms of bias are by no means unique to military or diplomatic circles. In an uncertain context, it is extremely difficult for human beings to assess the probabilities of success or failure correctly. High probabilities are rapidly assimilated to absolute certainty. Low probabilities are often considered as implausible.

The hypothesis that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction was plausible and, thus, considered to be a certainty among senior officials in George W. Bush's administration. On the contrary, in 1941, the probability of a Japanese aircraft attack on the American naval base in Pearl Harbor was low. Consequently, the American army was ill prepared for it (Wohlstetter 1962).

By combining the different types of perception bias, ranging from the tendency to overestimate enemy hostility to that of overestimating the probabilities of military success, it is understandable that military conflicts are more frequent than the theory of rational choice would suggest (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995; Kim and Bueno de Mesquita 1995; Van Evera 1999). As Robert Jervis commented, "although war can occur in the absence of misperception, in fact misperception almost always accompanies it" (1988: 699).

Yet, foreign policy does not always depend on a leader's personality, cognitive bias and perception—far from there. Decision-makers must rely on their state's bureaucracy if they want to carry out their foreign policy. However, as the next chapter shows, bureaucracies direct and constrain leaders in their decision-making processes.

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CHAPTER 4

What Is the Influence of the Bureaucracy?

In modern democracies, the civil service is officially subordinate to the elected representatives. The bureaucracy is supposed to remain politically neutral and ensure that government decisions are implemented. In reality, the relationships between bureaucrats and political leaders are not always clear-cut. While Eisenhower was preparing to move into the White House, the outgoing President Truman whispered to his advisors: "He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating" (Neustadt 1960: 9).

The bureaucracy is not very malleable. There are some foreign ministries that have budgets worth hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of employees. It is nigh on impossible to implement organizational or doctrinal reforms swiftly in such circumstances.

Time also plays in favor of the civil service. Unlike the elected representatives, it is not constantly under threat of being ejected from power at the next elections. It was in place before the leaders arrived and will remain so when they leave. If a decision does not meet with the bureaucracy's approval, it can implement the decision slowly and partially and, thus, compromise its effectiveness or even its efficiency.

The institutional design of the bureaucracy can also greatly affect foreign policy. The more agencies are institutionally independent from a government's executive, the more they are likely to pursue their own preferences, to seek greater autonomy and to make executive foreign policy objectives difficult to meet. The US distribution of foreign aid is a case

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in point. Research shows that government agencies with aid programs and well-defined objectives are not always responsive to the administration's priorities, while the foreign aid programs of agencies that are more institutionally dependent on the executive will meet the diplomatic objectives of the president (Arel-Bundock et al. 2015).

The bureaucracy's principal resource is no doubt its expertise. It selects the information presented to the leaders and arranges it intelligibly. By presenting the problems or possible actions in a certain way, it structures the leaders' decision-making.

Obviously, elected representatives are not powerless vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. They appoint several senior officials, adopt budgetary appropriations and determine the government's broad policy orientations (Wood and Waterman 1991). Sometimes their decision goes against the bureaucracy's recommendations. The Japanese government, for example, ratified the Kyoto Protocol on climate change despite the unfavorable opinion expressed by several influential ministers (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007). Similarly, the Clinton administration favored NATO enlargement to East European countries despite the opposition expressed by the US bureaucracy (Goldgeier 1999). This chapter discusses the control of government leaders over the bureaucracy as well as the influence of the civil servants more closely.

Management Styles

The decision-making process in foreign policy varies as a function of the leaders' management style—in other words, the way they manage information and the people around them. Leaders adopt very different management styles. In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher relied predominantly on the small team from her cabinet, whereas her immediate successor, John Major, relied more on his ministers and the civil service (Kaarbo 1997). In the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev preferred a centralized authoritarian style, whereas Leonid Brezhnev was more interested in reaching a consensus within the politburo (Stewart et al. 1989). These variations do not depend on the political regime or on the type of problem to be resolved, but on the political leaders' preferences and capacities.

Different management styles influence the decision-making process and, ultimately, foreign policy itself (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). For example, if Major had been prime minister instead of Thatcher, he would undoubtedly have lacked the necessary determination to engage in the

Falklands War despite the objections raised by several ministers (Kaarbo 1997). Similarly, if Khrushchev had been secretary general instead of Brezhnev, he may not have shifted his position on military aid for Egypt as a function of the politburo's preferences (Stewart et al. 1989).

Research on foreign policy management styles can be broken down into complementary branches. The first focuses on the different variables, which make it possible to distinguish between the management styles and identify the ideal types. The second, which is more normative than descriptive, aims to identify the most suitable management styles for foreign policy decision-making.

Defining Management Styles

For analytical purposes, a leader's management style can be broken down into four main variables. The first variable concerns the scope of the circle of advisors consulted before making a decision. Some leaders surround themselves with an inner circle made up of faithful allies in whom they have unwavering confidence. The inner circle can act as a filter between the leader and the rest of the governmental apparatus. Other leaders prefer broadening their circle of advisors so they have more direct access to first-hand information and to experts who are in the field (Link and Kegley 1993).

The second variable that determines the management style is the interaction framework between the advisors. A conventional method of classification, developed by Richard Johnson (1974) and Alexander George (1980), differentiates formal, collegial and competitive frameworks. Formal frameworks seek to produce solutions that are as rational and efficient as possible by using clear hierarchical procedural rules. Collegial frameworks are more based on teamwork and guided by flexible and informal rules, which make it easier to reach a consensus. Competitive frameworks encourage clashes between the different advisors seeking to gain the upper hand. In the United States, it is generally acknowledged that Ronald Reagan encouraged a formal framework, Bill Clinton a collegial framework and Franklin Roosevelt a competitive framework (Haney 1997).

The third variable is the degree of centralization of the decision-making process. The head of state can make the final decision alone or delegate to a group, independently of the number of advisors consulted and their interaction framework. For example, a decentralized decision-making method in a competitive framework will leave plenty of room for

bureaucratic rivalries. Foreign policy will reflect the distribution of power between the different players involved. However, if the leader encourages a centralized method within the same competitive framework instead, he will first let his advisors clash. He can then use the confrontation to his advantage to glean a maximum amount of information and ideas. Then he will decide according to his own preferences and views (Rosati 1981; Hermann and Preston 1994; Kaarbo 1997; Hermann et al. 2001a; Beasley et al. 2001; Mitchell 2005; Garrison 2007).

The fourth and last variable that constitutes the management style is the leader's interpersonal skills. If he is eloquent and charismatic, he will succeed in convincing his own advisors and giving impetus to his entire team. He can also resort to different manipulative strategies to modify the group dynamic. For example, he can make new proposals to split the majority, modify the agenda for a meeting so that the first decision provides the strategic framework for the second decision, or associate two subjects to create new coalitions within his administration (Maoz 1990).

The Most Appropriate Management Style

By selecting one or more of these variables, some studies have attempted to identify a management style that would be more suitable for foreign policy decision-making. Most of these studies conclude that extremes are generally best avoided: the decisional group should be neither too narrow nor too broad; the participants should be able to hold different points of view, but share common values; and decision-making should come halfway between centralized authoritarianism and fragmented pluralism. Extremes of any kind are a handicap to one's capacity to analyze, adapt and learn (George 1972; Destler 1977; Kowert 2002).

Excessive informality and excessive formality can lead to similar mistakes. In the United States, for example, President Lyndon B. Johnson adopted a particularly informal style. The Tuesday Lunch Group that he set up to discuss foreign policy did not always include the same advisors. In addition, it lacked a preset agenda and a decision-making framework. This informality may have been problematic when it came to thoroughly appraising all the information. It may also have contributed to President Johnson's mistakes because he was bogged down in the Vietnam War with no real withdrawal plan (Preston and Hart 1999).

President George W. Bush adopted a style at the White House that had the formality of large corporate board meetings. He combined this with a major and fairly uniform delegation from his inner circle. The decision-making framework was rigid, which prevented a genuine confrontation of ideas and made it difficult to challenge the president's assumptions. This formalism was a factor that contributed to the analytical mistakes made by the Bush administration. It became engaged in Iraq without thinking clearly about the security situation that would arise after Saddam Hussein's downfall. Thus, Johnson's informalism and Bush's formalism have contributed to similar failures, in Vietnam for the former and in Iraq for the latter (David 2004; Burke 2005; Haney 2005; Mitchell 2005; Rudalevige 2005; Mitchell and Massoud 2009; Badie 2010).

However, some management styles can generate specific weaknesses (Hermann et al. 2001a, b). A formal interaction framework, combined with a highly decentralized decision-making process, can encourage governance by standard operating procedures. This decision-making method allows for fast and effective responses to routine questions, but can be disastrous in crisis situations. With a competitive and decentralized framework, there is the risk of encouraging bureaucratic rivalries. Competition can be beneficial for expressing different opinions. However, as a decision-making method, it can lead to incoherent policies. Lastly, a decentralized and collegial framework is particularly vulnerable to the groupthink syndrome identified by Irving Janis, which is discussed in the next section. Therefore, the head of state should resort to different strategies of group management, similar to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in order to avoid falling into the trap of groupthink (Fig. 4.1).

		Decision-making framework	
		Vertical	Horizontal
Head of state	Active	Risk of authoritarian personality	Risk of groupthink
	Passive	Risk of governance by SOPs	Risk of bureaucratic politics

Fig. 4.1 Risks associated with management styles

While some management styles are counter-indicated, not a single style is a panacea for all situations and all leaders. First and foremost, the management style should correspond to the leader's cognitive capacities, his level of experience and knowledge, his endurance to stress and his need for control. Different leaders and different situations require different management styles (Preston and Hart 1999; Preston 1997, 2001; Kowert 2002; Mitchell 2010).

For example, whereas the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was trying to reach a consensus with his advisors, his daughter and successor, Indira Gandhi, adopted a more centralized and authoritarian management style. The different styles suited their respective personalities. The former sought the approval of his entourage, while the latter was more suspicious and viewed the world with antagonism. The style of one would not have suited the other. These differences in personality and style are ultimately reflected in their respective foreign policies. Nehru sought to appease the tensions with China and withdraw from the conflicts of the Cold War, while Gandhi's foreign policy was far more aggressive (Pavri 2002; Steinberg 2005).

Group Dynamics

Important foreign policy decisions are often discussed in small groups of senior political officials. Some groups are officially institutionalized, such as the Communist Party's Central Committee in the People's Republic of China or the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs in Canada. Other more informal groups exist, like the Tuesday Lunch Group at the White House, which brought together a few trusted advisors around President Johnson to discuss the Vietnam War (Haney 1997; Beasley et al. 2001; Hermann et al. 2001a, b).

Three main reasons can explain why heads of state often rely on group deliberation to reach a decision. First, on the socio-psychological level, it is a way of reducing the stress inherent to the pressure of decision-making, which would otherwise fall on one person's shoulders. Second, on the administrative level, it provides the opportunity to sound out different ideas and consider different opinions. Lastly, on a political level, a group decision is considered more legitimate by the administration responsible for implementing it and by the public in general.

The group decision-making practice has encouraged foreign policy analysts to develop theories that are specifically adapted to group dynamics.

It is common knowledge that a group's dynamics actually modify the behavior of its members. Group members adjust their expectations and rhetoric as a function of the interactions and their perception of the group. Yet, until now, only one foreign policy theory has genuinely risen to the challenge: groupthink. It has been well received way beyond the realm of FPA and appears to have been empirically proven.

Groupthink

The psychologist Irving Janis identified a specific group dynamic that he called "groupthink" (1972). It is a syndrome that occurs when the pressure to reach a consensus supersedes the group's objectives. The members become so obsessed by their own cohesion that they suppress their differences. Their capacities to analyze events and formulate moral judgments are substantially diminished as a result.

Janis observed the phenomenon of groupthink long before he started working on foreign policy. While studying support groups for smokers who wanted to give up, he noted that pressure in favor of cohesion might conflict with the group's objective (Hudson 1997). Janis was then struck by the realization that his observations on groupthink seemed to mirror the historian Arthur Schlesinger's description of the decision-making process that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In 1961, the Kennedy administration decided to send a thousand Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime. Kennedy and his team had just taken office in the White House and had not yet established clear decision-making procedures. However, pressure was running high. It was the middle of the Cold War, and some observers were worried that the new president, a young democrat, would lack the firmness and confidence of his predecessor, General Eisenhower. The Bay of Pigs landing was in fact planned under President Eisenhower, which helped reassure the new administration. When the plan was presented to Kennedy, none of the advisors dared express their reservations, not even those who secretly harbored doubts. Yet, the operation was seriously flawed. It was based on a sharp underestimation of the pro-Castro forces and an overestimation of the surprise effect that would be created. The outcome was dismal: not only were the exiles soon captured, but the failed invasion attempt also strengthened the hold of the Castro regime and brought it closer to the Soviet Union (Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1976).

Several factors may contribute to the emergence of groupthink. These include a high level of stress, strong socio-cultural uniformity, a weak or dominant leader, a feeling of isolation, an overestimation of the group's capacities, a dubious decision-making method, a high concentration of sources of information and low self-esteem. Several of these factors were clearly present when Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs landing ('t Hart 1990; Schafer and Crichlow 1996).

Groupthink can be recognized by a set of symptoms. The most important are the illusion of unanimity and invulnerability, the repression of divergent opinions, the systematic justification of past mistakes, the conviction of moral superiority and the tendency to stereotype the actors who do not belong to the group. When several of these symptoms are combined, there is the risk that crucial elements of information will be ignored and that the group's decisions will be flawed (Kowert 2002).

Apart from the Bay of Pigs landing, groupthink can also help explain why groups adopt terrorism as the best strategy to reach their political objectives (Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass 2014), why France and Britain approved Nazi Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland (Walker and Watson 1989; Ahlstrom and Wang 2009) or the decision made by George W. Bush's administration to invade Iraq in 2003 (Haney 2005; Badie 2010). In general, groups seem to advocate more extreme foreign policies than would be the case if an average was determined after questioning participants individually (Hermann and Hermann 1989).

The pathological approach adopted by Irving Janis and his successors naturally led them to compile a series of prescriptions to reduce the risks of groupthink. These include the leader's abstention with regard to expressing his opinions at the outset, a structured presentation of the different possible interpretations of data and the nomination of a devil's advocate whose role is to criticize the other members' ideas (George 1972; George and Stern 2002).

President Kennedy apparently drew similar conclusions from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the following year, Kennedy insisted that individuals with different points of view chair the ExComm; he delayed expressing his own view and appointed his brother Robert to supervise the identification of all the possible options. The Cuban Missile Crisis is generally presented as being a situation where the risk of groupthink was high but skillfully avoided (Herek et al. 1987, 1989; Haney 1994).

Defining the Phenomenon

Criticisms of the groupthink theory are primarily of methodological nature. In several studies, the link of causality between group dynamics and the foreign policy outcome is a matter of conjecture that has yet to be proven. Apart from Kennedy, who recorded the ExComm's deliberations unbeknown to its members, most group deliberations remain secret. There are neither recordings nor minutes, and archives are not freely available to researchers. The problem of data access makes it difficult to retrace the causal processes in detail. Thus, case studies are particularly vulnerable to multiple interpretations. For example, some challenge Janis' interpretations and maintain that the process leading to the Bay of Pigs landing was not a matter of groupthink (Stern 1997) or, on the contrary, that the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a case of groupthink (Welch 1989). Moreover, studies on groupthink are accused of selection bias: the researcher identify a failure in foreign policy first and then try to find symptoms of groupthink.

Several methodological strategies provide a partial response to these criticisms. In the absence of primary sources of data from group deliberations, some researchers use content analysis to dissect the decision-makers' public declarations systematically and assess their perception of the group to which they belong (Tetlock 1979). Others prefer a controlled laboratory environment to verify whether homogeneous groups are better at resolving complex problems than heterogeneous groups (Flowers 1977).

Another methodological strategy is the comparative analysis of several cases that have been cross-checked by at least two different encoders (Herek et al. 1989). This method involves asking several encoders to examine a series of historic cases using diverse written sources and precise indicators. For each case, they determine whether symptoms of groupthink are apparent and if they consider that the decision adopted was judicious. Researchers then focus on the historic cases for which the different encoders reached the same conclusions. After using this method for 31 historic cases, Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow suggest that it is not the high level of stress that leads directly to inadequate foreign policy decisions, but groupthink as defined by Janis (Schafer and Crichlow 2002).

Therefore, the government leader's management style seems to play a fundamental role in foreign policy (Schafer 1999). Groupthink occurs not so much because of unexpected situations, such as crises or lack of

information, but because of the instructions that government leaders give to their advisors, the atmosphere they succeed in creating and the way they organize the decision-making process.

Organizational Model

Graham Allison developed an organizational model for foreign policy when he was still a PhD student at Harvard University. He was doing research to explain the American and Soviet behavior during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In the process, he developed three explanatory models with the help of a research group on bureaucracy. In 1969, he presented the models for the first time in an article published in the *American Political Science Review*. Later, in 1971, he provided details of all three models in his dissertation, published under the title *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. The book soon became a classic of FPA and of political science, more generally. Allison published a revised version in 1999 with the help of Philip Zelikow, in the light of archives that were divulged by the American and Russian governments after the Cold War. The revised edition sparked theoretical discussions on Allison's three explanatory models, including the organizational model.

Organizational Strategies

Graham Allison's organizational model is directly inspired by Herbert Simon's research on limited rationality and by James March's research on organizations. It rejects the idea that foreign policy is the outcome of rational calculations made by a central authority. Instead, foreign policy is presented as the product of an organizational mechanism.

