Who Leads Matters:

The Effects of Powerful Individuals

Margaret G. Hermann

Maxwell School, Syracuse University

Thomas Preston

Washington State University

Baghat Korany

American University, Cairo

Timothy M. Shaw

Dalhousie University

An examination of how governments and ruling parties make foreign policy decisions suggests that authority is exercised by three types of decision units: leaders, groups, and coalitions. Moreover, the literature indicates that within any one government the pertinent decision unit often changes with time and issue. In this article we are interested in exploring what happens

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NOTE: Hermann and Preston are responsible for the theoretical discussion presented here; all four authors applied the theoretical framework to particular leaders and situations which they had studied extensively in other research to explore its applicability. The authors would like to express their appreciation to Michael Young for developing a software program that facilitates assessing leadership style from interviews and speeches with leaders (see www.socialscienceautomation.com) and to Eric Stern and Deborah Wituski for their constructive comments on an earlier draft.

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

when the decision unit is a single, powerful individual. When such an individual takes responsibility for making the choice regarding how to deal with a foreign policy problem, what effect can he or she have on the substance of the action selected? This type of decision unit is considered to involve a "predominant leader" because one person has the ability to commit the resources of the society and, with respect to the specific problem being confronted, the power to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed.

The focus of attention here is on the importance of leadership style in understanding what predominant leaders will do in formulating foreign policy—on how different ways of dealing with political constraints, processing information, and assuming authority can promote different reactions to what is essentially the same decision-making environment. In what follows we explore the conditions under which the authoritative decision unit is likely to be a predominant leader, the characteristics of such leaders that can shape what they urge on their governments, and the nature of the impact on policy. Throughout we will provide examples of situations when predominant leaders with various leadership styles have acted as decision units and indicate what happened as a means of illustrating the application of the framework we are advancing in these pages.

The Leader as Authoritative Decision Unit

When a single individual has the power to make the choice concerning how a state is going to respond to a foreign policy problem, he or she becomes the decision unit and acts as a predominant leader. Under such conditions, once the leader's position is known, those with different points of view generally stop public expression of their own alternative positions out of respect for the leader or fear of reprisals. If these others are allowed to continue discussing additional options, their opinions are no longer relevant to the political outcome of the moment. As Abraham Lincoln is reported to have said to his cabinet: "Gentlemen, the vote is 11 to 1 and the 1 has it." Only Lincoln's vote mattered in this instance; he was acting as a predominant leader and making the authoritative decision.

The decision unit dealing with a particular foreign policy problem is likely to be a predominant leader if the regime has one individual in its leadership who is vested with the authority—by a constitution, law, or general practice—to commit or withhold the resources of the government with regard to the making of foreign policy. A monarch is an illustration of this kind of predominant leader—for example, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah of Jordan. The decision unit can also be a predominant leader if the foreign policy machinery of the government is organized hierarchically and one person is located at the top of the hierarchy who is accountable for any decisions that are made. As

Harry Truman said about the American presidency: "The buck stops here." Moreover, if a single individual has control over the various forms of coercion available in the society and, as a result, wields power over others, the decision unit can be a predominant leader. Dictatorships and authoritarian regimes often fall into this category and have predominant leaders dealing with foreign policy matters—for instance, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Kim Il Sung in North Korea (see Korany, 1986b).

Even though a political regime has a single, powerful individual who would qualify under the above definition as a predominant leader, that person *must exercise* authority in dealing with the problem under consideration to become the authoritative decision unit. Otherwise, another type of decision unit assumes responsibility for making the decision. Single, powerful leaders have been found to act as predominant leaders under the following conditions (see, e.g., Hermann, 1984, 1988a, 1995; Greenstein, 1987; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Preston, 2001): (1) they have a general, active interest in, as well as involvement with, foreign and defense issues; (2) the immediate foreign policy problem is perceived by the regime leadership to be critical to the well-being of the regime—it is perceived to be a crisis; (3) the current situation involves high-level diplomacy or protocol (a state visit, a summit meeting, international negotiations); or (4) the issue under consideration is of special interest or concern to the leader. When a single, powerful leader is interested in foreign policy, he or she generally seeks to control the foreign policy agenda and shape what happens. Whether or not they are interested, however, such leaders can be drawn into the formation of foreign policy when their governments are faced with a crisis or they are involved in a summit meeting.

Franco of Spain is an example. Although qualified as a predominant leader given the structure of power in Spain during his tenure, Franco is reported to have had little interest in foreign affairs and to have left much of the foreign policymaking to his foreign and economics ministers. Only when an issue became critical to his regime, such as renegotiation of agreements concerning the American bases in Spain, did he assume the role of predominant leader in the foreign policymaking process (see Gunther, 1988).

The opposite case can hold as well. Even leaders who generally do not have the authority to commit the resources of their governments without consulting with others can act like predominant leaders under certain conditions. When such leaders have an intense interest in foreign affairs or a particular substantive foreign policy issue or find themselves in the midst of an international crisis, they can assume more authority than is ascribed to their positions. Indeed, a number of scholars (e.g., Hermann, 1972; George, 1980; Lebow, 1981; Hampson, 1988; 't Hart, 1990) have observed that in international crises there is a strong tendency for a contraction of authority to the highest levels of government which, even in democracies, decreases usual institutional and normative

restraints and increases leaders' decision latitude while at the same time encouraging them to act on their perceptions of the national interest and their images of the public's preferences. This phenomenon has led some to "question the extent to which the foreign policy process of democracies differs from that of autocracies" under crisis conditions (Merritt and Zinnes, 1991:227). Consider Margaret Thatcher's consolidation of her authority when faced with the invasion of the Falkland Islands (Freedman, 1997) and George H. W. Bush's "personal involvement in the diplomacy required to maintain the coalition" during the Gulf War (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1995:254; see also Woodward, 1991; Preston, 2001). In these instances, though not constitutionally or legally designated as predominant leaders, Thatcher and Bush assumed such a role.

Leadership Style and Foreign Policymaking Practices

In reaction to the historical debate about whether leaders are born with certain leadership propensities or rise in response to the challenges of their times, researchers have uncovered ample instances of individuals who fall into both categories. This result permits meaningful typification and has implications for the foreign policymaking process when the decision unit is a predominant leader. In the study of political leadership, the more familiar categorizations based on this distinction are crusader vs. pragmatist (see, e.g., Stoessinger, 1979; Nixon, 1982), ideologue vs. opportunist (see, e.g., Ziller, 1973; Ziller et al., 1977; Suedfeld, 1992), directive vs. consultative (see, e.g., Lewin and Lippit, 1938; Bass and Valenzi, 1974; Bennis and Nanus, 1985), task-oriented vs. relations-oriented (see, e.g., Byars, 1973; Fiedler and Chemers, 1984; Chemers, 1997), and transformational vs. transactional (see, e.g., Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985, 1997; Hargrove, 1989; Glad, 1996). Regardless of theoretical purpose, these typologies rest on the assumption that the leadership style of one type of leader is guided by a set of ideas, a cause, a problem to be solved, or an ideology, while the leadership style of the other type arises out of the nature of the leadership context or setting in which the leader finds him or herself. As Snyder (1987:202) has observed, one type is more goal driven; the other is more situationally responsive. The differences between these two leadership styles appear to result from the leaders' images of themselves and their perceptions of where their behavior is validated and are suggestive of how sensitive the leaders are likely to be to the current political context (see Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann, 1993).

The more goal-driven leaders—the crusaders, the ideologues, those who are directive, task-oriented, or transformational in focus—interpret the environment through a lens that is structured by their beliefs, attitudes, motives, and

passions. They live by the maxim "unto thine own self by true," their sense of self being determined by the congruence between who they are and what they do. As Gardner (1983) has noted, these leaders have an "inside looking outward" perspective on life. They act on the basis of a set of personal standards and seek out leadership positions where their standards generally are reinforced (Browning and Jacob, 1971; DiRenzo, 1977; Hall and Van Houweling, 1995). Because they tend to selectively perceive information from their environment, such leaders have difficulty changing their attitudes and beliefs (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974; Hermann, 1984; Freidman, 1994). Changes that do occur are usually at the margins. Moreover, they choose associates who define issues as they do and who generally share their goals. These leaders value loyalty and often move to shape norms and institutions to facilitate their personal goals (Hermann and Preston, 1994; Preston, 2001).

Leaders who are more responsive to the current situation—the pragmatists, the opportunists, and those who are consultative, relations-oriented, or transactional—tend, to paraphrase Shakespeare, to see life as a theater where there are many roles to be played. Indeed, people are essentially performers whose main function is choosing the "correct" identity for the situation at hand (Goffman, 1959). Such leaders perceive themselves to be flexible and open-minded. They seek to tailor their behavior to fit the demands of the situation in which they find themselves, and, before making a decision, ascertain where others stand with regard to an issue and estimate how various groups and institutions are likely to act (Driver, 1977; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989). In essence, the self-image of these leaders is defined by the expectations and interests of others. To become acceptable, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, motives, and passions must receive external validation from relevant others. Contextually responsive leaders seek to maintain extensive information-gathering networks to alert them to changes in the interests and views of important constituencies (Manley, 1969; Hermann, 1988b; Suedfeld and Wallace, 1995). Moreover, they recruit associates who have access to those constituencies on whom their political support depends (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974; Stein, 1994; Preston, 2001).

Research on the foreign policy behavior of governments led by predominant leaders with these two styles (see, e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1980, 1984; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989; Snare, 1992) indicates that there are differences in the kinds of actions that each type advocates. The more contextually responsive predominant leaders appear more constrained by the specific domestic settings in which they find themselves than do their more goal-driven counterparts, and, accordingly, are relatively incremental in the activities they urge on their governments. They are less likely to engage in conflict than the predominant leaders who are more goal-driven, and are averse to committing their country's resources to bellicose

actions unless the choice enjoys the support of important constituencies. The contextually responsive leaders are predisposed to seek support for their international decisions. Interested in consensus-building and multilateral approaches to foreign policy, they are most comfortable working within the range of permissible choices that their constituents authorize. They are not high risk takers—only if they can mobilize the constituents they perceive are needed to support a particular activity are they likely to move forward. Indeed, such leaders are less likely to pursue extreme policies of any kind (neither confrontation and war nor peace initiatives and international agreements) unless pushed to do so. Contextually responsive predominant leaders are more likely to be led into conflict or cooperative actions than to lobby for their initiation.

Unlike their contextually responsive counterparts, goal-driven predominant leaders come to foreign policy problems with a particular perspective or set of policy priorities. Such leaders reinterpret and redesign situations, their goals and principles defining what is important in foreign policy. Specific issues—economic decline, military security, internal famine, Arab nationalism, illegal immigration—shape these leaders' views concerning their external priorities and their postures toward other actors. Constraints are things to be overcome or dealt with, not accepted; they are obstacles in the way but are viewed as not insurmountable. Indeed, such leaders are not averse to using diversionary tactics (scapegoating, "bashing" the enemy) to "rally constituencies around the flag" thus reducing the effectiveness of domestic opposition that may disagree with a particular action or activity. Goal-driven predominant leaders energetically try various maneuvers to pull policymaking totally under their direction. As a result, they believe they know more about what is happening in foreign policy in their government and can exercise greater control over it (see Hermann and Preston, 1994; Kissinger, 1994; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998).

Several examples may help to illustrate the relevance of this difference in degree of sensitivity to the political context to understanding the foreign policy decision making of predominant leaders. Consider two leaders who were forced by circumstance to become predominant: Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela and Eisaku Sato of Japan. Betancourt is an example of a goal-driven leader. He was president of Venezuela during the early 1960s and spent much of his tenure in office trying to maintain Venezuela in the democratic community after a decade of military dictatorship. He believed strongly in the importance of having democratic regimes in Latin America and based his foreign policy on his perceptions of the political systems of the countries he viewed as the sources of his problems. If he perceived a state to be a democracy, it was a friend; if a dictatorship, it was a foe. He enunciated this formula into the Betancourt Doctrine and reacted to all governments based on this kind of analysis (Alexander, 1982). Betancourt's beliefs structured the foreign policy behavior he urged on his state.

Sato, prime minister of Japan in the late 1960s and early 1970s, is an example of a contextually responsive leader. Destler and his colleagues (1979:40), in their analysis of the extended textile wrangle that took place between the United States and Japan during this time period, observed that Sato "was an extraordinarily cautious and discreet man. He would 'tap his way across a stone bridge to be sure it was safe'; he avoided making commitments to one position or another, particularly on controversial policy issues, until a general consensus emerged among the influential groups concerned." Sato wanted to know where others stood and what position would garner the most support before he acted. Cues from the situation were important in structuring the decisions he would urge on his government.

As this discussion suggests, by ascertaining how sensitive a predominant leader is to contextual information, we learn where to look for an explanation of what actions and policies such leaders are likely to encourage their governments to take. If the leaders are contextually responsive (i.e., sensitive to contextual information), their behavior will be more pragmatic and situationally driven; we need to examine the particular political problem and setting closely to determine what is likely to happen. Public opinion, the media, the considerations of powerful legislators, potent interest groups, and advisers may all play some role in shaping foreign policy. If the leaders are goal-driven (i.e., less sensitive to contextual information), their behavior will be more focused around their own beliefs, attitudes, passions, and principles. By learning what motivates these leaders we can understand what the governments' foreign policy actions will probably entail. Knowledge about the political setting becomes less important while information about the leader's policy priorities becomes critical. Thus, degree of sensitivity to the political context is a key variable in determining how a predominant leader is going to respond when he or she becomes the authoritative decision unit in the formation of foreign policy.[1] It is the starting point for differentiating among predominant leaders and the processes they will probably use in dealing with foreign policy problems.

Assessing Sensitivity to the Political Context

How do we decide if a predominant leader is more goal-driven or contextually responsive, or, in other words, how sensitive he or she is likely to be to the political setting in working on foreign policy problems? To assess a leader's sensitivity to contextual information, we seek the answers to three questions: (1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment—do they

[1]This variable is consistent with several others in the political and social psychology literatures, namely, self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987), need for cognition (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), and integrative complexity (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert, 1992).

respect or challenge such constraints? (2) How open are leaders to incoming information—do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response? (3) What motivates leaders to take action—are they driven by an internal focus of attention or by responses from salient constituents? These questions represent different ways of being sensitive to the political context and are featured prominently in research on how leaders make decisions. The answers to these queries suggest the strategies and leadership styles predominant leaders are likely to use in addressing a foreign policy problem. Let us explore these questions in more detail.

Reaction to Political Constraints

There is much discussion in research on foreign policymaking about the constraints under which leaders must operate in the decision-making process. Indeed, some argue that domestic and international constraints are such that it is more parsimonious to leave leaders out of the explanatory equation altogether (see Hermann and Hermann, 1982; Greenstein, 1987; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Young and Schafer, 1998; and Byman and Pollack, 2001 for reviews of this debate). But as scholars have moved to consider how domestic and international constraints can interact in shaping foreign policy in the so-called two-level game, they have reinserted the leader as the negotiator who maneuvers the government and state toward some foreign policy action (see, e.g., Putnam, 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, 1993). Leaders are viewed as playing a pivotal role in the bargaining that is required to build a consensus with both their domestic constituents and their international counterparts around a particular option. Moreover, as we observed earlier, those interested in organizational and bureaucratic politics have discovered that in situations of high salience to a government there is a contraction of authority to those individuals with ultimate responsibility for the decision. At such times, leaders are generally freed from the usual constraints on their choices. And others have argued that domestic forces have an impact on foreign policy through leaders' strategies for dealing with opposition (see, e.g., Levy, 1989; Snyder, 1991; Hagan, 1994, 1995; Kupchan, 1994). Leaders can use foreign policy to divert attention away from an opposition, to accommodate to the opposition, or to co-opt the opposition's position; each strategy influences the character of the decision. Thus, there are a number of ways in which leaders can become active in dealing with the political constraints in their environments that, in turn, can shape what happens in foreign policy.

We are interested here in how important it is to a particular predominant leader to exert control and influence over the political environment and the constraints that environment poses as opposed to being adaptable to each specific situation and remaining open to responding to the current demands of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances. In other words, is a predominant leader

predisposed to be a constraint challenger or constraint respecter? Our previous description of the variable, sensitivity to the political context, suggests that predominant leaders whose leadership style makes them responsive to contextual information are likely to both pay attention to political constraints and work within such parameters. Predominant leaders who are more goal-driven are less likely to perceive political constraints, but if they do they will view them as something to be tested and overcome, not acceded to. Consider the following.

Research has shown that leaders who are relatively insensitive to the context are more intent on meeting a situation head on, achieving quick resolution to problems they are facing, being decisive, and dealing with what is perceived as the problem of the moment (see, e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Tetlock, 1991; Suedfeld, 1992; Kowert and Hermann, 1997). Their beliefs, attitudes, and passions are highly predictive of their responses to events. Constraints are obstacles but not insurmountable. To facilitate maintaining influence over events, such leaders work to bring policymaking under their control (see, e.g., Hermann and Preston, 1994, 1999; Preston, 2001).

Leaders who are more sensitive to the context have been found to be more (1) empathetic to their surroundings, (2) interested in how relevant constituencies are viewing events and in seeking their support, (3) open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise, and (4) focused on events on a case-by-case basis (see, e.g., Driver, 1977; Ziller et al., 1977; Hermann, 1984; Snyder, 1987; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Tetlock, 1991; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998). They need support from their political environment before making a decision. Constraints set the parameters for action. Flexibility, political timing, and consensus-building are viewed as important leadership tools.

Although several studies have found that leaders who are less sensitive to the political context tend to come to office in autocratic political systems and those who are more sensitive in democratic political systems (see Hermann, 1984; Hermann and Hermann, 1989), the relationship is not monotonic. Indeed, the correlation between regime type and leaders' scores on a measure of sensitivity to the political context for 110 heads of state in office 1959–1987 was .56 (gamma). But the data are suggestive of how these two types of leaders are likely to deal with constraints. The goal-driven (less sensitive) leaders are going to be more comfortable in a setting where they are in control and able to set the criteria for action, while the contextually responsive (more sensitive) leaders will have increased tolerance for the sharing of power and the time involved in gaining the consent of the governed.

Openness to Information

In examining the foreign policymaking of American presidents, George (1980; see also Johnson, 1974; Campbell, 1986; Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986; Burke and

Greenstein, 1991; George and Stern, 1998; Preston, 2001) has observed that the kinds of information they wanted in making a decision were shaped by whether they came with a well-formulated vision or agenda framing how data were perceived and interpreted or were interested in studying the situation before choosing a response. These two approaches to information processing not only affected the kinds of data presidents sought but also the types of advisers they wanted around them. A president with an agenda seeks information that reinforces a particular point of view and advisers who are supportive of these predispositions. A president focused on what is happening politically in the current situation is interested in what is "doable" and feasible at this particular point in time and which advisers are experts or highly attuned to important constituencies and can provide insights into the political context and problem of the moment.

Leaders who are less sensitive to the political context act more like advocates. They are intent on finding that information in the environment that supports their definition of the situation or position and overlooking any evidence that may be disconfirmatory. Their attention is focused on persuading others of their positions. As Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann (1989) found in studying decisions of the Soviet Politburo, those leaders who were advocates for a position used their time to build a case and lobby others to their side; they spent little time assessing the nature of the terrain and others' positions.

Leaders who are more sensitive to the political context are, in fact, cue-takers. They both define the problem and identify a position by checking what important others are advocating and doing. Such leaders are interested in information that is both discrepant and supportive of the options on the table at the moment. In the Politburo study referred to above, the leaders who were more sensitive spent time gathering information and talking with salient persons, seeking political insights into who was supporting which option and with what degree of intensity. Such information was important to them in formulating a representation of the problem and selecting a position.