More specifically, the organizational model suggests that bureaucracies adopt two strategies to fulfill their mandate and manage the complex situations that they have to deal with. The first of these strategies is decentralization. The bureaucracy is actually a conglomerate made up of multiple organizational units that are quite independent from each other. When a problem occurs, it is automatically broken down into small tasks that can be carried out by these organizational units.

For example, if a new lethal virus triggers an epidemic abroad, the government would mobilize several ministries according to their respective expertise. Each one then would divide the tasks that need to be accomplished and allocate them to different units. Within the foreign ministry, a

first unit would be responsible for providing technical assistance to foreign governments, a second unit would check the information that was transmitted, a third would put pressure on the World Health Organization, a fourth would provide consular assistance for travelers, a fifth would impose restrictions on migratory flows, a sixth would encourage international scientific cooperation and a seventh would manage trade in pharmaceutical products. All the other ministries, ranging from health to public security, would also divide the tasks that they have to accomplish and allocate them to smaller organizational units. Hence, the response to a problem, such as an epidemic, is too complex for it to be coordinated entirely by a central authority.

The organizational model suggests that the bureaucracy's second strategy for managing complexity is to adopt standard operating procedures (SOPs). SOPs are rules that set out the conduct that an organizational unit should follow in the event of a given situation. They cover all aspects of government action, ranging from drafting official speeches (Neumann 2007) to the response to terrorist attacks (Kuperaman 2001). Following President Kennedy's decision to implement a naval blockade against Cuba in October 1962, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara became quite suspicious of the Navy's SOPs and wondered how the navy would intercept the first Soviet ship,

> Calling on the Chief of Naval Operations in the navy's inner sanctum, the navy flag plot, McNamara put his questions harshly. Who would make the first interception? Were Russian-speaking officers on board? How would submarines be dealt with? At one point McNamara asked Anderson what he would do if a Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. Picking up the Manual of Navy Regulations, the navy man waved it in McNamara's face and shouted, "It's all in there." (Allison 1969: 707)

As this example illustrates, when a bureaucratic unit has to accomplish a novel task, this task is often assimilated to a situation already covered in the SOP directory and the prescribed response is automatically implemented. Every situation is interpreted and treated as if it were an event that the bureaucratic unit had actually anticipated. This *modus operandi* reduces the response time and means that some aspects of coordination can be planned ahead.

On the other hand, SOPs make bureaucracies more rigid and more resistant to change. Over and above times of crisis, which can cause major disruptions, inertia is prevalent and learning processes are slow. Even in

organizations that are capable of critical self-assessment and that strive to evolve, SOPs impose such severe restrictions on practices that change is hard to implement. Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt commented despondently on the resilience of the American bureaucracy:

> The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want. . . . But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the na-a-vy ... To change anything in the na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching. (Roosevelt, quoted in Allison 1969: 701–702)

It is not surprising that Roosevelt considered the navy to be particularly resilient. Although foreign ministries' practices may also be extremely codified, the army corps is even more heavily dependent on SOPs. Military forces are hierarchical and disciplined organizations that are constantly in training so they can respond to certain situations. Operation manuals set out precise details of the actions that should be carried out according to a series of indicators and different levels of risk. Pre-established scenarios set the number of units to be deployed, how the mission should be run and the exit strategy. Quantifiable and observable benchmarks, such as the number of dead in combat or the destruction of a given target, are used to grade responses and evaluate a mission's success. As far as the armed forces are concerned, SOPs are tools that are indispensable for the efficacy of their operations.

Effects of SOPs

The persistence of SOPs can have dramatic consequences. Strategies proven in a specific context can be ineffective in a different context. The American military tactics developed during the Korean War proved to be unsuitable against the Vietnamese guerrilla force (Khong 1992). Similarly, the intelligence procedures set up during the Cold War failed to help the American government prevent the September 11 terrorist attacks (Parker and Stern 2002; Zegart 2007). Of course, organizations respond to their failures by developing their SOP portfolio. However, as the context is constantly changing, SOPs can rapidly be out of touch with the reality.

In some circumstances, SOPs can even help trigger armed conflicts. According to Barbara Tuchman (1962), SOPs played a key role in the outbreak of the First World War. The Austrian ultimatum led to the Russian mobilization, which in turn led to the German ultimatum against Belgium, which led to the French and British declarations of war. This chain reaction was virtually unstoppable because of the SOPs. The Austrian army rejected the idea of a simple siege of Belgrade, the Russian army rejected partial mobilization and the German army rejected a war limited to the Eastern Front. This was due to the fact that none of the armies had actually envisaged these scenarios and they were ill-prepared for them. Each one considered that a rapid offensive would bring a major strategic advantage, and the SOPs were developed accordingly. As Barbara Tuchman notes:

> Once the mobilization button was pushed, the whole vast machinery for calling up, equipping, and transporting two million men began turning automatically. Reservists went to their designated depots, were issued uniforms, equipment, and arms, formed into companies and companies into battalions, were joined by cavalry, cyclists, artillery, medical units, cook wagons, blacksmith wagons, even postal wagons, moved according to prepared railway timetables to concentration points near the frontier where they would be formed into divisions, divisions into corps, and corps into armies ready to advance and fight. [...] From the moment the order was given, everything was to move at fixed times according to a schedule precise down to the number of train axles that would pass over a given bridge within a given time. (Tuchman 1962: 74–75)

Obviously, SOPs do not necessarily lead to outcomes as dramatic as the First World War. On the contrary, in different circumstances, they can help diffuse conflicts. As they are regular and stable, they send clear signals to other states and increase the credibility of threats. SOPs themselves were not the cause of the First World War. Rather, governments were part of a system in which they allowed themselves to be governed by SOPs (Levy 1986).

When government leaders are fully aware of the power of SOPs, they can force the bureaucracy to deviate from the scenarios forecast and encourage their advisors to devise more creative solutions. John and Robert Kennedy did just that during the Cuban Missile Crisis. To prevent

the situation from escalating into a nuclear war, they made sure that the navy would maintain the naval blockade with unusual flexibility and that the air force would refrain from retaliating when one of their planes was shot down (Allison and Zelikow 1999).

Decision-makers who consider that the problems they face require new SOPs can also set up new organizations rather than attempt to reform existing ones. This is partly what motivated the Bush administration to create the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 in the wake of the 9/11, 2001, attacks, which exposed the weaknesses of the existing intelligence organizations (Johnson 2005). The Bush administration also set up the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 because Bush mistrusted the US Agency for International Development (Hook 2008).

In short, SOPs only represent a danger to political leaders who are unaware of the mechanisms that govern the bureaucracy or when it comes to questions of little importance that escape their attention. Therefore, the scope of Allison's organizational model is limited. It is certainly pertinent when applied to the study of how fairly technical decisions are implemented. However, it is less relevant when it comes to understanding the decision-making processes that concern crucial foreign policy issues. That is no doubt why it is rarely used in FPA, even though it is often mentioned. Allison also developed a bureaucratic model that inspired far more research.

Bureaucratic Model

Graham Allison developed the bureaucratic model, much like the organizational model, in order to explain American and Soviet behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969, 1971). Allison drew from the research on bureaucracy and foreign policy conducted by Richard Neustadt, Samuel Huntington, Warner Schilling and Roger Hilsman. In turn, his model inspired several researchers (Allison and Halperin 1972; Halperin et al. 2006; Marsh 2014; Keane and Diesen 2015; Keane 2016; Blomdahl 2016).

One Game, Several Players

The bureaucratic model conceptualizes the governmental apparatus as a decentralized and pluralist framework within which several "players" interact. The different players are not organized according to a clear and functional division of work. Instead, their policy domains partly overlap. As a result of these overlaps, players must defend their viewpoint and their own interests against other players. They must negotiate with each other to make sure that the government's actions reflect their vision and serve their own interests.

Graham Allison's original model clearly specifies that the players are flesh and blood human beings (1969). This ontological approach meant that analysts could integrate aspects of social psychology into the bureaucratic model ('t Hart and Rosenthal 1998; Ripley 1995; Kaarbo and Gruenfeld 1998; Kaarbo 2008). Nonetheless, Allison stresses the fact that individuals' ideas and interests generally correspond to the bureaucratic unit to which they belong. An organizational culture promotes the uniformity of ideas within a bureaucratic unit. The career prospects offered by the growth of an organization are conducive to convergence of interests. Thus, Allison famously adopted the adage "*Where you stand depends on where you sit*". In other words, an individual's position (on an issue) depends on where he is located (on a chart). Hence, players are often equated to bureaucratic units that are in competition (Mitchell 1999).

The different ministries involved may have radically different points of view on a given foreign policy issue. For example, tensions ran high within the Bush administration when the United States envisaged phasing out the agricultural credits offered to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The National Security Advisor saw it as an opportunity to impose sanctions on Saddam Hussein, the Department of State was concerned that it would undermine attempts at constructive dialogue, the Department of the Treasury feared that Iraq would refuse to repay its debts and the Department of Agriculture wanted to maintain a program that benefited American farmers (Holland 1999).

The different teams in a bureaucratic game are not necessarily whole departments. They can also be specific groups from the same department. Hierarchical fault lines can set ground-level staff against managers, which Allison refers to as "Indians" and "chiefs". Functional divisions may also occur, setting units on the same hierarchical level against one another. In the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, for example, the Division of Economic Affairs is traditionally more in favor of liberalizing agricultural market than other divisions, which are more concerned about local producers' interests (Seizelet 2001).

In this bureaucratic game, the head of state is considered to be an additional player, first among equals, who defends his own vision and his own interests. He does not have the monopoly of power and generally refrains from concluding a debate arbitrarily. Indeed, when he has resolved to

make a decision alone, he can still be swayed by discussions between the different bureaucratic players (Smith 1980; Rosati 1981; Christensen and Redd 2004).

Interactions Between the Players

The outcome of the bureaucratic game is determined by several factors. One of the factors is the set of procedures that Allison calls "action-channels". These official or unofficial rules determine which players take part in which decision, when and how. They provide a decision-making framework that constitutes an advantage for some players and a disadvantage for others. Thus, the most marginalized organizations within a decision-making process often afford to adopt firm ideological stances. However, they are generally unable to disseminate their ideas within the governmental apparatus because the action-channels are unfavorable (Drezner 2000).

The outcome of the bureaucratic game also depends on the distribution of resources among the players. The scale of the budget, the level of expertise, the social support and transgovernmental alliances constitute resources that a player can use to exert a significant influence. A player that has a structural disadvantage can also increase his influence on the decision-making process by adopting different approaches. Some studies, inspired by psychosociology or social constructivism, underline that the quality of the line of argument plays an important role in bureaucratic games (Weldes 1998; Honig 2008). Even minor and marginal players can exert a strong influence if they play their cards right (Kaarbo 1998).

Nonetheless, the foreign policy decision that results from a bureaucratic game may not necessarily be the one supported by the actor who dominates the "action-channels", has the most resources or is particularly strategic. Frequently, the final decision is not actually the preferred choice of any of the players. It could be the smallest common denominator, the median position, the *status quo* or the outcome of haggling between the different players.

The bureaucratic politics model shows, for instance, that the decision-making process leading the Obama administration to order a troop surge in Afghanistan in 2009 was the result of a political compromise. Some players, including Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and General McChrystal, argued for a counter-insurgency strategy, which necessitated an extra 40,000 troops on the ground over several years, while other players, like

Vice president Biden and National Security Advisor James Jones, pressed the president to adopt a counter-terrorist strategy, which implied fewer resources, around 5,000–10,000 troops. Ultimately, President Obama ordered a surge of 30,000 troops but for only 2 years (Marsh 2014).

The result of these bargaining can be sub-optimal for the state. Even if all the players act rationally, the outcome of their interaction may appear irrational (Gelb and Betts 1979; Lebow 1981). For example, Canada decided in 2004 to authorize the export of generic medicines to developing countries without asking the patent holders for authorization. The Canadian Departments of Trade, Health, Industry and Foreign Affairs, in partnership with the Canadian International Development Agency, developed the mechanism jointly. Together, they reached a compromise that all the players considered satisfactory. Yet, the compromise included so many contradictory concerns that it was ineffective. The pharmaceutical companies threatened to reduce their investments in Canada, the country's international standing suffered and access to medicines did not improve (Morin and Gold 2010; Morin 2011).

Position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Foreign policy is no longer the prerogative of ministries of foreign affairs, if indeed it ever was. Until the 1960s, foreign ministries did have a virtual monopoly of the channels of action pertaining to foreign policy, but that is no longer the case.

In most countries, ministries of foreign affairs are now faced with increased competition in their own policy field. Today, all the major governmental agencies in modern states conduct international activities, and they are not necessarily dealing with or being accompanied by the foreign ministry. The ministries designated for defense and external trade have always been associated with foreign policy. However, the ministries in charge of education, finance, health, culture and so on have now also developed their own services for international relations. Some even deploy agents abroad and are directly involved in international negotiations. Foreign ministries may still have a supervisory role when negotiations are institutionalized within the framework of intergovernmental organizations. However, a significant amount of the sectoral ministries' international activity is more informal, involving transgovernmental networks. This makes it even easier to elude the foreign ministries' channels of action (Hopkins 1976).

Competition also comes from the government leaders themselves. Their schedules are now dotted with frequent summit meetings. In addition to the regular meetings with different groups and coalitions, such as the G-20, NATO, the Commonwealth and APEC, there are a growing number of annual bilateral meetings, for example, between Spain and France or Germany and Israel (Dunn 1996; Krotz 2010). It is increasingly common to see government leaders at the multilateral UN summits. While Indira Gandhi was the only head of state at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, a total of 115 government leaders took part in the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Rio in 2012. In general, the preparation of these summits is supervised by the direct representatives of the government leaders, known as "Sherpas", who short-circuit the traditional channels of action of diplomatic hierarchy.

With this increased competition, foreign ministries lack the necessary resources to lead the field. Their budgets are not as high as those allocated to the ministries of defense, their actions are generally less visible than those conducted by the ministries of trade and industry, and they do not benefit from the support of influential social groups, as is sometimes the case for ministries of agriculture.

In the age of instant communication, traditional diplomatic channels are sometimes criticized for their slowness, their cost, their formalism and their lack of technical expertise. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, declared that if the foreign ministries and ambassadors "did not already exist, they surely would not have to be invented" (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 232). While Brzezinski was only joking, a report commissioned by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1976 seriously advised dismantling the foreign service (Wallace 1978). Although the report's recommendations were never adopted, this radical example illustrates the prejudice that exists in the different branches of the public administration against the ministry of foreign affairs.

Bureaucratic Model and Its Critics

Allison's bureaucratic model stimulated debate that has been going on for 40 years. There are as many publications that use the bureaucratic model to explain foreign policy as there are studies that criticize the model's assumptions (Krasner 1971; Art 1973; Perlmutter 1974; Wagner 1974; Freedman 1976; Caldwell 1977; Steiner 1977; Smith 1980; Bendor and Hammond 1992; Welch 1992, 1998; Rhodes 1994).

Three main criticisms have been directed at the bureaucratic model. The first concerns the difficulty to operationalize it. The model is apparently too complex, ambiguous and imprecise for establishing stable causal relationships and predicting behavior. It does not clearly define who the players are, what their preferences are and how the final outcome is reached. It simply lists a series of factors and provides a narrative framework to explain a decision *a posteriori*.

The second criticism concerns the disparity between the model's assumptions and empirical observations. The model is limited to bureaucratic players. Consequently, it ignores the influence of parliaments, the pressure from interest groups and the restrictions imposed by the international system. In addition, it underestimates the rise of the government leader. When it comes to crucial issues and in times of crisis, a government leader can generally impose his preferences and limit bureaucratic bargaining. Therefore, the bureaucratic model is only relevant for a limited number of issues, which are neither sufficiently routine to be governed by SOPs, nor sufficiently important to warrant direct intervention by the head of state. The model is also unsuitable for studying centralized political systems that give priority to the government leader's role. Although the model has been used to study the foreign policy of different countries, including Canada (Michaud 2002), China (Chan 1979) and the USSR (Valenta 1979), we can presume that these countries are generally less prone to bureaucratic rivalries than the United States.

The third criticism, which is supported particularly by Stephen Krasner (1971), is normative. Krasner's concern is that the bureaucratic model discharges elected representatives of their responsibilities. When a mistake is made, a government leader could use the theoretical model's legitimacy to blame the bureaucracy. From this perspective, the bureaucratic model represents a threat to democracy. However, in this respect, groupthink, which is the antithesis of bureaucratic games, is no more reassuring, as seen earlier in this chapter.

The management styles and the bureaucratic games, however, do not operate in a vacuum. They vary as a function of the institutional context within which they operate. Democracies and autocracies do not produce the same administrative dynamics, no more so than presidential and parliamentary regimes. The next chapter looks at the institutional level of analysis.

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CHAPTER 5

To What Extent Is Foreign Policy Shaped by Institutions?

Foreign policy decisions are always made within an institutional framework, which shapes actors' preferences and behavior. This is one of FPA's most firmly established observations. As Thucydides observed 2500 years ago, democracies, aristocracies and monarchies are driven by distinct mechanisms that lead to different foreign policies. To this day, new publications regularly corroborate this observation.