Less sensitive leaders act like the classic cognitive misers from the information processing literature and the more sensitive leaders like the naive scientists or hypothesis testers that are also described in this research (see, e.g., Axelrod, 1976; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Jonsson, 1982; Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Fazio, 1986; Lau and Sears, 1986; Suedfeld, 1992). The cognitive miser's attention "to various aspects of their environment is narrowly focused" and is guided by schemas or images that define the nature of reality (Lau and Sears, 1986:149). They rely on simple rules or heuristics in making a choice, engaging in top-down information processing in which information is sought to maintain or strengthen the original schema. These leaders start "with the conceptualization of what might be present and then look for confirming evidence biasing the processing mechanism to give the expected result" (Lindsay and Norman, 1977:13).

Hypothesis testers, like the more sensitive leaders, engage in bottom-up information processing; rather than imposing structure on the data, they are guided by the evidence they are receiving from the environment. They are likened to naive scientists who seek to learn if their initial reactions to a problem are supported by the facts, or to use information from the environment to develop a position. In other words, such leaders consider what among a range of alternative scenarios is possible in the current context. As pundits say, the leader "runs an idea up the flagpole to see who salutes it." Feedback becomes critical in helping such leaders modify their behavior to fit the situation (see Steinbruner, 1974).

Contextually responsive predominant leaders are likely to be hypothesis testers or cue-takers in response to foreign policy problems, seeking out information from the political setting before urging an action; they will be relatively open to incoming information. Goal-driven predominant leaders are advocates and cognitive misers pushing their agendas and using their vision of the way things should be to tailor information; they will see what they want to see and, thus, will be relatively closed to the range of information that is available.

Motivation for Action

As Barber (1977:8) has argued, leaders' motivation defines the way they "orient [themselves] toward life—not for the moment, but enduringly." It shapes their character, what is important in their lives, and drives them to action. A survey of the literature exploring motivation in political leaders suggests that a variety of needs and incentives push persons into assuming leadership positions in politics (see, e.g., Barber, 1965; Woshinsky, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Walker, 1983; Payne et al., 1984; Snare, 1992; Winter, 1992, 1995). Examination of the resulting list, however, indicates that political leaders are motivated, in general, either by an internal focus—a particular problem or cause, an ideology, a specific set of interests—or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment—seeking acceptance, approval, power, support, status, or acclaim. In one case, what motivates them is internal; they are pushed to act by ideas and images they believe and advocate. In the other instance, they seek a certain kind of relationship with important others and are pulled by forces outside themselves to action. Those leaders focused on problems and causes are less sensitive to the political context; they know what needs doing and do it. The leaders interested in building relationships are more sensitive to the political context because it is only through interaction with others that they can be satisfied and fulfilled.

This difference in motivation is reflective of the two functions leaders have been found to perform in groups, organizations, and institutions: assuring in-

stitutional survival (group maintenance, relationship-building) and policy achievement ("getting things done," task performance) (see, e.g., Fiedler, 1967, 1993;Vroom and Yetton, 1973; Bass, 1981; McGrath, 1984; Campbell, 1986; Hargrove, 1989). Choosing one or the other of these two foci of attention produces a particular style of leadership. A focus on building relationships emphasizes interest in the development of consensus, networks, collegial interactions, and the empowerment of others along with heightened attention to interpersonal and social skills as well as attention to image maintenance. A focus on accomplishing something attaches importance to leaders' problem-solving and management skills and interest in agenda-setting, advocacy, and implementation. For those motivated by relationships with others, persuasion and marketing are central to achieving what they want, whereas for those for whom dealing with a cause or solving a problem is highly salient, mobilization and effectiveness feature prominently in movement toward their goals. Again, one type of motivation necessitates more sensitivity to the political context than the other. Building relationships is only possible if there is some sensitivity to what is going on with important others; it is easier for the leader to push to accomplish things without taking much contextual information into account.

How Leaders Can Matter

Answers to the above questions about how sensitive a leader is likely to be to the political context combine to provide the analyst with information about that individual's leadership style and some clues about the kind of foreign policy behavior he or she will urge on the government when in the role of a predominant leader.[2] Knowledge about how leaders react to constraints, process information, and are motivated to deal with their political environments indicates that there are a wider array of leadership styles than the two that dominate the leadership literature. Table 1 displays the eight leadership styles that result when these three factors are interrelated.

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[2] One of the authors (Hermann, 1999a) has developed a way of assessing the answers to the three questions posed here from leaders' responses to questions in press conferences and interviews focusing on seven traits that previous research has shown are linked to particular leadership styles. The manual describing this technique is available on the web at www.socialscienceautomation.com along with several examples of applications of the assessment-at-a-distance method to current leaders. Data on 150 heads of state and national leaders from around the world are now available using this technique. A software program, Profiler+, has been developed to do the assessment automatically from machine-readable text.

TABLE 1. Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Challenges Constraints (Becomes a crusader)	Closed to Information	*Expansionistic* (Focus is on expanding one's power and influence)	*Evangelistic* (Focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause)
Challenges Constraints (Is generally strategic)	Open to Information	*Incremental* (Focus is on maintaining one's maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both)	*Charismatic* (Focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act)
Respects Constraints (Inclined toward pragmatism)	Closed to Information	*Directive* (Focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's own views while still working within the norms and rules of one's current position)	*Consultative* (Focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a particular situation)
Respects Constraints (Is usually opportunistic)	Open to Information	*Reactive* (Focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow)	*Accommodative* (Focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others and sharing accountability in the process)

Crusaders, Strategists, Pragmatists, and Opportunists

Leaders' methods of dealing with political constraints and information interact to form four ways often used in the media and leading policy journals to describe politicians' leadership styles. They are engaging in a crusade, being strategic,

acting pragmatically, or being opportunistic. The leaders are responding differently to their political environments and are being differentially sensitive to the political context. Consider the following.

Those leaders who challenge constraints and are relatively closed to information from the environment (cognitive misers) are the least sensitive to the political contexts in which they find themselves. They are, indeed, usually crusading for or advocating a position and being proactive. If the political context facilitates what such leaders want to do, they can be effective in mobilizing others to action. But "crusaders" do not wait to take action until the time is right. They are like a dog with a bone—they will find a way! By being convinced that available information supports their position, they can often create a very persuasive rationale for what they are doing that gives their actions credibility and legitimacy. Thus, in the decision-making process, such leaders' positions are likely to prevail as they take charge and work to control what happens. Fidel Castro is an example of a crusader. He has spent much of his political career engaged in trying to export the socialist revolution in Latin America and Africa; he has challenged constraints, interpreted events according to his design, and pursued his position religiously from sending guerrilla troops and revolutionaries to providing medical and technical aid to particular grassroots politicians and movements (see Geyer, 1988).

The opposite of the crusaders are the opportunists—those who respect constraints and are open to information from the political setting (hypothesis testers/naive scientists). For them, knowledge about the political context is crucial; they are the most sensitive to contextual information. Such leaders are expedient, defining the problem and taking a position based on what important others seem to be pushing. Bargaining lies at the heart of the political game; unless some kind of consensus can be built, inaction is preferable to an action that has the potential of losing support and building opposition. Politics is the art of the possible in the current setting and time. A leader on the contemporary political scene with this leadership style is Zoran Djindjic, president of Serbia (Hermann, 1999d). In working across the past decade to remove Slobodan Milosevic from power, Djindjic has acted as a broker and intermediary convening various political groups in an effort to find one that could achieve the goal; he has been willing to move as slowly or quickly as the situation permits. Much like a chameleon, Djindjic has adjusted his behavior to match the situation.

Those leaders who exhibit signs of being both low and high in their sensitivity to the political context—those who challenge constraints but are open to information and those who respect constraints while being relatively closed to information—are, perhaps, the more interesting leaders because they can at the same time benefit from and use the situation in which they find themselves. These are the strategic and pragmatic leaders. They are reflective of what the

information processing literature has come to recognize as the cognitive manager (see, e.g., Suedfeld, 1992; Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert, 1992; Suedfeld and Wallace, 1995). Cognitive managers engage in "conserving resources when spending them is unnecessary or futile, spending them when to do so leads to a net material or psychological gain" (Suedfeld, 1992:449). For these leaders, political timing is of the essence.

For the strategists who know what they want to do, information is sought concerning what the most feasible means are currently to reach that goal. For example, Hafez al-Assad of Syria was known to have three goals—to recover the Golan Heights, to guarantee the rights of the Palestinians, and to play a role in the region (Neumann, 1983–84; Pakradouni, 1983). But he wanted to achieve these goals while taking minimal risks. He "built his power stone by stone; he never rushes" (Dawisha, 1980:179). Thus, some have observed that the analyst could judge what issues were uppermost in Assad's mind by watching which foreign visitors came to Damascus. It was important to "size up the opposition," getting a sense of their positions and just how committed they were to their points of view before considering his next moves (Hermann, 1988b). The behavior of strategic leaders like Assad may seem unpredictable as they walk a fine line between actions that move them toward their goals while avoiding mistakes, failures, and disasters. As has been said of Assad, he took "care to hit the adversary without knocking him out and help the friend without really bailing him out, for the roles could be reversed one day" (Pakradouni, 1983:14).

For the pragmatic leader who respects the political constraints in the environment and seeks to work within them while at the same time having some idea about where he or she wants to take the government, the dilemma is to ensure that some progress is made toward a goal without stepping outside the bounds of one's position. If the time is right to push their own positions, they can do so; but such leaders can also accommodate to pressure if the time is not quite right. The observer may sense some indecisiveness as the pragmatic leader moves to uncover what will and will not work in a particular situation. Mohammad Khatami, the current president of Iran, is an illustration of a pragmatist (Hermann, 1999b). He ran for office on, and has championed throughout his tenure, a more moderate approach to Islamic law than currently governs the Iranian people, as well as its application in a fair and just fashion. But he also recognizes that the way the Iranian government is structured, he must share leadership with the Ayatollah Khamenei and the various clerical organizations that oversee the adjudication of laws and the selection of candidates for office. A cleric himself, Khatami has been trying to work within the system to ensure change can occur without overturning the Islamic revolution. He is searching for a way to reach his goal and maintain the support of his large, young population of supporters while not alienating the powerful clerics.

Effects of Leadership Style

When we add the leader's motivation for action to his or her reactions to constraints and openness to information, as indicated in the last two columns of Table 1, we further differentiate leadership styles by denoting what individuals will do who are more concerned with the issues facing their governments vs. what individuals will do who are more interested in the responses of relevant constituencies and audiences. Although certain leaders have the facility to move between these two orientations, most feel more comfortable emphasizing one or the other (see Hermann, 1999a). In interaction with knowledge about reactions to political constraints and openness to information, these orientations suggest what lies at the heart of a leader's political agenda. Thus, crusaders who have a cause or problem to solve are likely to focus on expanding their span of control over resources and/or geographical space—empire, sphere of influence, and hegemony are important parts of their worldview—in order to increase their ability to gain future leverage in a particular domain. Crusaders who crave relationships and influence over others seek to convert others to their position or point of view—the more converts the greater the feeling of success. These expansionists and evangelists have little use for those who cannot understand the urgency of their concerns; they identify with their goals completely, at times becoming isomorphic with the positions of their countries and willing to risk their offices for what they believe is right and just. Their positions should prevail because they know what is best for all concerned. Those who cross such leaders are considered the equivalent of traitors. The expansionists and evangelists are not very concerned about the political environment around them except as it impedes their progress toward their goals. Their behavior is relatively predictable and consistent over time.

This last statement is not applicable to leaders with the other leadership styles described in Table 1. The current situation and state of the political context play a bigger role for them. The leadership styles are suggestive of what becomes important to the leader to assess in the situation and where the analyst may want to look to understand what is happening. Thus, leaders with an incremental leadership style are interested in maintaining control over what they do in foreign policy and having the flexibility and maneuverability to move slowly or quickly depending on the circumstances to increase the probability that they can achieve what they want. They are interested in any action, however modest, that will inch them toward their goals as long as said activity does not restrict their movement in the future. Leaders with a charismatic leadership style accept that perceptions of power and authority are often in the "eye of the beholder" and are desirous of ensuring that important constituencies and institutions understand and support what they are doing before, and even as, they are engaged in particular foreign policy activities. These leaders look for ways to enhance or,

at the very least, to maintain their image in the eyes of certain constituencies. They are not averse to using diversionary tactics to consolidate their support and approval ratings. Both these leadership styles promote strategic and deliberative behavior; the particular setting and circumstances shape how these leaders will work to reach their goals. They know what they want to do; at issue is whether or not the current context indicates such behavior is feasible and likely to be successful.

Leaders with directive and consultative leadership styles have a political agenda but believe they must work within the domestic and international constraints that shape their office and their government's position in the international arena. They must pragmatically deal with the parameters that define their political space. Those with a directive leadership style focus on guiding policy deliberations in a direction that is responsive to their goals and what they perceive are important issues for the country to consider and address. Such leaders appear to intuitively understand, however, that there are bounds on their actions and are intent on respecting such limits while still moving to deal with current problems. The challenge becomes how to take the initiative or respond quickly and decisively when rules and procedures define what is possible and are intended to slow down the decision-making process. For leaders with a consultative leadership style, the people who have the potential of blocking or making action more difficult become the focus of attention, not the issue or topic under discussion. It is important for these leaders to become the hub of any information network so that they can monitor who supports or is in opposition to what they think should be done. Calculations are made about engaging in specific activities based on the extent of support and opposition among those to whom one is beholden for one's position.

As we noted previously, leaders who both respect constraints and are open to information are the most affected by the context and cues in the current situation in deciding what to do in foreign policy. They are the most buffeted by the political winds. And they tend to exhibit a reactive or an accommodative leadership style. Leaders with a reactive leadership style respond to how they view the particular problem they are facing can be managed given the current resources and political support that they have. These leaders attempt to be rational as they try to maximize what is possible while minimizing any costs to themselves and their chances of remaining in office. Problems are dealt with on a case-by-case basis; planning is considered difficult because one cannot take into account all possible permutations of events. It is the event not considered that will come to pass. For leaders with an accommodative leadership style, consensus-building and finding some compromise are the most relevant political skills. At issue is who are the relevant constituencies with regard to the current problem; how accountable is the leader to them? What actions will co-align the needs and interests of these important others? Is there a position

these particular constituencies could support and around which they could rally? Others' positions and views become important in shaping what is done as the accommodative leader strives to build a consensus that will be acceptable.

Two Caveats

The discussion to this point has described leadership styles that are derived from extreme scores on the three variables: reaction to constraints, openness to information, and motivation for action. Since each of these variables represents a possible continuum, the leadership styles in Table 1 should be considered ideal types. In considering what leadership style best characterizes a particular predominant leader, the analyst should select the one closest to the variables on which the person appears high or low. Where the individual seems more moderate, it is feasible to assume that he or she could move between the leadership styles for that variable.[3] Take as an example Slobodan Milosevic. He certainly challenged the political constraints in his environment and appeared to have a perspective through which he viewed the world, yet for quite a while he moved fairly easily between expanding his own power and control and enlivening the Serbs' sense of nationalism and preeminence (Hermann, 1999c). He manifested both expansionistic and evangelistic leadership styles, using one style to bolster the goal of the other.

One further caveat is important. The leadership styles in Table 1 can be applied to domestic as well as foreign policy. Two of the authors (Hermann, 1980, 1984, 1988a; Hermann and Preston, 1994; Preston, 2001) have discovered that leaders' styles, however, may change across these two domains depending on their degree of expertise in each. Whereas leaders may challenge constraints in the domain in which they have experience, the opposite may hold where they have little experience. In this arena, they are, in effect, learning on the job and may be more cautious and feel more constrained. And whereas leaders may be more open to listen and take advice when they have little experience, they may believe they know what needs to be done with experience. Leaders can be much more reliant on situational cues and their advisers when they are inexperienced than as they gain expertise. Consider how much more

[3] By using the assessment-at-a-distance technique mentioned in footnote 2, researchers can determine numeric scores for a leader on the three variables in Table 1 and compare that leader's scores with those of other leaders in the region or culture as well as with a composite set of scores for 150 national leaders. These assessments can be further contextualized by examining how a leader's scores may differ when talking before different audiences, being interviewed domestically or internationally, and discussing different topics, as well as in settings that vary as to the degree of spontaneity they afford the speaker. Instructions regarding how to use this technique are available in Hermann (1999a).

comfortable George H. W. Bush was in exercising his authority and control in dealing with foreign policy problems than he was in domestic politics; most of his positions prior to becoming President of the United States dealt with foreign policy (e.g., UN Ambassador, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, chief of the U.S. Liaison Office after the opening to China) (Preston, 2001). As Bush observed after negating the advice of many following the uprising in Tiananmen Square, "I know China. . . . I know how to deal with them" (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992:182). After all, he, not them, had had experience in dealing with the Chinese leadership! Such was not usually the case for Bush with regard to domestic policy.

Illustrations of the Predominant Leader Decision Unit

In our previous discussion we described the conditions under which a single, powerful individual can become a predominant leader as well as proposed the importance of a leader's sensitivity to the political context in discerning how he or she is likely to act when a predominant leader and considered eight different leadership styles that are related to variations in sensitivity. What happens when we apply this framework to some cases? Does its application help us understand what occurred in a particular situation and why? In what follows, we are going to examine four cases where we believe the decision unit was a predominant leader: (1) the recognition in 1975 of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) by the Nigerian reformist military regime of General Murtala Mohammed; (2) the decision by the Egyptian cabinet in April 1973 to go to war against Israel; (3) the1965 decision by the Johnson administration to escalate United States involvement in Vietnam; and (4) the Bush administration's decisions regarding how to deal with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. These cases illustrate the various conditions under which powerful leaders can become predominant as well as provide examples of a crusader, a strategist, a pragmatist, and an opportunist and four distinct leadership styles.

Nigerian Recognition of the MPLA[4]

Occasion for decision. In July 1975 Murtala Mohammed gained control of the Nigerian government in a bloodless coup against General Yakubu Gowon's regime. The palace coup took place in response to popular discontent about the relative anarchy that had come to characterize Nigerian society and policy-

[4]This section builds on a case study developed by Shaw with the assistance of John Inegbedion.

making. The regime change ushered in a new era in Nigeria as the two men differed markedly in their personalities and leadership style. Gowon, a Christian from a small tribe in the Plateau State, was described as a "patient man of gentle nature"; Mohammed, a devout Muslim from an aristocratic family in Kano, was characterized as "tough, inflexible, [and] strong-minded" (Aluko, 1981:242). While Gowon had pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, Mohammed called for an independent foreign policy, for a Nigeria that "took hard stands" on sensitive issues (Shepard, 1991:87).

Murtala Mohammed's opportunity to exert a strong, independent foreign policy came early in his tenure and grew out of the Angolan civil war and the untimely departure of the Portuguese colonial administration in November 1975. Portugal withdrew from Angola, disregarding the role it had agreed to play in facilitating the development of a government of national unity among the three liberation movements—MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA—seeking to control Angola after the colonizers left. In the ensuing chaos, the MPLA which had gained control of the capital—Luanda—declared Angola independent and formed a government. With the two superpowers in the Cold War supporting different liberation movements, reactions to the MPLA declaration were swift. The South African government, with the knowledge of their counterparts in Zambia and Zaire and the help of the United States, moved its army from its base in southern Angola toward Luanda with the objective of wresting control of the country from the MPLA which they viewed as Marxist and knew had Cuban backing and Soviet advisers.

Mohammed and members of his government viewed this move as a replay of South Africa's interference on the side of Biafra in the attempt to break up Nigeria during its civil war. When an appeal to Kissinger urging that the United States pressure South Africa to stop its advance went unheeded, the Mohammed regime found itself faced with a foreign policy problem and the need to make a decision. Was a government of national unity still possible and, if not, should Nigeria recognize the MPLA and fight to consolidate Angola's sovereignty by urging African countries and the international community to accord the MPLA diplomatic recognition? As Akinyemi (1979:155) observed, "if the new regime was hoping for a methodical and gracious transition from a leisurely and somewhat conservative foreign policy to a dynamic one . . . the Angolan crisis came as a rude reminder that foreign policy crises are no respecter of domestic political pace."