Many researchers focus on the impact that institutional structures have on foreign policy, largely because of resource availability. Not everyone has access to secret government reports and to the personal thoughts of heads of state. However, everyone can distinguish a parliamentary system from a presidential system or proportional representation from a first-past-the-post electoral system. These are stable categories, which correspond to relatively consensual definitions. Databases like the *Polity IV Project* provide information on political regimes in all countries since the turn of the nineteenth century, making it possible to draw comparisons and identify patterns.

Conceptual innovations have also stimulated research. Since the emergence of neo-institutionalism in the 1980s, the very notion of political institution has broadened. It is no longer merely limited to the constitutional rules that determine how decision-makers are elected. It also includes all formal and informal rules and practices, representations and standards that govern social and political life, both within and outside the state (March and Olsen 1984; Evans et al. 1985; Ikenberry 1988; Stone

J.-F. Morin, J. Paquin, *Foreign Policy Analysis*,
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1992; Hall and Taylor 1996). As a result, institutions are no longer perceived as inert and stable, but as intermediary variables with a degree of autonomy that lie somewhere between social interactions and behaviors. On the one hand, institutions slowly and gradually adapt to changing situations. On the other hand, they are designed to last, which gives them a capacity to structure behaviors.

An array of theoretical approaches, ranging from rationalism to constructivism, can be used to guide research on the impact of institutions on foreign policy. This chapter presents some of the theoretical approaches by focusing on four forms of institutions: parliamentary and electoral system, state organization, political regime and economic regime.

Parliamentary and Electoral System

The generic term "democracy" combines a whole range of different institutional configurations. Electoral and parliamentary systems, in particular, vary significantly from one democracy to another. Yet, institutional variations within democracies can help to explain some of the differences in foreign policy (Beasley and Kaarbo 2014; Brommesson and Ekengren 2013).

Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes

A fundamental distinction can be made between presidential regimes and parliamentary regimes. In the former, there is a strict separation between legislative and executive power, whereas, in the latter, these two powers are interdependent. In presidential regimes, the management of foreign policy is entrusted to the president, but the president cannot ignore the counter-power exercised by parliament. Inversely, the prime minister at the head of a parliamentary regime is drawn from parliament and generally controls the majority. Therefore, he has greater autonomy when it comes to managing foreign policy.

The American president is undoubtedly the most classic example of a president whose powers are limited by parliament. The American Congress can intervene in foreign policy in several ways. It can adopt laws and resolutions, set fiscal policies and confirm important nominations. Congress has powers that allow it to adjudicate on qualifying the massacre of Armenians as genocide, block IMF loans to countries that systematically violate human rights and put an end to John Bolton's career as an American ambassador.

The American constitution also grants Congress the power to regulate external trade, to declare war and to ratify treaties. Thus, Woodrow Wilson failed to persuade the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, despite being one of its main architects. Likewise, the Congress blocked the ratification of the Havana Charter and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, despite some support from the White House. As John F. Kennedy commented, the president "is rightly described as a man of extraordinary powers. Yet it is also true that he must wield those powers under extraordinary limitations" (Sørensen 1965: xii).

Congress's power over American trade policy was particularly striking during the 1929 crisis. In the panic, Congress adopted the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, which has remained infamous in the United States. The act dramatically increased customs tariffs, which exacerbated the effects of the crisis and caused it to spread on an international scale. If the control of American trade policy had been centralized in the White House, the reaction would no doubt have been different. Traditionally, Congress is more receptive to the grievances of the immediate victims of an economic crisis because representatives are elected on a local level and elections are held every 2 years. After the fiasco of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, the Congress could no longer ignore its institutional vulnerability to local interest groups and transferred some of the control of trade policy to the executive branch (Krasner 1977; Frieden 1988; Haggard 1988; Goldstein 1988; Bailey et al. 1997; Hiscox 1999; Ehrlich 2008).

Compared to the American president, the Canadian prime minister enjoys considerable room for maneuver. The Canadian parliamentary system does not require the prime minister to consult his parliament before engaging in an armed conflict or ratifying an international treaty. This characteristic of the Canadian system explains why Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol, whereas the Clinton administration, including Vice President Al Gore, did not dare to submit it to the Senate. Canada is no more efficient than the United States in terms of energy consumption; it does not have greater interest in reducing its energy dependence; it is not significantly more vulnerable to climate change; nor is it any closer to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Canadian parliamentary regime allowed Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by ignoring protests from some members of parliament, which the Clinton administration was unable to do (Harrison 2007).

These constitutional rules are not sufficient on their own to clarify the role of parliaments in foreign policy. Different standards and practices can accentuate their influence, even in parliamentary regimes. Member of the Canadian Parliament, for example, frequently help formulate foreign policy by discussing the laws for implementing treaties, publicly adopting a stance on international current affairs, questioning the government on its policies, leading missions abroad, collaborating with parliamentarians from other countries and producing reports on foreign policy research (Nolan 1985; Clark and Nordstrom 2005; Carter and Scott 2009; Dieterich et al. 2015).

Conversely, in presidential systems, the executive generally has considerable flexibility, which far exceeds that suggested by the written constitution. American presidents frequently take advantage of their prestige and their direct access to the media to swing public debates in a given direction and encourage Congress to fall into line (Meernik 1993; Entman 2004). Some presidents have even foiled Congress's powers by assuming their function as commander in chief of the armed forces so they could start conflicts without waiting for authorization from Congress (Auerswald and Cowhey 1997; Fisher 2014). Presidents often sign "executive agreements" as oppose to treaties to avoid having to obtain Senate's approval (Caruson and Farrar-Myers 2007). The Reagan administration even sold weapons to Iran secretly to finance insurgent groups in Nicaragua without leaving any official trace in Congress' budgetary accounts (Koh 1988).

The relationships between Congress and the president evolve as a function of the historical context. At the start of the Cold War, the American president had tremendous support from Congress. While he was often faced with major objections on domestic policy issues, members of Congress exercised restraint on matters of foreign policy, for fear of weakening the United States' position with regard to its Soviet rival. Politics was said to stop at the water's edge. This "double presidency", where the president has greater power in foreign policy than domestic policy, gradually crumbled with the growing opposition to the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Subsequently, Congress became more involved in foreign policy and thwarted the White House decisions on a more regular basis. Republicans and democrats expressed their disagreements on foreign policy more openly. It was only in the immediate aftermaths of September 11 attacks in 2001 that the president was able to enjoy a particularly deferential Congress in terms of foreign policy issues, at least until the problems of the Iraq War became evident (Wildavsky 1966; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1992; Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Fleisher et al. 2000; Sabbag 2001; Scott and Carter 2002; Kassop 2003; Lindsay 2003; Johnson 2005; Souva and Rohde 2007; Busby and Monten 2008; Meernik and Oldmixon 2008; Carter and Scott 2009; Newman and Lammert 2011).

This said, the foreign policy of presidential regimes cannot always be distinguished from that of parliamentary regimes. In general, the foreign policy of presidential systems can be expected to have greater continuity in the long term. In comparison, foreign policy fluctuates more in parliamentary systems as a function of the government in power. The transition from George W. Bush's administration to Barack Obama's did not involve a major shift in foreign policy. However, important changes occurred following the transition from Silvio Berlusconi's administration to Mario Monti's in Italy or when David Cameron took over from Gordon Brown in the United Kingdom (Andreatta 2008; Beech 2011).

Nonetheless, although formal rules may set presidential and parliamentary regimes apart, there is some convergence in practice. In presidential regimes, presidents do not officially have all the powers to act unilaterally. However, they do have centrifugal political powers at certain times. In parliamentary regimes, prime ministers have greater flexibility. Nonetheless, they are accountable to parliament and cannot ignore parliamentary opinions, especially when they do not hold an absolute majority. This is the reason why several studies on major differences between the foreign policies of both regimes reached ambiguous conclusions (Auerswald 1999; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003).

Parliamentarians and Their Preferences

One variable, which explains the variations in foreign policy more clearly than the political regime, is the ruling party's ideological orientation (Rathbun 2004; Koch 2009; Hofmann 2013). Right-wing and left-wing governments generally favor quite different foreign policies.

Statistical analyses indicate that right-wing governments, whose voters are generally less pacifist, are more likely to be involved in armed conflict. Left-wing governments, on the other hand, are more likely to be attacked by foreign countries, and conflicts in which they are involved are more likely to degenerate.

Counterintuitively, left-wing governments invest more on military expenditure than their right-wing counterparts. It might be because they are aware of their vulnerability to attacks. Military spending, a form of

state economic intervention, can also be considered as part of a redistribution policy (Marra 1985; Prins 2001; Narizny 2003; Palmer et al. 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006).

In matters of development aid, some studies indicate that governments controlled by a left-wing party usually give to more countries and provide more aid to each one than right-wing governments (Imbeau 1989; Thérien and Noël 2000; Travis 2010).

In addition, left-wing governments' trade policy constitutes a better fit in terms of the predictions of the classic Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. In countries where labor is plentiful, left-wing governments encourage trade liberalization to attract investors and provide employment. In economies with a higher degree of wealth per capita, they encourage protectionism instead to protect jobs from delocalization (Dutt and Mitra 2005).

When parliamentarians are not subject to severe party discipline, the variations in their votes also correspond to the forecasts of the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. Several statistical studies show that American senators and representatives adopt positions on foreign policy issues that match the economic interests of the voters in the district or state that they represent (Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; Conley 1999; Baldwin and Magee 2000; Fordham and McKeown 2003; Broz 2005; Broz and Hawes 2006; Ladewig 2006; Jeong 2009; Milner and Tingley 2011).

Nonetheless, for some foreign policy issues, American representatives seem to be driven by their own beliefs and personal values. That is the case for the question of economic sanctions, the policy toward Israel and the control of antiballistic missiles (Bernstein and Anthony 1974; McCormick and Black 1983; Hill 1993; Rosenson et al. 2009; Milner and Tingley 2011).

Despite numerous analyses, it is not easy to identify what really motivates members of Congress. Their ideological inclination and their electoral interests do not always match. In addition, different coalitions, which are relatively stable and informal, can develop and influence their votes, such as the traditional alliance between the internationalists and the liberals or, more recently, between the evangelists and the supporters of an aggressive foreign policy. Political parties in the United States and elsewhere are only formal coalitions that federate several heterogeneous interests. Even when party discipline is relaxed, parties provide the central framework for haggling between different approaches to foreign policy (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Cronin and Fordham 1999; Rosenson et al. 2009).

Political Cohabitation and Coalitions

In presidential and semi-presidential systems, the election results can give rise to a situation in which the head of state and the parliamentary majority belong to two different political parties. This so-called cohabitation happened several times in France since the 1980s, and it resulted in a situation that restricted both the president and the prime minister (Volgy and Schwarz 1991).

Several studies show that political cohabitation is particularly unfavorable when it comes to implementing an ambitious and risky foreign policy. In general, divided governments are keen to maintain the *status quo*. Statistically, they are less likely to make a firm commitment to trade liberalization or to start armed conflicts (Cowhey 1993; Cohen 1994; Lohmann and O'halloran 1994; Meernik 1995; Milner and Rosendorff 1997; Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).

Systems based on proportional representation can lead to the formation of a coalition government constituted of several political parties. Coalitions of this kind are generally fragile and require continual negotiations between parties involved. Minority parties, whether they are right-wing or left-wing, nationalist or environmental, can then take advantage of the situation in order to influence foreign policy. However, these parties may not necessarily steer foreign policy in a specific direction. Studies examining the likelihood of coalition governments resorting to armed force have obtained contradictory results. Studies focusing on the effect of proportional representation on trade liberalization are equally contradictory (Rogowski 1987a; Prins and Sprecher 1999; Ireland and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; Palmer et al. 2004; Li 2005; Chan and Safran 2006; Clare 2010).

Above all, coalition governments tend to adopt foreign policies that are momentarily more extreme in some way. The fluctuations in Turkey's Europeanist orientation or the shifts in Israel's commitment to peace, for example, can partly be explained by their system of proportional representation and the vicissitudes of their coalitions (Gallhofer et al. 1994; Kaarbo 1996, 2008; Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008).

The instability of coalition governments can also generate fears on the financial markets. In fact, the risks of speculative attacks are statistically more pronounced in countries led by a coalition government than in those led by a majority government. Markets are also wary of governmental cohabitation because these governments generally react less rapidly and

decisively in the event of a crisis. On the other hand, highly centralized governments are no more reassuring given that their demise can lead to radical political shifts. The institutional structures that offer a certain balance between stability and flexibility are the least vulnerable to speculative attacks (Leblang and Bernhard 2000; Leblang and Satyanath 2006).

In general, states have more confidence in foreign regimes that guarantee parliament's active involvement in the decision-making process. These regimes have a more transparent foreign policy because parliamentary debates provide foreign countries with a continual flow of information on the government's intentions and capacities. On the other hand, a government's leader who is directly elected by the population may appear more credible in the eyes of its foreign partners. If an international agreement is violated, a political leader is more likely to face political sanctions if he is accountable to the people and not simply to his own assembly. In the end, semi-presidential regimes, with head of state elected by popular vote and a government leader accountable to parliament, may represent the optimum balance (McGillivray and Smith 2004).

Strong State and Weak State

One of the most common institutional approaches in FPA involves determining the balance of power between the state and society. In some ways, it overturns neorealist theory by examining the distribution of power, not between states, but at their very core, so that their foreign policy can be explained.

Determining the Relative Power of the State

Three indicators are generally used to assess the internal power of a state: state centralization, social mobilization and political networks (Krasner 1978; Katzenstein 1977; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991; Evangelista 1995; Schweller 2006; Alons 2007).

The first of these indicators, state centralization, indicates the degree to which the government leader controls executive power. This varies as a function of a series of institutional factors. In general, autocracies are more centralized than democracies, unified countries more so than federations, parliamentary regimes more than presidential regimes, majority governments more than coalition governments, unicameral parliaments more than bicameral parliaments and two-party systems more than multiparty systems (Lijphart 1999).

If we bear these criteria in mind, it is easy to draw the conclusion that Belgium and Switzerland are more decentralized than Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. However, most states are in the gray area between the two extremes. Even in an autocracy, political power can be fragmented. The People's Republic of China is not a liberal democracy, but the rivalries between the State Council and the People's Liberation Army, like those between the different clans within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, are very real (Chan 1979; Lampton 2001; Ripley 2002).

As a way of reducing the different political regimes to a common denominator, several analysts use the concept of "veto player" (Tsebelis 2002) to compare the degree of centralization. A veto player is an individual or a collective actor with the effective capacity to block a given decision. In constitutional monarchies, even if the monarch officially has the right to veto certain decisions, he generally does not have the effective capacity to use this power because of prevailing norms and practices. On the contrary, a minister, a parliament, a political party and a federal body can all be veto players in foreign policy, depending on the political context, the institutional structure and the type of decision, even if the constitution does not formally recognize their veto power. The more veto players there are, the more decentralized the decision-making process and the greater the likelihood of maintaining the *status quo* in matters of foreign policy (Kaarbo 1997). The number of veto players in trade policy, for example, is directly correlated to the maintenance of protectionist policies (O'Reilly 2005).

The second indicator for characterizing a country's internal structure is social mobilization. This depends on two main factors: the degree of cohesion and the degree of social organization. The more organized and cohesive a society is, the greater its capacity to have a significant influence on foreign policy.

In France, these two factors are comparatively weak. Even among groups that defend similar interests, such as employers' organizations or left-wing parties, internal dissension is common. The fragmentation of the French society is the very antithesis of the cohesion that characterizes several Asian societies, which value consensus more than public debate. Despite this ideological heterogeneity, or perhaps because of it, social mobilization on foreign policy issues is not very organized in France compared to other Western democracies. France is quite unfamiliar with the multitude of NGOs and think tanks dedicated to foreign policy that

can be seen in the United States, the United Kingdom or Scandinavian countries. In addition, French pacifist movements do not have anything like the scale of influence of their German or Japanese counterparts. Some associations are particularly active on specific topics, like agricultural protectionism, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or humanitarian aid, or, at specific times, such as during the negotiations on the multilateral agreement on investment. However, French social groups are much more active when it comes to questions of domestic policy, thus allowing the French government greater flexibility on foreign policy matters (Cohen 2004; Anheier and Lester 2006).

The third and last indicator of a state's internal power links the two previous indicators. It is the degree of connection between social and governmental forces. Governments, as much as societies, need channels for communication and interaction to ensure that their position on foreign policy issues prevails.

Foreign policy advisory bodies constitute one of the channels linking governments to their society. All things being equal, they are more common in political cultures, which consider lobbying to be a healthy political activity that provides the government with a continuous supply of diverse opinions. They are less common in political cultures, which consider that defending individual interests is detrimental to the general interest (Risse-Kappen 1991).

There are other less institutionalized channels of communication, such as the practice of revolving doors. According to this practice, staff rotate between university, industry, the media and the civil service. Ideas flow more freely between the government and society when the divisions between the different professional worlds are relatively permeable and non-linear career paths are valued. Inversely, when professional careers are more linear and access to senior public service is limited to pools of candidates, the administration is more isolated from social influences (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009).

In some cases, public and private actors are so closely associated that it is difficult to distinguish between them. In Russia, the way that the public, economic and media powers are interwoven constitutes a form of state corporatism. It is now difficult to fathom whether politicians who sit on company boards are there to defend the public interest or whether Russian foreign policy in the Caspian Sea region is serving the oligarchs (D'Anieri 2002; Dawisha 2011).

By combining these three indicators, analysts can determine whether the balance of power favors the state or the society. Peter Katzenstein (1977), Stephen Krasner (1978) and the other pioneers of this approach place France and the United States at opposite extremes of the continuum that contrasts elitist democracies, governed from above, with pluralist democracies, governed from below. The United States is considered to be the archetype of the weak state with its federal system, its powerful Congress, its highly mobilized society, its unstable public services and political networks dominated by private actors. Inversely, France represents a particularly strong state because of its unified and centralized political system, its stable public service, its fragmented social movements and elite networks, which are dominated by the public sector.

Power of the State and Its Foreign Policy

At least three streams of literature use the contrast between weak and strong states to explain foreign policy. The first focuses on the flows of influence, which are descending in strong states and ascending in weak states. It should be easier for states that are powerful in relation to their society to impose their foreign policy preferences. Inversely, weak states are dependent on social forces and public opinion.

Thomas Risse-Kappen (1991), for example, compares how four liberal democracies take into account public opinion with regard to their foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He notes that the policies of the United States and Germany, two states considered weak in relation to their society, were in line with their respective public opinion. However, the foreign policies in France and Japan, two powerful states, were out of kilter with their public opinion.

Other studies focus on how businesses influence trade policy. In times of economic crisis, all governments are under tremendous pressure to encourage protectionist policies. Yet, more powerful states are generally better able to resist pressure and maintain a degree of trade openness than weaker states (Mansfield and Busch 1995; Henisz and Mansfield 2006).

The second literature using the concepts of strong state and weak state is that of the transnational diffusion of norms. Combining constructivism and institutionalism, this literature argues that strong states are generally more impermeable to the emerging ideas promoted by transnational actors and intergovernmental organizations. They can resist longer than

their weaker counterparts. However, once these ideas have been integrated, strong states are more effective at ensuring their dissemination within their society (Checkel 1999; Hook 2008).

In the 1980s, for example, the Soviet state considerably reduced its influence as a result of the reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. This encouraged the spread of liberal norms in the Soviet Union, which weakened the state further. Paradoxically, the state gradually lost its capacity to implement these liberal reforms and a powerful Russian state emerged after the dissolution of the USSR (Evangelista 1995).

The third literature concerns the relationships between a state internal and external power. The main hypothesis examined is that a state that is powerful in the international system can be seriously handicapped by its internal weakness. The flows of influence from the society toward the government encourage the defense of parochial interests to the detriment of large collective projects. If the process of converting resources into influence threatens individual interests, the state can be forced to offer compensation. These additional adjustment cost increases the state's vulnerability to external pressures (Krasner 1977, 1978; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Lamborn 1991; Snyder 1991; Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Zakaria 1998; Clark et al. 2000; Schweller 2006; Alons 2007; Kirshner 2012).

The French state is strong enough to freely exploit and mobilize its national resources in order to implement an ambitious and interventionist foreign policy. The French state-controlled economic model, which encourages a few large "national champions", is one example. By comparison, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was unable to engage his country militarily in the Second World War before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor because of the American population's isolationist preferences. To some extent, the EU's institutional weakness equally restricts its ambitions in matters of foreign policy. The EU's weight in international relations is rather disproportionately small in relation to its economic production and its population (Hill 1993).

There are two main criticisms of the analyses of a state's institutional capacity to convert its resources into influence. The first criticism is the failure to consider individual dynamics and preferences within the government. When it comes to explaining foreign policy behavior, limiting oneself to a country's institutional structure is an apolitical approach, implying that the identity of political leaders plays no fundamental role (Gourevitch 1978).

The second criticism refers to the analysis of the two-level game, which is presented in Chap. 7 (Putnam 1988). From this perspective, internal constraints are not necessarily transferred to the international level. In the context of a negotiation, these constraints can be converted into opportunities. A decentralized institutional structure and strong social opposition make it easier for a negotiator to impose its preferences on its foreign counterparts. A negotiator can even make reference to its domestic constraints in order to increase his share of power on the international level.

Democratic Peace Proposition

The democratic peace proposition is probably the most convincing empirical demonstration that political institutions can have a major impact on foreign policy. Researchers have found a strong correlation between democracy and peace in the 1980s and 1990s. To quote Jack Levy, it is a phenomenon that "comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (1988: 662). However, the specific mechanisms involved in the phenomenon of democratic peace remain unclear, and researchers are still debating about the causal mechanisms that account for this empirical observation. Is democratic peace really about democracy, or is it about economic interdependence, international organizations or a combination of several factors (Russett and Oneal 2001; Mousseau 2013)?

Observing the Democratic Peace

The term democratic peace refers to the observation that democracies do not generally wage war on each other. Their wars are almost systematically waged against autocracies. This observation has been reproduced and validated many times by statistical analyses. The relationship between democracy and peace remains statistically significant even when other factors that help explain the variations in armed conflicts are controlled, such as the degree of economic interdependence, cultural and ethnic ties, belonging to a common regional organization, stability of the international system, asymmetry of power, geographic proximity and military alliances. The presence of two democracies is almost a sufficient condition to guarantee peaceful relationships between the two states. This correlation has all the appearance of a causality (Chan 1984, 1997; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992; Ember et al. 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1993, 1994; Ray 1998; Maoz 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Dixon and Senese 2002; Oneal et al. 2003; Choi 2011).

The democratic peace is essentially a dyadic phenomenon. Most authors do not consider democracies to be particularly peaceful. Over and above their dyadic relationships with other democracies, they seem just as aggressive as autocracies. A few analysts consider that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies toward all countries, irrespective of their regime. They generally acknowledge that the monadic behavior that they claim to detect is less pronounced than the dyadic phenomenon, which remains firmly established (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Benoit 1996; Rousseau et al. 1996; Rioux 1998; Leeds and Davis 1999; Reiter and Stam 2003; Keller 2005).

Nonetheless, it is important to note that this is not an absolute law, but a probabilistic observation. Democratic peace does not mean that there has never been and never will be a military conflict between two democracies. The war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, for example, is a notable exception to the democratic peace proposition. However, the vast majority of armed conflicts in the last two centuries have involved either a democracy against an autocracy or two autocracies. When evaluated in terms of all the potential conflicts between all the possible pairs of countries, this pattern indicates that the probability of a war between two democracies is very small (Arfi 2009).

Some analysts segment history and note that democratic peace is only statistically significant during a particular period. In Ancient Greece, democratic cities were often in conflict and the democratic peace was not observed. It seems to be a more recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, analysts disagree about the period when it began. Most of them suggest that it emerged at the start of the nineteenth century, but some push the date forward to the Cold War or even the 1970s. Consequently, we could deduce that it might be a temporary phenomenon that is likely to fade as quickly as it appeared (Weede 1984; Farber and Gowa 1995). Some have also argued that as the number of democracies will grow, peace among them is likely to decline, as autocracies will no longer pose a common threat that forced them to stick together (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013).

On the contrary, we could consider that the democratic peace is a phenomenon that is likely to increase. Indeed, the process of democratization, which leads an autocratic regime to democracy, is particularly destabilizing and creates a situation that is conducive to armed conflicts. According to some analysts, the democratic peace is only possible between countries that have fully completed their democratization process. However, the empirical demonstration of this hypothesis is tenuous and

fiercely contested (Walt 1996; Wolf et al. 1996; Maoz 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Oneal et al. 2003; Mansfiled and Pevehouse 2006).

Defining the Variables of the Democratic Peace

Obviously, the probabilistic observation of the democratic peace depends on the definition of variables. The notion of democracy is particularly polysemic. Several statistical studies have adopted the indicators from the *Polity IV* project to define democracy, such as a multiparty system and holding free elections with universal suffrage. But over and above these objective indicators, democracy can have a subjective dimension. Most governments consider themselves to be democratic, including the Unified Socialist Party in the former German *Democratic* Republic and the Stalinist regime in today's *Democratic* People's Republic of Korea. Similarly, the perception of democracy abroad depends as much on cultural proximity and political alliances as on stable objective criteria (Hermann and Kegley 1995; Owen 1997; Geva and Hanson 1999; Widmaier 2005).

The bias in the perception of democracy can help explain some of the anomalies of the democratic peace. At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States refused to recognize the Spanish constitutional monarchy as a democracy, despite its multiparty system, its universal suffrage and the freedom of the press. Thus, the fight against Spanish despotism was used to justify the 1898 war, which paradoxically led to the development of American imperialism in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines (Peceny 1997). This situation recurred several years later during the First World War. The United Kingdom, France and the United States did not perceive the German Empire as a democracy, despite the fact that it had some of the characteristics of a democracy (Oren 1995). Nonetheless, it is difficult to determine whether this perception bias is the cause or the consequence of the animosity between the warring parties.

The notion of peace is also ambiguous. Statistical studies on the democratic peace generally define it in negative terms—in other words, by the absence of an interstate war that causes over 1000 deaths in a 12-month period. Although open wars between two democratic states are rare, proxy wars and clandestine operations occur more frequently. During the colonial period, the European democracies were fiercely opposed to the democratic movements in their colonies. Later, during the Cold War, the CIA led armed operations in several democracies to fight socialist or

revolutionary movements (Poznansky 2015; Levin 2016). Statistical studies on the democratic peace fail to take account of most of these operations because they do not correspond to the definition of interstate war (Trumbore and Boyer 2000; Ravlo et al. 2003).

Having said that, statistical studies that analyze peaceful relationships from different angles generally confirm the existence of a democratic peace. In addition, they have fewer disputes in general, are less easily drawn into an escalating conflict and less likely to resort to some sort of armed force against another democracy. They impose economic sanctions on each other less frequently, and when they do, they generally apply sanctions that only target the ruling elite so that the citizens are spared. Democracies are also more inclined to accept negotiation, third-party mediation and recourse to legal means to resolve disputes. The peaceful relationship between democracies can even be seen in different fields, including trade, the management of water resources and the emission of transboundary pollution (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994; Rousseau et al. 1996; Mousseau 1998; Rioux 1998; Dixon and Senese 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2003; Bernauer and Kuhn 2010; Kalbhenn 2011).

In addition, if narrower definitions of the democratic peace are adopted, there is the risk that the number of cases in modern history would be too limited to establish a statistically significant relationship, particularly if several control variables are taken into account. The democratic peace would then be as exact and ridiculous as the observation that countries, whose name starts with the letter K, rarely wage war on each other. Several authors also mention this methodological difficulty to suggest that democratic peace is ultimately a mere fluke. While this is very unlikely, it remains a possibility (Spiro 1994; Thompson 1996).

Peaceful Nature of Democracies

The real Achilles' heel of the democratic peace is the uncertainty about the causal explanation that links democracy to peace. Several hypotheses have been formulated, but there is still no consensus. As Ted Hopf stated, democratic peace "is an empirical regularity in search of a theory" (1998: 191).

The first explanation that comes to mind is probably the least convincing. It suggests that the interest of democratic states is defined on the basis of their citizens' interest and that the latter have a strong aversion to interstate wars (Jakobsen et al. 2016). This hypothesis has been frequently mentioned since Emmanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham.

Generally, individuals are unwilling to run the risk of dying in combat or to see their loved ones take that risk. They may also be afraid that their material conditions would deteriorate because conflict disrupts trade relations or because of the cost of funding military operations. Yet, democratic governments cannot ignore their citizens' aversion to war without taking the risk of being ousted from power.

These individual preferences might suggest that democracies are more inclined to maintain the *status quo* in the international system, whereas their autocratic counterparts may be more easily tempted by expansionist foreign policies. Indeed, autocracies are more likely to intervene in civil wars in order to grab natural resources. By comparison, the lure of profit is a less common determining factor when democracies decide to take military action in internal conflicts. High voter turnout generally makes elected leaders more reluctant to engage in armed conflict. Elected representatives also seem keener to find a peaceful resolution to conflicts. They act as mediators in international conflict more often and are better peacekeepers than dictators (Doyle 1986; Lake 1992; Kydd 2003; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Reiter and Stam 2003; Bélanger et al. 2005; Crescenzi et al. 2011; Horowitz et al. 2011; Koga 2011).

Yet, this explanation of the democratic peace, which focuses on democracies' preference for peace, is not wholly convincing. In several democratic systems, groups defending fighters' interests or aggressive ideas, such as arms manufacturers or nationalist groups, are influential enough to pressure their governments to adopt aggressive policies. In fact, democracies have triggered several wars of aggression, whereas some autocracies, like Spain under Franco or Iran under the Shah, have tried to avoid them. *A priori*, democracies do not seem to be intrinsically more reasonable or peaceful (Kegley and Hermann 1996; Geis et al. 2006).

In fact, when a conflict breaks out, democracies can be particularly threatening. Elected representatives are well aware that a military failure can rapidly turn into an electoral defeat. Therefore, they tend to deploy more resources to increase their chances of obtaining military victory. For similar electoral reasons, they also tend to aim for total victory rather than negotiate ways out of a war. The rallying effect that is generated by the outbreak of war makes any negotiation with the enemy politically risky. As a result, several statistical studies note that democracies wage wars that are more devastating and victorious than those waged by autocracies (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Desch 2002; Merom 2003; Biddle and Long 2004; Choi 2004; Palmer et al. 2004; Lyall 2010; Colaresi 2012).

Moreover, democracies are more likely than autocracies to maintain their wartime commitments to a military coalition and to fight to the finish. The combination of their respect for the institutionalized decision-making process and the effectiveness of veto players, that is, political actors whose agreement is necessary to change the course of actions, explain this behavior (Choi 2012).

This extremism provides the basis for another explanation of the democratic peace. In fact, democracies have a political incentive to minimize risks, and thus, they choose to intervene in wars that have a high probability of success. Democracies are well aware that other democracies are formidable and tenacious enemies. As a result, they undoubtedly prefer attacking autocracies. This calculation could simultaneously explain why democracies wage as many wars as autocracies, but mutually avoid conflict with each other. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues formulated this hypothesis quite logically, although it has not yet been proven empirically (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Lektzian and Souva 2003).

Explaining the Democratic Peace Through Norms

Several empirical studies explain the democratic peace in terms of norms. Detailed case studies (Russett and Antholis 1992; Owen 1997; Friedman 2008), laboratory experiments (Mintz and Geva 1993) and statistical analyses (Maoz and Russett 1993; Raymond 1994; Mousseau 1998) reveal the existence of a social norm that prohibits wars against other democracies. Citizens and, by extension, their governments seem to consider that disputes between democracies should be resolved via negotiation or arbitration. In their view, wars are only legitimate against autocracies, particularly if they aim to free people from their oppressors and spread democracy.

Some analysts even consider that a collective identity exists between democracies, which could prevent armed conflict between them. Democracies already share certain values that encourage the convergence of their foreign policies and reduce the sources of tension (Gartzke 1998, 2000; Bélanger et al. 2005). This affinity has served as a hotbed for the creation of a collective identity, designed to resist autocracies. The experience of the Second World War and the Cold War has, notably, provided a common narrative line. Today, this collective identity changes the way democracies view the world. The same behavior can be interpreted as defensive if it is adopted by another democracy, but as offensive if it is adopted by an autocracy. When a conflict breaks out, democracies tend to form a group and support each other (Siverson and Emmons 1991; Wendt 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Werner and Lemke 1997; Peceny 1997; Lai and Reiter 2000; Hayes 2009; Vucetic 2011).

Curiously, a similar phenomenon seems to exist between autocracies. If autocracies are divided into three categories, military regimes (like the military junta in Burma), personal regimes (like Gaddafi's Libya) and one-party regimes (like communist China), there does appear to be some sort of community of allegiance between dictators in the same category. Since 1945, there has not been a single war that sets two personal regimes or two military regimes against each other, and conflicts between one-party regimes have been particularly rare. A standard that prohibits war between similar regimes seems to apply as much to democracies as it does to autocracies (Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003).

Explaining democratic peace through norms and collective identities is criticized, nonetheless. Some studies underline that the nature of a foreign country's political regime seldom constitutes a key factor in political discussions. In addition, during the Cold War, several democracies were allied with extremely repressive dictatorial regimes and failed to intervene when another democracy was in danger of becoming authoritarian. There is clearly a Euro-Atlantic community of allegiance. However, if a community federating all democracies does actually exist in people's minds or in political leaders' practices, it still seems fragile (Layne 1994; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Gibler and Wolford 2006).

Exchange of Information and Credibility

Many analysts explain the democratic peace in terms of the capacity of democracies to exchange credible information. Before starting a war, democratic governments have to prepare public opinion, and in some cases, they even have to obtain parliamentary approval. Generally, it is impossible for them to launch a large-scale surprise attack. In fact, even when they do not envisage armed conflict, they are constantly pressed to express their intentions, their objectives, their preferences and their capacities. Democracies are, therefore, much more transparent than autocracies.

In addition, the information transmitted via parliamentary debates or the media is relatively credible. In democracies, decision-makers cannot give false information or deviate from their stated intentions without putting their reputation at risk and paying for the consequences at the next

elections. If they make a threat, they create a rallying effect and put their reputation at stake, which prevents them from backing down. As bluff is not an option for democracies, they send more credible signals to their enemies. Therefore, democracies can use these signals to resolve conflicts before the situation deteriorates (Fearon 1994, 1997; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001; Gartzke and Li 2003; Slantchev 2006; Tomz 2007; Potter and Baum 2010).

Explaining democratic peace in terms of the credibility of the information exchanged by democracies is the subject of some criticism. Some analysts consider that the freedom of the press actually plays a crucial role in the transmission of credible information. However, the freedom of the press does not necessarily correspond to the nature of the political regime. Some democratic leaders have a high control over the press and some autocracies do have a free press. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to talk about the "peace of the freedom of the press" rather than the "democratic peace" (Van Belle 2000).