Decision unit. Faced with this occasion for decision, did Mohammed act as a predominant leader in this case? In other words, did he have the authority to commit the resources of the government without having his position reversed and did he exercise that authority in this instance? Given the internal and external groups and coalitions that have often presumed themselves to have the

ability to act for the Nigerian government and the relative anarchy that has often characterized the country's regimes (see Shaw, 1987), this question becomes an appropriate one to ask. This "pluralism" was an issue for Mohammed as well; he had made his predominance a condition for accepting the coup makers' offer to lead Nigeria earlier that year. As he clearly put it to the junta, "if you are inviting me to be head of state, I'm not going to allow you to tie my hands behind my back [by consensus decision making]. I must have executive authority and run the country as I see best" (Garba, 1987:xiv). Because the group believed that only Mohammed could keep the country, particularly the armed forces, together, the junta acquiesced. He moved quickly to restructure the foreign policymaking bodies within the government to bring them under his control. Indeed, his role in foreign policymaking was so pervasive that "it was widely believed that Murtala unilaterally took the decision to recognize the MPLA government in November 1975" (Aluko, 1981:247).

In addition to structuring the regime with himself at the pinnacle of power, two other conditions point to Mohammed's being a predominant leader in this decision. The first is his general interest in Nigerian foreign policy. He came to office with the view that "Nigeria must be visible in the world"; his foreign minister was instructed to spend "one week out of every two abroad" (Garba, 1987:9). As one of the commanding officers who had brought the Nigerian civil war to a decisive end, Mohammed was reported to have had a substantial interest in defense policy. Indeed, he was a major proponent of an African High Command—a permanent force with the purpose of forestalling extra-continental intervention in African political conflicts (Inegbedion, 1991). The second condition is that his regime was faced with a crisis that posed both a threat and an opportunity for him. The South African intervention into the Angolan civil war was an especially significant problem for Mohammed since this move contradicted one of his foreign policy priorities: the elimination of colonialism and racism in Africa. If he was to demonstrate his desire for an activist foreign policy and compete for continental leadership, he needed to do something dramatic and quick. By pushing for an African solution to the Angolan problem, Mohammed could demonstrate that Nigeria had "assumed the mantle of continental leadership relinquished by Ghana twenty years before" (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, 1981:14). It was important that he not delegate this responsibility but that he make the decision.

Leadership style. Having determined that Mohammed acted as a predominant leader in response to this occasion for decision, does his leadership style help us understand the decision he made? In other words, by ascertaining how he reacts to political constraints, how open he is to incoming information, and what motivates him to act, can we suggest what he is likely to do in this kind of situation?

In both the domestic and foreign policy arenas, Mohammed appears to have been a constraint challenger. As we have already noted, in assuming the

position of head of state, he indicated he would not be constrained. To ensure his control over foreign policy, he centralized decision making within the Supreme Military Council under his direct supervision and disregarded the recommendations of the once powerful Ministry of External Affairs. In contrast to his predecessor's use of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to build a multilateral consensus regarding international issues, Mohammed saw it as an instrument of Nigerian foreign policy (Aluko, 1981). In addition, he felt that "Nigeria should be more vociferous on South Africa and Third World issues, disregard regional or continental institutions, identify with the Third World, oppose the global establishment, and challenge the West" (Shepard, 1991:87). He was intent on inculcating this new direction into Nigerian foreign policy.

Mohammed has been described as "bold, decisive, and pan-Africanist" (Agbabiaka, 1986:334). He came to office with a particular set of goals and viewed the political landscape through the lens of what he wanted to do. The South African military presence in Angola constituted not only a threat to the newly won independence of Angola but a serious breach of Nigeria's national defense. If Pretoria were allowed to occupy Angola directly or even indirectly through UNITA or FNLA surrogates, "it would only be a question of time before the adjoining states were gobbled up, and a direct threat posed to Nigeria" (Ogunsanwo, 1980:23). Indeed, P. W. Botha, South Africa's defense minister, had boasted that when they reached Luanda there would be little to prevent them from going on to Lagos. The only information Mohammed wanted was some indication of what needed to be done to build the necessary support to ensure general recognition of the MPLA. Information was used to facilitate implementation of a decision, not in the formation of the decision. In this regard, Mohammed was relatively closed to incoming information, particularly any that challenged his right to provide pan-African leadership. He was idealistic and, as such, knew what he wanted to do.

Mohammed came into office with what he perceived was a task to do: to develop an activist foreign policy and to have Nigeria assume its rightful position of leadership on the African continent. He was eager to move toward achieving these goals and was motivated to take whatever action would indicate his interest in tackling this task. He was looking for ways to indicate to other African governments that Nigeria was once more a player in continental affairs. Indeed, since coming to office, he had appointed one of the country's foremost analysts of Nigerian foreign policy, Bolaji Akinyemi, to formulate new guidelines for the country's external relations and commissioned a blue-ribbon committee of academics, commentators, and military officers to advise on the reform of the foreign policy system (Akinyemi, 1979; Garba, 1987).

As this discussion suggests, Mohammed was willing to challenge constraints, he had a set of goals that determined the kinds of information he sought

in the environment, and he was motivated to tackle the task of creating an activist foreign policy. According to Table 1, Mohammed should evidence an expansionistic leadership style and act like a crusader. In this situation, his leadership style indicates that he should have been interested in trying to expand his and Nigeria's power and influence—to turn the crisis to the Nigerian government's advantage. Such a style should lead Mohammed to make a quick decision, seek loyal lieutenants to execute the decision, select a bold and dramatic action, and engage in what might be viewed as a risky maneuver.

Foreign policy decision. An examination of the Nigerian government's response to this occasion for decision indicates that once Mohammed was appraised of South Africa's invasion into Angola after the MPLA's declaration of independence, he believed that Nigeria must recognize the MPLA immediately. It was only in deference to diplomatic protocol and the felt need to appraise the American ambassador of the decision that Mohammed agreed to delay announcing his decision for twenty-four hours (Garba, 1987). With the announcement of Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA as the rightful government of Angola came a firm commitment of aid to the new government. "Once we accorded recognition, things moved with what came to be thought of as Murtala-esque speed . . . and anyone, particularly in the foreign ministry . . . who asked about a quid pro quo for Nigeria's staunch support was decisively overridden" (Garba, 1987:23). "We promised to give [the MPLA] everything from C-130 aircraft to fresh meat, and even took on the Gulf Oil Company on their behalf" (Garba, 1987:31). Moreover, all of Nigeria's instruments of statecraft were concentrated on implementing the decision. The Nigerian diplomatic corps and senior military officers were assigned the task of ensuring that Angola under the MPLA got the political recognition that comes with independence. "Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA was a key factor in the African collective swing to the MPLA and the eventual recognition of that party as the government of Angola" (Shaw and Aluko, 1983:174). By his decision, Mohammed had set the tone for an activist foreign policy which later saw the Nigerian government threaten to withdraw its Olympic team from the 1976 Montreal games and reject Anglo-American proposals for settling the constitutional deadlock in Rhodesia (Aluko, 1981). He had acted as a predominant leader and made a swift and dramatic decision reflective of a person with an expansionistic leadership style.

Egyptian Decision to Attack Israel[5]

Occasion for decision. Middle East analysts agree that Egypt's war against Israel in October 1973 represents a major turning point in Arab-Israeli rela-

[5] This section builds on a case study done by Korany (1990).

tions. Not only did this war, which began on an Israeli religious holy day, Yom Kippur, have a national impact, it had wide-ranging regional and international ramifications. Many believe that the Arab-Israeli peace process and Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem would not have happened without this war. Moreover, the decision produced an oil crisis as well as stagflation in the international system, and increased the role of the U.S. in the region, at the same time decreasing the influence of the Soviet Union.

Although there were a number of Egyptian decisions during the course of the October War, we are going to concentrate here on the decision to go to war. That is, we are interested in understanding the decision the Egyptian government made to go with a military solution to the stalemated situation it found itself in vis-à-vis Israel in 1973 rather than to continue the search for some diplomatic breakthrough. The October War poses something of a paradox because Egypt's president at the time, Anwar Sadat, is perceived as the peacemaker with Israel. And, indeed, he did embark on a visit to Jerusalem when Israel and Egypt were technically still at war, he was excluded from the Arab League for establishing a formal peace with Israel, and he probably paid—at least partly—with his life for his bold action. An argument can be made that Sadat was interested all along in a diplomatic solution to Egypt's problems with Israel but because of both domestic and international pressures could no longer ignore the war option and a military confrontation.

Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967 compounded by the impasse in finding a political solution to its aftermath laid the foundations for the round of violence in October 1973. To the Egyptian leadership, the Six-Day War was a debacle both militarily and economically (see Korany, 1986a). Indeed, by the 1970s economic problems were beginning to constrain what the Egyptian government could do in foreign policy (Dessouki, 1991). With debt increasing by a yearly average of 28 percent, Egyptian foreign policy became focused on finding external help in paying for it. "In Egypt, ideological and political considerations were overshadowed by more immediate economic concerns" (Dessouki, 1991:161). Moreover, as a reaction to the growing economic strains, the public became more restless and vocal; demonstrations among both the military and students increased in the fall of 1972 as impatience grew with the fact that there was neither peace nor war with Israel and, as a result, their lives and prospects were grim. Among Egyptian officials there was a feeling of being under siege (see Rubinstein, 1977).

The Egyptian government under Sadat's leadership tried a number of different strategies to maintain their bargaining power and to attempt to find a solution to their economic problems that seemed tied up with the impasse with Israel. Much of the activity focused on restructuring Egyptian foreign policy away from the Soviet Union and toward rapprochement with the United States. These moves included a proposal in 1971 to reopen the Suez Canal and an

expressed willingness to sign a peace treaty with Israel, expulsion of Soviet military advisers in the summer of 1972, and high-level talks with U.S. officials in the winter of 1973. All these efforts failed to produce meaningful results (see Quandt, 1977; Freedman, 1982; Dessouki, 1991). Sadat became frustrated with the ineffectiveness of his diplomatic initiatives to the West and convinced that as long as Egypt was perceived as a defeated party and Israel was in a position of superiority, the United States would do nothing.

Thus, in the spring of 1973, Sadat believed a decision needed to be made between diplomatic and military options. And events were pushing him toward a military solution. As Sadat remarked in a *Newsweek* interview (April 9, 1973), "the time has come for a shock. . . . Everything in this country is now being mobilized in earnest for the resumption of the battle—which is inevitable. . . . One has to fight in order to be able to talk." The Egyptian government and its leader, Anwar Sadat, were faced with an occasion for decision.

Decision unit. Was Sadat a predominant leader in this case? Did he have the authority to commit the resources of the government without having his position reversed and did he exercise that authority in this instance? The Egyptian government is both presidential and the result of a military takeover. Constitutionally, and in practice, the presidency is the center of foreign policymaking and Egypt's four presidents (from General Naguib to Mubarak) are ex-army men. This latter fact has usually given excessive influence to the military in Egypt's decision making. Indeed, the thesis could be defended that Egypt's 1967 debacle was in great measure the result of the dispersion and rivalry between Nasser's presidential apparatus and a set of military fiefdoms. The rout and resultant humiliation of the army were the occasion for the resumption of authority by the president. And by all accounts the Egyptian armed forces of the 1970s were quite different from those of 1967; they were better educated, more professional, and trained in conditions as close as possible to the expected war environment (Heikal, 1975).

But because Sadat lacked Nasser's credentials and experience when he assumed the presidency in the fall of 1970, early in his presidency he was quite wary of the military. He was bent on curbing its political influence and maintaining it as a purely fighting force. Thus, during the three-year period between his arrival in power and the launching of the October War, Sadat changed the minister of defense three times before he found a person who was "professional, honest, [and] wholly above politics" (Heikal, 1975:184; see also Shazly, 1980). Moreover, he weathered an attempted coup and countercoup, ending up arresting prominent fellow leaders including the vice-president and placing them on trial for treason. Sadat was finally able to consolidate his authority in March 1973 when he formed a new cabinet with himself as prime minister as well as president. In taking both positions he could ensure that he had control over the

policymaking apparatus when it came time to make a choice concerning how to deal with Israel (see Rubinstein, 1977; Freedman, 1982). Sadat viewed what happened between Egypt and Israel as having potential repercussions for both Egyptian domestic and foreign policy as well as making it easier or harder for him to retain power. The need to make a decision between diplomatic and military options in dealing with Israel was both a critical decision for the Egyptian government and one on which Sadat perceived his fate rested. He was not about to delegate authority to others when it came to making the decision. As Dessouki (1991:169) has observed, by early 1973 Sadat had the power to engage in "a highly personalized diplomacy . . . characterized by the ability to respond quickly and to adopt nontraditional behavior."

Leadership style. Given that Sadat acted as a predominant leader in response to this particular occasion for decision, does knowledge about his leadership style aid us in understanding the decision he made? By determining how he reacts to political constraints, how open he is to incoming information, and what motivates him to act, can we propose what he is likely to urge on his government?

An assessment-at-a-distance of Sadat's leadership style (see Snare, 1992 for details) indicates he was likely to challenge the political constraints he perceived in his environment but was interested in doing so more behind the scenes than directly. Only when such activity was not having the desired effect would Sadat move to take a bold action (e.g, the expulsion of the Soviet advisers in the summer of 1972). Sadat "displayed an adeptness at balancing and reconciling political rivals" and a "sense of timing"; he worked to coax others to go along and to forge a consensus where such was feasible (Rubinstein, 1977:217, 238). He was prepared to exercise what he viewed as Egypt's leadership position in the Arab world—"a property that [he perceived] could not be challenged or taken away" (Dessouki, 1991:167)—to restore the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and to deal with his country's dire economic problems.

The data in the leadership style assessment-at-a-distance profile also suggest that Sadat was sensitive to both confirmatory and disconfirmatory information in his political environment. He perceived himself to be balancing a number of domestic and foreign policy demands, trying to co-align the various forces into a "workable" policy. Once, however, Sadat had convinced himself of what would work, he expected "concrete solutions to flow automatically from political level agreement on the essentials" (Vance, 1983:174). He knew where he wanted to go in broad outlines; the detail and timing grew out of the particular context of the moment.

In his motivation for action, the assessment-at-a-distance data denote a focus on maintenance and survival of his country. His policymaking was intended to ensure that Egypt could survive economically and militarily. A number of scholars talk about Sadat's courtship of the West, the Soviets, and the Arab world as

he sought to find a way to deal with the war of attrition facing his country in 1972 (e.g., Quandt, 1977; Rubinstein, 1977; Dessouki, 1991). He perceived that he needed the support of these others to be able to tackle Egypt's problems. Sadat's general affableness and desire for approval as well as his enjoyment of crowds and the spotlight lend support to the importance of relationships in both his political and personal life.

As this discussion suggests, Sadat was willing to challenge constraints but was open to information from his environment regarding what was possible and how far he could push at any point in time. Moreover, he was interested in building and maintaining relationships with the appropriate people and entities he believed could ease his domestic and foreign policy problems. Given this profile, according to Table 1 Sadat should exhibit a charismatic leadership style. As a predominant leader with the choice between engaging in more diplomacy or going to war in early 1973, the framework would expect Sadat to act strategically and, while making a general decision for war, to consider how to enhance the chances of success by including others in the process and the activity. Having made the decision he would choose that moment to implement it when he believed he had the relevant others onboard ready to participate and, in turn, enhance the likelihood for success.

Foreign policy decision. Accounts of Sadat's policymaking during the buildup to the Yom Kippur War indicate that the decision to go to war was made and ratified by the cabinet during April 1973. There was a sense at the time that a military confrontation with Israel was no longer a moral necessity but a political one. But the decision was not implemented immediately because Sadat perceived that he needed to prepare the political terrain first. He "embarked on an ambitious policy of enormous complexity. The intricacy of the design was only dimly perceived at the time" (Rubinstein, 1977:217). His strategy was intended to ensure that his own people and military were ready for what was going to take place, the flow of Soviet arms was adequate to the task, he had the economic and political support of the oil-rich Arab states and their willingness to use the oil card if necessary, he had secured an alliance with Syria that enabled a surprise attack on two fronts simultaneously, and enough diplomatic activity was in place to keep the United States and Israelis off guard as to Egypt's plans. Sadat considered any war to be limited in scope; he was intent on doing what it took to improve the negotiating odds for Egypt with Israel and the United States. That he went a long way toward achieving his goal with all his maneuvering after making the decision to engage in a military confrontation with Israel is evident in the following observations: "The prevailing attitude toward the Arab world held by [American] policymakers was challenged by the October war" (Quandt, 1977:201); indeed, "it required the October war to change United States policy and to engage Nixon and Kissinger in the search for an

Arab-Israeli settlement" (Quandt, 1977:164). "The Arabs regained their dignity and no longer feared to negotiate as an inferior, defeated party" (Safran, 1989:390).

Escalation of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam[6]

Occasion for decision. One of the most studied and hotly debated foreign policy decisions of Lyndon Johnson's presidency is the decision in July 1965 to dramatically escalate American troop involvement in Vietnam (e.g., Thomson, 1968; Hoopes, 1969; Janis, 1972; Kearns, 1976; Berman, 1982, 1989; Burke and Greenstein, 1991). Indeed, some have argued that the escalation was a critical juncture in the Vietnam War and in the Johnson presidency. In approving General Westmoreland's request for forty-four battalions of ground troops (over 125 thousand men) for use in South Vietnam to halt the Viet Cong offensive and "restore the military balance" vis-à-vis Communist North Vietnam, Johnson became politically trapped in a continually escalating spiral of involvement in a war he did not want. At the same time, his Great Society domestic programs which represented his true policy interests were left largely unimplemented and drained of resources by the conflict in Indochina (see Johnson, 1971; McPherson, 1972; Kearns, 1976). Instead of leaving the legacy in domestic policy that he had intended, the Johnson presidency is more often defined, by historians and the public, by his connection to the Vietnam War.

The debate over increasing the number and role of U.S. ground troops in Vietnam in the summer of 1965 was a significant phase in the "Americanization" of the war. The immediate problem confronting the Johnson administration was the deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam. By June 1965, the failure of the U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam had become apparent to the White House. Instead of decreasing North Vietnam's resolve and determination, the bombing was having just the opposite effect (Berman, 1982). The unstable South Vietnamese government had changed once more. The Viet Cong had executed an American prisoner of war and bombed a riverboat restaurant near the American embassy in Saigon. Dire predictions were being made for Vietnam by Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland unless there was a significant increase in American forces in the area. The new South Vietnamese leadership echoed the call for additional troops.

> The problem now facing President Johnson was different from that which had faced his predecessors. Within a matter of weeks South Vietnam would fall to the Communists without a substantial ground commitment by the United States.

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[6]This section draws on materials from Ripley and Kaarbo (1992) and Preston (2000, 2001).

> Was the United States committed to saving South Vietnam, preventing a Communist takeover, or saving face? (Berman, 1982:77)

An occasion for decision was at hand. By early July Johnson realized he and his advisers had to reach a final decision regarding whether to escalate or reduce the U.S. commitment to the war. And, if escalation were chosen, to decide the size of the deployment, if reserves would be called up, and what the ceiling would be to the overall American commitment.

Decision unit. Faced with this occasion for decision, did Johnson act as a predominant leader in this case? A hallmark of Johnson's style, both in the Senate and oval office, was a tightly hierarchical, centrally controlled organizational structure among his advisers that facilitated his maintaining dominance over the policy environment (McPherson, 1972; Kearns, 1976; McNamara, 1995; Preston, 2000). Johnson insisted on being his own chief of staff and at the center of all lines of communication. He structured the nature of debates among his advisers and made all the final decisions himself. Nothing occurred in the Johnson White House without the president's approval. No significant decisions were taken or policy initiatives adopted without his involvement. As Dean Rusk (1969:38–39) observed, "as far as Vietnam is concerned, President Johnson was his own desk officer . . . every detail of the Vietnam matter was a matter of information to the President, and the decisions on Vietnam were taken by the President." Moreover, after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, Johnson had virtually a blank check to take nearly any military action he desired in Vietnam due to the vague nature of the resolution (see Berman, 1982; Ambrose, 1993). Although Johnson did delegate responsibility for gathering information and formulating options to his advisers with regard to Vietnam, there is no evidence that he ceded any authority for committing the resources of the government. His advisers were there to propose and evaluate options, not to choose (Goldman, 1969).