Other analysts consider that even autocratic regimes can be vulnerable in terms of their reputation and find themselves in a position where they cannot back down without paying a political price. Soviet Premier Khrushchev, for example, was forced to resign in the months that followed his volte-face during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, the information provided by autocracies also seems sufficiently credible to provide the basis for negotiation (Weeks 2008).

On balance, none of the explanations of the democratic peace is as well documented as the democratic peace itself. The aggressive inclination of some democracies, the frequent tensions between them and the numerous cases of cooperation with autocracies make the democratic peace proposition a particularly intriguing phenomenon. In reality, the phenomenon is probably multicausal. It is quite likely that the democratic peace could be explained by several variables simultaneously (Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1997; Starr 1997).

Economic Liberalism

The idea of a free market emerged from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, alongside the ideas of universal law and perpetual peace. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762), Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) and Emmanuel Kant's *Project for a Perpetual Peace* (1795) are all based on the principle that individual liberty leads to collective well-being. As a consequence, researchers consider that if a liberal foreign policy is to remain coherent, it should pursue this triple heritage. Liberalism in foreign policy thus implies simultaneously the promotion of free trade, the defense of human rights throughout the world and the maintenance of peaceful relations (Doyle 1986, 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001).

Liberal discourse has fundamentally oriented research to focus on the triangular relationships between peace, trade and human rights, so much so that the other normative and theoretical perspectives are virtually ignored (Neocleous 2013). The new stream of literature on "open economy politics", which has only recently reexamined the question, is also one of the many derivatives of liberalism (Lake 2009). If the democratic peace is an empirical observation in search of a theory, liberal peace is a theory with an unquenchable thirst for empirical demonstrations. Although liberal peace is already reasonably well supported by research, some gray areas remain.

From Democracy to Free Trade

The first wave of trade liberalization actually started with a debate on individual rights. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the British middle class were clamoring for the repeal of the Corn Laws, a series of protectionist measures concerning the cereal trade, which primarily benefited the landed gentry. This protectionism was denounced as an unfair privilege granted to a wealthy minority. Free trade, on the contrary, was to benefit those who generated wealth by working for it rather than those who inherited land. It was supposed to encourage the imports of raw materials, reduce the price of food commodities and maintain stable and peaceful relations with foreign trade partners. Despite some resistance, the British parliament gave in to pressure in 1846, abolished the Corn Laws and reduced customs tariffs unilaterally. In its wake came the first movement of trade liberalization on a world scale (Kindleberger 1981; Spall 1988; Brawley 2006).

Even now, democracies tend to favor more liberal trade policies than autocracies. In fact, inclusive political systems encourage policies that benefit the greatest number of individuals, even when profits are minimal for the majority and losses are devastating for a minority. The pattern is even more pronounced in electoral systems where constituencies are so spread out that the preferences of the different interest groups are cancelled out

or disappear in the mass of voters. Inversely, autocracies are more inclined to encourage protectionist policies that benefit the ruling minorities. They maintain higher customs tariffs and give more subsidies to industries that support the government (Rogowski 1987a; Brawley 1993; McGillivray and Smith 2004; Li 2006; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008).

This relationship between democracy and trade is particularly pronounced in developing countries. According to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem in the Heckscher–Ohlin model, when the main factor of production is labor rather than capital or land, workers have a collective interest in making sure that their economy is open to foreign investors and export-oriented. The aim is to increase demand for labor and exert pressure to obtain higher wages. In a democratic political system, workers can demand this preference and oppose protectionist resistance. Thus, the wave of democratization that occurred in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s probably contributed to the liberalization of their economies (Rogowski 1987b; Dutt and Mitra 2005; Milner and Kubota 2005; O'Rourke and Taylor 2007; Baccini 2011).

Democracies are also more likely to conclude free-trade agreements than autocracies. For elected representatives, a free-trade agreement is not just a strategy to guarantee the reciprocity of liberalization. It also provides the symbolic opportunity to show their citizens that they are actively addressing their economic problems (Mansfield et al. 2002).

Having said that, do democracies trade more with each other than they do with autocracies? Statistical studies on the subject are contradictory. Some studies conclude that democracies trade more with each other, while others invalidate this hypothesis (Bliss and Russett 1998; Morrow et al. 1998; Verdier 1998; Mansfield et al. 2000; Bartilow and Voss 2006, 2009).

In addition, democratic forces do not seem to strive for complete liberalization or to encourage liberalization in all areas. Western democracies, particularly the United States, European countries and Japan, maintain strong protectionist measures for agriculture in terms of customs tariffs, public subsidies or phytosanitary barriers. These protectionist measures are not simply due to the fact that farmers have a greater capacity for mobilization than consumers. They are also the result of the citizens' preference. In France or Japan, the citizens who could benefit economically from a reduction in agricultural protectionism remain largely in favor of maintaining it, despite being fully aware of the direct repercussions on retail prices and public expenditure. This paradox cannot be explained by classic liberal theories (Naoi and Kume 2011).

From Free Trade to Peace and Vice Versa

The theory of liberal peace suggests that free trade encourages peaceful relationships. In fact, conflicts generally restrict trade between warring parties. The more intense the trade relations, the higher the economic cost of a conflict. Beyond a certain threshold, the potential gains of military victory are outweighed by the losses incurred as a result of the conflict. At least, this is the most likely rationalist explanation for the empirical observation that has been repeated statistically umpteen times, namely, that economic interdependence reduces the risks of conflict (Polachek 1980; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Li and Sacko 2002; Oneal et al. 2003; Simmons 2005; McDonald 2004; Bussmann and Schneider 2007; Gartzke 2007; Goldsmith 2007; Xiang et al. 2007; Bohmelt 2010; Bussmann 2010; Dorussen and Ward 2010; Fordham 2011; Hegre et al. 2010; Polachek and Xiang 2010; Soysa and Fjelde 2010; Mousseau 2013).

The positive relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful relationships is so well established that research now focuses on the conditions that cause variations. Three categories of conditions have been identified. The pacifying effect of trade varies primarily as a function of the characteristics specific to the countries involved. Thus, it is more pronounced when the countries involved are democratic, developed or have electoral systems that encourage large exporters (Papayoanou 1996; Hegre 2000; Krastner 2007; Gelpi and Grieco 2008).

Liberal peace also varies as a function of the nature of the products traded. Arms trade, for example, is strongly correlated to peaceful relations: not a single state sells weapons to its enemies! Oil trade, on the other hand, increases the statistical probabilities of conflict between trading partners (Goenner 2010; Li and Reuveny 2011).

Lastly, the nature of interdependence has an influence on its pacifying effects. The value of trade over national output, the degree of institutionalization of trade relations, the symmetry of these relations and perspectives for future growth, all have an impact on the relationship between trade and peace (Copeland 1996; Gartzke and Li 2003; Hegre 2004; McDonald 2004).

All things being equal, given that economic interdependence encourages peaceful relations, it is not surprising that former aggressors turn to trade to end their past disputes once and for all. The European Coal and Steel Community, built among the ruins of the Second World War, is by no means an isolated example. The Brazilian–Argentinean, India–Pakistan

and American–Vietnamese couples have all reached trade agreements to mark their commitment to developing peaceful relations. This practice is so common that past conflicts statistically increase the probabilities of reaching a free-trade agreement (Martin et al. 2010).

In fact, the choice of free-trade partner often depends more on a special security relationship than on commercial logic. The wave of free-trade agreements reached under George W. Bush's administration is a particularly good illustration of this. Several agreements were reached with countries that did not represent an important market for the United States, but supported the war in Iraq, like Australia, El Salvador, South Korea, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Honduras. Other agreements were concluded with countries that collaborated closely with the war on terror, such as Morocco and Bahrain. Conversely, the Bush administration showed little enthusiasm for the proposal of a negotiated free-trade agreement with New Zealand because it did not support the war in Iraq and systematically refused to let American nuclear vessels navigate in its territorial waters (Schott 2004; Newham 2008).

Although the United States has not signed a free-trade agreement with Iraq, their commercial exchanges shot up during the war. American exports went from 31 million dollars in 2002 to over 2 billion in 2011. There is nothing exceptional about this situation. Several studies show that military alliances and military occupations, to a greater extent, significantly increase the flow of trade and investment (Pollins 1989; Gowa and Mansfield 1993, 2004; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Long 2003, 2008; Bartilow and Voss 2006; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007).

Critics of the Liberal Peace

The liberal peace argument, which suggests there is a synergy between democracy, trade and peace, is not without its critics. Some critics consider that the endogenous link between trade and peace could lead statistical studies to overestimate the positive relations between the two. The causal mechanisms go both ways, but few studies take that into account when attempting to measure the effects of trade or military alliances (Goenner 2011).

More radical critics underline that trade can encourage armed conflicts. Several hypotheses have been put forward, but they are contradictory and have yet to be confirmed (Martin et al. 2008; Peterson 2011). A preliminary hypothesis suggests that if a country is dependent on access to foreign markets, it becomes vulnerable to economic coercion and different types

of incursion. Therefore, it may be tempted to engage in armed conflict to recover its autonomy. A second hypothesis suggests that multilateral liberalization mitigates bilateral dependency and, thus, encourages conflict. The negotiations held at the WTO could reduce the opportunity cost of bilateral conflicts, thus making them more attractive. A third hypothesis is based on the observation that the intensification of trade relations between two countries can divert trade to the detriment of a third country. The latter could then envisage resorting to armed force to recover its market share.

There is a fourth even more radical hypothesis. It is the one put forward by Lenin in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Lenin 1917). According to Lenin, liberalism encourages the edification of large industrial and bank groups. Once they have acquired a dominant position in their respective market, they clash with each other in order to continue expanding. The First World War is a perfect demonstration of this type of confrontation.

While Lenin's book may have disappeared from the usual bibliographic references and the liberal vision now dominates the literature, the First World War remains an intriguing case. How can we explain that democracies with well-integrated trade relations became involved in such a devastating war? The democracy/autocracy and liberalism/protectionism dichotomies are probably too crude to shed light on this apparent anomaly. To understand the First World War, a fine-grain analysis is required, and special attention should be given to the specific institutions in each country, particularly to their parliamentary system (Tuchman 1962; Kaiser 1983; Papayoanou 1996).

Social constraints are an important factor in the study of foreign policy. This is why the next chapter presents the social level of analysis by looking at the interactions between foreign policy leaders and the multiple social forces that mark the political landscape.

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CHAPTER 6

How Influential Are the Social Actors?

Various social actors influence or seek to influence foreign policy. NGOs, companies, the media, ethnic groups, unions and experts all exert a degree of pressure on the government. They also interact—exchanging information, setting up coalitions and continually adapting to their environment. The government does not simply listen passively to their grievances. It is involved in social dynamics and, in turn, seeks to influence societal actors. The social fabric is made up of a two-way flux of influence, which overlaps to form a complex system.

Awareness of this complexity helps clarify some commonplace ideas. It is often argued that the electorate has little interest in international politics, that a high death toll suffices to reduce public support for a military intervention, that unpopular politicians use international crises to distract attention from domestic problems, that public opinion reacts impulsively to images shown on television, that NGOs are altruistic by nature while private corporations are egocentric and that the influence of experts is limited to technical issues. This chapter examines each of these commonplace assumptions in turn.

Public Opinion

Public opinion is surveyed constantly, but the press only reports a tiny selection of polls. Other poll results are freely accessible, notably via databases, including the Roper Centre, the Program on International Policy

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Attitudes, the Pew Research Center or the European Commission's Eurobarometer. Here again, only a fraction of the surveys is covered. Political leaders themselves commission series of opinion polls, but the results are never made public.

According to Pierre Bourdieu, "public opinion does not exist" (1979: 124). With this provocative statement, Bourdieu points out that respondents do not necessarily have a structured opinion *a priori* and that questions may determine the responses. Even if we adopt this viewpoint, the fact remains that public decision-makers are bombarded by poll results that are presented as reflecting public opinion. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask whether the avalanche of surveys that piles up on decision-makers' desks actually does have a significant influence on how they conduct foreign policy.

The Almond–Lippmann Consensus and Its Critics

Research on how public opinion influences foreign policy has evolved significantly in recent decades. In fact, it took a 180° turn. Yet, the nature of public opinion, survey techniques or the decision-making process has not changed radically. Instead, it is new analytical methods and new research questions that have led analysts to draw different conclusions about the nature of public opinion and the influence of opinion polls (Holsti 1992, 1996).

Until the 1970s, most analysts were extremely critical of public opinion. It was perceived as being incoherent, volatile and capricious. Several analysts considered that letting opinion polls guide foreign policy was dangerous. According to the prevailing theories at the time, public opinion was thought to delay government intervention in explosive situations and force governments to get bogged down in conflicts that were doomed to failure. To sum up, it was considered to be "too pacifist in peacetime and too bellicose in wartime" (Lippmann 1955: 20).

Alexis de Tocqueville and a few of his contemporaries already considered that the reins of foreign policy should be entrusted to experts. Foreign policy was thought to be too complex to be left to citizens who were more preoccupied with their own immediate and daily problems. In addition, it requires secret negotiations that cannot be debated in the public realm. This elitist position made its mark on several constitutions, which put foreign policy exclusively in the hands of the head of state, thus limiting the prerogatives of parliamentarians, who are more vulnerable to swings in public opinion.

Classic realists broadly shared this opinion (Foyle 1999; Nincic 1992). Immediately after the Second World War, realists anxiously observed that decision-makers, such as Roosevelt, had an increasing appetite for surveys. They also noticed that charismatic leaders, like Hitler, had a formidable capacity to mobilize crowds. Moreover, they assumed that public opinion was naive. The French public, for example, naively believed it was protected by the Maginot Line. In Hans Morgenthau's view, "[t]he rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational" (Morgenthau 2005 [1948]: 565). George Kennan went even further:

> I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat (Kennan 1951: 70).

Since Morgenthau and Kennan, however, most realists exclude public opinion from their conceptualization of international relations. They reject idealism and are keen to depict international relations as they truly appear, but their aversion to public opinion conducted them to ignore it as a variable. The idea that public opinion is potentially a nuisance and that it has no real influence is strangely muddled up in the realist tradition.

Other researchers, who do not belong to the realist school of thought, analyzed public opinion more seriously, by tackling it head-on. Gabriel Almond was one of the first to provide empirical support to the hypothesis that public opinion is volatile. By studying biennial Gallup polls and how Americans rate the most important issues, he observed that public opinion seemed to be incapable of maintaining stable preferences and a constant focus (1950). With his "mood theory", Almond agreed with the conclusions drawn by the journalist Walter Lippmann, who had already noted the public's lack of insight during the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Together, they forged the empirical basis of what we call the "Almond–Lippmann consensus" on the volatility of public opinion.

Public opinion differs from the opinion of the elite, but that does not necessarily mean it is radical or nonsensical. During the Vietnam War, while surveys pointed to the growing opposition to American foreign policy, some studies questioned the Almond–Lippmann consensus. Sidney Verba and his team, in particular, showed that American public opinion demonstrated a degree of complexity, subtlety and moderation by opposing both a unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam and greater engagement, and by favoring negotiation with the Viet Cong (Verba et al. 1967).

Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro resolutely put an end to the Almond–Lippmann consensus (1988, 1992). By analyzing thousands of surveys, they identified several hundred questions that were asked more than once to samples of the American population. They observed that, far from being unstable, American public opinion remains relatively constant. Between 1930 and 1990, there was a less than 10% fluctuation for 73% of the responses to questions that were asked at least twice. Not only that, when there was a sudden turnaround in public opinion, it was systematically in response to new information. Thus, Page and Shapiro concluded that public opinion is more rational than incoherent. This view is still held by most analysts (Russett 1990; Holsti 1992; Knopf 1998; Isernia et al. 2002; Colaresi 2007; Ripberger et al. 2011; Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger 2014; McLean and Roblyer 2017).

Although analysts have now basically abandoned the Almond–Lippmann consensus, one fact remains: preferences revealed by opinion polls are distinct from those expressed by the elite. In several Arab countries, public opinion supports more aggressive policies toward Israel than their leaders (Telhami 1993). In Switzerland, public opinion is resolutely more isolationist than political representatives (Marquis and Sciarini 1999). In the United States, until the election of Donald Trump as president, public opinion favored more mercantilist trade policies than the republican elite, which was predominantly pro-trade (Herrmann and Tetlock 2001). The gap between the population's majority opinion and that expressed by the intellectual, media and economic elite can be as great as 50 percentage points for some fundamental foreign policy issues (Oldendick and Bardes 1982; Cunningham and Moore 1997; Page and Barabas 2000; Dolan 2008; Ripberger et al. 2011).

Structure of Public Opinion

Public opinion is relatively stable because it is structured along lines that are also relatively stable. Some analysts consider that structuring public opinion along a left-right axis, which is common in relation to social and economic policies, could also be relevant for foreign policy (Aguilar et al. 1997; Stevens 2015). However, this is not always the case. In several regions of the world, for example, anti-Americanism is no more of a right-wing than a left-wing prerogative (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007).

In general, opinions on foreign policy are more easily broken down along lines that are specific to foreign policy. Eugene Wittkopf proposed two axes: the first sets internationalism against isolationism, and the second sets conciliation against militant action (1990). This two-dimensional structure was successfully and simultaneously tested by Wittkopf, on the basis of surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, on the basis of surveys specifically targeting the elite (1990). Subsequent studies refined the analysis by adding additional axes, such as a third axis opposing unilateralism and multilateralism (Citrin et al. 1994; Chittick et al. 1995; Rosati and Creed 1997; Bjereld and Ekengren 1999; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2004; Reifler et al. 2011). In all cases, public opinion does appear to be structured and articulated around relatively stable axes.

If respondents' position along these axes is stable, we could presume that the variables that influence respondents are equally stable. Several avenues can be explored in relation to this issue. Some studies examine the impact of psychological variables on opinion, such as the degree of confidence in human nature (Brewer and Steenbergen 2002; Binning 2007) or the degree of risk tolerance (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Ehrlich and Maestas 2010). These variables are stable for individuals. They are partly determined by genetic factors, which may help explain the stability of public opinion.

Other studies focus instead on cultural variables, like national identity (Schoen 2008), religion (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008; Çiftçi and Tezcur 2016), cultural sensitivity (Hill 1993), the image of other countries (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990) and cultural proximity (Sulfaro and Crislip 1997). Here again, the culture's stability helps stabilize public opinion.

Two theoretical models conceptualize the relations between these psychological and social variables. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) developed a three-level hierarchical model: foreign policy preferences are based on

social norms, which in turn are based on personal values. For example, a position that favors an increase in the development aid budget may result from a norm, which considers that it is a duty to intervene in the case of a humanitarian crisis. In turn, this norm is shared among those who have a high degree of compassion.

Herrmann et al. (1999) propose a cognitive-interactionist model instead. They consider that foreign policy preferences expressed in surveys are the consequence of constant and systematic interactions between respondents' particular dispositions and prevailing social perceptions with regard to the international context. For example, conservative-leaning individuals and the widespread perception of national decline can strengthen each other, generating an opinion that is strongly in favor of greater military spending.

Other studies adopt a more rationalist approach and establish a direct causal relation between respondents' interests and preferences. Most of these studies focus on trade policies because material interests are easier to document. In particular, they highlight the concordance between the level of workers' skill and their support for free trade. The more specialized the workers, the more they stand to gain from liberalization and the more they actually support liberal trade policies. Some studies have even found a statistically significant relationship between the consumption of imported goods and support for free trade. These studies suggest that respondents, as workers and consumers, are surprisingly capable of identifying their economic interest (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Baker 2005; Fordham 2008).

Variations in economic gains that citizens extract from globalization may affect other domains of foreign policy (Trubowitz 1992). The level of education and exposure to the media do not directly lead to greater awareness with regard to international politics. Obviously, it all depends on the type of education and media (Gentzhow and Shapiro 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Kennedy and Dickenson 2013). Moreover, when individuals derive economic benefits from globalization, they tend to be better informed about the political context in foreign countries and aware of foreign cultures. Thus, in China, the emerging middle class is simultaneously less nationalistic and less hostile toward the West (Johnston 2006).

Information also affects support for military intervention overseas. The number of deaths in combat, in particular, can have a significant impact on public opinion. *Ceteris paribus*, the greater the number of victims, the less

support there is for war. Mueller even identified a logarithmic function according to which a small number of deaths in the first stages of a conflict can trigger a massive decline in public support (Mueller 1973, 1994; Marra et al. 1990; Koch and Gartner 2005; Karol and Miguel 2007; Gartner 2011).

Nonetheless, the relationship between the number of deaths and public support is neither direct nor linear. Public opinion may sometimes tolerate a high number of victims and continue to support a war. Several conditions affect the sensitivity of opinion with regard to the casualties of war, including (1) the probability that conscription is enforced, (2) the mission's multilateral framework, (3) the severity of the enemy threat, (4) the likelihood of military success and (5) elite's cohesion in favor of military intervention. All these conditions suggest that public opinion can take several criteria into account (Jentleson 1992; Downs and Rocke 1994; Larson 1996; Oneal et al. 1996; Powlick and Katz 1998; Kull and Destler 1999; Kull 2002; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Eichenberg 2005; Vasquez 2005; Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Gelpi et al. 2009; Baum and Groeling 2010a; Horowtiz et al. 2011; Grieco et al. 2011; Perla 2011).

Influence of Public Opinion

One question, nonetheless, remains in the balance: public opinion may well be stable, subtle and coherent, but does it actually influence foreign policy? The answer appears to be affirmative (Hildebrandt et al. 2013). At least in Western democracies, there is generally a concordance between public opinion and foreign policy. In addition, when there is a swing in public opinion, it is usually followed by a change in foreign policy (Monroe 1979, 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983; Hartley and Russett 1992; Foyle 1999; Rottinghaus 2007).

However, the influence is by no means absolute, systematic and immediate. Recent evidence suggests that the public opinion–foreign policy nexus is not as strong in the presence of an external security threat (Davis 2012). Several examples clearly illustrate that public opinion is not always taken into account. Italy and Spain took part in the Iraq War in 2003 despite public opposition (Schuster and Maier 2006; Chan and Safran 2006). However, both countries withdrew from Iraq after the elections when the parties which had made a clear commitment to withdraw came to power.

Most analysts consider that it is precisely the prospect of elections that puts pressure on elected representatives to consider public opinion. Contrary to popular belief, foreign policy can play a significant role in elections when there are major differences between the candidates. A number of voters, even those who do not follow international current affairs closely, have strong opinions on how foreign policy should be conducted. But they are not all interested in the same issues. Some are concerned with immigration, others with terrorism and still others with negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, when voters concerned by these different issues are put together, they can have a significant impact on election results (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006; Meernik 1995; Baum 2002a, b; Anand and Krosnick 2003; Reifler et al. 2011).

Analysts also agree about the type of influence that public opinion exerts on foreign policy. Public opinion rarely leads decision-makers to adopt specific policies. Instead, public opinion sets parameters within which a whole range of policies can be considered acceptable. If public pressure fails to prevent a government from entering a war, it can force the government to strive to create a multilateral coalition or prevent it from deploying weapons of mass destruction from the outset. Public opinion channels available options without imposing a specific one (Russett 1990; Hinckley 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Sobel 2001; Foyle 2004).

As a channeling force, public opinion helps stabilize foreign policy. When a government is in favor of a shift toward greater isolationism and protectionism, public opinion will exert pressure that is pro-interventionist and liberal. However, when the next government advocates interventionism and liberalism, public opinion is likely to bring it back to greater isolationism and protectionism. Public opinion represents a force of opposition rather than proposition (Nincic 1988).

Current research now looks at the conditions that increase or reduce public opinion influence. Three intermediary variables have been identified, though none has yet been firmly established. The first variable is the degree of state's independence. Internal independence, as well as external independence, can have an impact on the influence of public opinion. At the external level, a state is likely to be more sensitive to public pressure if it is economically or militarily independent in relation to the outside world and has little involvement in international bodies. At the internal level, a state that is institutionally decentralized will also be more sensitive to the influence of public opinion (Risse-Kappen 1991; Chan and Safran 2006; Alons 2007; Kreps 2010).

The second intermediary variable is visibility. Certain foreign policy issues attract more public attention than others. Unsurprisingly, public opinion has a greater influence when it comes to ratifying a multilateral treaty or participating in a military conflict than for issues like the management of stocks of tuna in the North Atlantic or the export of dangerous waste (Monroe 1998; Petry and Mendelsohn 2004). The phase of the decision-making process also has a significant effect on the level of visibility. Public opinion is more influential during phases that attract public attention, such as when an issue is put on the agenda, than when decisions are implemented (Knecht and Weatherford 2006).

The third and last intermediary variable is decision-makers' beliefs. Two types of belief are important: normative and strategic. In the first case, a leader may consider that he has the moral duty to take his population's opinion into account. In the second case, a leader may judge that public support is a prerequisite to the success of a foreign policy. The two beliefs can significantly increase the influence of public opinion. They also help explain how public opinion has a degree of influence in autocratic regimes, which are not subject to election pressure (Powlick 1991, 1995; Telhami 1993; Foyle 1999; Keller 2005; Dyson 2007; Foster and Keller 2010).

Nevertheless, political leaders can misinterpret public opinion. American presidents, for example, tend to overestimate the public's sensitivity with regard to the number of soldiers killed in combat and they underestimate its attachment to multilateral norms and procedures. Thus, fearing a public outcry, the United States withdrew from Lebanon in 1984 after an attack killing 241 American soldiers. However, retrospective analysis shows that the fall in public support at the time of the event was by no means inevitable (Burk 1999; Kull and Destler 1999; Kull and Ramsay 2000).

Audience Costs

Developed by James Fearon almost 25 years ago, the audience cost theory has bolstered the argument according to which public opinion influences foreign policy (Fearon 1994). Fearon argues that leaders cannot be certain of their enemies' determination to go to war during a crisis because they can bluff about their true intentions in order to get maximum concessions. He maintains that we can learn more about our enemies' true intentions when they choose to "go public", that is, when they publicly commit

to taking coercive actions such as mobilizing troops or issuing public warnings. Indeed, leaders who choose to commit publicly focus the attention of their domestic audiences, raise their expectations and run the risk of paying a high political cost if they ultimately choose to back down their public threat. Fearon maintains that historical record shows that domestic audiences are tougher with leaders who formulate empty threats than with those who do not escalate at all.

Audience cost theory has been relatively popular because it was used to study the relationship between democracy and war. Some argue that democracies are more likely than autocracies to win wars because their leaders are publicly elected and can be voted out in the next election. As a result, the audience cost matters more to them. As Jack Levy explains, "Audience cost theory suggests that the ability of domestic publics to punish political leaders for failing to implement their earlier threats creates additional incentives for leaders to stand firm during crises" (Levy 2012: 383). As a result, democratic leaders are more likely to avoid inconsistency and to choose to escalate a conflict only when they are determined to go to war (Reiter and Stam 1998). Accountability to the public, the argument goes, is what makes democracies special in international relations. Audience cost theory has also been mobilized to explain the democratic peace proposition, as mutual audience costs refrain democratic leaders from going to war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). The theory has also been applied to the realm of economic sanctions and evidence indicates that leaders will suffer domestic audience costs if they publicly commit to adopting economic sanctions and subsequently back down (Thomson 2016).

This said, there is still no consensus on the merits of this theory, as research has shown contradicting results (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012). Some have also argued that audience cost theory is not significantly supported by empirical evidence (Mercer 2012), and others have raised some methodological problems in testing the theoretical proposition (Gartzke and Lupu 2012).

Influence of Leaders on Public Opinion

Research has shown that the influence of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making is not a one-way street. In some cases, leaders do not simply anticipate public opinion: they direct it. At least, they make a considerable effort to do so. Studies suggest that politicians can especially

influence public opinion in times of war (Berinsky 2009). In the American context, for instance, presidential rhetoric increases the public accessibility to the president's view on a war, which significantly influences public opinion to the president's benefit (Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger 2014).

Some diplomats openly admit that they devote as much energy trying to persuade the population in their own country as they do trying to convince representatives in foreign countries. To achieve their purpose, they may use rousing speeches, emphasizing shared principles or generating a climate of fear (Western 2005; Wolfe 2008). They may also set up programs designed to convince the most reticent, such as industrial reconversion or employment insurance programs, to encourage support for free trade (Ruggie 1982; Bates et al. 1991; Rodrik 1998; Hiscox 2002; Hays et al. 2005).

However, we cannot be sure that these efforts bear fruit. Some studies suggest they are futile (Edwards 2003), while others conclude that public opinion is, primarily, guided by political elites (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Witko 2003; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). In fact, most studies that examine the true capacity of decision-makers to influence public opinion focus on a specific hypothesis, namely, the "diversionary war hypothesis", which is based on the "rally around the flag" phenomenon.

Rally Around the Flag

Since John Mueller's pioneering work (1973), it is now well established that dramatic events, which thrust a country onto the international stage, create a temporary effect that rallies the country's population around its government leader. Argentina's attack on the British Falkland Islands, for example, significantly boosted support for Margaret Thatcher. The effect lasted long enough for the Falklands War to constitute a factor that contributed to Thatcher's reelection in 1983 (Lai and Reiter 2005). It is a phenomenon that Mueller called "the rally around the flag".

The most impressive rally around the flag is undoubtedly the one enjoyed by President George W. Bush after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. President Bush's approval rating on the eve of the attacks was 51%. It shot to 86% on September 15, and by September 21, it reached a peak of 90% (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). This dramatic surge contributed to Congress's almost unanimous adoption of two resolutions, which gave the president incredibly extensive powers for his war on terror (Kassop 2003).

Attacks are not the only events capable of generating a rally around the flag. The trigger can be an event that occurs in any field of activity. It can be positive or negative as long as it is clearly identified, has major implications and is sudden. An important scientific advance, hosting an international summit, a sporting victory, a stock market crisis or an important diplomatic visit can all generate a rallying effect (Mueller 1973; Marra et al. 1990).

The nature of the political regime does not seem to be a determining factor. The phenomenon is particularly well documented in the United States, because of the wealth of data available. Since the Second World War, the Gallup polling firm has conducted thousands of surveys on support for the American president. Its questions are always formulated in the same way. Researchers can now use these data to document the slightest fluctuations in public opinion. However, the rally phenomenon can also be observed in parliamentary systems (Lai and Reiter 2005) and even in autocracies (Heldt 1999; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Levy and Vakili 2014).

Nevertheless, other contextual factors can amplify the "rally around the flag". In the United States, at least, the effect can be magnified if the following situations arise: the president has a low rate of support before the dramatic event occurs, republicans and democrats collaborate, the country is not already at war, there is abundant media coverage of the event, the president appears to take a risk that puts his career at stake and the U.N. Security Council supports the American response to the crisis (Lian and Oneal 1993; Baker and O'Neal 2001; Baum 2002b; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Colaresi 2007; Groeling and Baum 2008).

These contextual variables also have an impact on the scale of the rallying effect, but the reasons for this are not clear. There is still uncertainty about the causal processes that link dramatic events to increased support for the government leader. According to some analysts, it is first and foremost a population's patriotic reaction. Dramatic events boost the feeling of belonging in terms of national identity, generating not only increased support for the government leader, but also for all national political institutions (Mueller 1973; Parker 1995).

Other analysts consider the rallying phenomenon to be more the result of the news cycle. When a crisis occurs, journalists initially turn to the government leader, who can monopolize media space temporarily. It is only later that criticisms are raised, spread by the media and the rallying effect subsides (Brody 1991; Oneal et al. 1996; Baum and Groeling 2010a, b). However, independently of the causal explanation, if international crises actually increase the rate of support, government leaders could be tempted to generate them deliberately.

Temptation of War as a Rallying Lever

Several analysts have suggested the hypothesis that political leaders are more likely to generate an international crisis when they find themselves in a fragile position on the domestic political stage. A military conflict could be declared with the intention of diverting attention away from economic problems or political scandals. From this perspective, domestic political instability could be one of the primary factors of international instability.

There are numerous historical case studies of diversion strategy. Bismarck's imperialism at the time of the Berlin Conference and the German Emperor William II's offensive strategy during the First World War could be explained by the desire to counter socialist movements in imperial Germany (Kaiser 1983). The very risky mission to rescue the American hostages in Teheran may have been approved by Jimmy Carter in order to increase his standing six months before the presidential elections (Brulé 2005). In addition, the launch of cruise missile strikes against suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan on August 20, 1998, could be interpreted as an attempt by President Clinton to distract attention from the statement he made before the grand jury, three days earlier, concerning his extramarital relations with Monica Lewinsky (Hendrickson 2002; Baum 2003). Diversion theory even made an incursion into popular culture when the film *Wag the Dog* featuring Robert De Niro and Dustin Hoffman came out in late 1997 just before the Lewinsky sex scandal. The movie plot revolved around a strategy of diversion that strangely resembled the events leading President Clinton to order bombings on Afghanistan and Sudan. This prompted the US media to introduce diversion theory to the public and to draw a parallel between the reality of foreign policy and the fictional story of the film.

However, establishing a true link of causality between domestic political problems and aggressive foreign policy is difficult. Military interventions are multicausal, and it is often impossible to assess the relative influence of a specific factor when studying a single case. By analyzing several cases, however, it is easier to isolate variables and compare them. Statistics do not allow us to retrace all the causal processes, but they are useful to identify significant relationships.

Statistical studies on the diversion hypothesis are more mitigated than historical case studies (Levy 1988). Some statistical studies clearly indicate that government leaders resort to military force more often when the rate of unemployment or the rate of inflation is high, or when the rate of economic growth is low. Some studies add that during periods of war or economic hardship, government leaders who are running at the next election intensify the use of force prior to the elections. Other studies reveal that government leaders who seek to boost their domestic support through external action are the ones who lack the resources to use redistribution policies or repression to achieve the same goals (Gaubatz 1999; DeRouen 2000; Prins 2001; Clark and Reed 2005; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Colaresi 2007; Brûlé et al. 2010; Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Williams et al. 2010; Kisangani and Pickering 2011).

One of the most frequently quoted articles in the abundant literature is the one by Ostrom and Job (1986). Their statistical analysis concludes that American presidents resort to military intervention more often to increase their popularity when the level of support is already quite high than when it is low. This surprising result does not fit the original hypothesis of diversion strategy. We would expect diversion to be used as a last resort, when the chances of reelection are slim and low enough to justify a risky strategy. After all, the rally effect can be modest, it is temporary in all cases and the strategy can easily turn against its initiator if the conflict drags on or if defeat seems imminent.