Leadership style. Having determined that Johnson acted as a predominant leader in response to this occasion for decision, does information on his leadership style help us understand the decision he made? In other words, if we ascertain how he reacts to political constraints, how open he is to incoming information, and what motivates him to act, can we say anything about the nature of what he will propose to do?

Although Johnson's desire to be in control of his policy environment might at first glance suggest that he would challenge constraints, it is more accurate to conceive of him as working within the constraints he perceived were operative in any political setting. Johnson possessed a subtle appreciation of power in Washington and recognized the need to be attentive to Congress while at the same time taking into consideration the domestic political scene. He preferred

not to be the first person to stick his neck out on a tough issue. Instead, Johnson tended to move only after the waters had been tested and others had staked out the advance positions. "He entered into the labors of others and brought it about" (McPherson, 1995). As McGeorge Bundy (1993) noted, Johnson was always the legislator gathering information to facilitate building a majority and negotiating his way toward a decision that would not alienate those whose support he needed. Even the so-called Johnson treatment was intended, in his own words, to "let me shape my legislative program to fit their needs and mine" (Kearns, 1976:186). There is some evidence that his lack of experience in foreign affairs led him to be more deferential toward the constraints in the foreign policy environment and less forceful in the exposition of his own views than he was in considerations of domestic policy. In the foreign policy arena, "he was insecure, fearful, his touch unsure. . . . [H]e could not readily apply the powerful instruments through which he was accustomed to achieve mastery" (Kearns, 1976:256).

Johnson possessed a largely undifferentiated image of the world. He relied heavily on stereotypes and analogies, processing most of his information about foreign affairs through relatively simple lenses. Thus, for example, Johnson tended to view Vietnam in straightforward ideological terms; it was a conflict that involved freedom vs. communism, appeasement vs. aggression (Kearns, 1976:257). Johnson's simplified worldview not only envisioned American values as having universal applicability abroad but held that these values were so clearly correct that there was a worldwide consensus regarding their positive nature. Moreover, he saw parallels between Vietnam in the summer of 1965 and Munich. He explained his inability to withdraw from Vietnam because history told him that "if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing what Chamberlain did in World War II" (Khong, 1992:181). And even though Johnson was noted to be a voracious consumer of information, he was very selective in the type of information he sought from his environment, focusing primarily on information that would assist him in passing or implementing a program (Bundy, 1993; McPherson, 1995).

Johnson has been described by colleagues as highly task oriented and strongly driven to accomplish his policy objectives, judging all his daily activities by one yardstick—whether or not they moved him toward his goals (Rusk, 1969; Califano, 1991). Nothing was more important than accomplishing what he wanted to accomplish. "He was in a hurry and wanted to see the results of something . . . really wanted to change the world, to be the best President ever" (Christian, 1993). Johnson's work habits were legendary among his colleagues who frequently noted the intensity with which he approached his job. As Rusk (1969:1–2) observed, "he was a severe task-master, in the first instance of himself." Johnson was a "doer." His emphasis on solving problems is best illus-

trated by his inevitable response to staffers who entered his office describing some terrible problem or chaotic situation without at the same time proposing a solution or course of action. Johnson would stare at them and proclaim: "Therefore!" As Christian (1993) noted, "they learned pretty quick that you better come in with an action to address it [the problem]. You couldn't just get away with saying something's wrong."

As this discussion suggests, Johnson worked within the political constraints he perceived defined his political environment, being caught up as were many policymakers of his era in the lesson from Munich not to stand back while smaller nations were absorbed by enemies who would never be satiated. He believed in the validity of containment as a policy and used it as a lens through which to interpret information about Vietnam and other countries in the international arena. And he was task oriented, always interested in making decisions that would deal with the perceived problem of the moment. Given this profile, according to Table 1, Johnson should exhibit a directive leadership style for this particular occasion for decision.[7] As a predominant leader decision unit, we would expect him to guide policy along paths consistent with his own views but to try to do so within the political parameters of the current situation. For leaders with this style, it is important to know something about the views of their advisers and the constituents they perceive are relevant to the problem at hand since these individuals will help to define the nature of the political context at any point in time. Given their pragmatic inclinations, leaders with a directive leadership style will take their cues about what is feasible and doable from the options, debate, and discussion around them. How extreme any foreign policy decision is likely to be will depend on the range of options under consideration and the potential for a satisfactory compromise or consensus among those in the political setting when a choice needs to be made.

Foreign policy decision. An examination of policymaking regarding the decision to send forty-four battalions of U.S. soldiers to Vietnam indicates that the decision to take this action was not made until July 27, though Johnson's inner circle was involved in debating the appropriate course of action from late June onwards. The president was ascertaining the nature of the political terrain during the intervening time period, testing out his own ideas as well as determining where others stood and with what degree of commitment. After a contentious meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on June 23rd in which his advisers strongly disagreed over the next course of action in Vietnam, Johnson

[7] Assessment-at-a-distance data collected on Johnson supports this interpretation of his reaction to political constraints, the way he processes information, and his motivation for action (see Hermann, 1984; Preston, 1996, 2000).

requested the protagonists to draft separate proposals arguing for their particular position. In the course of a week he received three different proposals: one from Under Secretary of State George Ball arguing against deployment and making the case for "cutting our losses" and withdrawing U.S. troops from South Vietnam, the second from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that favored the deployment of 175 thousand American troops in 1965 and an undetermined additional number in 1966 as well as a significant call-up of the reserves (approximately 235 thousand reserves and national guards); and the third from Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy proposing a "middle way," or the deployment of 75-85 thousand troops and holding off further deployment decisions until the effects of the initial step could be ascertained over the summer while still continuing the existing bombing campaign.

At a meeting of the NSC on July 21, Johnson emphasized that he wanted a thorough discussion of all the options by his advisers "so that every man at this table understands fully the total picture."[8] The session was marked by a great deal of give and take. As the meeting progressed, it became clear that Ball's argument had failed to sway the others. As Bundy observed toward the conclusion of the session: "The difficulty in adopting it [Ball's option] now would be it is a radical switch without evidence that it should be done. It goes in the face of all we have said and done." Johnson held a series of meetings following this one in which he challenged the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for calling for an even larger escalation than that proposed by McNamara; talked with members of the NSC about strategies for approaching Congress, selling the policy to the public, and calling up the reserves; and reacted to Clark Clifford's arguments for getting out of Vietnam.

When he came to the meeting of the NSC on July 27th, Johnson was ready to make the final decision, having heard the debate over increasing involvement and the likely impact on domestic politics and public opinion. After observing that the situation in Vietnam continued to deteriorate, Johnson laid out what he believed to be the five choices the government had and remarked to his advisers that his preference was to give "the commanders the men they say they need" but to "neither brag about what we are doing or thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians" and to engage simultaneously on the diplomatic side in working to bring the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. He did not ask for the authority to call up the reserves because he perceived such an action would be unpopular with the public. With this decision,

[8] Meeting on Vietnam in Cabinet Room, 10:40 a.m., July 21, 1965 from "July 21–27, 1965 Meetings on Vietnam" folder, Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Meeting Notes File, Box 1, Johnson Library. The rest of the discussion about this decision builds on materials from this folder in Meeting Notes File, Box 1 at the Johnson Library.

Johnson tried to develop a policy consistent with his own views of the situation but that also fit within the parameters in which he found himself politically. It was heavily influenced by the views of the political terrain of those who were involved in the discussions.

U.S. Decision to Intervene in the Gulf Crisis [9]

Occasion for decision. After weeks of regional tensions between Iraq and Kuwait and several ill-fated diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis by both United States and Arab leaders, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 1, 1990, quickly overrunning the country. Although the U.S. intelligence and defense communities had observed Iraqi military movements in the days prior to the invasion and alerted policymakers, the Bush administration was still caught by surprise at the sudden Iraqi assault (Baker, 1995; Powell, 1995; Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). George H. W. Bush and his advisers were faced with an unanticipated problem and rushed to take some stop-gap measures such as calling for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council, freezing all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, and ordering warships dispatched to the Gulf. They began deliberations the next day on possible U.S. policy responses to the Iraqi invasion. An occasion for decision had been forced upon them. All were concerned about the potential of Iraq moving into Saudi Arabia and the implications of the current crisis for world oil supplies. Brent Scowcroft (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:315, 317) later recalled about this first meeting that it "was a bit chaotic" since they "really did not yet have a clear picture of what was happening on the ground" but he "was frankly appalled at the undertone of the discussion which suggested resignation to the invasion and even adaptation to a *fait accompli*." "[T]he discussion did not come to grips with the issues" (Powell, 1995:463). Bush's response was that "we just can't accept what's happened in Kuwait just because it's too hard to do anything about it" (Woodward, 1991:229). Thus began a series of formal and informal meetings as the president and his advisers wrestled with what to do.

Decision unit. Faced with this occasion for decision, did Bush act as a predominant leader in this case? In other words, did he have the authority to commit the resources of the government without having his position reversed and did he exercise that authority in this instance? Because of his extensive foreign policy experience before becoming president, Bush had immense self-confidence in his abilities to deal with complex foreign policy issues and showed far greater interest in being actively involved in foreign than in domestic policymaking

[9] This section draws on material in Preston (2001); the assessment-at-a-distance data are described in detail in Winter et al. (1991).

(Rockman, 1991; Barilleaux, 1992; Crabb and Mulcahy, 1995; Hermann and Preston, 1999). Foreign policy was Bush's "meat" while most everything else was "small potatoes"; it was the role of "foreign-policymaker-in-chief" that most captured Bush's interests (Rockman, 1991:12). Bush took an active role in setting the overall foreign policy agenda, framing specific foreign policy issues, and shaping most final foreign policy decisions in his administration (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1995). Although he generally sought to obtain consensus among his advisers for his policy views, he was also comfortable relying solely upon his own policy judgments if these conflicted with the views of his experts (Barilleaux, 1992; Baker, 1995). During the decision making regarding the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait, Bush was observed to have played "his own Henry Kissinger" in terms of his personal involvement in the diplomacy required to maintain a coalition (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1995:254). He wanted to be in control and to know all the details regarding the situation (Woodward, 1991). In what was perceived as a crisis, he intended to be the predominant leader.