Ostrom and Job do not invalidate the hypothesis of resorting to foreign policy as a diversion strategy. They simply reformulate it. According to them, a government leader who wishes to engage in military conflict to boost his popularity needs to have a minimum amount of support to start with. This cushion is necessary to avoid a disaster in the event of military defeat. The rallying strategy is primarily aimed at members of the government leader's party or those in his coalition. Some studies actually identify a relationship between recourse to military force and the low rate of support for the government leader among his traditional followers (Morgan and Bickers 1992; Nicholls et al. 2010).

Several statistical studies actually go far beyond Ostrom and Job's criticism and directly attack the hypothesis of diversion. They claim that democratic countries are no more likely to engage in conflict during election years, even when their economic situation is difficult. They generally avoid military conflict in the months leading up to an election. These studies conclude that a tacit norm might exist in several countries, which prohibits the use of military force on the international stage as a way of conducting political battles on the national stage (Meernik 1994, 2000, 2001; Meernick and Waterman 1996; Yoon 1997; Gaubatz 1999; Leeds and Davis 1997; Gowa 1998; Foster and Palmer 2006).

These groups of statistical studies reach diametrically opposed conclusions because they do not use the same data. Some studies define resorting to force dichotomously, while others introduce a sliding scale to take into account the degree of force deployed. Some are limited to the post–Second World War period, and others go back as far as the Franco-German war in 1870. Some focus on support for the government leader, while some take into account the position and preferences of the other actors involved in the decision-making process. Some studies adopt a unilateral model, while others consider the fact that variations in levels of support may also affect the behavior of other governments. Some studies break down the data on a term basis and consider that the opportunity to mobilize foreign policy is constant, while others take each crisis as a unit of analysis that provides government leaders with the chance to intervene. Some studies ignore the nature of the enemy, while others distinguish the enemy according to the nature of their political regime. Methodological controversies always cause disputes, and analysts use statistical models that are increasingly complex. As yet, it is not possible to establish a definitive verdict.

To be sure, some government leaders refrain from using military force even though it could be used to their advantage. This may be because they use substitutes instead. In particular, they can replace military force with a trade dispute. In this way, they can generate a similar rallying effect and join forces with the economic stakeholders that stand to gain from the dispute. Thus, when the unemployment rate rises in the United States, the probability that the American president will provoke a trade dispute increases significantly (DeRouen 1995; Clark 2001; Whang 2011).

Government leaders can also substitute a conflict with the rhetoric of opposition. According to Sophie Meunier (2007), President Jacques Chirac tinted his speeches with anti-Americanism to create a rally around the flag that was inexpensive and involved little risk. Over 40 years ago, Mueller himself insisted that the rally around the flag is not solely generated by military conflicts. Curiously, the literature on foreign policy as a diversion strategy focuses on war and rarely considers other possibilities.

The Media

The media are in a difficult position, located as they are between the political leaders and the population. They are not messengers that slavishly pass on government's press releases, nor are they mirrors that systematically reflect public opinion. They are actors, with a degree of autonomy that can influence both leaders and public opinion.

The Media's Influence

The media play a very important role in foreign policy (Baum and Groeling 2010a, b; Peksen et al. 2014). Only a minority of journalists have the necessary means to gain access to firsthand sources of information on the scope and effects of foreign policy. Distances, foreign languages and contextual understanding represent significant barriers. Therefore, sources of information are concentrated, which magnifies the influence of the editorial choices made by a few foreign correspondents.

One of the most important editorial choices involves identifying and prioritizing foreign policy news that will be reported, which is called priming. As only limited media space is available, several events compete daily. In this news business, the same topics usually dominate the media space. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the reactions it provokes, for example, make front-page news more often than other bloodier conflicts. This recurrence can be explained by a phenomenon of path dependency: insistent media coverage of a specific problem generates people's interest and provokes responses from decision-makers. This creates the conditions for maintaining it among the top issues in international current affairs. Once a foreign policy issue breaks through the media's editorial filter, it is likely to come back periodically (Wood and Peake 1998; Oppermann and Viehrig 2009).

Another editorial choice has to do with news framing, that is, the angle used by the media to present the news. This involves the selection and layout of the elements of information that provide substance to the news and structure its interpretation. Framing defines the problem, identifies the protagonists, qualifies their interactions and puts the episode into context. The conflict that set Chechnya against Russia, for example, can be presented as a war of independence between a people and an imperial power or as the demonstration of a clash between Muslim and Christian civilizations or even as a wave of terrorism led by a group of extremists (Oates 2006).

Although available frames are virtually unlimited, a coherent and intelligible news item can only be presented in a single framework. The media favor familiar frames that are based on shared social norms or that reproduce the established national identity (Snow et al. 1986; Entman 2004). Despite their interest for news and current affairs, the media that dominate foreign policy coverage generally make conformist decisions when it comes to both the selection of news items and their treatment.

These editorial decisions can have an impact on public opinion. In one of the first books on the influence of the media on foreign policy, Bernard Cohen underlines the fact that the media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (1963: 13). Repetition has a powerful effect of persuasion when it comes to ranking priorities. Even today, foreign policy issues that are regularly covered by the media become the issues that most of the population considers to be the most important (Soroka 2003).

Nonetheless, Cohen seems to have underestimated the influence of framing. Recent research indicates that the way news is reported can also have an influence on public opinion with regard to foreign policy (Jordan and Page 1992). Even articles and reports, which do not convey an explicit opinion, structure thought and steer reflection in a given direction. Articles that adopt a human scale, rather than a systemic scale, induce a certain mistrust of internationalist foreign policies (Baum 2004). Articles that present the anger rather than the sadness of victims of a conflict incite readers to call for action against the culprits (Small et al. 2006). Lastly, those that underline the losses that the country suffers on the international stage, and not the gains, encourage readers to favor riskier foreign policies (Wolfe 2008).

Media framing, in particular, influence individuals who have little interest in and a minimum understanding of foreign policy (Hiscox 2006). It would be a mistake to presume that this section of the population, which is disinterested in foreign policy, is not exposed to the media that covers foreign policy. Matthew Baum's research clearly shows that even variety shows, tabloids and the gutter press also exert an influence on their audience with regard to foreign policy (Baum 2002a).

Media's influence goes far beyond a disinterested public and has an impact on government leaders and foreign ministers as well. Underlying causal mechanisms for this influence may involve three channels. First, the media can put pressure on leaders to adopt a position on problems that

they had previously overlooked. Journalists' questions or even anticipating their question can help put a foreign policy issue on the government's agenda. Second, foreign reports and editorials in major newspapers can influence leaders' ideas because they are considered to be a source of information and analyses, which complements the reports produced by the administration. In their memoirs, several heads of state openly acknowledge that they were influenced by pictures broadcast on CNN or reports in *The New York Times*. Donald Trump's acknowledgment that the pictures of chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians pushed him to authorize the launch of Tomahawk cruise missile against the Syrian government in the spring of 2017 is a clear example of this. Third, leaders may believe that specific media coverage influences their electorate and due to this indirect bias, they may adjust their policies for electoral purposes. Sometimes even civil servants favor the policies promoted by the media, believing that they will then satisfy their leaders, who are sensitive to fluctuations in public opinion (O'Heffernan 1991; Powlick 1995; Wood and Peake 1998; Entman 2000; Van Belle et al. 2004).

Some factors can accentuate the media's influence on leaders. A high level of uncertainty and fierce criticism of existing policies are among the most important factors. The media's influence also seems to be more pronounced for the least strategic issues and the most marginal countries. The famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, for example, united all these conditions: the withdrawal of Soviet aid to developing countries created a situation of uncertainty, the media heavily criticized Western countries for their inaction and the region concerned was not particularly strategic. As a consequence, the reports of the famine broadcasted by the BBC helped boost the levels of aid that Western countries gave to Ethiopia (Robinson 2002; Miklian 2008).

How Leaders Influence the Media?

Although the media can have an impact on foreign policy, the flows of influence also go in the opposite direction: political leaders often influence journalists. Several studies demonstrate this by simultaneously encoding the opinions expressed by leaders and those expressed in the media. Their respective evolution is analyzed over time. Other studies confirm this by highlighting the media's complacency toward the policies of allied countries and their negative bias with regard to enemy countries (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Bennett 1990; Suedfeld 1992; Bennett and Manheim 1993; Wolfsfeld 1997; Zaller and Chiu 2000; Entman 2004; Bennett et al. 2007; Groeling and Baum 2009).

Leaders have several advantages when it comes to influencing journalists: (1) they enjoy an aura of legitimacy and control, which enhances their credibility; (2) they have the capacity to provoke news events by making statements or taking action; (3) they escape the pressure of parliamentarians and lobbyists, most of whom have little interest in foreign policy; (4) they can withhold strategic information or, on the contrary, put up "trial balloons"; (5) they choose the journalists that interview them and accompany them on official trips; and (6) they supply the journalists with official photographs and videos, which they alone can provide.

In fact, the relationships between leaders and the media are more cooperative than conflicting. They fit into a framework of interdependence or "mutual exploitation" (O'Heffernan 1991). On the one hand, leaders want to use the media to reach their audience without disclosing the most sensitive information. On the other hand, journalists want to maintain privileged relationships with those who provide them with information without damaging their image of impartiality.

In this context, leaders' influence on the media varies, depending on the circumstances. Military conflicts, especially, increase both their desire and their capacity to influence the media. To generate and maintain support for war, it is essential to convey optimistic messages on the probabilities of success and to present the enemy as a direct threat that defies reason and goodwill. Demonizing a foreign head of state in governmental communication strategies is one of the most reliable warnings of an imminent military conflict (Hunt 1987).

During an actual conflict, governments control access to sensitive information, such as the progression of operations and the death toll. They can set the conditions for journalists who accompany military troops and even impose censorship. Leaders have maximum control when wars are short-lived and remote. On the contrary, leaders find it harder to influence the media during periods of relative peace, such as the one that characterized American foreign policy in the 1990s (Berry 1990; Entman 2000; Zaller and Chiu 2000; Tumber and Palmer 2004).

The influence of leaders on media also varies from country to country. In autocratic regimes, the state often has a direct control over the media. In these countries, there is a high congruence between media coverage

and governmental views (Suedfeld 1992; Whitten-Woodring 2009). Even in some democracies, the government directly or indirectly controls several media outlets, which broadly reflect the government's perspective (D'Anieri 2002; Oates 2006; Archetti 2008).

In the United States, foreign policy debates transmitted by traditional media channels remain in the "sphere of legitimate controversy" (Hallin 1986). When an international crisis occurs, the president and the secretary of state are often the first to be interviewed, and their point of view is broadcast first. Subsequently, when the opposition party, recognized experts or even dissidents from the ruling party express criticism, the media communicate it in abundance. Nonetheless, marginal or deviant opinions, which are not shared by one of the groups from the political elite, rarely find an echo in mainstream American media. Controversies pictured in the media mirror debates within the elite political circle (Bennett 1990).

A striking example of this phenomenon of "indexation" is the media coverage of the Vietnam War. Contrary to popular opinion, the media coverage remained largely in favor of the American government's policy. It was in line with the republican and democratic heavyweights for as long as they supported the war. Later, when the media expressed criticism, it only concerned the cost of the war and the probabilities of success. The media barely mentioned the viewpoint of the pacifist movements that disclaimed the very legitimacy of the war (Hallin 1986).

Half a century later, the media coverage of the war in Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the American government launched its war against terrorism as an interstate war. Presidential speeches were widely broadcast by the American media and, by extension, most Americans were convinced that Afghanistan and Iraq represented an immediate threat. Media criticism about the probabilities of success and the financial costs of the war only emerged during the 2004 presidential campaign, and to a greater extent after the 2008 campaign. *The New York Times* even admitted that several articles written by Judith Miller about the Iraqi threat proved to be unfounded and were the consequence of an overly close relationship between the journalist and the Bush administration. However, the very legitimacy of the war in Afghanistan was not seriously called into question by mainstream media during the first term of the Bush administration (Foyle 2004; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Tumber and Palmer 2004; Bennett et al. 2007; Wolfe 2008; Aday 2010; Baum and Groeling 2010a, b).

CNN Effect

The American media's tow-the-line attitude may surprise those who thought that the "CNN effect" had overturned the balance of power between the leaders and the media. The expression "CNN effect" became part of everyday vocabulary during the Gulf War in 1991. At the time, the CNN television network demonstrated its capacity to broadcast a military conflict live all over the world. It represented both a new source of information for governments and an added constraint for military operations, which could offend the public. Some journalists suggested that the emergence of international news channels had tipped the balance of power in favor of the media (Taylor 1992).

However, the so-called CNN effect has not been fully substantiated by research. In fact, its validity depends on its exact definition (Livingston 1997; Gilboa 2005; Bahador 2007; Balabanova 2010; Gilboa et al. 2016). If the CNN effect is understood to mean provoking emotive and spontaneous responses by broadcasting dramatic images on television, the advent of international news channels has not significantly changed the situation. The images of violence in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, failed to mobilize public opinion and incite Western governments to intervene rapidly. Even the American operation *Restore Hope* that set out to bring peace in Somalia does not stand up to scrutiny. The American media were not interested in Somalia until the administration brought the conflict to their attention. The political decision to withdraw from the conflict came before the most dramatic images of the death of American soldiers were broadcast (Livingston and Eachus 1995; Mermin 1997). No matter how dramatic the images broadcast on news channels may be, they are not a sufficient condition or a prerequisite for military intervention. In addition, when images of disasters are broadcast, funds allocated for international development may be diverted to emergency aid instead (Jakobsen 1996, 2000).

However, there does seem to be a "CNN effect" if it is understood to mean a fast response time. With live news broadcast 24 hours a day, political leaders now have to respond to international crises immediately if they want to avoid seeing their opponents monopolize media space and impose the terms for debate. This increased pressure can have major repercussions on managing foreign policy. Government leaders and foreign ministers sometimes have to take a stance before they can check information with their embassies, consult their advisors or attempt secret diplomatic negotiations away from the media gaze. This pressure exerted by news

channels can have perverse effects when it comes to maintaining peaceful relations. Nonetheless, the CNN effect does not tip the balance of power, nor does it increase media influence (Gilboa 2003; Wolfsfeld 2004).

Foreign policy is more likely to be upset by a different phenomenon, which remains vague and sparsely documented, namely, the transnationalization of new media outlets. Until recently, the media, public opinion and governments overlapped on the same territory. The media outlets that were geared toward several countries and the analysts bold enough to talk about a global public opinion were few and far between. Consequently, most theoretical models that conceptualize the triad of the state, the media and public opinion emphasize their mutual influence, but continue to ignore the transnational flows of influence (Entman 2004; Baum and Potter 2008; Sparrow 2008; Nacos et al. 2011).

However, these models are gradually becoming anachronistic with the multiplication of international news channels and the spread of social network platforms on Internet such as Facebook and Tweeter. Using transnational media, governments communicate directly with foreign populations, demonstrators short-circuit their political authorities and address the whole of the international community while heads of state continue to exchange information when diplomatic channels are broken. Although these transnational communications have always been possible on a more modest scale, new media outlets are developing transnational relations to such an extent that traditional actors are changing their behavior (Van Belle 2000; Badie 2005; Seib 2008; Price 2009).

Not everyone benefits from media transnationalization in the same way. As the following sections illustrate, interest groups and expert communities are increasingly transnational. They are among the main beneficiaries of the new information and communications technologies (Aday and Livingston 2008).

Interest Groups

Interest groups are organizations dedicated to defending particular interests within the state decision-making process. The nature of the specific interests can differ (Berry and Wilcox 2016). Christopher Hill proposes a typology as a function of the nature of the interests that groups defend (2003). The first category brings together groups defending economic interests, including firms, consumer associations and unions. The second is made up of groups defending territorial interests, including indigenous

communities, ethnic minorities and municipalities. The third category concerns groups defending specific ideas, such as feminist NGOs and churches. However, regardless of the category to which they belong, interest groups that are actively involved in foreign policy have similar activities and the study of their influence raises similar methodological challenges.

How Interest Groups Influence Foreign Policy?

Most interest groups have three features in common, which are independent of the type of interests that they defend. First, in their efforts to influence governments, they have to work closely with other groups. Loosely coordinated coalitions are the norm for representing interests. Isolated actions remain the exception. The coalitions' configuration even constitutes one of the main determining factors when it comes to how much influence the interest groups can exert (Morin 2010).

Second, the major coalitions that defend economic, territorial or political interests use similar strategies for action. They develop rhetoric that they hope will be convincing, strive to align themselves with public opinion, communicate their message through different media outlets, conduct research to support their arguments, testify before parliamentary commissions, meet political leaders behind closed doors and offer compensation to those who agree to support them. The daily work of a lobbyist from *Human Rights Watch* is not dissimilar to that of a lobbyist defending Airbus' interests (Sell and Prakash 2004).

Third, interest groups can exert greater influence during the preliminary stages of the decision-making process. In these early stages, they can influence the frame through which an issue will be understood by the decision-makers and ensure that it is actually included on the political agenda. In subsequent stages, when the different options are examined and policies are implemented, interest groups' influence diminishes and is superseded by the bureaucracy and expert communities. It is only at the assessment stage that the interest groups recover their original leverage (Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Joachim 2003; Busby 2007; Carpenter 2007; Bernhagen 2008; Morin 2010; Bubela and Morin 2010).

These three characteristics are common to the diverse categories of interest groups and across the different domains of public policy. However, the literature that examines how interest groups influence foreign policy

specifically is less developed. There are surprisingly few publications on the subject, and the general scope of most research findings is limited. Interest groups constitute one of the weak links in FPA.

It is tempting to attribute this deficiency to the fact that interest groups are less active in the field of foreign policy than in other fields of public policy. At first glance, foreign ministers appear to be under less pressure from lobbyists than their other cabinet members. They are not required to interact daily with a designated group in the way that agricultural ministers have to interact with farmers, education ministers with teachers and cultural ministers with artists. Not surprisingly, comparatively few organizations devoted specifically to foreign policy are included on the public registers of lobbyists (Broscheid and Coen 2007).

Nonetheless, this argument is not entirely convincing. Although it may explain that researchers studying interest groups find more fertile ground in domains other than foreign policy, it fails to explain why most foreign policy analysts overlook the influence of interest groups. Interest groups may be more active in other domains of public policy, but that does not rule out the possibility that they can exert a significant influence on foreign policy in certain circumstances.

Methodological Pitfalls

If few foreign policy analysts tackle the subject of interest groups directly, it is probably due to the major methodological constraints. Isolating the influence of one interest group is particularly difficult when several groups interact and not one of them *a priori* has the upper hand.

One of the safest methodological strategy to demonstrate how a specific interest group influences foreign policy is the one suggested by Betsill and Corell (2007). The method has three components: first, the triangulation of different types of data from various sources; second, identifying all the elements in the causal chain that link the interest groups' actions to the policy adopted by the state; and lastly, the counterfactual analysis, which is used to eliminate rival explanations one after the other.

However, this method is harder than it appears. At least four problems may arise. The first is to identify all the strategic actions that are undertaken by the interest groups and that the analysis should take into account. Some actions are difficult to trace because they only target public decision-makers indirectly, through third-party organizations, foreign countries or public opinion (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008). For example, we can presume

that the donations, made by pharmaceutical companies to African countries in the early 2000s, were designed to counter the NGO campaign in Western countries that set out to modify trade regulations for the export of generic medicines. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide conclusive empirical evidence for this hypothesis. If we do not know what the different interest groups' goals are and which actions should be included in the analysis, it is difficult to evaluate the successes and failures of the different actions (Bubela and Morin 2010).

The second methodological difficulty is the instability of the interest groups' preferences. If their preferences were constant over time and homogenous in space, they could be deduced even when they are not explicit. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In the field of liberalization, several American firms and unions switched positions, respectively, during the 1970s. The increase in capital mobility and the reduction in labor mobility led some businesses to abandon their protectionist positions and some unions to express greater mistrust of free trade (Midford 1993; Milner 1987, 1988, 1999; Hiscox 2002). At the same time, in Latin America, business managers with similar interests were defending radically different positions. When Brazilian industrialists were campaigning for import substitution as a trade strategy, their Argentinian counterparts were campaigning against it (Sikkink 1991). Therefore, we cannot deduce, let alone explain, the interests that a particular group defends without carefully examining the specific ideological and material factors.

The third methodological problem is how to interpret the policy adopted by the decision-makers. Maintaining the *status quo* does not necessarily mean that the interest groups' actions have been ineffective. The pressure exerted by one group may simply have offset the pressure from another group. More often, rival interest groups simply exercise influence on different agents within the state apparatus. Incoherent foreign policies often result from the conflicting pressures exerted by interest groups. On some environmental issues, for example, Japan adopts varied positions within different international bodies as a function of the relative influence of the different interest groups involved (Morin and Orsini 2013).

The fourth methodological difficulty is taking into account how the state influences interest groups. The state does not only respond to pressure; it also acts independently and can even have a direct influence on interest groups. A government that takes part in an international negotiation can increase its leverage if it demonstrates that it is under considerable domestic pressure. Consequently, some negotiators can strategically

increase the pressure from interest groups in order to reap the benefits at the international level. For example, General Musharraf may have tolerated extremist Islamic groups in Pakistan because their presence meant that his requests for economic aid could be justified to Westerners (Grove 2007). Conversely, a government can weaken interest groups by using cross-negotiation strategies. By jointly negotiating the liberalization of manufactured goods and the reduction of agricultural subsidies, the European Commission can weaken the agricultural lobby, which is calling for subsidies, by setting it against the industrial lobby, which is calling for reduced customs tariffs (Davis 2004). When these public authority actions and the bidirectional flows of influence are taken into account, the analyses of the interest groups' influence are much more complicated.

Case Studies and Generalizations

Researchers can overcome certain methodological problems if they choose the group they are going to study carefully. In order to simplify analysis, a number of studies examine the influence of groups that claim to defend the interests of a particular ethnic community (Ahrari 1987; Shain 1994; Smith 2000; Ambrosio 2002; Kirk 2008; Koinova 2013; Haglund 2015).

Ethnic groups are more transparent than private corporations when it comes to their actions and strategies. This is because they are generally based on an entire community. Their preferences and priorities are as stable as the prevailing situation in their country of origin and can remain unchanged for several decades. In addition, most ethnic groups are not directly opposed to specific rivals. By comparison, unions cannot be analyzed without taking into account how companies behave. Lastly, some ethnic groups are more autonomous than groups that are economically or politically dependent on the government, such as farmers or charities.

Studies have shown that ethnic groups can have significantly different degrees of influence over foreign policy. In the United States, groups representing Mexican, Greek, Cuban, Irish, Jewish, Polish, Indian or Armenian communities all had a significant influence on foreign policy. On the contrary, Italian, Arab and Chinese groups do not exert an influence that is proportional to the demographic weight of the communities that they represent. These variations can be explained in part by contextual factors, such as how compatible their demands are with the country's general interest, how the community is integrated within the government and the sympathy expressed by public opinion. Internal factors inherent to a group can also explain its degree of influence. These include its organizational strength, level of political activity, internal cohesion, representativeness, financial resources and links with a given economic sector (Shain and Barth 2003; Haney and Vanderbush 2005; Rubenzer 2008).

Two American interest groups, which represent ethnic communities, combine several of these conditions and exercise a significant influence on the United States' foreign policy. First, there is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In their book, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt defend the idea that this interest group is so powerful that it encouraged the United States to adopt a foreign policy that was contrary to America's national interest (2007). To prove their point, they suggest that the amount of American military and economic aid given to Israel is disproportionate to the strategic importance that Israel has represented since the end of the Cold War. What is more, America's support for Israel complicates the United States' relations with the entire Muslim world.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to evaluate AIPAC's influence as an interest group. On the one hand, the pro-Israel impulse is driven by diverse interest groups and goes far beyond AIPAC and the Jewish community. On the other hand, AIPAC regularly opposes the powerful oil and arms manufacturing industries when it comes to supporting Arab countries. It is impossible to assess AIPAC's real impact without taking into account the pressure, which is often subtle, exerted by its allies and rivals (Rosenson et al. 2009; Dannreuther 2011).

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) is the other highly influential interest group in matters of American foreign policy. It represents the community of Cubans in exile. CANF was established in 1981 and modeled on AIPAC. It has the same organizational structure, financial strategies and political tactics. It has the additional advantage of being highly concentrated in Florida and New Jersey. Thus, they constitute blocks of voters that are influential at legislative and presidential elections. According to experts, the maintenance of the American embargo on Cuba since the end of the Cold War cannot be explained without taking into account CANF's influence and the one-upmanship that it encouraged between democrats and republicans. But here again, the flows of influence are not as direct and one-way as they may seem.

In reality, the Reagan administration helped set up and develop CANF in the 1980s in the hope of exerting indirect pressure on Congress in line with its conservative ideology. Even after the Cold War, CANF continued to receive substantial public funding and to implement projects

designed by the government. From this angle, CANF's influence partially reflects the influence of American executive power (LeoGrande 1998; Brenner et al. 2002; Haney and Vanderbush 2005; Eckstein 2009; Rubenzer 2011).

This close interweaving between interest groups and part of the state apparatus is not specific to ethnic communities. The most famous example of the confusion between public and private interests is clearly the military–industrial complex denounced by Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell speech:

> This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. [...] We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. (Eisenhower 1961)

After this famous speech, several research studies actually confirmed the close links that united the defense minister and his private suppliers. These groups joined forces and succeeded in convincing Congress to continually increase its military spending and encourage an aggressive foreign policy based on building military capacity. However, it is an extreme case that is certainly not representative of other interest groups or other countries (Melman 1970; Adams and Sokoloff 1982; Kotz 1988).

One methodological strategy involves the simultaneous analysis of several cases, which makes it possible to draw conclusions that are easier to generalize. Elizabeth DeSombre used this approach to study how interest groups influence the positions that America adopts within the framework of different environmental negotiations (2000). Through her qualitative and quantitative analysis, she was able to observe that the United States could be an international leader for environmental protection when NGOs' interests coincide with American business interests. This was the case during the international negotiations on the protection of endangered species and the protection of the ozone layer, two issues for which NGOs, as much as businesses, wanted American standards to be diffused on a global scale. On the other hand, the United States has never been a leader in the fight against desertification or climate change because there

is little NGO campaigning for the former and a number of businesses are firmly opposed to the latter. This observation does not mean that unanimity between the interest groups is a necessary or a sufficient condition for exerting influence. It quite simply means that when their interests are aligned, a proactive foreign policy can be encouraged.

Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page increased further the number of cases in their study of interest groups (2005). To assess the relative influence that different interest groups exert on foreign policy, they used opinion polls of interest groups and American public decision-makers. Using different statistical methods, they observed that the decision-makers' opinion on several foreign policy issues is more in line with business managers than with union leaders. However, over and above this simple observation, it was impossible for them to establish whether decision-makers' preferences were a direct result of the business managers' actions.

A series of quantitative studies examine how ethnic groups influence international conflicts. These studies conclude that the strong presence of an ethnic minority significantly increases the probabilities that their host countries will intervene in a conflict with their country of origin, especially if it is an autocracy. The relationship between ethnic structures and interstate conflicts is well documented. However, the details and conditions for the causal processes remain unclear. General patterns can be identified, but at the expense of a detailed analysis that retraces full causal processes (Davis and Moore 1997; Henderson 1998; King and Melvin 1999; Bélanger et al. 2005; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; Paquin 2008; Koga 2011).

The Experts

President Eisenhower's farewell speech, quoted earlier, is famous for his denunciation of the military–industrial complex. However, in the same speech, Eisenhower also denounced the excesses of academics, scientists and other experts who have specialized knowledge and increasingly influence public policies. In Eisenhower's view, the association between experts and politics represents as great a threat to democracy as the association between the industry and the military.

Experts are more driven by their causal beliefs than by their material interests. For example, some experts campaign for the liberalization of foreign investment, arguing that such a policy would encourage economic growth, without necessarily hoping to gain personally from liberalization (Chwieroth 2007).

Experts enjoy symbolic capital thanks to their authoritative knowledge, which they use to promote their ideas among political leaders. However, they do not generally have the necessary political and economic leverage to influence public opinion or, indeed, to influence the electoral calculations made by elected representatives. On the other hand, they are socially recognized as privileged holders of expertise, which gives them a certain intellectual authority. This position allows them not only to supply governments with information, but also to help construct the cognitive frame through which information is filtered and interpreted. Therefore, experts' action is more a matter of persuasion than pressure (Antoniades 2003).

Think Tanks

Some experts work with organizations, which are specifically set up for the purpose of persuading decision-makers about the validity of the causal relationships that these experts advocate. These are reflection groups, commonly known as think tanks (Abelson et al. 2017). Several are particularly active on foreign policy, including the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings Institution, the Council of Foreign Relations, Chatham House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Crisis Group and the French Institute of International Relations.

Some think tanks have considerable means at their disposal. The Rand Corporation alone has an annual budget of over 200 million dollars and over 1700 employees. Its analyses on rational dissuasion had a significant influence on American foreign policy during the Cold War (Kaplan 1983; Adler 1992; Parmar 2004; Ahmad 2008).

Although think tanks generally present themselves as being independent and apolitical, several are working closely with political parties. In 1975, for instance, experts working at the Brookings Institution wrote a report on how to address the Arab–Israeli conflict, which stagnated under Gerald Ford. This report had a significant impact on Jimmy Carter and was later adopted under his administration. The report changed the US approach to the conflict, and several of its authors were appointed in the Carter administration (Jensehaugen 2014).

In some cases, public authorities provide the impetus to set up a think tank, as well as most of its funding. In other cases, the close relations between think tanks and the government are fed by a constant staff turnover: public decision-makers become experts when they lose

elections and experts enter government when they win. From this perspective, the idea that think tanks and governments are organizations that are independent from each other is an approximation, which can conceal close involvement.

Epistemic Communities

A number of foreign policy analysts are less interested in experts' organizations than in their networks or so-called epistemic communities. Peter Haas defines an epistemic community more precisely as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (1992a: 3).

An epistemic community is a network that is more restricted than an entire discipline or profession. Its members have to share not only causal beliefs and criteria for validating knowledge, but also normative principles and a common political vision (Haas 2016). However, members of an epistemic community can occupy different functions and be involved in diverse organizations. They may be academics, company employees or even civil servants. They may also be active in more than one country and exert an influence on several governments at the same time. During the Bretton Woods Negotiations, for example, the epistemic community of Keynesian economists significantly influenced the British and American governments, from the inside and the outside (Ikenberry 1992; Blyth 2002).

The network approach corresponds to the experts' *modus operandi*. However, it can be difficult for the analyst to delineate the perimeter of an epistemic community and identify its members. Mapping techniques can be used to analyze social networks. A graphic representation of an epistemic community can be constructed on the basis of the links between experts, such as joint publications or shared bibliographic references. Another method involves conducting a discourse analysis or a content analysis in order to identify the experts who share principles, beliefs and doctrinal prescriptions. However, members of an epistemic community cannot be precisely and confidently identified with either of the two methods. In the first case, the analyst has to presume that the experts with close links also share causal and normative beliefs. In the second case, he must presume that the experts who share beliefs operate in the same network. Each time, the analyst runs the risk of overestimating the magnitude of an epistemic community (Roth and Bourgine 2005).

Delineating an epistemic community is methodologically challenging. So much so, that a number of studies stop at this stage and do not assess the scope of the community's influence (Sebenius 1992). Some case studies have shown that epistemic communities had influenced foreign policy. This was particularly the case during international environmental negotiations, including negotiations relating to the ozone layer, acid rain, the Mediterranean Basin and climate change (Haas 1990, 1992b; Zito 2001). However, over and above this observation, the extent of the epistemic communities' influence remains uncertain. Too few studies manage to consider their endogenous problems (Chwieroth 2007b), separate their influence from their allies' influence (Toke 1999) or compare their influence to their rivals' influence (Jacobs and Page 2005).

Different epistemic communities have varying degrees of influence. In some cases, their influence is significant and in others it is marginal. Although epistemic communities appear to have had a significant influence in the framework of several environmental negotiations, this is not an absolute rule. For example, in the case of whale protection, in addition to pressure from the epistemic community of cetologists, industry groups and environmental NGOs have both exerted a major influence in countries that actively support the international moratorium on whaling, as well as in countries that oppose it (Peterson 1992).

Explaining the conditions for this variation is problematic. The epistemic community's size and the stage of the decision-making process do not appear to be determining factors (Adler and Haas 1992). On the other hand, decision-makers' ideological predisposition, in terms of how receptive they are to the epistemic community's ideas, and the opportunity to promote ideas on an institutional level, appear to be prerequisites (Haas 1990; Checkel 1993; Newman 2008; Eriksson and Norman 2010). A series of additional factors may amplify an epistemic community's influence, including support from an NGO coalition, a high degree of uncertainty, a crisis situation and a weak opposition (Zito 2001).

Experts' Predictions

A group of experts may have a significant influence on a foreign policy, but that is no guarantee that the policy will be wise and judicious. Experts are often not only wrong. Worst, they are often overconfident in the validity of their knowledge.

Philip Tetlock reached this conclusion after conducting a large-scale longitudinal experiment (2005). He began by asking recognized experts to formulate a series of predictions in several domains, including foreign policy, and to evaluate the degree of confidence in the validity of their predictions. Twenty years later, Tetlock observed that experts were no better at making predictions than well-informed citizens. In fact, the more specialized an expert is in a particular field, the more confident he is about his predictions and the more likely they are to be erroneous. Tetlock concluded that knowledge could increase the illusion of certainty, making experts impervious to information that contradicts their assumptions.

When experts' predictions are correct, it is not necessarily because they are based on a detailed rigorous analysis. In some cases, the experts' influence helps generate the events that they predict. They are "self-fulfilling prophecies". For example, if foreign policy experts at Tokyo University or at the French National School of Administration teach students that democracies do not wage war against each other, the Japanese and French elite are likely to integrate this line in their belief system and to perceive the world through this bias. When they become leaders of their country, they will have greater confidence in other democracies and will generally resolve their differences through peaceful means (Risse-Kappen 1995; Houghton 2009).

On the other hand, if experts at Moscow's State Institute of International Relations argue that the scarcity of natural resources encourages military conflicts, shortages will effectively generate mistrust at the Kremlin and some Russian leaders may be tempted to launch preventive attacks (Haas 2002). In addition, if experts consider that in the next few decades one of the main lines of confrontation will set the Western world against Islamic civilization, the governments that are convinced by this prediction actually run the risk of contributing to its fulfillment (Bottici and Challand 2006; Eriksson and Norman 2010).

Thus, foreign policy analysts do not position themselves outside the world that they strive to explain or understand; they are also actors. Their ideas are not simply a reflection of foreign policies; they help shape them. From this perspective, the distinctions between the observer and the observed, like that between reality and ideas, are not as clear as they may seem at first glance or as we would like to believe. This is a mundane observation for anthropologists, but is still novel and disconcerting for a number of foreign policy analysts.

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