Leadership style. Given that Bush appears to have acted as a predominant leader in response to this occasion for decision, does learning about his leadership style help us understand what he decided to do? By determining how he reacts to political constraints, how open he is to incoming information, and what motivates him to act, can we make any proposals about what he is likely to urge the government to do?

An assessment-at-a-distance of Bush's leadership style (see Winter et al., 1991; Preston, 2001) indicates that he is responsive to the political constraints in his environment. He sought, where possible, to develop consensus among his advisers through a willingness to compromise on policy specifics, if not overall goals. He has been called "a low-key version of Lyndon Johnson" (Rockman, 1991:18), negotiating quietly outside the glare of publicity with as little rancor as possible and then announcing a compromise or consensus. Bush was noted to be extremely sensitive to the political arena when making decisions, very focused on maintaining the support of important constituents; he was "by instinct a retail politician that takes care not to alienate anyone" (*New York Times*, 1990:3). As a result, he placed great emphasis on gathering feedback from the external environment and in cultivating an extensive informal network of contacts. With such information, he could choose the "middle path" on issues and preserve good relations with important others (Woodward, 1991; Duffy and Goodgame, 1992). "Bush did not dream impossible dreams or commit himself to unattainable objectives" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1995:256). He worked within the constraints of the political situation in which he found himself.

The assessment-at-a-distance data also suggest that Bush was open to information from the political environment. Indeed, he established an "honest broker"-style national security adviser to "objectively present to the president the views

of the various cabinet officers across the spectrum" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:18) and an extensive network of individuals that included people both inside and outside the administration as well as foreign leaders. He used the networks as a sounding board. "The President called his principal allies and friends often, frequently not with any particular issue in mind but just to chat and exchange views on how things were going in general" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:61). During the Gulf crisis, Bush's personal diplomacy and policy discussions with regional leaders were extensive, broad, and detailed in scope. He believed that a "thousand shades of gray" existed in foreign affairs and was constantly probing his surroundings for data that permitted meaningfully interpreting the current political situation and climate before making a decision (Rockman, 1991; Crabb and Mulcahy, 1995).

As the previous discussion suggests, and the assessment-at-a-distance data indicate, building relationships was important for Bush. The observation that it is people, not ideas or issues, that drove Bush's interactions is a common one. He depended on personal relationships in building his formal and informal networks of contacts. Moreover, he was very cautious not to damage this personal network or upset important contacts. Indeed, he was interested in advisers who were team players and loyal to facilitate the building of consensus (Rockman, 1991; Woodward, 1991). Bush was widely viewed as a leader who emphasized the politics of harmony and conciliation through compromise rather than the politics of confrontation (Berman and Jentleson, 1991; Rockman, 1991; Barilleaux, 1992). He paid attention to maintaining relationships and relied on these ties to help him understand the political constraints in any situation and as sources of specific information about just what was happening at a particular point in time. He believed that personal diplomacy and leadership went hand in hand and that by developing personal relationships with constituents and other leaders one could gain cooperation, avoid misunderstandings, and obtain room to maneuver on difficult political issues.

In sum, Bush appears to have respected the parameters of the political environment in which he found himself, seeking to understand in full the nature of the particular occasion for decision that faced him by using his extensive network of contacts. His leadership style involved listening to his advisers, consulting by phone with relevant domestic and world leaders, and collecting as much information about the situation as possible. Building and maintaining relationships was critical to leadership. Given this profile, according to Table 1, Bush should exhibit an accommodative leadership style for this particular occasion for decision. As a predominant leader decision unit, we would expect him to focus on reconciling differences and building consensus among those involved in policymaking both within the country and outside, empowering these others to be part of the process, and, in turn, sharing accountability for what happens. Any decisions that are made are likely to represent a compromise among the

options considered and are intended not to alienate or antagonize important constituencies. Of prime importance is ascertaining what is opportune in this particular political moment.

Foreign policy decision. An examination of the U.S. policymaking process following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reveals that Bush and his advisers explored a range of options—international economic sanctions, a naval blockade of Iraq, deterrence of further Iraqi actions against Saudi Arabia, and a strike against Iraq—all the while seeking information. As Bush commented, "we didn't want to make statements committing us to anything until we understood the situation" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:317). He used his time to phone foreign as well as congressional leaders on the issue. From these contacts Bush was able to find out what particular individuals knew and where they stood; he also briefed them on other leaders' positions. In the process of moving these leaders toward action, he sought to build consensus, to listen to the concerns of the other leaders, and to avoid the appearance of dictating to them. Bush believed that "whatever we do, we've got to get the international community behind us" (Powell, 1995:464).

With the United Nations Security Council primed to pass Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq, Bush and his advisers turned their attention to military options in their meetings on August 3rd and 4th. There was much discussion and debate not only about what needed to be done militarily but also about the political consequences of various U.S. actions both domestically and internationally. As consensus grew that keeping Hussein from entering Saudi Arabia was an important objective of any U.S. action, considerations turned to the deployment of troops, how many, what kind, and where they would be deployed. After much give and take, with a number of his advisers indicating misgivings about some aspect of what was being proposed, Bush papered over the differences by approving both a naval blockade of Iraq and deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia contingent on King Fahd's approval (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:328–329). With this action Bush had made the decision to intervene in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq, although the ultimate shape of American policy and the fate of Kuwait had not yet been decided. And he began work on convincing the Saudi leadership to accept American troops on their soil.

Conclusions

The four occasions for decision and leaders we have discussed here have indicated how leadership style can have an effect on what governments do in foreign policy when the decision unit is a single, powerful individual—a predominant leader. By learning how such leaders are likely to react to the political

constraints they perceive in their environments, how open as opposed to selective they usually are in viewing incoming information, and whether they are more motivated to accomplish something or to build and maintain relationships, we gain the ability to ascertain leadership style and to determine how sensitive these people are likely to be to the political context.

An examination of the four cases suggests that differences in sensitivity can have a number of effects on decision making when the decision unit is a predominant leader.

- The decisions appear to become less defined and definitive as we move from crusaders like Mohammed to the opportunists like Bush and from the leaders with an expansionist style to those who are more accommodative. The goals are less visible in the decisions, and information about how the leader views his or her current political situation grows in importance.
- The people surrounding the predominant leader have a better chance of influencing the decision the more strategic, pragmatic, or opportunistic the leader is. Indeed, these types of leaders are dependent on cues from the environment in making their decisions. Such appears to be particularly the case if they value relationships. The issue becomes ensuring that all voices are being heard. What if there had been more policymakers of George Ball's persuasion in Johnson's advisory group; would they have swayed what Johnson thought or, at the least, suggested that there was a political constituency for that option? While the more strategic and opportunistic leaders are likely to seek out a range of opinions because of their openness to information, pragmatic leaders may get caught thinking they have consulted widely when their predilection for selective perception has limited whom and what they have heard.
- Political timing seemed the most important to the strategic leader, Sadat. He had a sense of what needed to happen before he could consider implementing his decision. The crusader here, Mohammed, was hell-bent to take action almost regardless of the consequences, while Johnson and Bush were working on developing the objectives they hoped to see occur even as they were responding to the events of the moment. The latter two knew more what they did not want to see happen than what they hoped would occur.
- Each of these occasions for decision was part of a sequence of such occurrences across a period of time. We have focused in these instances on one frame of a larger film or episode. We expect these four leaders with their various leadership styles to show differences in how they will react to setbacks or future successes. Mohammed as an expansionist will continue to press for his independent foreign policy in a variety of venues;

> Sadat with his charismatic leadership style will evidence a foreign policy that "zigs and zags" as he tries different ways of resolving his country's economic woes by becoming tied to the West; Johnson being directive will work to keep U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam consistent with his image of containment policy as well as what he and those around him perceive are the relevant domestic and international pressures of the moment until there is an irreconcilable divergence among both domestic and international opinions on what to do; and Bush with his accommodative leadership style will be interested in making decisions that will maintain a broad consensus among his advisers and the formal and informal networks he has built at home and abroad—when that consensus begins to unravel and there is none that can be sustained in its place, the American intervention in the Gulf will be over.

The occasions for decision we have described were selected to illustrate how the predominant leader part of the decision units framework functions and to provide the reader with examples of four different types of leaders. The leaders were chosen because the authors had studied and written about them before. We have, however, merely laid the foundation for future research. It is important now to consider broadening the scope of our studies to include examining a larger set of leaders and linking assessment of their leadership styles to event data for governments for those situations where we would expect them to act as predominant leaders. Hermann and Hermann (1989) report a prototype of what such research might look like. The advent of software to assess both leadership style (Profiler+; see Young, 2000) and governments' actions (KEDS/TABARI; see Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle, 1994; Schrodt and Gerner, 2000) makes such studies more feasible. There is also merit in doing more intensive case studies where we explore individual leaders with the potential for predominance across a series of occasions for decision within the same problem domain as well as across a set of problems. Do the leaders always serve as the decision unit or only under certain conditions; does leadership style differ by domain, type of problem, degree of expertise; is there a consistency in the effects of leadership style on governments' behavior or do different types of feedback heighten or diminish a particular effect? Preston (2001) has begun such research on post-World War II American presidents but there is more to do. Does political structure and time in history affect the potency of the relationships proposed for this piece of the decision units framework? Given the lack of a monotonic relationship, noted earlier, between type of political structure and sensitivity to the political context, there should be leaders in democratic systems that manifest expansionist and evangelist leadership styles as well as leaders in autocratic systems that are reactive and accommodative. Are such leaders like their counterparts in the other type of political system? Hermann and Keg-

ley (1995) have made some proposals about what we might expect to find that need exploration. As the reader will note, we have just begun to study the predominant leader decision unit. We welcome help in taking the next steps.

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